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Recent Decisions
THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
I. CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. Ignoring the American Rule: Interpretation of Statutory Fee-Shifting
Gone Awry
In Pak v. Hoang,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered
whether a court could award a tenant postjudgment attorney's fees for
recovery efforts2 under the Maryland Security Deposit Act3 (MSDA),
which includes reasonable attorney's fees in its statutory remedy.4
The court held that the reasonable attorney's fees provision of the
MSDA included postjudgment attorney's fees so that the remedy pro-
vided by the statute could not be circumvented.5 While the court ap-
propriately provided recourse to the tenant, its statutory
interpretation led to an overly broad "remedial statute" analysis that
inappropriately extended application of the statute to include fees in-
curred in postjudgment recovery efforts.6 In its statutory interpreta-
tion, the court overlooked the importance of the American rule7
which would have led to a more appropriate narrow construction that
would have precluded recovery under the MSDA.8 Reliance on the
statute for recovery set a precedent with no clear limit to its applicabil-
1. 378 Md. 315, 835 A.2d 1185 (2003).
2. Id. at 321, 835 A.2d at 1188. Recovery efforts include continued legal work de-
signed to ensure collection of the judgment returned. See id. at 319, 835 A.2d at 1187.
3. MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 8-213 (1957) (recodified at MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP.
§ 8-203 (2003)).
4. Pak, 378 Md. at 320-21, 835 A.2d at 1188.
5. Id. at 335-36, 835 A.2d at 1196-97. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the remedy
would otherwise be circumvented if such fees were not included because a landlord could
appeal or fail to cooperate and overcome the tenant's ability to pay for legal help in recov-
ery of his or her judgment. Id.
6. See infra notes 160-174 and accompanying text (discussing the invalidity of the
court's application of remedial statute analysis to the MSDA).
7. The American rule represents the common-law rule followed by American courts,
including those of Maryland, that requires each litigant to be responsible for their own
attorney's fees. See infra notes 78-84 and accompanying text (discussing the common law
regarding attorney's fees, often referred to by courts and the literature as the American
rule).
8. See infra notes 175-214 and accompanying text (discussing the result of a correct
statutory analysis of the MSDA).
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ity.9 Instead, recourse should have been provided to Mr. and Mrs. Pak
through discovery sanctions under the Maryland Rules.1 °
1. The Case.-
a. Prejudgment Proceedings.-In December 1999, Minh-Vu
Hoang filed a complaint in the District Court of Maryland in Mont-
gomery County seeking $25,000 in damages for a breach of lease
against Ho and Lisa Pak." The Paks were tenants living in a
townhouse owned by Hoang.1 2 The case was transferred to the Circuit
Court for Montgomery County after the Paks requested ajury trial. 3
After the transfer, the Paks filed counterclaims alleging that Hoang
had breached the lease and had violated the MSDA by not returning
the Paks' security deposit.'
4
The Paks moved for summary judgment and in July of 2000, the
circuit court granted the motion and dismissed with prejudice
Hoang's claim that the Paks had broken their lease. 5 On October 31,
2000, after a damages hearing, the circuit court entered judgment
against Hoang on the Paks' counterclaims and awarded $7,378.91,
which included attorney's fees incurred up until that point, to the
Paks.1
6
b. Postjudgment Proceedings.-To recover the judgment, the
Paks filed postjudgment discovery motions to which Hoang made no
initial response.1 7 The Paks then filed a Motion to Compel Answers to
Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents in Aid of
Execution, which the circuit court granted on May 23, 2001.18 Hoang
failed to respond to this order, and as a result, the Paks filed a Petition
for Civil Contempt and for the Entry of Appropriate Relief two
months later. 9 After a hearing on September 20, 2001, the circuit
court entered another order requiring Hoang to respond to both the
9. See infra notes 215-221 and accompanying text (discussing the problems associated
with the precedent established by allowing postjudgment fees to be recovered under the
statute).
10. See infta notes 222-241 and accompanying text (discussing the application of the
Maryland Rules regarding discovery sanctions to Pak).
11. 378 Md. at 318, 835 A.2d at 1186.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id., 835 A.2d at 1186-87.
16. Id. at 318-19, 835 A.2d at 1187.
17. Id. at 319, 835 A.2d at 1187.
18. Id.
19. Id.
1.0412005]
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interrogatories and the request for documents. 20 Hoang then failed
to appear at an October 29, 2001, compliance review hearing.21 As a
result, the circuit court issued a writ of body attachment for Hoang's
arrest.22 Hoang was arrested and released on her own recognizance. 23
At the circuit court hearing on the Paks' Petition for Civil Con-
tempt on December 6, 2001, the court found Hoang in civil contempt
and sanctioned her with thirty days of incarceration subject to a purge
provision. 24 At the hearing, the circuit court gave Hoang one month
to comply with the contempt order. 25 The Paks also filed a Motion for
Supplemental Award of Attorney's Fees from Hoang.26 The fees and
expenses requested covered efforts to satisfy the original judgment
and included fees incurred from January 22, 2001, until October 29,
2001, totaling $5,127.44.27 The Paks relied on the MSDA as the legal
basis for their motion, but also argued that the court could award the
fees pursuant to its contempt power.2 ' The compliance hearing was
set for January 14, 2002, to determine if Hoang responded appropri-
ately to the Paks' Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatories and
Request for Production of Documents in Aid of Execution.29
At the end of the one month time period within which Hoang
had to comply with the contempt order, Hoang delivered a check to
the Paks' counsel for the total $7,378.91 originally ordered and all
interest then due.30 Therefore, at the compliance hearing the only
outstanding issue was the Paks' Motion for a Supplemental Award of
Attorney's Fees.3 ' The circuit court denied the Paks' motion for such
fees, reasoning, inter alia, that the MSDA did not allow the court to go
back and award additional fees when the judgment creditor had diffi-
culty collecting.32 The circuit court did find, however, that although
Hoang had complied with the contempt order she did not do so by
20. Id
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. According to the purge provision, the incarceration sanction would be re-
moved if Hoang complied with the circuit court's orders. Id
25. Pak v. Hoang, No. 38, slip op. at 2 (Md. App. Jan. 24, 2003).
26. Pak, 378 Md. at 319, 835 A.2d at 1187.
27. Pak, No. 38, slip op. at 2-3.
28. Id. at 3.
29. Pak, 378 Md. at 319, 835 A.2d at 1187.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 320, 835 A.2d at 1187.
32. Id. at 322, 835 A.2d at 1188.
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the January 7 deadline.3 ' The circuit court, in announcing its deci-
sion, noted:
I think that [appellee's] conduct is reprehensible. I think
that she really has done whatever she could to throw road-
blocks in the way of the other side. I think that she has de-
fied the orders of this court. She has done a lot of things
that I take a very dim view of, and I think that she ought not
get away with those things.
So, as much as, in fairness, I would like to go ahead and
impose a sanction for that contempt . . . I don't think it
would be enforceable.
... I wish there were a greater sanction than that that
could be imposed on her. I don't feel that I can.34
The basis of the court's ruling on the motion was lack of power to
award fees.3 5
The Paks appealed the decision to the Court of Special Appeals,
arguing for the award of postjudgment fees on several bases.3 6 How-
ever, the Court of Special Appeals held that such fees were not availa-
ble to the Paks under the MSDA,3 7 the courts' contempt power,38 or
the court's inherent power to impose sanctions for discovery viola-
tions.39  The Court of Appeals subsequently granted certiorari to de-
cide whether the court had the power to award supplemental
attorney's fees.40
2. Legal Background.-A court's decision to grant postjudgment
attorney's fees under a statutory reasonable attorney's fees clause im-
plicates several areas of law. First, it requires the court to follow estab-
lished statutory interpretation practice.41 Second, it involves an
analysis of the Maryland courts' treatment of attorney's fees generally.
In interpreting fee-statutes, Maryland has followed the American rule,
which, while allowing for some exceptions, militates against such shift-
33. Pak, No. 38, slip op. at 6 (quoting the written order of the circuit court, dated
August 21, 2002).
34. Pak, 378 Md. at 321-22, 835 A.2d at 1188 (quoting the circuit court's oral comments
during the hearing on Appellant's Motion for Supplemental Award of Attorney's Fees).
35. Pak, No. 38, slip op. at 6.
36. Pak, 378 Md. at 320, 835 A.2d at 1187.
37. See Pak, No. 38, slip op. at 8.
38. Id. at 14.
39. Id. at 15.
40. Pak, 378 Md. at 320, 835 A.2d at 1187-88.
41. See infra notes 44-63 and accompanying text.
10432005]
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ing in most situations. 42 Third, should the statute offer little or no
authority to grant postjudgment fees, it requires the exploration of
other avenues for granting postjudgment attorney's fees, including
the use and applicability of sanctions for discovery violations. 43 In par-
ticular, sanctions for pretrial discovery violations can also be applied
to postjudgment discovery.
a. Statutory Interpretation in Maryland.-Maryland courts fol-
low the "cardinal rule" of statutory interpretation: statutes are inter-
preted to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature.4 4
In interpreting statutes, the Court of Appeals first looks to the words
of the statute, giving them their ordinary and natural meaning.4 5 In
situations in which the ordinary and natural meaning of the statutory
provision is unequivocal, courts need not engage in further statutory
analysis because unambiguously-worded rules must be read without
forcing hidden meanings designed to broaden the application of the
statute.4 6
Statutes, however, are not always unequivocal in their language-
they can be ambiguous in several ways. In Giant Food, Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Labor, Licensing & Regulation, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
recognized that where a statute can be given more than one meaning,
it is ambiguous.4 v In Giant, the court was faced with determining the
proper construction of a statute which contained two clauses-"stop-
page of work" and "premises"-for which the parties offered differing
definitions.4"
Previously, in Washington National Arena Ltd. Partnership v. Comp-
troller of the Treasury,49 the Court of Appeals had set forth another type
of ambiguity, specifically concluding that where a statute omits an is-
sue that is within its ambit and is relevant to its purpose, the statute is
42. See infra notes 78-103 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 104-133 and accompanying text.
44. Giant Food, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor, Licensing & Regulation, 356 Md. 180, 188, 738
A.2d 856, 860 (1999).
45. Id. at 188-89, 738 A.2d at 860-61 (quoting Brodsky v. Brodsky, 319 Md. 92, 98, 570
A.2d 1235, 1237 (1990)).
46. Id. at 189, 738 A.2d at 861 (stating that when statutes "are clear and unambiguous,
no construction or clarification is needed or permitted, it being the rule that a plainly
worded statute must be construed without forced or subtle interpretations designed to
extend or limit the scope of its operation") (quoting Tucker v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.,
308 Md. 69, 73-75, 517 A.2d 730, 731-32 (1986)).
47. Id. (quoting Tucker, 308 Md. at 73-75, 517 A.2d at 731-32).
48. Id. at 187-88, 738 A.2d at 859-60 (analyzing section 8-1004 of the Labor and Em-
ployment Article).
49. 308 Md. 370, 519 A.2d 1277 (1987).
1044 [VOL. 64:1040
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ambiguous on that point.5 1 In Washington National Arena, the statute
set forth a tax on gross receipts from admissions, but did not address
allocation where a given fee included admissions and other services. 5'
The court found the statute to be ambiguous as to allocation because
of the omission.52
Where a statute is ambiguous, the Court of Appeals interprets the
statute by considering the literal or usual meaning of the words, as
well as their meaning and effect in light of the setting, objectives, and
purpose of the enactment. 53 In particular, in Washington National
Arena, the court looked at the whole statute and noted that failure to
proscribe allocation does not mean that the legislature intended to
permit it. 54 When faced with an ambiguous statute in Giant Food, the
Court of Appeals stated that it may consider the results of applying
one meaning over another and adopt the construction that avoids an
unreasonable outcome.55
In the court's analysis of the ambiguous statute in Witte v.
51Azarian, it addressed one type of unreasonable outcome, stating that
statutes in derogation of the common law are strictly construed so as
not to make any change in the common law beyond what is expressly
stated and necessary.57 There, the court based its finding on the fact
that the statute at issue contradicted a long recognized common-law
notion.5 8 Recognizing that most statutes change the common law, the
court acknowledged that the principle of strict construction bends
when there is a clear legislative intent to change the common law.59
The Witte court, however, did strictly construe the statute because it
found that the legislative intent was not clear where there was no clear
documentation or discussion of the provision by the legislature.60
An examination of the Court of Appeals's treatment of ambigu-
ous statutory provisions pertaining to punishment is necessary to un-
50. Id. at 375, 519 A.2d at 1279.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Giant Food, 356 Md. at 189, 738 A.2d at 861.
54. 308 Md. at 375, 519 A.2d at 1279.
55. 356 Md. at 189, 738 A.2d at 861. Interpretation should avoid "an illogical or unrea-
sonable result, or one which is inconsistent with common sense." Id. (quoting Tucker v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 73-75, 517 A.2d 730, 731-32 (1986)).
56. 369 Md. 518, 801 A.2d 160 (2002).
57. Id. at 533-34, 801 A.2d at 169-70.
58. Id. at 533, 801 A.2d at 169. The statute governed the qualification of an expert to a
required certificate of merit in a malpractice claim and as a result restricted the pursuit of
such common-law claims. Id.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 533-36, 801 A.2d at 169-71.
10452005]
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derstand the punitive attorney's fees provision of the MSDA. In
analyzing ambiguous statutes that mete out punishments for viola-
tions, Maryland courts generally construe such statutory punishments
in favor of the defendant.6 1 This general rule, termed the rule of len-
ity, has been followed by the Court of Appeals to require strict con-
struction of punitive statutes to avoid punishment not contemplated
by the legislature.62 The rule of lenity applies to statutory offenses.63
The Supreme Court of the United States has allowed postjudg-
ment attorney's fees in certain situations. In Pennsylvania v. Delaware
Valley Citizens' Counsel for Clean Air,64 the Court held that attorney's
fees could be awarded under the Clean Air Act (CAA) for legal work
involving administrative proceedings crucial to the vindication of the
Citizens' Counsel's rights under a consent decree because the efforts
were ordinarily necessary to ensure compliance with the judgment.65
In that case, the Court based its holding on the common purpose of
the CAA-to promote citizen enforcement of important federal poli-
cies.66 Specifically, the Court found that Congress enacted the CAA to
encourage citizen enforcement of the standards and regulations estab-
lished in the CAA. 67 The Court further relied on its determination
that the purpose behind the fee-shifting provision of the CAA was sim-
ilar to that of the Civil Rights Act where Congress believed that many
legitimate claims would not be redressed unless reasonable attorney's
fees could be awarded for bringing these actions.6" The Court also
relied on clearly stated legislative intent that the attorney's fees pro-
vide citizens broad opportunities to become involved in the effort to
promote clean air.69 The fee award upheld by the Supreme Court was
based on fees incurred in administrative proceedings designed to up-
hold a consent decree.7" According to the Court, the proceedings
61. See Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 437, 639 A.2d 675, 679 (1994) (finding that
when there is doubt concerning a penalty, a milder one will be preferred over a harsher
one). The court will not increase a penalty when such an interpretation can be based on
no more than a guess as to legislative intent. Monoker v. State, 321 Md. 214, 222, 582 A.2d
525, 529 (1990).
62. Gargliano, 334 Md. at 437, 639 A.2d at 679.
63. Monoker, 321 Md. at 223, 582 A.2d at 529.
64. 478 U.S. 546 (1986).
65. Id. at 561 (stating that postjudgment attorney's fees were appropriate when "'useful
and of a type ordinarily necessary' to secure the final result obtained from litigation")
(quoting Webb v. Bd. of Educ., 471 U.S. 234, 243 (1985)).
66. Id. at 560.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 561.
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were necessary to ensure continuing and ongoing compliance with
the consent decree.71
Other courts, including the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit, have similarly allowed recovery of reasonable
postjudgment attorney's fees in certain situations. 72 For example, the
Eighth Circuit awarded postjudgment attorney's fees in Jenkins v. Mis-
souri, where the court stated that providing attorney's fees was impor-
tant to ensure enforcement of civil rights awards. 73  Like Delaware
Valley, Jenkins also dealt with attorney's fees incurred in ongoing moni-
toring of a court's decree and not the mere recovery of ajudgment.
7 1
The federal cases have involved situations where the government has
widely stated the importance of private enforcement for the good of
all and have largely been related to civil rights and other basic
rights. 75 In addition, the federal cases where the courts awarded
postjudgment fees have generally involved ordinary and necessary
ongoing monitoring of court orders.76
b. Maryland Courts Follow the American Rule with Respect to Fee-
Shifting, While Allowing for Limited Exceptions.-When faced with ambig-
uous statutes, Maryland courts have looked to the common law in an
effort to discover legislative intent.77 In doing so, Maryland has fol-
lowed the common-law rule against fee-shifting called the American
rule, while allowing for statutory exceptions. The American rule influ-
ences statutory construction of fee-shifting by providing some indica-
tion of legislative intent, since statutes in derogation of the common
law are often given limited construction in the absence of a clear indi-
cation that the legislature intended otherwise.
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Missouri, 127 F.3d 709, 717 (8th Cir. 1997) (allowing for attor-
ney's fees incurred in monitoring the defendant's compliance with court orders).
73. Id. at 718.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Balark v. Curtin, 655 F.2d 798, 803 (7th Cir. 1981) (emphasizing that "Con-
gress has determined that attorneys' fees are necessary to fulfill the purposes of the civil
rights laws by transferring the costs of litigation to those who infringe upon basic civil
rights").
76. See, e.g., Ass'n for Retarded Citizens of N.D. v. Schafer, 83 F.3d 1008, 1010-11 (8th
Cir. 1996) (stating that it is "generally accepted that prevailing plaintiffs are entitled to
postjudgment fee awards for legal services necessary for reasonable monitoring of the
decree").
77. See Witte v. Azarian, 369 Md. 518, 533, 801 A.2d 160, 169 (2002) (discussing the
relationship between the common law and construction of ambiguous statutes and finding
that the common law relevant to an ambiguous statute influences the finding of legislative
intent).
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The American rule, as applied in Maryland, makes litigants re-
sponsible for their own attorney's fees.78 While Maryland courts have
not always referred to it as the American rule, the Court of Appeals in
Caffrey v. Department of Liquor Control" noted that the American rule
has been referred to in the court's jurisprudence as far back as the
beginning of the twentieth century.8" Specifically, the Caffrey court
observed that the common-law principles underlying the American
rule were recited in 1909 in McGaw v. Acker, Merrall & Condit Co., 1
which discussed the principles based on a case from 1854.82 The
Court of Appeals in Cafftey presumed that the legislature understood
the generally accepted proposition that the courts rarely shift counsel
fees when it passed a statute in 1941 that included a fee-shifting provi-
sion.8" The Caffrey court held that the legislature's failure to include a
provision in the statute at issue for the recovery of attorney's fees indi-
cated its intent not to allow the recovery.84
The Court of Appeals has not strictly followed the American rule
in all circumstances; instead, it has allowed for limited exceptions.
When deciding whether the jury can consider attorney's fees in calcu-
lating punitive damages in St. Luke Evangelical Lutheran Church, Inc. v.
Smith, the Court of Appeals acknowledged the American rule and
noted that it prevented the prevailing party from recovering attorney's
fees as an element of damages.85 Exceptions to the rule that attor-
ney's fees incurred by the prevailing litigant are not recoverable as
compensatory damages against the losing party are quite rare.86 Yet
the court in St. Luke allowed an exception, holding that reasonable
attorney's fees may be considered by the jury in cases in which puni-
tive damages are appropriate.87 The St. Luke court also noted several
78. Megonnell v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 368 Md. 633, 659, 796 A.2d 758, 774
(2002).
79. 370 Md. 272, 805 A.2d 268 (2002).
80. Id. at 294, 805 A.2d at 281.
81. 111 Md. 153, 160, 73 A. 731, 734 (1909).
82. 370 Md. at 293-94, 805 A.2d at 280-81 (citing Wallis v. Dilley, 7 Md. 237, 249
(1854)).
83. Id. The Cafftey court also noted that "nowhere in this country have statutorily-fixed
attorney's fees been revised to keep pace with the fall in the value of money. Such legisla-
tive reluctance to keep pace suggests that the principle of full compensation for litigation
expenses never firmly took hold in this country." Id. at 293, 805 A.2d at 280 (quoting St.Luke Evangelical Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Smith, 318 Md. 337, 344, 568 A.2d 35, 38
(1990)).
84. Id. at 295, 805 A.2d at 281. The American rule therefore restrained the court's fee-
shifting finding. Id.
85. 318 Md. at 344, 568 A.2d at 38.
86. Hess Constr. Co. v. Bd. of Educ., 341 Md. 155, 160, 669 A.2d 1352, 1354 (1996).
87. 318 Md. at 339, 568 A.2d at 36.
1048 [VOL. 64:1040
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other exceptions, stating that counsel fees may be awarded when: (1)
parties to a contract include a fee-shifting provision; (2) there is statu-
tory authority for imposing such fees; (3) the defendant's wrongful
conduct forces the plaintiff into litigation with another party; and (4)
a plaintiff must defend against a malicious suit."8
The MSDA provides for the recovery of attorney's fees and as a
result is an exception to the American rule. 9 The MSDA establishes
the parameters under which landlords may require and hold security
deposits from tenants. ° The MSDA specifically sets forth a tenant's
recourse when a landlord withholds the security deposit?1 and further
states, "[i] f the landlord, without a reasonable basis, fails to return any
part of the security deposit... the tenant has an action of up to three-
fold of the withheld amount, plus reasonable attorney's fees."
9 2 The
statute does not make any reference to postjudgment fees.9 3
Furthermore, the punishment clause (threefold damages and
reasonable attorney's fees) is only triggered when the court decides
that the landlord withheld the security deposit without a reasonable
basis.9 4 The MSDA authorizes attorney's fees in conjunction with a
threefold damages award.9 5 The court has concluded that in Mary-
land, a statutory award of attorney's fees serves as a legislative instru-
ment for punishing wrongful conduct.96 Therefore, the punitive
damages of the MSDA, including the recovery of attorney's fees and
threefold damages were designed to punish individuals for their viola-
tion of the statute."7
The court has, to some extent, interpreted legal-fee statutes with
the underlying rationale that statutory fee-shifting is punitive. For ex-
ample, the Court of Appeals in Rohrbaugh v. Estate of Stern concluded
that the threefold damages clause of the MSDA is punitive in nature.
98
In Rohrbaugh, the court held that the landlord unreasonably withheld
a portion of the security deposit and that the threefold damages were
88. Id. at 345-46, 568 A.2d at 39.
89. See id. (noting that counsel fees may be awarded under an express statutory
provision).
90. See generally MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-203 (2003) (establishing statutory au-
thority governing the use of security deposits in Maryland).
91. Id. § 8-203(e).
92. Id. § 8-203(e)(4).
93. Id.
94. Rohrbaugh v. Estate of Stern, 305 Md. 443, 451, 505 A.2d 113, 117 (1986).
95. REAL PROP. § 8-203(c) (4).
96. St. Luke Evangelical Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Smith, 318 Md. 337, 347, 568 A.2d
35, 39 (1990).
97. See id. (stating that the attorney's fees clause of the MSDA was a punishment).
98. 305 Md. at 449, 505 A.2d at 116.
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intended to punish the egregiousness of the violation of the statute-
that is, to punish the landlord's conduct in withholding the excessive
amount of security deposit.99
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has not yet ruled on the idea
of postjudgment attorney's fees under a statutory exception to the
American rule. It has, however, in one case, alluded to the idea. In
addressing the appropriateness of a jury determination of attorney's
fees under a statute similar to the MSDA, °00 the court in Admiral Mort-
gage, Inc. v. Cooper held that the remedial statute's reasonable attor-
ney's fees should be determined by ajudge, not ajury. ' °1 It based its
reasoning on the fact that judges would be better able to determine
reasonable fees since such fees might continue to accrue if post-trial
motions or appeals are filed.' °2 In noting that postjudgment fees are
relevant to the determination of attorney's fees, the court implied that
the initial grant of attorney's fees could take into account likely
postjudgment efforts.'0 3
c. The Court of Appeals Has Used Sanctions to Award Attorney's
Fees.-In addition to awards pursuant to specific statutory exceptions,
attorney's fees may also be awarded for discovery violations.0 4 The
Court of Appeals has employed sanctions under the discovery rules to
punish wrongful or bad faith conduct. 5 In particular, the sanctions
allow for fee-shifting as a response to discovery violations."°6 While
sanctions are generally applied to pretrial discovery, the Maryland
courts have applied the discovery rules in postjudgment situations as
well.107
Noncompliance with discovery orders are discovery violations ad-
dressed by Maryland Rule 2-433 and the available sanctions are set
99. Id. at 451, 505 A.2d at 117.
100. The statute at issue involved withheld wages rather than a withheld security deposit.
Admiral Mortgage, Inc. v. Cooper, 357 Md. 533, 536, 745 A.2d 1026, 1027 (2000). The
statute, MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-507.1 (1999), in providing damages for money
withheld, however, provided similar damages, including threefold damages for the with-
held amount and reasonable counsel fees.
101. Admiral Mortgage, Inc., 357 Md. at 547, 745 A.2d at 1033.
102. Id. at 547-48, 745 A.2d at 1033.
103. Id.
104. MD. R. 2-433(a) (3) (2005).
105. See infra notes 113-124 and accompanying text (discussing the use of sanctions to
punish discovery violations).
106. MD. R. 2-433.
107. See infra notes 129-133 and accompanying text (discussing the situation in which
discovery rules were applied in a postjudgment situation).
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forth therein."' 8 Rule 2-433 allows a circuit court to impose sanctions
if it finds a failure to comply with an order compelling 
discovery.10 9
The possible sanctions for the failure to comply may include, but are
not limited to,' 10 reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees.
l
"'
Moreover, the Court of Special Appeals has held that Maryland Rule
2433 provides trial courts broad discretion to impose sanctions for
discovery violations even in the absence of a specific rule describing
the violation.
112
In addressing discovery violations, the Court of Appeals in Lynch
v. R.E. Tull & Sons, Inc. 13 determined that a trial court is not limited
in its authority to impose sanctions to situations where it finds willful
or contumacious behavior involving violations of Maryland discovery
rules.' 14 Dismissal or entry of a default judgment may also be appro-
priate on other occasions." 5 In Lynch, however, the Court of Appeals
upheld a default judgment finding that a five-month delay in discov-
ery responses was so flagrant that it was willful.
16 The Maryland
courts have dismissed cases for other similar discovery failures. For
example, the Court of Special Appeals held in Rubin v. Gray,
117 that
failing to respond to interrogatories may warrant dismissal.'
1 8  In
Rubin, the court found that the dilatory party ignored several attempts
to obtain answers to propounded interrogatories and, furthermore,
ignored prescribed dates for compliance. 19
The variety of circumstances in which courts may impose sanc-
tions for discovery violations do not always require formal motions to
108. See Wilson v. N.B.S., Inc., 130 Md. App. 430, 447, 746 A.2d 966, 974 (2000) (stating
that "the sanctions under Rule 2-433 apply to discovery rule violations and noncompliance
with orders compelling discovery to which parties ordinarily are entitled").
109. Id at 444, 746 A.2d at 973.
110. Id
111. MD. R. 2-433(a)(3).
112. Wilson, 130 Md. App. at 444, 746 A.2d at 973. The Wilson court stated that:
Maryland case law teaches that merely because a specific discovery failure is not
covered expressly by the sanctions rule, in and of itself, does not mean that the
rule is inapplicable. When the conduct of a party or a deponent technically does
not constitute a failure to abide by the rules of discovery, the court nevertheless
may have rule-based sanctions authority, under Rule 2-433.
Id
113. 251 Md. 260, 247 A.2d 286 (1968).
114. Id. at 261, 247 A.2d at 286-87.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 261-62, 247 A.2d at 287.
117. 35 Md. App. 399, 370 A.2d 600 (1977).
118. Id. at 401, 370 A.2d at 602 ("[A] failure to respond to interrogatories as a deliberate
stall is a sufficiently flagrant abuse to justify dismissal.").
119. Id. at 400-01, 370 A.2d at 601-02.
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be made under the rules. 120 For example, the Court of Appeals, in
Broadwater v. Arch, held that judges have the authority, under the dis-
covery rules, to impose sanctions on their own motion without the
request of a party to the suit. 12 1 Specifically, the court held that when
there is a problem with the response to interrogatories, a trial court
may deal with the inadequacy by imposing sanctions sua sponte within
the framework of the Maryland discovery rules. 1 22 Furthermore, in
Wilson v. N.B.S., Inc.,'1 3 the Court of Special Appeals noted that a
court may have rule-based sanction authority under Rule 2-433 to
sanction conduct that does not technically violate discovery rules. 124
The Maryland courts have frequently held that sanctions for non-
compliance with discovery orders are at the discretion of the trialjudge. 12 5 However, in certain instances, a trial court's failure to fash-
ion at least some remedy to alleviate the resulting injury constitutes an
abuse of discretion. In Bartholomee v. Casey,1 26 the Court of Special
Appeals found an abuse of discretion where the court allowed the
plaintiffs to present evidence that contradicted their responses to in-
terrogatories. 127 Specifically, the court held that a failure to supple-
ment interrogatories substantially prejudiced the opponent's defense
and that the court should have fashioned a remedy.12
In Maryland, discovery sanctions and rules created for prejudg-
ment discovery apply to postjudgment discovery as well. The Court of
Special Appeals in Melnick v. New Plan Realty Trust129 addressed this
issue in a case involving postjudgment discovery proceedings designed
to aid enforcement against a money judgment debtor. 3 In Melnick,
the court held that implicit in Maryland Rule 2-633, which governs
postjudgment discovery in aid of enforcement, is the power and au-
thority of the pretrial discovery procedures. 1 ' The court reasoned
that the policy considerations behind the discovery procedures are
the same for prejudgment and postjudgment discovery and are thus
120. See, e.g., Broadwater v. Arch, 267 Md. 329, 336, 297 A.2d 671, 674 (1972).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. 130 Md. App. 430, 746 A.2d 966 (2000).
124. Id. at 444, 746 A.2d at 973.
125. See, e.g., Broadwater, 267 Md. at 336, 297 A.2d at 674 (stating that the trial court has
discretion over sanctions for violations of the discovery rules).
126. 103 Md. App. 34, 651 A.2d 908 (1994).
127. Id. at 50, 651 A.2d at 915.
128. Id.
129. 89 Md. App. 435, 598 A.2d 787 (1991).
130. Id. at 436, 598 A.2d at 788.
131. See id at 438, 598 A.2d at 789 (discussing the relationship between postjudgment
discovery and the Title 2 prejudgment discovery rules and procedures).
1052 [VOL. 64:1040
10532005] COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
necessary for both types of discovery. 132 As a result, the finding in
Melnick allows the remedy for noncompliance with postjudgment dis-
covery requests and orders to be addressed by the provisions of the
discovery sanctions in the discovery rules, specifically Maryland Rule 2-
433.133
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Pak v. Hoang, the Court of Appeals
held that the circuit court has the power to award supplemental attor-
ney's fees incurred in enforcing a judgment rendered under the
MSDA and for appeals defending a judgment under the statute.
134
Writing for the majority,1 31 Judge Cathell limited the basis for the
court's analysis and finding to just one of the four questions presented
by the Paks on appeal-whether the circuit court has the authority to
award supplemental attorney's fees pursuant to the MSDA in an effort
to enforce a judgment entered pursuant to that Act.' 36 The court de-
cided that it need not address the other questions presented for ap-
pellate review, including whether the circuit court could have
awarded supplemental, postjudgment attorney's fees under the Mary-
land Rules which govern discovery violations.13 7 Instead, the court
found that the attorney's fees incurred when seeking to recover the
judgment through filing postjudgment motions and appeals can be
included in an expanded definition of the reasonable attorney's fees
remedy of the MSDA.
13 8
In considering whether the MSDA gives courts the authority to
award postjudgment attorney's fees, the Court of Appeals interpreted
the MSDA and ultimately found that the MSDA is remedial in na-
ture. 1 39 The court then reasoned that the remedial nature of the
MSDA requires liberal construction.140 That construction, in turn, al-
lowed the Court of Appeals to conclude that the trial court had the
authority under the MSDA to award postjudgment attorney's fees to
132. Id. ("The policy considerations for these discovery procedures have remained the
same and are necessary during post-judgment as well as pre-trial proceedings.").
133. Id. at 438, 598 A.2d at 788-89 (citing Price v. Orrison, 261 Md. 8,9-10, 273 A.2d 183,
183 (1971)).
134. Pak, 378 Md. at 321, 835 A.2d at 1188.
135. Judge Cathell was joined by ChiefJudge Bell andJudges Eldridge, Wilner, Harrell,
and Battaglia. Id. at 317, 337, 835 A.2d at 1186, 1197.
136. Id. at 321, 835 A.2d at 1188.
137. Id. at 320, 835 A.2d at 1187. The other questions offered for review included
whether the circuit court had the authority to award supplemental attorney's fees pursuant
to a court's inherent powers or incident to its contempt powers. Id. at 320, 835 A.2d at
1187-88.
138. Id. at 321, 835 A.2d at 1188.
139. Id. at 328, 835 A.2d at 1192.
140. Id.
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ensure the tenants' rights regarding the return of their security de-
posit as described in the statute. 141
The court first engaged in statutory interpretation to ultimately
find that the MSDA was remedial in nature.142 Relying on the court's
definition of a remedial statute as one that, among other things, (a)
provides a remedy or improves or facilitates remedies already existing,
and (b) relates to practice, procedure, or remedies, 143 the court rea-
soned that the MSDA provides a remedy to tenants who believe their
landlord has failed to appropriately return their security deposit.'44
The punitive damages remedy, clear procedure, and timeline set forth
in the MSDA convinced the Pak court of the remedial nature of the
statute, which favored the grant of postjudgment attorney's fees.' 4 5
Next, the court found that the liberal interpretation of remedial
statutes provides courts with the authority to expansively interpret a
statute to give effect to the remedial purpose, which in this case al-lowed the court to award postjudgment attorney's fees. 14 6 The Pak
court relied on precedent to support its use of liberal construction of
the MSDA in an effort to give effect to its remedial purpose. 147 The
court reasoned that prohibiting recovery of postjudgment attorney's
fees under the MSDA might preclude the tenant's right to fully re-
cover.148 The court also relied on an extrapolation of dicta from a
prior case to support its argument that remedial statutes allowing for
141. Id. at 322, 835 A.2d at 1189.
142. Id. at 326-28, 835 A.2d at 1191-92.
143. Id. at 325-26, 835 A.2d at 1190.
144. Id at 328, 336, 835 A.2d at 1192, 1197.
145. Id. at 327, 336, 835 A.2d at 1191-92, 1197. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that
the punitive measure, capped at threefold the withheld amount of the security deposit,
demonstrated the legislature's concern for the tenant's rights against landlords. Id. at 327-28, 835 A.2d at 1192. The court continued, and found that the legislature included the
threefold damages clause in an effort to deal with the difficulties tenants have in seeking
the return of their security deposit from difficult landlords. Id.
146. See id. at 328-29, 835 A.2d at 1192-93 (reasoning that liberal construction of theMSDA would allow the term "reasonable attorney's fees" to include fees incurred
posjudgment).
147. Id. at 326, 835 A.2d at 1191 (citing Caffrey v. Dep't of Liquor Control, 370 Md. 272,306, 805 A.2d 268, 288 (2002)). The court further supported its holding with its interpre-
tation of federal fee-shifting cases and cases from other states. See generally id. at 331-36,835 A.2d at 1194-96. The Pak court relied on several federal cases in which postjudgment
attorney's fees were granted. Id. at 331, 835 A.2d at 1194. The majority emphasized several
cases where these fees were granted in response to efforts necessary for monitoring con-
sent decrees. Id.
148. Id. at 329, 835 A.2d at 1192 ("An interpretation excluding postjudgment attorney'sfees from [the MSDA] during a tenant's direct attempt to enforce collection of ajudgment
against such a landlord ... might effectively defeat the tenant's right to fully recover from
the landlord.").
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recovery of attorney's fees might also allow for recovery of fees in-
curred in postjudgment efforts.1 49
In her dissent, Judge Raker argued that the MSDA does not pro-
vide the court with the authority to grant postjudgment attorney's
fees. 150 She reasoned that Hoang's highly objectionable conduct was
not, by itself, a violation of the MSDA and that the Paks had already
recovered the fees permissible under the MSDA.15 1 Judge Raker de-
termined that this situation should be controlled by the general rule
regarding attorney's fees, which suggests that an award of attorney's
fees and other litigation expenses may not be granted by the court
unless specific statutory provisions, or a contract between the parties,
provide for them.
152
In addition, Judge Raker argued that the remedial nature of the
statute did not require liberal construction, which would include re-
covery of attorney's fees to enforce the judgment under the phrase
"reasonable attorney's fees."1 53 She reasoned, without further expla-
nation, that the majority's finding significantly expands the definition
of fee-shifting without sufficiently limiting its applicability.154
4. Analysis.-In Pak v. Hoang, the Court of Appeals determined
that the MSDA was remedial in nature and that such statutes are to be
liberally construed.1 55 In applying a liberal construction, the court
held that the clause in section 8-203(e) (4) of the MSDA allowing for
the recovery of reasonable attorney's fees includes supplemental,
postjudgment, attorney's fees. 156 The court's application of a liberal
construction to the statute was inappropriate 57 and has established a
precedent whereby the threshold required for granting attorney's fees
is significantly lowered in contravention of the long-established com-
mon-law American rule that militates against fee-shifting. Proper stat-
149. See id. at 330, 835 A.2d at 1193 (finding that the court had earlier "recognized that
remedial statutes providing for attorney's fees might encompass post-judgment fees") (re-
ferring to Admiral Mortgage, Inc. v. Cooper, 357 Md. 533, 745 A.2d 1026 (2000)). In its
discussion, the court noted that the case was only somewhat similar and acknowledged that
it was relying on dicta. Id.
150. See Pak, 378 Md. at 337, 835 A.2d at 1197 (Raker, J., dissenting) (stating that the
respondent's conduct in the recovery phase was not a violation of the MSDA).
151. Id. (Raker, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the Paks had already recovered
counsel fees under the Act and explicitly highlighted the absence of other provisions sup-
porting the recovery of additional fees under the Act. Id. (Raker, J., dissenting).
152. Id (Raker, J., dissenting).
153. Id. (Raker, J., dissenting).
154. Id. (Raker, J., dissenting).
155. Id at 328, 835 A.2d at 1192.
156. Id. at 328-29, 835 A.2d at 1192.
157. Id. at 337, 835 A.2d at 1197 (Raker, J., dissenting).
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utory construction, instead, suggests that the statute does not provide
for recovery of fees incurred postjudgment15 8  Furthermore, the
court overlooked the application of discovery sanctions, which it
could have used to achieve the same result-granting postjudgment
attorney's fees to the Paks-without ignoring the American rule. 159
a. The Pak Court Inadequately Supported Its Interpretation of the
MSDA.-In order to reach its holding, that the MSDA allows for
postjudgment attorney's fees, the court set aside commonly accepted
rules of statutory construction. Furthermore, the court inadequately
supported its holding with dicta from Maryland cases and distinguish-
able federal case law. The Pak court began its analysis by addressing
statutory interpretation precedent in Maryland, but ultimately failed
to conduct a proper analysis of legislative intent. The court replaced
an ambiguous-statute analysis with a remedial-statute analysis, merely
mentioning ambiguity when it noted that the MSDA was silent on
postjudgment attorney's fees, but going no further. 6 ° The court thus
restricted its analysis to an assumption that the legislature, once it in-
tends a statute to be remedial, intends the broadest interpretation to
effect that purpose.1 6' The court did not even cursorily address any
countervailing evidence of legislative intent.162 Specifically, the court
did not discuss the common law regarding fee-shifting in Maryland 6 '
and it failed to address the absence of any postjudgment language in
the statute or to properly assess that ambiguity.
In addition, the court failed to cite case law to support its finding
that the MSDA, or any other Maryland statute, could provide for
postjudgment attorney's fees.16 4 The court admitted that the only
Maryland case it cited, Admiral Mortgage, Inc., had a tenuous relation-
ship to Pak.'6 5 The court relied on dicta in Admiral Mortgage, Inc. that
158. See infra notes 175-214 and accompanying text (discussing the result of a proper
interpretation of the MSDA).
159. See infra notes 222-241 and accompanying text (discussing the applicability of dis-
covery violation sanctions).
160. Pak, 378 Md. at 324, 835 A.2d at 1190.
161. See id. at 336, 835 A.2d at 1197 (finding that, even though the MSDA is silent on
postjudgment attorney's fees, the remedial nature of the statute necessitates their
availability).
162. See generally id. (omitting any discussion of other evidence of legislative intent exclu-
sive of that which flows from a finding that the statute is remedial in nature).
163. See generally id. (omitting any general discussion of fee-shifting in Maryland or the
adherence to the American rule).
164. See generally id. (citing just one Maryland case where posqudgment attorney's fees
were even mentioned).
165. See id. at 330, 835 A.2d at 1193 (qualifying the applicability of Admiral Mortgage, Inc.
v. Cooper, 357 Md. 533, 745 A.2d 1026 (2002) by stating that the case was "somewhat similar
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merely suggested that attorney's fees might continue to accrue after a
verdict. 166 From this dicta, however, the court implied that Maryland
courts may allow postjudgment fees under a "reasonable attorney's
fees" statutory provision.
1 67
Moreover, the Pak court mistakenly relied on the federal case law
it cited in support of statutory postjudgment attorney's fees in that the
cases favoring such fees involved statutes where the legislative intent
focused on the importance of easing citizen enforcement, which is
linked to postjudgment efforts. The Pak court correctly noted that
the provision for attorney's fees of the CAA discussed in Delaware Val-
ley is similar to that of the MSDA, in that it allows for the recovery of
"reasonable attorney's fees.' 6  The Pak court, however, failed to rec-
ognize that the Supreme Court granted such fees because it found
that the clear intent of the statute was to encourage and facilitate pri-
vate enforcement of the CAA.'6 9 Furthermore, the Pak court failed to
recognize that Jenkins allowed postjudgment fees because that case in-
volved the protection of civil rights, a consideration not presented in
Pak.7° While the postjudgment attorney's fees in Jenkins were neces-
sary to adequately enforce important civil rights,1 7 1 the Pak court did
not offer an explanation as to why the government's interest in pro-
tecting tenant rights necessitated postjudgment attorney's fees-in
fact, it undercut such an argument by noting the effect of the three-
fold damages clause.172
The Pak court also failed to recognize that the federal cases were
inapplicable to Pak because those cases granted postjudgment fees
when legal work for ongoing monitoring of compliance with the
courts' orders was necessary and ordinary.173 In the federal cases
cited by Pak, the postjudgment efforts taken in private enforcement of
ajudicial decree were determined to be ordinarily necessary to ensure
in that, albeit as dicta, we recognized that remedial statutes providing for attorney's fees
might encompass post-judgment fees").
166. Id. at 330-31, 835 A.2d at 1193-94.
167. Id. at 331, 835 A.2d at 1194.
168. See id at 331-33, 835 A.2d at 1194-95; Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council
for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 560 (1986); 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (d) (2000). The act states: "The
court, in issuing any final order in any action brought pursuant to subsection (a) of this
section, may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness
fees) to any party, whenever the court determines such award is appropriate." § 7604(d).
169. Compare Pak, 378 Md. at 331-33, 835 A.2d at 1194-95, with Del. Valley, 478 U.S. at 560.
170. Jenkins v. Missouri, 127 F.3d 709, 718 (8th Cir. 1997); see supra note 73 and accom-
panying text.
171. Jenkins, 127 F.3d at 718; see supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
172. See infra note 184 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that the threefold
damages already serve to help adequately enforce the judgment).
173. See, e.g., Del. Valley, 478 U.S. at 561.
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compliance with the CAA and the judicial consent decree. 174 In con-
trast, the postjudgment efforts here cannot be considered to be ordi-
narily necessary to ensure the result obtained from litigation because
Hoang's reprehensible behavior hindering recovery was far from ordi-
nary. The Pak court should have found that the continued monitor-
ing required in Pak is not ordinarily necessary; normally the judgment
debtor in a simple security deposit recovery case has no complicated
settlement or court order to follow which necessarily requires addi-
tional legal work.
b. Proper Statutory Analysis Suggests That the MSDA Should Not
Have Been Used to Recover Postjudgment Attorney's Fees.-In interpreting
the MSDA the Pak court ignored the traditional rule for statutory in-
terpretation reiterated by the court in Giant Food,17 5 requiring that
the court first look at the plain language of the MSDA, giving the
words their natural and ordinary meaning. 7 6 The Court of Appeals,
in Pak, correctly recognized that the language of the MSDA subsec-
tion (e) (4) does not define "reasonable attorney's fees," and as a re-
sult does not explicitly mention postjudgment fees.1 77 The court,
however, failed to properly assess the effect of the omission-that it
allows for two possible interpretations of the statute; reasonable attor-
ney's fees either (1) include postjudgment fees or (2) do not include
postjudgment fees.17 8 The omission thus renders the statute ambigu-
ous as two interpretations are plausible.1 79
The Pak court should have acknowledged, as it did in Washington
National Arena, that a failure to proscribe a possible interpretation of a
statute does not mean that the legislature intended that interpreta-
tion." 0 The Pak court ignored the fact that the omission of any refer-
ence to postjudgment fees in the MSDA merely represents a failure to
proscribe such attorney's fees and did not recognize that the legisla-
ture did not necessarily intend to permit them.
Given the ambiguity, the court should have considered the mean-
ing of the term "reasonable attorney's fees" in light of the objectives
174. Id.
175. Giant Food, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor, Licensing & Regulation, 356 Md. 180, 738 A.2d
856 (1999).
176. Id. at 189, 738 A.2d at 861.
177. Pak, 378 Md. at 336, 835 A.2d at 1197.
178. See Washington Nat'l Arena Ltd. P'ship v. Comptroller of Treasury, 308 Md. 370,
375, 519 A.2d 1277, 1279 (1987) (deeming a statute that omits an issue that is within its
ambit and is relevant to its purpose to be ambiguous).
179. See id.
180. See id.
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and purposes of the statute."' While the Pak court correctly ascer-
tained the purpose of the MSDA, it erroneously held that postjudg-
ment attorney's fees were necessary to effectuate its goals. The
judicial addition of recovery for postjudgment fees to the reasonable
attorney's fees clause was redundant given that postjudgment attor-
ney's fees can be achieved through other parts of the statute. The
court noted that the legislature already implicitly included postjudg-
ment attorney's fees by including the threefold damages clause.'
8 2
The Pak court also recognized that the mere existence of a threefold
damage clause demonstrates that the legislature acknowledged the
difficulties tenants may have in getting landlords to return their secur-
ity deposits."' Furthermore, the court correctly stated that those dif-
ficulties include recovery, a difficulty the court acknowledged tenants
consider when deciding whether to sue. The court improperly relied
on each of these observations to support its remedial statute analysis
when the observations more appropriately support the idea that the
allowance for recovery of threefold damages already serves to counter-
balance the difficulties in recovering security deposits without the
need for supplemental, postjudgment attorney's fees.' 84 Since the
MSDA has already addressed the difficulty of recovery with the three-
fold damages, the judicial addition of the absent provision for
postjudgment attorney's fees was unnecessary and thus contrary to
proper statutory interpretation as described in Giant Food, which cau-
tioned against interpreting statutes in a manner that created unrea-
sonable results.'85 Given that the majority's conclusion that the
threefold damages clause eases the difficulty of recovery, it is superflu-
ous to include postjudgment fees to achieve the same ends. The court
should not have read an omission into the statute where the purpose
of the omitted language was already addressed.' 86
181. See Giant Food, Inc., 356 Md. at 189, 738 A.2d at 861 (solving an ambiguity by look-
ing at the words of the statute in light of the objectives and purpose of the statute).
182. Pak, 378 Md. at 327, 835 A-2d at 1192.
183. Id. at 327-28, 835 A.2d at 1192.
184. See id. ("[T]he statute's imposition of attorney's fees recognizes the problem [te-
nants have in bringing suit] and addresses it by allowing for an additional remedy for
tenants."). As such, the legislature has already explicitly worked to remedy the difficulty of
recovery without explicitly providing for postjudgment attorney's fees.
185. See Giant Food, 356 Md. at 189, 738 A.2d at 861 (finding that interpretation should
avoid results that are inconsistent with common sense).
186. See id. (finding that interpretation of ambiguous terms should be conducted in
light of the statute's purpose). Where the purpose is satisfied without an expansive inter-
pretation, such an interpretation is unnecessary and thus contrary to the rules of statutory
interpretation.
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The Pak court's failure to recognize the importance of the noted
ambiguity led the court to ignore prior case law that shed light on the
MSDA's objectives and purpose.1"7 The Pak court ignored the rele-
vance of its finding in Rohrbaugh, which suggested that the award of
postjudgment attorney's fees should not be granted under the
MSDA."'8 In Rohrbaugh, the court observed that the wrongful conduct
for which the MSDA provides the remedy of attorney's fees is the with-
holding of the security deposit without a reasonable basis.'" 9
Rohrbaugh suggests that including the fees incurred postjudgment
would go beyond the legislative intent to punish that withholding.
The Pak court failed to apply Rohrbaugh when it granted attorney's
fees that were incurred as a result of the separate and distinct act of
neglecting to comply with the circuit court's ruling and subsequent
orders regarding its judgment. 9 0 Therefore, the court should have
concluded that the recovery of postjudgment attorney's fees incurred
in recovery efforts was beyond the legislative purpose of the MSDA.
Furthermore, the Pak court ignored the applicability of the prin-
ciples underlying the rule of lenity regarding ambiguous punishments
in its analysis of the MSDA's "reasonable attorney's fees" clause.' 9
Ordinarily, courts apply the rule of lenity to criminal law.' 9 2 However,
the Pak court failed to recognize that its principles can also apply to
civil punishment statutes. 9 ' The rule of lenity in Maryland applies to
ambiguous punitive measures,' 9 4 but the Pak court failed to recognize
the connection between its finding in Rohrbaugh, that the threefold
damages and attorney's fees contained in the MSDA are punitive in
nature,'9 5 and its finding in the present case that the application of
187. Cf. Washington Nat'l Arena Ltd. P'ship v. Comptroller of Treasury, 308 Md. 370,
375, 519 A.2d 1277, 1280 (1987) (using prior case law to provide content to the ambiguous
statutory term).
188. See Rohrbaugh v. Estate of Stern, 305 Md. 443, 505 A.2d 113 (1986) (stating that
the damages of the MSDA were for the wrongful withholding of the security deposit).
189. Id.
190. Pak, No. 38, slip op. at 8 (stating that noncompliance with a postjudgment discov-
ery order is a discovery violation, not a violation of the MSDA).
191. See Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 437, 639 A.2d 675,679 (1994) (holding that the
rule of lenity requires that ambiguous statutory punishments be construed in favor of the
defendant).
192. Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The
Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REv. 467, 487 (2002).
193. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court 1993 Term:
Foreward: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REv. 26, 104 (1994).
194. Gargliano, 334 Md. at 437, 639 A.2d at 679.
195. Rohrbaugh v. Estate of Stern, 305 Md. 443, 451, 505 A.2d 113, 117 (1986) (stating
that section 8-203(e) (4) damages are punitive).
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the punitive "reasonable attorney's fees" clause in the MSDA is
ambiguous. 196
The Pak court should have followed the principles underlying the
rule of lenity, which requires that an ambiguous statute be interpreted
in favor of the defendant, and narrowly construed the "reasonable at-
torney's fees" clause.' 97 Specifically, such an analysis requires that a
court not interpret a statute to increase the penalty that it places on
an individual when there is some doubt as to the punishment imposed
by a statute. 9 ' The Pak court should not have allowed for postjudg-
ment fees because increasing the attorney's fees recoverable under
the MSDA would increase the punishment beyond the threefold dam-
ages explicitly stated in the statute. 199 While the court in Pak noted
that the damages section of the MSDA does not plainly include
postjudgment attorney's fees,2 ° ° it ignored its holding in other cases
that "the rule of lenity forbids the extension of punishment 'to cases
not plainly within the language' of the statute."'2 1 Application of the
principles underlying the rule of lenity to Pak would limit the award of
attorney's fees to those that were incurred in the initial prosecution of
the case.
20 2
Finally, in assessing the ordinary and natural meaning of the rea-
sonable attorney's fees clause, the court ignored the influence of the
common law on its statutory interpretation. The Pak court ignored
the common-law American rule which should have influenced its con-
struction of the fee-shifting MSDA by providing an indication of legis-
lative intent. Adherence to the American rule would have caused the
Pak court to narrowly interpret the fee-shifting because statutes in der-
ogation of the common law are often given limited construction in
the absence of a clear indication that the legislature intended
otherwise.20 3
196. See Pak, 378 Md. at 324, 835 A.2d at 1190-91 (mentioning the possible ambiguous
nature of the MSDA).
197. See Gargliano, 334 Md. at 437, 639 A.2d at 679 (finding that where there is doubt
concerning a penalty, a milder one will be preferred over a harsher one).
198. Id.
199. See id. (finding that a court should not interpret a statute so as to increase the
penalty it placed on an individual where the punishment is ambiguous).
200. Pak, 378 Md. at 336, 835 A.2d at 1197.
201. Sec'y, Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs. v. Henderson, 351 Md. 438, 448, 718 A.2d
1150, 1155 (1998) (quoting Md. House of Corr. v. Fields, 348 Md. 245, 267, 703 A.2d 167,
178 (1997)).
202. SeeRohrbaugh v. Estate of Stern, 305 Md. 443, 451, 505 A.2d 113, 117 (1986) (find-
ing that the punitive damages of the MSDA are based on the withholding of the security
deposit).
203. The American rule refers to the common-law rule against fee shifting; see supra
notes 78-103 and accompanying text (discussing the American rule and its exceptions).
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The Pak court should have concluded that the legislature in-
tended a limited construction of the term "reasonable attorney's fees"
because the Maryland Court of Appeals has historically adhered to the
American rule, limiting fee-shifting. An expansive definition of rea-
sonable attorney's fees runs contrary to the court's reluctance to allow
fee-shifting in general.2 °4 Since the court, in Caffrey, assumed that the
legislature understood the common-law American rule in 1941, the
Pak court should have found that the same Maryland legislature, in
passing the predecessor to the MSDA initially in 1957,2o5 was still
aware of Maryland's adherence to the American rule and of the
court's reluctance to award such fees.20 6 The court should have rec-
ognized the legislature's knowledge of the underlying common-law
rule against fee-shifting and the legislature's decision to omit a provi-
sion in the MSDA explicitly stating that postjudgment attorney's fees
be included in the term "reasonable attorney's fees." Based on these
realizations the court should have found that the legislature did not
intend to allow for the recovery of postjudgment fees under the
MSDA.2 °7
The court should have found that the term "reasonable attorney's
fees," while a statutory exception to the American rule, should be nar-
rowly construed because the MSDA does not expressly allow the recov-
ery of postjudgment attorney's fees. 208 The Pak court should have
acknowledged its finding in St. Luke, where the court recognized that
an exception to the American rule is allowed where there is statutory
authority for imposing fee-shifting. 209 In so proceeding, the Pak court
should have also noted that statutory exceptions to the American rule
are quite rare2 0 and that such an exception is allowed only where a
statute expressly allows the recovery of attorney's fees. 21' The Pak
court should have noted that there is statutory authority for fee-shift-
204. See Caffrey v. Dep't of Liquor Control, 370 Md. 272, 295, 805 A.2d 268, 281 (2002)
(failing to include "reasonable attorney's fees" suggested that the legislature did not intend
to allow them because allowing them ran contrary to the court's reluctance to award attor-
ney's fees).
205. MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 8-213 (1957).
206. See Cafftey, 370 Md. at 294, 805 A.2d at 281 (discussing the legislature's awareness of
the Maryland courts' adherence to the American rule in enacting an earlier statute).
207. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
208. See Pak, 378 Md. at 324, 835 A.2d at 1190-91.
209. St. Luke Evangelical Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Smith, 318 Md. 337, 345-46, 568 A.2d
35, 39 (1990).
210. See Hess Constr. Co. v. Bd. of Educ., 341 Md. 155, 160, 669 A.2d 1352, 1354 (1996).
211. See Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 355 Md. 566, 590, 735 A.2d 1081,
1094 (1999).
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ing in the MSDA and that it should be limited because the MSDA does
not expressly allow for postjudgment attorney's fees.21 2
The court should have narrowly interpreted the MSDA because
statutory fee-shifting, as an exception to the American rule, runs con-
trary to common law. The Pak court should have followed the prece-
dent it set in Witte, in which it held that statutes which overlap with
and contradict common law should be strictly construed.213 As such,
the court should have construed the MSDA strictly to avoid changing
the common-law American rule on attorney's fees beyond what is ex-
pressly stated and supported by legislative intent.214 In conducting
that strict construction, the court should not have presumed that the
MSDA did not intend any change other than that which it clearly pro-
nounced. Under the rationale in Witte, the legislative intent to change
the common law requires clear documentation. In Pak, however, the
legislature did not explicitly include postjudgment fees; therefore, the
Pak court's interpretation of "reasonable attorney's fees" should have
been limited to what was clearly announced, leaving fees incurred
pursuant to efforts to recover the judgment unrecoverable under the
statute.
c. By Allowing Postjudgment Attorney's Fees Under the MSDA, the
Court Set a Precedent with No Clear Limit to Its Applicability.-The Pak
court's extension of "reasonable attorney's fees" under the MSDA to
include those fees incurred postjudgment to aid recovery results in an
unnecessary expansion of fee-shifting with no clear limit to its applica-
bility.215 By improperly interpreting the statute, the court applied a
liberal construction to the MSDA in order to bring postjudgment at-
torney's fees within the ambit of its meaning and the authority it
grants.2 1 6 In so doing, the court set a precedent whereby all statutory
fee-shifting remedies can be used to obtain postjudgment attorney's
fees.217
The holding of the Pak court is not tied to the factual underpin-
nings of the case-that Hoang defied court orders and undermined
the initial judgment-but is instead tied to a liberal statutory interpre-
212. See Pak, 378 Md. at 324, 835 A-2d at 1190-91.
213. See Witte v. Azarian, 369 Md. 518, 533, 801 A.2d 160, 169 (2002) (finding that
statutes in derogation of the common law are strictly construed so as not to make any
change in the common law beyond what is expressly stated and necessary).
214. See id.
215. Pak, 378 Md. at 337, 835 A.2d at 1197 (Raker, J., dissenting).
216. See id. at 336, 835 A.2d at 1196.
217. See id. at 337, 835 A.2d at 1197 (Raker, J., dissenting).
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tation of the term "reasonable attorney's fees."2 18 As a result, the
court opened the door to the possibility of a postjudgment creditor
obtaining attorney's fees from a postjudgment debtor who cooperates.
Taken to the extreme, the court's holding would allow Pak to obtain
punitive damages amounting to threefold the withheld amount, pre-
judgment attorney's fees, and postjudgment attorney's fees for inter-
rogatories designed to discover Hoang's ability to pay, even if Hoang
complied with the court order.219 The court should have held that
the threefold damages of the MSDA already address such ordinary
postjudgment efforts because the legislature, by including the puni-
tive measure, acknowledged that tenants have difficulty in recovering
their security deposit.2 2° Since the threefold damages take into ac-
count some difficulty in suing and recovering, a court's decision not
to provide postjudgment fees under the statute does not, as the major-
ity suggests, make the MSDA meaningless.2 21 If that were the case, all
judicial decisions which did not later allow for postjudgment fees
would render the statutory remedy meaningless and such a conclusion
strains reason.
d. The Court Ignored the Applicability of Discovery Sanctions as a
Means to Allow for Recovery of Postjudgment Attorney's Fees.-The Pak
court could have granted postjudgment fees under the Maryland dis-
covery rules,22 2 but chose instead to ignore their applicability.2 23 The
court should have applied discovery rule sanctions to avoid the
problems inherent in expanding the definition of the statutory dam-
ages clause regarding reasonable attorney's fees.2 24
While the Court of Appeals may not frequently impose sanctions
for discovery violations and in fact may rely on the trial court's assess-
ment, the Pak court ignored a record replete with evidence of the
lower court's desire to punish Hoang and to use the Maryland Rules
to allow for the recovery of postjudgment attorney's fees incurred dur-
218. See generally id. at 336, 835 A.2d at 1196-97 (basing its granting of postjudgment
attorney's fees on its interpretation of the statute, not the defendant's behavior).
219. See id. (stating simply, and without providing any limitation, that reasonable attor-
ney's fees under the MSDA may include postjudgment fees incurred so that the remedy is
not rendered meaningless).
220. See id. at 327, 835 A.2d at 1192 (acknowledging that the threefold damages clause is
designed to offset the difficulties ordinarily encountered by tenants seeking return of their
security deposits).
221. See id. at 336, 835 A.2d at 1197.
222. MD. R. 2-433 (authorizing the imposition of sanctions based upon a failure to com-
ply with an order compelling discovery).
223. See Pak, 378 Md. at 321, 835 A.2d at 1188.
224. See infta notes 236-241 and accompanying text.
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ing efforts to recover the judgment. While trial courts have discretion
in applying sanctions for discovery violations, the denial here came
from a perceived lack of power to do so, not a decision within the
court's discretion that discovery sanctions did not apply. 225 Specifi-
cally, the trial court believed that the power to sanction was linked to
the contempt finding that disappeared after the judgment was paid.226
The Pak court, however, correctly acknowledged that Hoang did not
comply with the purge provision's requirements for production.2 2 7 As
such, the Pak court was not constrained by the trial court's failure to
impose sanctions. Moreover, the Pak court should have followed
Broadwater, in which the court upheld sanctions, imposed sua sponte,
for a delay in answering interrogatories.22
The Pak court should have recognized that the Maryland Rules
applied because Hoang's failure to comply was not a violation of the
MSDA, but was instead a violation of the Maryland Rules governing
discovery. While the MSDA punishes the retention of security depos-
its withheld without a reasonable basis,2 29 the problem in Pak was not
that through the willful delay Hoang would effectively render the
MSDA remedy meaningless (thus requiring a strengthening of the
statute), but instead it was that through the willful delay Hoang would
effectively render the court's decision meaningless (thus requiring a
strengthening of the court's decision) .230 As a result, the court should
have instead found that Hoang's noncompliance with a postjudgment
discovery order was a discovery violation.23 '
Furthermore, the Pak court should have recognized that the
Maryland Rules represent a viable exception to the American rule as
attorney's fees may be awarded for discovery violations.2 12 While dis-
covery rules ordinarily govern pretrial discovery, the court in Pak
should have applied the reasoning of the Court of Special Appeals in
Melnick, which determined that the circuit court may apply discovery
225. Pak, No. 38, slip op. at 6. The constrained circuit court stated: "[I]n fairness, I
would like to go ahead and impose a sanction for that contempt... I don't think it would
be enforceable .... I wish there were a greater sanction than that could be imposed on
her. I don't feel that I can." Id. at 5.
226. Id. at 5.
227. Pak, 378 Md. at 319, 835 A.2d at 1187.
228. See Broadwater v. Arch, 267 Md. 329, 336, 297 A.2d 671, 674 (1972).
229. See Rohrbaugh v. Estate of Stern, 305 Md. 443, 505 A.2d 113 (1986) (stating that
the damages of the MSDA were for the wrongful withholding of the security deposit).
230. See Pak, No. 38, slip op. at 8 (stating that "[n]oncompliance with a post-judgment
discovery order is a discovery violation, not a violation of the Security Deposit Act").
231. See id.
232. MD. R. 2433(a)(3); Steinhoff v. Sommerfelt, 144 Md. App. 463, 488, 798 A.2d
1195, 1209 (2002).
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sanctions under the authority granted by Maryland Rule 2-433 to
postjudgment discovery violations.2 33
By applying discovery rule 2-433 to this situation, the court would
have held that Hoang's behavior was sufficiently willful to merit sanc-
tions because Hoang's failure to respond to Pak's Motion to Compel
Answers to Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents
in Aid of Execution is a violation of the rule.23 4 Furthermore, the
court's sanction for this failure, under the rule, could have included
attorney's fees.
23 5
Moreover, even if the failure to respond was not mentioned spe-
cifically in a rule, application of the finding in Wilson suggests that the
Pak court could still have granted sanctions including attorney's
fees.236 Based on Hoang's dilatory behavior and the circuit court's
finding that Hoang willfully hindered recovery,237 the Court of Ap-
peals should have followed the precedent it set in Lynch, in which a
default judgment was upheld because the lower court found that the
delay was willful and granted postjudgment attorney's fees under the
Maryland Rules as a sanction for discovery violations.23 8 In Pak,
Hoang refused to answer interrogatories adequately for almost a
year,239 far longer than the delay in Lynch24 and similar to the behav-
ior in Rubin, both of which resulted in dismissals upheld on appeal.
241
It is axiomatic that granting attorney's fees is a less harsh sanction
than dismissal or imposition of a default judgment. It would have
been appropriate for the Pak court to impose a sanction under Mary-
land Rule 2-433 requiring Hoang to pay reasonable postjudgment at-
torney's fees. This use of discovery sanctions would have avoided the
expansion of fee-shifting associated with the Pak court's interpretation
of the MSDA.
233. See Melnick v. New Plan Realty Trust, 89 Md. App. 399, 438, 598 A.2d 787, 789
(1991).
234. SeeWilson v. N.B.S., Inc., 130 Md. App. 430, 444, 746 A.2d 966, 973 (2000) (finding
that a circuit court may apply sanctions under Rule 2-433 for a failure to comply with an
order compelling discovery).
235. MD. R. 2-433(a) (3).
236. See Wilson, 130 Md. App. at 444, 746 A.2d at 973; see also supra note 112 and accom-
panying text.
237. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
238. See Lynch v. R.E. Tull & Sons, 251 Md. 260, 247 A.2d 286 (1968) (using the ultimate
sanction, dismissal, where the defendant willfully delayed).
239. Pak, 378 Md. at 319-22, 835 A.2d at 1187-88.
240. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (finding a five-month delay in complet-
ing discovery responses warranted a dismissal).
241. See supra notes 117-119 and accompanying text (discussing the defendant's behav-
ior in Rubin v. Gray, 35 Md. App. 399, 370 A.2d 600 (1977)).
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5. Conclusion.-In Pak v. Hoang, the Court of Appeals held that
the MSDA was remedial in nature and thus applied a liberal construc-
tion of the term "reasonable attorney's fees" to hold that postjudg-
ment attorney's fees are included within its meaning.24 2 The court
misapplied the rules of statutory interpretation and, in so doing,
failed to narrowly interpret the statute because it ignored the rele-
vance of its finding that the statute was ambiguous as to postjudgment
fee-shifting. 243 The court failed to recognize that while the common-
law American rule allows for some exceptions, the exception in the
case at bar, given the general reluctance to allow such fee-shifting,
should not be broadly interpreted beyond what is clearly stated by the
legislature.244 In finding that the statute was remedial, the court ig-
nored the factual underpinnings of the case and set a precedent for
the meaning of attorney's fees that will allow all statutory fee-shifting
clauses to include postjudgment fees regardless of the other party's
behavior.245 To avoid this outcome, the Court of Appeals should have
clarified the authority of the circuit court by holding that the circuit
court has the authority to apply sanctions based on discovery viola-
tions outlined in the Maryland Rules of Civil Procedure.246 Had it
done so, the Court of Appeals could have not only punished Hoang's
reprehensible behavior, but also set a more appropriate limited stan-
dard for granting postjudgment attorney's fees.
ScoTr J. GOLDBERG
242. Pak, 378 Md. at 336, 835 A.2d at 1197.
243. See supra notes 175-202 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 204-207 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 215-221 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 222-241 and accompanying text.
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II. CONTRACTS
A. A Narrow Construction of the State's "Moral Obligation" at Contract
In Stern v. Board of Regents,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland
considered whether sovereign immunity barred an action against the
Board of Regents of the University System of Maryland alleging that
eleven State colleges and universities breached contracts with their
students by increasing the price of tuition for the Spring 2003 semes-
ter after the semester had begun.2 The court held that the alleged
contracts did not meet the requirements of section 12-201 (a) of the
State Government Article,' which waives the State's sovereign immu-
nity in actions arising from written contracts executed by duly author-
ized State officials.4 Narrowly construing section 12-201 (a) to avoid
diluting the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the court determined
that the statute is unambiguously limited to written contracts signed by
an authorized State official.5 Finding tuition bills and registration
materials bearing university seals insufficient to satisfy this signature
requirement, the court concluded that section 12-201 (a) did not
waive the State's immunity from the students' suit.6
In concluding that section 12-201 (a) is unambiguous, the court
failed to recognize that the plain language of the statute yields at least
two reasonable interpretations and thus satisfies the court's own defi-
nition of an ambiguous statute.7 Instead of holding that the text of
section 12-201 (a) unambiguously imposes a signature requirement that
it does not explicitly articulate, the court should have examined other
indicia of legislative intent.' In declining to do so, the court ignored a
body of compelling evidence that the legislature did not intend to
limit the scope of section 12-201 (a) to contracts signed by individual
State officials.9 Finally, in a break with precedent,' ° the court strictly
construed section 12-201 (a) wholly without reference to the statute's
underlying purpose-to bind the state to its moral obligations at con-
1. 380 Md. 691, 846 A.2d 996 (2004).
2. Id. at 694, 846 A.2d at 998-99.
3. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 12-201(a) (2004).
4. 380 Md. at 726, 846 A.2d at 1016.
5. Id. at 722, 846 A.2d at 1013-14.
6. Id. at 722-23, 846 A.2d at 1014.
7. See infra notes 183-215 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 216-244 and accompanying text.
9. See infta notes 216-245 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 250-262 and accompanying text.
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tract-thus improperly elevating its own policy of disfavoring sover-
eign immunity waivers above the will of the legislature.11
1. The Case.-Based on its August 2001 budget, the Board of Re-
gents (Board) of the University System of Maryland 12 (USM) ap-
proved tuition rates for the 2002-2003 school year.' 3 During the Fall
2002 semester, the USM institutions distributed registration materials
for the Spring 2003 semester with tuition pricing.14 Toward the end
of the Fall 2002 semester, students who had followed the proper regis-
tration procedures received tuition bills for the Spring 2003 semester
that reflected the prices advertised in the registration materials and
listed due dates ranging from December 17, 2002, to January 31,
2003.15 A majority of students paid their bills in full before the due
dates.16
When the state budget crisis began to escalate in the Fall of 2002,
the presidents of the USM institutions and the Board met to discuss
the possibility of budget cuts and various methods for absorbing
them. 7 In addition to a mid-year tuition increase, the Board dis-
cussed hiring freezes, staff furloughs, and the termination of certain
operating expenses.' 8 On November 20, 2002, the Board learned that
it would have to cut $30.4 million from its fiscal year 2003 budget, but
decided not to raise tuition at that time. 9 On December 23, 2002,
after learning that an additional $36.6 million in budget cuts for fiscal
year 2003 was probable, the Board called a special meeting to con-
sider the possibility of a mid-year tuition increase for the Spring 2003
semester.2" The Board also prepared a letter to inform students that
11. Seech. 450, 1976 Md. Laws 1180, 1181 (preamble) (declaring that the State is mor-
ally obligated to fulfill its contractual obligations and that sovereign immunity is no longer
appropriate in certain contract actions).
12. The Board of Regents sets forth the policies and regulations of the eleven institu-
tions comprising the University System of Maryland, namely: University of Maryland, Balti-
more; University of Maryland Baltimore County; University of Maryland, College Park;
University of Maryland Eastern Shore; University of Maryland University College; Bowie
State University; Coppin State College; Frostburg State University; Salisbury University;
Towson University; and University of Baltimore. MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. §§ 12-101 (b) (4),
12-102 (2004).
13. Stern, 380 Md. at 697-98, 846 A.2d at 999. The Board slightly increased these rates
in May 2002 to reflect its actual budget allocation from the General Assembly. Id. at 698,
846 A.2d at 999.
14. Id. at 698, 846 A.2d at 1000.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 699, 846 A.2d at 1000.
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an imminent tuition increase was possible.21 The letter was mailed to
the USM institutions on January 8, 2003.22 Each institution sent the
letter to its students promptly thereafter.23
On January 17, 2003, Governor Ehrlich confirmed the additional
$36.6 million in budget cuts. 2 4 The Board met on January 23, 2003,
and authorized the USM institutions to increase tuition for the Spring
2003 semester up to five percent,25 even though the semester had be-
gun and tuition deadlines had passed. 26 All but two institutions chose
to increase tuition.
2 7
A group of students from the nine institutions that elected to
raise tuition for the Spring 2003 semester filed suit in the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City alleging breach of contract,28 equitable es-
toppel, and a violation of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act
(CPA) .29 The students also filed a motion for a temporary restraining
order and a preliminary injunction to enjoin the imposition of the
tuition increase.'o Shortly thereafter, the students moved to certify
their suit as a class action.31
The circuit court denied the students' motion for a preliminary
injunction but promptly scheduled a hearing on the merits.3 2 After a
hearing, the circuit court granted the Board's motion for summary
judgment, holding that any contract between the students and their
respective institutions would have to be an implied contract and that
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 699, 846 A.2d at 1001. The presidents of USM institutions are vested with the
power to set tuition and fees subject to the authority of the Board. MD. CODE ANN., EDUC.
§ 12-109(e)(7) (2004).
26. Brief of Appellants at 9-10, Stern v. Board of Regents, 380 Md. 691, 846 A.2d 996
(2004) (No. 476).
27. Stern, 380 Md. at 699 n.8, 846 A.2d at 1001 n.8. Coppin State College and the
University of Maryland University College did not increase tuition. Id.
28. Id. at 694, 846 A.2d at 997-98. The students argued that their tuition bills estab-
lished an express contract between the students and the University. Brief of Appellants at
14, 32, Stern (No. 476). The bills reflected the names of the parties to be bound by the
contract (i.e., the student and the institution), the educational services to be provided, the
price for the semester, the due date for payment, and the penalty for late payment. Id.
29. Stern, 380 Md. at 694, 846 A.2d at 997-98. The complaint named the Board of
Regents, Chancellor William E. Kirwan, and David Ramsey, President of the University of
Maryland, Baltimore as defendants. Id., 846 A.2d at 998.
30. Id. at 694-95, 846 A.2d at 998.
31. Id. at 695, 846 A.2d at 998.
32. Id.
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implied contracts are barred by sovereign immunity." The students
then filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.34 The
Court of Appeals, on its own initiative, granted a writ of certiorari 5 to
consider whether sovereign immunity bars a breach of contract claim
against the Board for a mid-year tuition increase. 6
2. Legal Background.-The doctrine of sovereign immunity has
operated as a bar to suits against the State of Maryland for well over a
century.37 By the 1960s, however, the General Assembly took the posi-
tion that the doctrine often unjustly barred valid claims,38 and in 1976
enacted a statute, now codified at section 12-201 (a) of the State Gov-
ernment Article, waiving the State's defense of sovereign immunity in
certain contract actions.3 ' The Court of Appeals has long acknowl-
edged the cardinal rule that statutes must be interpreted to effectuate
the intent of the legislature.4" To this end the court must look first to
the plain language of the'statute, giving its words their ordinary and
natural meaning,41 and look to other indicia of legislative intent only
where the plain language is ambiguous.4 2 In addition, the court has
at different times applied the canon that statutes in derogation of the
33. Id. The circuit court also ruled that the students' equitable estoppel and CPA
counts could not be asserted against a state agency. Id. The day after the circuit court
granted the Board's summary judgment motion, the students filed a motion to alter or
amend, requesting a ruling on the merits of their motion for declaratory and injunctive
relief. Brief of Appellants at 4 Stern (No. 476). After a hearing, the circuit court denied
the students' motion, concluding that although sovereign immunity did not bar the stu-
dents' claim for declaratory and injunctive relief and that a quasi-contract likely existed
between the students and the University, the University's breach was reasonable under the
circumstances. Id. at 4-5; Stern, 380 Md. at 696, 846 A.2d at 998-99.
34. Stern, 380 Md. at 696, 846 A.2d at 999.
35. Stern v. Bd. of Regents, 378 Md. 613, 837 A.2d 925 (2003). The Court of Appeals is
authorized to issue a writ of certiorari to review proceedings pending in the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals on its own motion. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 12-201 (2004).
36. Stern, 380 Md. at 696-97, 846 A.2d at 999. The students did not raise the equitable
estoppel or CPA issues on appeal. Id. The Board filed a cross-appeal challenging the cir-
cuit court's ruling that sovereign immunity did not bar the students' claim for declaratory
and injunctive relief. Id. at 697, 846 A.2d at 999.
37. See Bd. of Trs. of Howard Cmty. College v. John K. Ruff, Inc., 278 Md. 580, 584, 366
A.2d 360, 362 (1976) (tracing a century of Court of Appeals decisions applying the doc-
trine beginning in 1871).
38. See Md. H.J. Res. 49, 1968 Sess. (asserting that sovereign immunity often capri-
ciously and unjustly bars recovery for valid claims).
39. 1976 Md. Laws 450, §§ 1OA(A)-(D).
40. Holbrook v. State, 364 Md. 354, 364, 772 A.2d 1240, 1245-46 (2001).
41. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. CCJ14746, 360 Md. 634, 641, 759 A.2d 755, 759
(2000).
42. Comptroller of the Treasury v. Clyde's of Chevy Chase, Inc., 377 Md. 471, 483, 833
A.2d 1014, 1021 (2003).
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common law must be directly construed,43 and the countervailing ca-
non that remedial statutes are to be liberally construed. 4 Where a
statute is both remedial and in derogation of the common law, courts
must exercise care not to construe the statute so narrowly as to perpet-
uate the injustice it was enacted to remedy.45 With respect to section
12-201 (a) specifically, the court has upheld the view that as a statutory
waiver of sovereign immunity, section 12-201 (a) must be strictly con-
strued to avoid diminishing the doctrine by judicial fiat and to com-
port with the principle that statutes in derogation of the common law
must be strictly construed. The court has also held that the waiver
created by section 12-201 (a) is limited to contracts that State officials
execute with "actual authority. 46
a. Maryland's Common-Law Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity.-
The doctrine of sovereign immunity has been firmly established in
Maryland since the late nineteenth century.4 7 Rooted in the English
common-law principle that the king cannot be sued in his own courts
without his consent,4" the doctrine prevented interference with gov-
ernmental functions and the public treasury.49 Thus, the court has
held that all State agencies and instrumentalities performing govern-
ment functions are entitled to sovereign immunity from suit.50 It is
43. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs. v. ARA Health Servs., Inc., 107 Md. App. 445,
457, 668 A.2d 960, 966 (1995), affid per curiam, 344 Md. 85, 685 A.2d 435 (1996).
44. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
45. See infta notes 110-118 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 121-127 and accompanying text.
47. See Katz v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 284 Md. 503, 507, 397 A.2d
1027, 1030 (1979) (noting that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is firmly established in
Maryland law); Bd. of Trs. of Howard Cmty. College v. John K. Ruff, Inc., 278 Md. 580, 584,
366 A.2d 360, 362 (1976) (tracing a century of Court of Appeals decisions applying the
doctrine beginning in 1871).
48. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (noting the English common-law ori-
gins of sovereign immunity); Katz, 284 Md. at 507, 397 A.2d at 1030 (noting that the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity is rooted in the notion that "the king can do no wrong");
Godwin v. County Comm'rs of St. Mary's County, 256 Md. 326, 330-34, 260 A.2d 295, 297-
99 (1970) (tracing the doctrine from its origins in English common law to its adoption in
Maryland).
49. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 715-16 (noting that sovereign immunity was a matter of
profound interest for the early American states, who were deep in debt following the
Revolution and fearful of suit); Md. State Highway Admin. v. Kim, 353 Md. 313, 333, 726
A.2d 238, 248 (1999) (noting that the doctrine of sovereign immunity operates to protect
the State from interference with governmental functions and maintain its control over the
state treasury) (citing Katz, 284 Md. at 507, 397 A.2d at 1030).
50. Katz, 284 Md. at 507, 397 A.2d at 1030; Godwin, 256 Md. at 334, 260 A.2d at 299.
While entitled to immunity in tort, counties and municipalities have been regularly subject
to suit in contract actions since 1862. Baltimore County v. RTKL Assoc., Inc., 380 Md. 670,
675, 846 A.2d 433, 436 (2004).
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well established that Maryland's public colleges and universities are
State agencies for sovereign immunity purposes.5"
b. Legislative History of Maryland's Statutory Waiver of Sovereign
Immunity in Contract Actions.-In 1976, the General Assembly enacted
Maryland's first statutory waiver of sovereign immunity.52 Now codi-
fied in sections 12-201 through 12-204 of the State Government Arti-
cle, the Act announced the State's consent to be sued in contract
actions, subject to certain limitations.53 The statute was the culmina-
tion of a seven-year movement in the legislature to abrogate the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity.
By the late 1960s, sovereign immunity had become disfavored for
unjustly allowing State and local governments to escape accountability
for their actions.5 4 In 1974 and 1975, the legislature passed bills abro-
gating the State's sovereign immunity in contract actions,55 but the
Governor vetoed them because they did not address the issue of negli-
gence claims masquerading as contract actions, neglected to preserve
the defense of unauthorized contracts, and failed to adequately pro-
vide for funds to pay judgments. 56 In 1976, the Governor's Commis-
sion to Study Sovereign Immunity (hereinafter "Commission"), which
51. See MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 12-102 (a) (2), (4) (2004) (providing that the University
is a State instrumentality which exercises an essential public function); Frankel v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of Md. Sys., 361 Md. 298, 301, 761 A.2d 324, 325 (2000) (recognizing the
University of Maryland as a unit of the State government for sovereign immunity
purposes).
52. An Act Concerning State and Local Governments-Defense of Sovereign Immu-
nity, ch. 450, 1976 Md. Laws 1180.
53. Id. The General Assembly has subsequently enacted additional statutes waiving sov-
ereign immunity, most notably, the Maryland Tort Claims Act, which waives the defense of
sovereign immunity in certain tort actions. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 12-104 (2004).
Other waivers include section 12-104 of the Education Article, which authorizes Maryland's
public universities to sue and be sued under certain circumstances, MD. CODE ANN., EDUC.
§ 12-104 (2004), and section 13-901 of the Tax General Article, which authorizes refund
claims against the state by claimants who erroneously pay the state a fee or charge greater
than is legally payable. MD. CODE ANN., TAx-GEN. § 13-901 (2004).
54. See Md. HJ. Res. 49, 1968 Sess. (asserting that sovereign immunity often capri-
ciously and unjustly barred recovery for valid claims); see also Baltimore County v. RTKL
Assoc., Inc., 380 Md. 670, 679-82, 846 A.2d 433, 438-40 (2004) (recounting the abrogation
movement in the General Assembly).
55. Md. H.B. 5, 1974 Sess.; Md. H.B. 1672, 1975 Sess. Two bills waiving the State's
immunity had been introduced previously but failed to gain the approval of both houses.
Md. S.B. 651, 1969 Sess. (proposing constitutional amendment waiving defense of sover-
eign immunity in any suit against State or local governmental unit except as provided by
law); Md. H.B. 1119, 1973 Sess. (waiving sovereign immunity in any contract action).
56. Veto Messages of May 31, 1974 and May 17, 1975, reprinted in REPORT OF THE COVER-
NOR'S COMMISSION TO STUDY SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY app. B-22-B-25 (1976) [hereinafter COM-
MISSION REPORT].
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the Governor organized a year earlier,5 7 released an interim report
noting that in the forty-five states that had abrogated sovereign immu-
nity in contract actions, the fiscal impact of doing so had been negligi-
ble.58 The Commission found that this minimal impact was due, in
part, to the various statutory limitations these states placed on their
waivers." Approximately three months after the Commission's in-
terim report was issued, the Governor signed into law House Bill 885,
which had been introduced by Commission member Delegate Joseph
E. Owens.60 Citing in a preamble the legislature's belief that the State
is under a "moral obligation" to fulfill its contractual duties, the new
law enacted a conditional waiver of sovereign immunity in contract
actions." The statute, codified at section 10A of Article 41,62 incorpo-
rated the following limitations, each of which had been highlighted in
the Commission Report for successfully limiting the impact of abroga-
tion in other states: (1) limiting liability to written contracts; (2) limit-
ing liability to contracts executed by a state official acting within the
scope of the official's authority; (3) preserving immunity from puni-
tive damages; and (4) limiting liability to claims within one year from
the later of the date on which the claim arose or the date on which
the contract was completed.6 3 The law also required the Governor to
allocate adequate funds in the state budget for the satisfaction ofjudg-
ments.64 With the passage of House Bill 885, Maryland joined thirty-
one other states that had abrogated sovereign immunity in contract
actions as of 1976.65
57. The Commission was initially appointed in 1968 but ceased activities due to an
apparent lack of funding. RTKL Assoc., Inc., 380 Md. at 680, 846 A.2d at 439.
58. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 56, at J-2.
59. Examples of these limitations included: limitations on time to assert claims, id. at
64-65, 72, 78-79, 88-91 (Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Illinois, Minnesota, Montana, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota); liability only on written contracts, id. at app.
A-29 (New Mexico); no liability on implied contracts, id. at 78 (Kansas); liability only on
claims arising from contracts made by agencies within the scope of their authority, id. at 88-
90; app. A-29 (New Mexico, Oregon); no liability for exemplary or punitive damages, id. at
79, 88-90 (Montana, Oregon); no liability for interest on judgments, id. at 79 (Montana);
no liability for attorneys fees, id. (Montana); requiring plaintiffs to exhaust their adminis-
trative remedies, id. at 79, 80-81 (Montana, Nevada); and appropriating funds to satisfy
judgments, id. at app. A-27 (New Jersey).
60. Md. H.B. 885, 1976 Sess.
61. Ch. 450, 1976 Md. Laws 1180, 1181.
62. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §§ 1OA(A)-(D) (1976).
63. Id. § 1OA(A)-(C).
64. Id. § 10A(D).
65. According to the Governor's Commission, the following states had adopted statutes
or constitutional provisions abrogating governmental contract immunity: Alaska, Arizona,
California, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massa-
chusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mex-
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The scope of the waiver came into question following the addi-
tion of Article 21 to the Maryland Code in 1980.66 The Act that cre-
ated Article 21, titled "State Procurement of Supplies, Services, and
Construction," transferred the statutory waiver of contract immunity
codified at Article 41, section 10A of the Maryland Code to sections 7-
101 through 7-104 of the new Article 21.67 While the language of the
contract immunity statute remained largely unmodified, with the ex-
ception of some minor style changes and the re-designation of the
statute's subsections,68 the "definitions" subtitle of the new article de-
fined "contract" as "every agreement entered into by a State agency
for the procurement of supplies, services, construction, or any other
item. ... "69 Three years later, in Q C Corp. v. Maryland Port Administra-
tion, the Maryland Port Administration (MPA) invoked the defense of
sovereign immunity in an action to enforce a lease, arguing that the
re-codification of the contract immunity waiver at Article 21 effectively
limited the waiver to actions arising from procurement contracts.
7
Because leases are not procurement contracts, the MPA contended
that the plaintiff's claim was barred by sovereign immunity.
71 The
Court of Special Appeals rejected the MPA's argument, noting that
both the Governor's Commission and the General Assembly intended
for Chapter 450 to establish a broad waiver of immunity.72 Because
nothing in the legislative history of Article 21 suggested that the legis-
lature intended to modify the waiver of contract immunity adopted in
1976, the court concluded that the General Assembly was unaware
that transferring the statute might subject it to the narrow definition
of "contract" that appeared in Article 21. In addition, the court
noted that its holding was confirmed by House Bill 1684, which re-
pealed the section of the code that purportedly limited the waiver to
procurement contracts. 7" The bill also restored sections 12-202
ico, NewYork, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 56, at 24-26. In Colorado, Idaho, Michigan, and North
Carolina, governmental contract immunity had been waived by judicial decision. Id.
66. Ch. 775, 1980 Md. Laws 2650.
67. Id.
68. See Q C Corp. v. Md. Port Admin., 68 Md. App. 181, 188, 510 A.2d 1101, 1104-05
(1986), affd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 310 Md. 379, 529 A.2d 829 (1987).
69. MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 1-101(f)(1) (1981).
70. 68 Md. App. at 184-85, 188, 510 A.2d at 1103, 1105.
71. Id. at 188, 510 A.2d at 1105.
72. Id. at 190, 510 A.2d at 1106.
73. Id. at 190-91, 510 A.2d at 1106.
74. Id. at 192-94, 510 A.2d at 1107-08; Md. H.B. 1684, 1986 Sess. The bill, which be-
came Chapter 265 of the Acts of 1986, was introduced by Delegate Owens, who sponsored
the bill that became Chapter 450 of the Laws of Maryland of 1976, section 12-201(a)'s
predecessor law. Md. H.B. 885, 1976 Sess.
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through 12-204 of the same article to nearly the same form the con-
tract immunity waiver embodied in 1976.7' The restored section 12-
201 (a), which has not changed since House Bill 1684 became effective
in 1986, reads in relevant part as follows:
§ 12-201. Sovereign immunity defense barred.
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by a law of the
State, the State, its officers, and its units may not raise the
defense of sovereign immunity in a contract action, in a
court of the State, based on a written contract that an official
or employee executed for the State or 1 of its units while the
official or employee was acting within the scope of the au-
thority of the official or employee.76
c. Statutory Interpretation.-The Court of Appeals has long
upheld the cardinal rule that statutes must be interpreted to deter-
mine and effectuate the intent of the legislature. 77 Because the stat-
ute itself is the best evidence of legislative intent,78 the first step in
interpreting a statute is to examine the plain language of the statutory
text, giving words their ordinary and natural meaning. 79 In ascertain-
ing a word's natural meaning, the court often consults a dictionary.8 °
Dictionary definitions, however, are not determinative and are used
75. Q C Corp., 68 Md. App. at 194, 510 A.2d at 1107. The bill renumbered sections 12-
202 through 12-204 as sections 12-201 through 12-203. Md. H.B. 1684, 1986 Sess.
76. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 12-201 (a) (2004). Section 12-201 (b) reads in its
entirety: "Exclusions.-In an action under this subtitle, the State and its officers and units
shall have the immunity from liability described under § 5-522(d) of the Courts and Judi-
cial Proceedings Article." That section provides that "in a contract action under Title 12,
Subtitle 2 of the State Government Article, the State and its officers and units are not liable
for punitive damages." CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 5-522 (2004). Sections 12-202 and 12-203 read
as follows:
§ 12-202. Limitation on claims.
A claim under this subtitle is barred unless the claimant files suit within 1 year
after the later of:
(1) the date on which the claim arose; or
(2) the completion of the contract that gives rise to the claim.
§ 12-203. Budget request to satisfy judgments.
To carry out this subtitle, the Governor shall include in the budget bill money
that is adequate to satisfy a final judgment that, after the exhaustion of the rights
of appeal, is rendered against the State or any of its officers or units.
77. Holbrook v. State, 364 Md. 354, 364, 772 A.2d 1240, 1245-46 (2001).
78. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. CCJ14746, 360 Md. 634, 641, 759 A.2d 755, 759
(2000).
79. Holbrook, 364 Md. at 364, 772 A.2d at 1245-46.
80. See State Dep't of Assessments & Taxation v. Md.-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning
Comm'n, 348 Md. 2, 14, 702 A.2d 690, 696 (1997) (noting that the court often consults
dictionaries when interpreting the ordinary and natural meaning of statutory text).
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merely as an aid in ascertaining the legislature's intent.8' All perti-
nent parts of the text are to be given meaning to the extent possible,
and no part of the law is to be rendered surplusage or meaningless
unless there is a clear indication to the contrary.82
The Court of Appeals has often declined to find implied require-
ments in a statute that the legislature could have explicitly included
had it intended to do so-a disposition consistent with the axiom that
the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature.8"
In Blind Industries and Services of Maryland v. Maryland Department of
General Services, 4 for example, the court considered whether a statute
requiring State entities to buy supplies and services that Blind Indus-
tries provided 85 also required State entities to buy services Blind In-
dustries did not ordinarily offer but had the ability to provide.8 6 In
concluding that it did require such, the court noted that had the legis-
lature intended such an interpretation, "it undoubtedly would have
said so; the statute very easily could have included the phrase, 'or may
in the future provide."' 87 In In re Douglas P., 8 the court similarly re-
jected the petitioner's argument that Maryland's child abuse statute is
limited to adult offenders, reasoning that if the legislature intended to
impose such a limitation, it would have done so explicitly, as it had in
other statutes.8 9
Where the plain language is ambiguous the court may then look
beyond the language of the statute.9 ° The court has defined an am-
81. Bd. of License Comm'rs for Charles County v. Toye, 354 Md. 116, 122-23, 729 A.2d
407, 410 (1999).
82. Chen v. State, 370 Md. 99, 106, 803 A.2d 518, 522 (2002). A clear illustration of the
canon against surplusage is provided in Hyle v. Motor Vehicle Administration, 348 Md. 143,
702 A.2d 760 (1997). There, the court considered whether the absence of a "person"
qualified to administer a breath test to a drunk driving suspect satisfied a statutory provi-
sion allowing a blood test to be administered in the absence of suitable breath test "equip-
ment." Id. at 145, 702 A.2d 760-61. In overturning the administrative law judge's holding
that the term "equipment," as used in the statute, included a "person" qualified to adminis-
ter a breath test, the court noted that if "equipment" encompassed "person," there would
have been no need for the statute to require elsewhere a report both identifying the "quali-
fied person" who administered the test and stating whether the test was performed with
approved "equipment." Id. at 150, 702 A.2d at 763. In other words, one of the two subsec-
tions would have been rendered surplusage. Id.
83. Governor of Md. v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md. 410, 428, 370 A.2d 1102, 1112 (1977).
84. 371 Md. 221, 808 A.2d 782 (2002).
85. MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 14-103 (2004).
86. 371 Md. at 223, 808 A.2d at 783.
87. Id. at 235, 808 A.2d at 790.
88. 333 Md. 387, 635 A.2d 427 (1994).
89. Id. at 393 & n.3, 635 A.2d at 430 & n.3.
90. Comptroller of the Treasury v. Clyde's of Chevy Chase, Inc., 377 Md. 471, 483, 833
A.2d 1014, 1021 (2003).
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biguous statute as one that can be reasonably interpreted more than
one way." In such cases, the court takes the second step of consulting
other indicia of the statute's underlying legislative intent.9 2 Some
commonly consulted sources of insight into legislative intent include
the statute's legislative history,93 amendments made to the statute's
predecessor bills as they passed through the legislature, 4 changes to
the statute after its initial enactment, 95 the practical and legal implica-
tions of competing constructions,96 titles and preambles,97 and
sources of information available to the legislature when drafting the
statute, including commission reports.98
The court has also looked to legislative purpose to aid in the in-
terpretation of a statute once it is deemed ambiguous.99 In Deny v.
State,'00 however, the court looked to the legislative purpose of the
statute at issue, even though it had declared the statute unambigu-
ous.1O' The plain language of a statute should not be read "in a vac-
uum," the court explained, but with reference to its underlying
legislative purpose.10 2 Deny thus supports the alternative view that a
court need not necessarily deem a statute ambiguous to draw properly
from legislative purpose in interpreting a statute.
Where statutory language is deemed ambiguous, the manner in
which the statute alters existing law may also guide the court's inter-
pretation. For instance, the court has applied the canon that statutes
in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed.'0 3 In
Romm v. Flax,'°4 for example, the court invoked the canon in inter-
preting section 10-702 of the Real Property Article, which provided
91. Liverpool v. Baltimore Diamond Exch., 369 Md. 304, 318, 799 A.2d 1264, 1272
(2002).
92. Id. at 317, 799 A.2d at 1272 (noting that when a statute is capable of more than one
meaning the court examines the circumstances surrounding its enactment).
93. Id.
94. Kaczorawski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515, 525 A.2d 628, 633 (1968).
95. Condon v. State of Md.-Univ. of Md., 332 Md. 481, 492, 632 A.2d 753, 758 (1993).
96. Baltimore County v. RTKL Assoc. Inc., 380 Md. 670, 678, 846 A.2d 433, 438 (2004).
97. Tidewater/Havre de Grace, Inc. v. Mayor of Havre de Grace, 337 Md. 338, 347, 653
A.2d 468, 473 (1995).
98. Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 294 Md. 183, 189, 448 A.2d 353, 356 (1982).
99. E.g., Liverpool v. Baltimore Diamond Exch., 369 Md. 304, 318, 799 A.2d 1264, 1272
(2002) (noting that when a statute is capable of more than one meaning, the court inter-
prets statutory language in light of legislative purpose).
100. 358 Md. 325, 748 A.2d 478 (2000).
101. Id. at 336-37, 748 A.2d at 483-85.
102. Id. at 336, 748 A.2d at 483-84.
103. This principle is rooted in Article 5 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, under
which Maryland citizens are guaranteed the common-law of England. Hardy v. State, 301
Md. 124, 131-32, 482 A.2d 474, 478 (1984).
104. 340 Md. 690, 668 A.2d 1 (1995).
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that if a required disclosure statement was delivered more than three
days after a vendor enters into a contract for the sale of property with
the purchaser, the contract was void.10 5 The court first determined
that the statute was ambiguous, noting that "void" could mean either
"of no legal force" or "voidable."106 The court then looked to the
legislative purpose and history of the statute, but found no evidence
that the legislature intended "void" to be interpreted in the former
sense. 10 7 The court further noted that interpreting "void" to mean "of
no legal force" ran counter to precedents in which the court rejected
this reading where it would have impermissibly allowed one party to
avoid contractual obligations by violating conditions precedent.
0 8
Strictly construing the statute because it appeared to alter the com-
mon-law meaning of "void," the court held that because there was no
evidence of legislative intent to the contrary, "void" must not be inter-
preted to mean "of no legal force."10' 9
Since most statutes alter the existing law, as the court noted in
Harrison v. John F. Pilli & Sons, Inc.,' 10 the canon is typically reserved
for statutes that threaten existing contract or property rights or that
interfere with personal liberties.111 Moreover, while the statute at is-
sue in Harrison, which required certain disclosures in connection with
the sale of improved real property, altered the common law, it was
also remedial.' 12 Noting the existence of the countervailing canon
that remedial statutes must be liberally construed to "suppress the evil
and advance the remedy,"' 1 3 the court rejected the lower appellate
court's strict construction of the statute and held that the contracts at
issue clearly fell within the scope of the statutory remedy.
1 14 In Pak v.
Hoang,1 5 the court similarly cautioned that courts should not mind-
lessly adhere to the canon of strict construction in a manner that per-
petuates the very problem the legislature sought to remedy.'
16
Accordingly, upon determining that a statute giving tenants the right
105. Id. at 691-92, 668 A.2d at 1-2.
106. Id. at 694, 668 A.2d 2-3.
107. Id. at 695, 668 A.2d at 3.
108. Id. at 696-97, 668 A.2d at 4.
109. Id. at 698, 668 A.2d at 4-5.
110. 321 Md. 336, 582 A.2d 1231 (1990).
111. Id. at 341, 582 A.2d at 1233 (citing N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION, § 61.06 (4th ed. 1986 rev.)).
112. Id. at 341, 582 A.2d at 1234.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 342, 582 A.2d at 1234.
115. 378 Md. 315, 835 A.2d 1185 (2003).
116. Id. at 326, 835 A.2d at 1191.
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to sue landlords for the return of security deposits was remedial,' 1 7
the court asked whether, when liberally construed, the statute af-
forded the relief sought by the plaintiff; the court held in the
affirmative."11
d. Interpretation of Section 12-201(a).-To comport with the
canon that statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly
construed, and the Court of Appeals's insistence that any diminution
of sovereign immunity must come from the legislature and not the
courts, the Court of Special Appeals held that section 12-201 (a),
which waives sovereign immunity in certain instances," 9 must be nar-
rowly construed.1 2' The Court of Appeals first interpreted section 12-
201 (a) in ARA Health Services, Inc. v. Department of Public Safety and Cor-
rectional Services.12 ' There, the court considered whether the Court of
Special Appeals properly held that the plaintiffs claim for reimburse-
ment under a health services contract with the State failed to satisfy
the requirements of section 12-201 (a) and was therefore barred by
sovereign immunity.122 In reaching its holding, the Court of Special
Appeals emphasized that section 12-201(a) must be narrowly con-
strued to comport with the Court of Appeals's insistence that any dim-
inution of sovereign immunity must come from the legislature and
not the courts, and the canon that statutes in derogation of the com-
mon law must be strictly construed.1 23
On appeal, the Court of Appeals parsed section 12-201(a) into
two elements limiting the application of the statute to actions where
"(1) the contract upon which the claim is based was reduced to writ-
ing; and (2) the State employee or official acted within the scope of
his or her authority in executing the contract.' 24 With respect to the
second element, the court held that "scope of the authority" as usedin 12-201 (a) refers to actual authority, and that contracts entered into
by State officials under apparent authority cannot be enforced against
the State regardless of the reasonableness of the plaintiff's beliefs. 25
Because the purported contractual modification upon which the
117. Id. at 324-28, 835 A.2d at 1190-92.
118. Id. at 328-36, 835 A.2d at 1192-97.
119. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
120. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs. v. ARA Health Servs., Inc., 107 Md. App. 445,457, 668 A.2d 960, 966 (1995), affd per curiam, 344 Md. 85, 685 A.2d 435 (1996).
121. 344 Md. 85, 685 A.2d 435 (1996).
122. Id.
123. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 107 Md. App. at 457, 668 A.2d at 966.
124. ARA Health Sews., 344 Md. at 92, 685 A.2d at 438.
125. Id. at 95, 685 A.2d at 440.
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plaintiff relied exceeded the state entity's actual authority, the court
affirmed, holding that sovereign immunity barried the plaintiff's
claim.126 Thus, under ARA Health Services, to satisfy section 12-201 (a),
plaintiffs must establish that the State official who executed the con-
tract acted with actual authority.127
The ARA Health Services court did not resolve the question of what
if any additional evidence was required to show that that the contract
was "written," and "executed" within the meaning of section 12-
201 (a). As a matter of Maryland common law, making a valid contract
requires neither a writing nor the parties' signatures, unless the par-
ties made them necessary at the time they expressed their assent as a
precondition to that assent. In Porter v. General Boiler Casing Co.,
28 the
court cited these principles in rejecting the trial judge's conclusion
that an employer was not a party to a collective bargaining agreement
simply because there was no signature on its contract with the
union.129 The court noted that the purpose of a signature is to
demonstrate mutuality of assent, which can also be established by the
conduct of the parties. 3 ° Even when a signature is required by stat-
ute, as the court found in Drury v. Young,13 a printed name anywhere
on a memorandum is sufficient if recognized by the named party as its
own and printed with the party's authority.
1 12
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Stern v. Board of Regents, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision holding that sovereign
immunity barred the students' breach of contract claim against the
University System of Maryland for raising the price of tuition for the
Spring 2003 semester after the students had registered and paid their
tuition bills in full.1 3 3 The court concluded that sovereign immunity
was not waived under section 12-201 (a)134 because the alleged con-
tract had not been "executed" within the meaning of the statute."
3 5
Construing section 12-201 (a) narrowly to avoid diluting the doctrine
126. Id at 96, 685 A.2d at 440.
127. Id.
128. 284 Md. 402, 396 A.2d 1090 (1979).
129. Id. at 410-11, 396 A.2d at 1095.
130. Id.
131. 58 Md. 546 (1882).
132. Id. at 554-55. The court held that an alleged contract for the sale of tomatoes
contained all the elements of a complete bargain (i.e., the names of the parties, the quality
and quantity of the goods to be sold, the contract price, the terms of the sale, and place of
delivery) and therefore satisfied the statute of frauds. Id.
133. Stern, 380 Md. at 694, 726, 846 A.2d 996 at 997, 1016.
134. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
135. Stern, 380 Md. at 719-23, 846 A.2d at 1012-14.
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of sovereign immunity, 1 6 the court interpreted the term "executed"
to require the signature of a duly authorized State official.1 3 7 Without
ruling on whether the contract at issue was "written" within the mean-
ing of section 12-201 (a), the court determined that even if it was, the
contract did not satisfy section 12-201 (a) because neither the letter-head nor the university seal on the tuition bills constituted a signature
of a duly authorized State official.138 Thus, the court held that the
waiver of sovereign immunity under section 12-201(a) did not apply
because the contract at issue was not "executed" under the meaning
of the statute.13
9
Writing for the majority, Judge Cathell 4 ° concluded that when
read in a narrow light, section 12-201(a) is "clear and unambigu-
ous." '41 To support this conclusion, the court cited the definitions of
the statutory terms "written contract" and "executed" in Black's Law
Dictionary. 4 2 The court first reviewed Black's definition of a written
contract-"one whose terms have been reduced to writing"14 3 
-and
the commentary accompanying the definition, drawn from the Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts:
Written contracts are also commonly signed, but a written
contract may consist of an exchange of correspondence, of aletter written by the promisee and assented to by the prom-isor without signature, or even of a memorandum or printed
document not signed by either party. Statutes relating to writ-
ten contracts are often expressly limited to contracts signed by one orboth parties. Whether such a limitation is to be implied when not
explicit depends on the purpose and context. 144
Based on this definition, the court found that because "written con-
tract" defines a completed agreement,' 45 the legislature did not need
to use the word "executed" in section 12-201 (a) to convey the same
meaning."' Reasoning that that legislature must have used the term
136. Id. at 720, 846 A.2d at 1012-13.
137. Id. at 723, 846 A.2d at 1014.
138. Id. at 721-23, 846 A.2d at 1013-14.
139. Id. at 723, 846 A.2d at 1014.
140. Judges Raker, Harrell, Battaglia, and Greene joined in the majority opinion.
141. Id. at 720, 846 A.2d at 1013.
142. Id. at 721-22, 846 A.2d at 1013 (quoting BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 327, 589 (7th ed.
1999)).
143. Id. at 721, 846 A.2d at 1013 (quoting BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 142, at
327).
144. Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 142, at 327 (in turn quoting RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 95 cmt. c (1981))) (emphasis in Stern opinion).
145. Id.
146. Id.
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"executed" to place a further limitation on the waiver of immunity in
addition to those already imposed by the term "written contract," the
court concluded that if the term "executed" did not mean "signed," it
would have been surplusage.147 The court, therefore, concluded that
the term "executed," in the context of the statute, meant "signed."
4
'
To further support its interpretation of "executed," the court
cited Black's definition of the term, "executed contract," and an ex-
cerpt of Black's definition of "executed." '149 Black's defines "executed
contract" as "[a] contract that has been fully performed by both par-
ties," or "a signed contract. "150 The portion of Black's definition of
"executed" quoted by the court reads:
(Of a document) that has been signed . .. [T]he term 'exe-
cuted' is a slippery word. Its use is to be avoided except
when accompanied by explanation .... A contract is fre-
quently said to be executed when the document has been
signed, or has been signed, sealed, and delivered. Further,
by executed contract is frequently meant one that has been
fully performed by both parties.151
Viewed in light of these definitions and the principle that statutory
waivers of sovereign immunity are to be narrowly construed to pre-
serve the State's control over government functions and public assets,
the court concluded that section 12-201(a) applies only to written
contracts signed by an authorized State official.
15 2
The court next addressed the students' claim that tuition bills
bearing the university seal were sufficient to satisfy the signature re-
quirement of section 12-201 (a).15 In support of their argument, the
students cited the court's holding in Drury that letterhead satisfied the
signature requirement of the statute of frauds.
154 The court rejected
the students' argument, concluding that the statute of frauds is not
applicable in the sovereign immunity context.
1 55
In addition to section 12-201 (a), the court addressed four other
theories under which the students claimed the Board's immunity had
147. Id.
148. Id. at 723, 846 A.2d at 1014.
149. Id. at 721-22, 846 A.2d at 1013.
150. Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAw DicrIONARY, supra note 142, at 321).
151. Id. at 721-22, 846 A.2d at 1013 (quoting BLACK'S LAw DIcrIONARY, supra note 142, at
589).
152. Id. at 722, 846 A.2d at 1013-14.
153. Id. at 722-23, 846 A.2d at 1014.
154. Id.; Drury v. Young, 58 Md. 546 (1882).
155. Stern, 380 Md. at 722-23, 846 A.2d at 1014.
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been waived. 156 First, the court held that section 13-901 (a) of the Tax
General Article, which authorizes refund claims where the claimant
has been charged more than is legally payable, was inapplicable be-
cause the issue sub judice was whether tuition increases were legal in
the first place.'5 7 Second, the court addressed the applicability of a
cause of action in assumpsit available where a statutory policy autho-
rizes a refund without specifying a remedy. 5 s The court held that the
theory did not apply because no refund policy existed for mid-semes-
ter tuition increases."5 9 Third, the court held that the students could
not maintain their action under the sue and be sued provision of sec-
tion 12-104(b) (3) of the Education Article because they failed to show
that the Board had funds to satisfy judgments or the authority to raise
them.'6 ° Finally, the court held that the students were entitled to no
relief under the common-law rule that sovereign immunity is waived
where the claimant seeks declaratory or injunctive relief from state
action enforcing an unlawful statute or illegally applying a lawful stat-
ute.'61 Because the students neither alleged that the Board acted pur-
suant to an unlawful statute, nor that the Board illegally applied alawful statute, the court held that sovereign immunity barred their
claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. 6 2 Thus, the court re-jected each of the five theories that the students raised in support of
their assertion that sovereign immunity had been waived.' 6 '
In dissent, Judge Wilner argued that section 12-201 (a) precluded
the University from asserting the defense of sovereign immunity.'64
Judge Wilner concluded that the students satisfied section 12-201 (a)
because the alleged contract between the students and the University
was both written and executed by a state official within the meaning of
the statute. 165 First, Judge Wilner determined that because a contract
need not be proven by only one document, the writings between the
156. Id. at 705-18, 723-25, 846 A.2d at 1004-12, 1015-16. To this end the students reliedprincipally on Frankel v. Board of Regents, in which the court discussed section 12-201 (a) and
each of the first three theories mentioned here as a possible basis for its holding that theplaintiff was entitled to a re-classification of his residency for tuition purposes. 361 Md.
298, 761 A.2d 324 (2000).
157. Stern, 380 Md. at 705-06, 846 A.2d at 1004.
158. Id. at 706-09, 846 A.2d at 1005-06.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 709-18, 846 A.2d at 1006-12.
161. Id. at 723-25, 846 A.2d at 1015-16.
162. Id. at 725, 846 A.2d at 1016.
163. Id. at 702-26, 846 A.2d at 1002-16.
164. Id. at 726, 846 A.2d at 1016 (Wilner, J., dissenting). Chief Judge Bell joined in
dissent. Id. (Wilner,J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 727, 846 A.2d at 1017 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
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students and the University-including course catalogs advertising tui-
tion and fees, registration materials, and tuition bills-formed an en-
forceable agreement."'
Second, Judge Wilner determined that section 12-201 (a) did not
impose a signature requirement because the plain language of the
statute does not require the contract to be signed, but merely executed
by an authorized State official.' 6 7 In support of this argument, he
noted the Court of Appeals's holding in Porter v. General Boiler Casing
Co.,16 8 that a signature is not necessary to form a contract, nor always
necessary to establish that a contract has been executed.
169
Finally, Judge Wilner reasoned that the public policy interest
against weakening the doctrine of sovereign immunity must be bal-
anced against the legislature's purpose in enacting section 12-
201 (a)-to remedy the injustice of allowing the State to breach con-
tracts.1 71 If shielded from liability for breaching its contract with pay-
ing students, the University could commit further breaches such as
raising tuition for a given semester retroactively after its conclusion
171
or shutting down schools mid-semester to absorb budget cuts without
returning tuition payments. 172 As such, Judge Wilner concluded that
the court's interpretation of section 12-201 (a) was out of balance with
the purpose for which it was enacted.
173
4. Analysis.-In Stern v. Board of Regents, the Court of Appeals
held that tuition contracts between the University System of Maryland
and its students did not meet the requirements of section 12-201 (a) of
the State Government Article,17 4 which waives the defense of sover-
eign immunity in certain contract actions against the State.
175 Nar-
rowly interpreting the statute to avoid diluting the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, the court concluded that the statutory text was
unambiguous 1 7 6 and that the students' contract was not "executed"
within the meaning of the statute because it was not signed by an au-
166. Id. at 728-29, 846 A.2d at 1017-18 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 730-31, 846 A.2d at 1019 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
168. 284 Md. 402, 396 A.2d 1090 (1979).
169. Stern, 380 Md. at 731, 846 A.2d at 1019 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 731, 846 A.2d at 1019.
171. Id. at 729, 846 A.2d at 1018.
172. Id. at 729 n.3, 846 A.2d at 1018 n.3.
173. Id. at 731, 846 A.2d at 1019.
174. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 12-201 (a) (2004); see supra note 76 and accompany-
ing text.
175. Stern, 380 Md. at 719-23, 846 A.2d at 1012-14.
176. Id. at 720, 846 A.2d at 1013.
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thorized State official. 177 In strictly interpreting the statute, the court
improperly advanced its own policy of disfavoring sovereign immunity
waivers while ignoring the statute's remedial purpose. 17' The court's
resultant conclusion that section 12-201 (a) is unambiguous disre-
garded a compelling alternative interpretation of the statute 179 and
the legislature's decision not to explicitly articulate a signature re-
quirement.8 0 The court should have acknowledged the ambiguity of
the statute and examined other surrounding indicia of the legisla-
ture's intent.'8 ' Had it done so, it would have found a body of evi-
dence that suggested that limiting the scope of section 12-201 (a) to
signed contracts undermines the broad remedy the statute was en-
acted to implement.'8 2
a. The Court Should Have Acknowledged the Ambiguity of Section
12 -2 01(a)'s Plain Language.-In concluding that section 12-201 (a) is
unambiguous, 8 3 the Stern court failed to recognize at least two signs
that the statute is ambiguous when read in light of its ordinary and
natural meaning.1 8 4 First, the statute is subject to at least two reasona-
ble interpretations, placing it squarely within the court's own defini-
tion of an ambiguous statute.'85 Second, whereas other Maryland
statutes explicitly articulate signature requirements, section 12-201 (a)
does not.18
6
The same legal dictionary cited by the court in support of its in-
terpretation reveals that section 12-201 (a) is susceptible to at least two
reasonable interpretations.18 7 While Black's Law Dictionary definitions
cited in the opinion suggest that a contract may be executed with or
without a signature, the court selectively quoted from only those defi-
177. Id. at 720-23, 846 A.2d at 1013-14.
178. See infra notes 246-262 and accompanying text.
179. See infra notes 188-208 and accompanying text.
180. See infra notes 209-215 and accompanying text.
181. See infra notes 216-245 and accompanying text.
182. See infra notes 216-245 and accompanying text.
183. Stern, 380 Md. at 720, 722, 846 A.2d at 1013-14.
184. See In re Adoption/Guardianship No. CCJ14746, 360 Md. 634, 641, 759 A.2d 755,
759 (2000) (stating that the best evidence of legislative intent is found in the ordinary and
natural meaning of the statute's plain language).
185. See Liverpool v. Bait. Diamond Exch., 369 Md. 304, 318, 799 A.2d 1264, 1272(2002) (stating that a statute is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to more than one
definition).
186. See infra notes 209-215 and accompanying text.
187. See State Dep't of Assessments & Taxation v. Md.-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning
Comm'n, 348 Md. 2, 14, 702 A.2d 690, 696 (1997) (noting that court often consults dic-
tionaries when interpreting the ordinary and natural meaning of statutory text).
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nitions supporting the former. 88 For instance, the court quoted
Black's first definition of "executed": "(Of a document) that has been
signed,"189 yet omitted the second definition: "That has been done,
given, or performed <executed consideration>." 0 Thus, even if sec-
tion 12-201 (a) may be reasonably interpreted as applying to contracts
that have been "signed" by a State official, the definition the court
omitted suggests the equally reasonable interpretation that the statute
applies to contracts "done, given, or performed" by a State official.1 91
Black's definition of "execute," also absent from the opinion, presents
similar alternatives: "To make (a legal document) valid by signing; to
bring (a legal document) into its final, legally enforceable
form . .. .92 Such definitions suggest that a signature is but one
means of accomplishing the larger end of rendering a contract en-
forceable. 93 The majority, however, failed to acknowledge that the
mutuality of assent required to form a binding contract may be estab-
lished by means other than a written signature, such as the conduct of
the parties,194 thus ignoring at least one reasonable alternative inter-
pretation of the statute.
188. See Stern, 380 Md. 721-22, 846 A.2d at 1013 (quoting excerpts from Black's Law
Dictionary's definitions of "written contract," "executed contract," and "executed" (quoting
BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY, supra note 142, at 321, 327, 589)).
189. Id. at 721, 846 A.2d at 1013 (quoting BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 142, at
589).
190. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 142, at 589. Black's further explains that "exe-
cuted" is a "slippery word" whose "use is to be avoided except when accompanied by an
explanation." Id. The court quoted this portion of the definition,.yet made no attempt to
reconcile this characterization of "executed" with its assertion that the term's meaning is
unambiguous. See Stern, 380 Md. at 720, 846 A.2d at 1013.
191. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY, supra note 142, at 589.
192. Id. The court also quotes Black's definition of "executed contract": "[a] contract
that has been fully performed by both parties.. . [a] signed contract." Stern, 380 Md. at
721, 846 A.2d at 1013 (quoting BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 142, at 321). Section
12-201(a), however, cannot be reasonably interpreted to incorporate this meaning. This
term is the antonym of "executory contract," which Black's defines as "a contract that re-
mains wholly unperformed or for which there remains something still to be done on both
sides... ." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 142, at 321. Because the universities had
yet to enroll the students at the agreed upon price, their contract was executory. See Stern,
380 Md. at 728, 846 A.2d 1017 (Wilner, J., dissenting) (concluding that the students' con-
tract was executory). Under a contract that is executed as opposed to executory, parties
have fully performed their obligations, leaving few if any circumstances under which a
cause of action for breach of contract could arise. Indeed, to interpret section 12-201 (a) to
waive the State's contract immunity only after there is no cause of action for breach of
contract would be to render the statute a nullity.
193. See BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY, supra note 142, at 589.
194. Porter v. Gen. Boiler Casing Co., 284 Md. 402, 410, 396 A.2d 1090, 1095 (1979).
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The court, however, argued that if "executed" did not mean
"signed," it would have been surplusage, 195 invoking the canon that
statutes must be interpreted to avoid rendering any part of the statute
surplusage.96 This argument rests on the flawed premise that the
term "written contract," as used in section 12-201(a), means com-
pleted agreement."' Based on this premise, the court reasoned that
it would be redundant if "executed" also meant "completed," and
therefore that "executed" must impose a further limitation.'9 8 The
only authority the court cites in support of the proposition that "writ-
ten contract" means "completed agreement" is Black's Law Dictionary
definition of "written contract"-one "whose terms have been re-
duced to writing."199 The court goes on to quote a portion of the
Black's definition taken from the Restatement (Second) of Contracts- "writ-
ten contracts are also commonly signed, but ... may consist of ... a
letter written by the promisee and assented to by the promisor without
a signature ... or even of a ... printed document not signed by either
party."20 ' Even assuming that by "completed," which does not appear
in the definition, the court meant "assented to," the court's argument
that "written contract" means both "reduced to writing" and "assented
to" ignores the equally compelling possibility that "written" simply
means "reduced to writing, '20 1 and that "executed" means "assented
to. "202
195. Stern, 380 Md. at 721, 846 A.2d at 1013.
196. See Chen v. State, 370 Md. 99, 106, 803 A.2d 518, 522 (2002) (noting canon against
surplusage in recital of court's principles of statutory construction); Hyle v. Motor Vehicle
Admin., 348 Md. 143, 150, 702 A.2d 760, 763 (1997) (overturning administrative law
judge's interpretation of a statutory term that rendered other parts of the statute
surplusage).
197. See Stern, 380 Md. at 721, 846 A.2d at 1013.
198. Id.
199. Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 142, at 327).
200. Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 142, at 327 (in turn quoting RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 95 cmt. c (1981))). It is noteworthy that Black'squo-
tation of the Restatement commentary omits the Restatement commentary's citation to
Chapter 5 of the Restatement, entitled "The Statute of Frauds." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 95 cmt. c (1981). The students similarly invoked the statue of frauds in sup-
port of their argument that because printed letterhead had been held as a matter of equity
to satisfy the statute of frauds' signature requirement, so too should the printed memo-
randa and tuition bills bearing the University seal satisfy any signature requirement im-
posed by section 12-201 (a). Stern, 380 Md. at 722-23, 846 A.2d at 1014. The court rejected
the argument, declaring the statute of frauds inapplicable in the context of sovereign im-
munity. Id. at 720, 846 A.2d at 1013. The court thus relied on the statute of frauds in one
instance to support its assertion that "written contract" means "completed agreement,"
only to reject it three paragraphs later when invoked by the students. See id. at 721-23, 846
A.2d at 1013-14.
201. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 142, at 327.
202. Id. at 589.
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Even under the court's approach of substituting the term
"signed" for the term "executed" in section 12-201 (a), the statute is no
less ambiguous. Black's Law Dictionary suggests two possible interpreta-
tions of the term "signed": one which narrowly limits the conception
of a signature to "[a] person's name or mark written by that per-
son... " and another which more broadly conceptualizes the term as
including "[a]ny name, mark, or writing used with the intention of
authenticating a document. "20 While the court does not explicitly
define what constitutes a signature within the meaning of section 12-
201(a), in holding that letterhead, school stamps, and insignias can-
not satisfy section 12-201 (a), the court clearly rejected the broader
conception of what constitutes a signature.20 4 Accordingly, under the
narrow definition, an individual may not enforce written contracts
against the State under section 12-201 (a) unless a person duly author-
ized by the State to do so personally signed the contract. 2 5 As Black's
Law Dictionary suggests, the term "signature," like the term "executed,"
is subject to at least two reasonable interpretations-one broad and
one narrow.20 6 Regardless of which word is used, section 12-201 (a)
appears susceptible to competing reasonable interpretations, 20 7 and
therefore meets the court's own definition of an ambiguous statute.20 8
Weighing further against the Stern court's conclusion that section
12-201 (a) is unambiguously limited to signed contracts is the fact that
the statute does not impose such a limitation explicitly.20 9 Whereas
the court in Blind Industries and In re Douglas P. declined to read terms
into the statutes at issue that the legislature could have explicitly in-
cluded if it so desired,210 the Stern court read an implied signature
requirement into section 12-201 (a) that the statute could have explic-
itly articulated but did not.21  The In re Douglas court, for instance,
203. Id. at 1387.
204. See Stern, 380 Md. at 722, 846 A.2d at 1014 (noting that the holding was reached in
light of "narrow definitions").
205. Id. at 731, 846 A.2d at 1019 (Wilner, J., dissenting) (noting that the court's holding
in effect restricts section 12-201(a) to contracts personally signed by the authority).
206. BLACK's LAw DICrIONARY, supra note 142, at 589, 1387.
207. See supra notes 187-202 and accompanying text (discussing the competing interpre-
tations of the term "executed").
208. See Liverpool v. Balt. Diamond Exch., 369 Md. 304, 318, 799 A.2d 1246, 1272
(2002) (finding a statute ambiguous where it is reasonably capable of supporting more
than one meaning).
209. See Stern, 380 Md. at 722, 846 A.2d at 1013-14 (citing policy and narrow dictionary
definitions as basis of holding).
210. Blind Indus. & Serv. of Md. v. Md. Dep't of Gen. Serv., 371 Md. 221, 808 A.2d 782
(2002); In re Douglas P., 333 Md. 387, 635 A.2d 427 (1994); see supra notes 83-89 and
accompanying text.
211. Stern, 380 Md. at 722, 846 A.2d at 1013-14.
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refused to read an implied limitation into the statute based on the fact
that the legislature had explicitly adopted the same limitation in an-
other instance.21 2 In contrast, the Stern court ignored the fact that
another section of the State Government Article contains an explicit
signature requirement, 213 thus establishing that the legislature could
have explicitly imposed a signature requirement under section 12-
201 (a) had it intended to do so. Finally, whereas the Blind Industries
and In re Douglas courts consulted the legislative history of the statutes
to determine whether the legislature intended to broaden or narrow
the reach of the statute in a manner not explicitly stated,214 the Stern
court reached the paradoxical conclusion that section 12-201(a)
unambiguously imposes an implied signature requirement. 215
b. Other Indicia of the Legislature's Intent Establish That the
Court's Interpretation of Section 12-201(a) Fails to Effectuate the Statute's
Broad Remedial Purpose.-After reaching its strained conclusion that
section 12-201(a) is unambiguous,216 the Stern court examined no in-
dicia of legislative intent beyond the plain language of the statute.217
Among the many extrinsic aids courts use when interpreting ambigu-
ous statutes,218 three available to the Stern court included the Commis-
sion Report;219 the pre- and postenactment legislative history of
section 12-201 (a)'s predecessor law;220 and the legal and practical ef-
212. See In re Douglas P., 333 Md. at 393, 635 A.2d at 430 (noting that the legislature had
explicitly confined section 3-831 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article to adult
offenders).
213. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 19-108 (2004) (requiring certificates of acknowl-
edgment to be executed by the signature of an officer). Prior to the enactment of section
12-201 (a)'s predecessor law in 1976, what is now section 19-108 of the State Government
Article was codified at article 18, section 8 of the Annotated Code of Maryland. As then
codified, the statute provided that "[t]he certificate of the acknowledging officer shall be
completed by his signature. . . ." MD. ANN. CODE art. 18, § 8 (1973).
214. Blind Indus. & Servs. of Md., 371 Md. at 234-35, 808 A.2d at 789-90; In re Douglas P.,
333 Md. at 393-94, 635 A.2d at 430.
215. See Stern, 380 Md. at 720-22, 846 A.2d at 1013-14 (holding that when read narrowly,
pursuant to public policy against waivers of sovereign immunity, section 12-201 (a) is unam-
biguous and that the term "executed" must mean "signed").
216. Id. at 720, 846 A.2d at 1013.
217. See id. (noting the principle that the court will not look beyond the statute's plain
language unless the statute is ambiguous).
218. See supra text accompanying notes 93-98.
219. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 56. See Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 294 Md. 183, 189, 448
A.2d 353, 356 (1982) (listing commission reports among the extrinsic aids properly con-
sulted when interpreting an ambiguous statute).
220. See supra notes 52-75 and accompanying text; Kaczarowski v. Mayor of Bait., 309
Md. 505, 515, 525 A.2d 628, 633 (1968) (noting that courts often consider amendments
made to a statute as it passed through legislature and its relationship to past and future
legislation).
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fects of competing constructions. 221 Each of these aids yields compel-
ling evidence that the legislature did not intend to limit the waiver of
section 12-201 (a) to actions arising from signed contracts.
(1) The Commission Report.-The Commission Report es-
tablishes that the Governor's Commission to Study Sovereign Immu-
nity did not contemplate or recommend adding a signature
requirement to the statute and presents empirical data that contra-
dicts the court's rationale for narrowly construing section 12-
201 (a) .222 To determine how best to limit the fiscal impact of abroga-
tion, the Commission documented what the forty-four states that had
abrogated sovereign immunity in contract actions as of 1976 did to
limit their respective waivers.2 2' The Commission Report does not
mention any state that had limited abrogation to contract actions aris-
ing from signed contracts. 2 24 Thus, the signature requirement read
into section 12-201 (a) by the Stern court is now the only limitation on
the statute that was neither employed by another state at the time sec-
tion 12-201 (a)'s predecessor law was enacted, nor studied by the
Commission.
2 25
The Commission Report also undercuts the court's policy ratio-
nale for narrowly interpreting section 12-201 (a), namely, to preserve
the government's control over the State treasury and prevent interfer-
ence with government functions.226 All forty-four states that had abro-
gated sovereign immunity in contract actions as of 1876, none of
which expressly limited abrogation to actions arising from signed con-
tracts, reported that the effects of abrogation had been negligible.227
The Stern court's assertion that a signature requirement is necessary to
protect the State from the fiscal and administrative burden of defend-
ing contract claims, even though section 12-203 requires the Governor
to allocate the necessary funds to pay such claims, therefore conflicts
with the empirical data that shaped section 12-201 (a).228
221. See Balt. County v. RTKL Assoc. Inc., 380 Md. 670, 678, 846 A.2d at 433, 438 (2004)
(noting that where the statute is ambiguous the court may look to legal and rational conse-
quences of competing constructions).
222. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 56; Stern, 380 Md. at 722, 846 A.2d at 1014.
223. See supra notes 58-59 (listing examples of limitations adopted in various states).
224. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 56, at 64-95 (surveying limitations imposed on
other states' contract immunity waivers as of 1976).
225. See id.
226. See Stern, 380 Md. at 722, 846 A.2d at 1013-14.
227. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 56, at app. J-2.
228. MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 12-203 (2004); see ch. 450, 1976 Md. Laws 1180,
1181 (preamble) (noting that the Governor's Commission had thoroughly studied the im-
plications of abrogating the State's immunity from contract actions).
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(2) Legislative Histoy.-The pre- and postenactment legis-
lative history of Chapter 450, section 12-201 (a)'s predecessor law,
counsels further against the Stern court's conclusion that the statute
implicitly imposes a written signature requirement. Each element of
section 12-201 (a) was incorporated into the statute's predecessor bill
to accomplish an objective that the earlier bills vetoed by the Gover-
nor did not.229 To preserve the State's immunity from negligence ac-
tions masquerading as contract actions (e.g., where a victim of an auto
accident caused by ice alleges the state breached a contractual obliga-
tion to remove ice promptly from roadways), section 12-201 (a) limits
the waiver to actions arising from written contracts. 230 To preserve
the defense of unauthorized contracts, section 12-201 (a) limits the
waiver to actions arising from contracts executed on the State's behalf
by an official acting within the scope of the official's authority.231 It is
therefore unsurprising that when the court first had occasion to parse
section 12-201 (a) in ARA Health Services, Inc., it broke the single sen-
tence containing both limitations into two elements, each connected
to a specific objective of the statute, one satisfied by a writing, and the
other by a State official's exercise of actual authority.232 By adding a
personal signature requirement to section 12-201 (a),233 the Stern
court created a third element that is both redundant and uncon-
nected with any of the statute's objectives. Indeed, because the writ-
ing at issue conceivably amounted to an express contract, and because
the Board did not contend that the documents constituting the writ-
ing (i.e., catalogs and tuition bills) were not prepared with actual au-
thority, the tuition contracts satisfied the two legislative objectives
underlying section 12-201 (a).234 The court's imposition of a signature
requirement therefore was not only unnecessary to fulfill the objec-
229. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 56, at B-22 to B-25; see also Balt. County v. RTKL
Assoc., Inc., 380 Md. 670, 681-83, 846 A.2d 433, 439-40 (2004) (noting that limitations
identified in the Commission Report were incorporated into House Bill 885 after the Gov-
ernor expressed his desire to await the Commission's findings upon vetoing House Bill
1672).
230. § 12-201(a); COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 56, at B-23.
231. Id. Other sections of the current waiver statute exclude punitive damages, § 12-
201 (b); provide funds for the satisfaction of judgments, § 12-203; and impose a time limit
on claims, § 12-202.
232. ARA Health Servs., Inc. v. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 344 Md. 85, 92, 685
A.2d 435, 438 (1996).
233. Stern, 380 Md. at 723, 846 A.2d at 1014.
234. See id. at 730, 846 A.2d at 1019-20 (Wilner, J., dissenting) (arguing that the stu-
dents' contracts are express). But see id. at 722, 846 A.2d at 1014 (declining to decide
whether the students' contracts were "written" within the meaning of section 12-201 (a)).
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tives of the statute's limitations, but defeated both the students' claim
and the statute's overarching remedial purpose.2 3 5
The postenactment legislative history of section 12-201 (a)'s pred-
ecessor law further suggests that the legislature intended to establish a
broader waiver of contract immunity than the court effectuated. In
response to the 1980 law that appeared to limit section 12-201 (a)'s
predecessor law to procurement contracts 23 6 the legislature quickly re-
enacted the contract immunity waiver in a form all but identical to the
original waiver enacted in 1976, making clear that attempts to narrow
the scope of the waiver were disfavored.23 7 Yet in reading a signature
requirement into section 12-201 (a), the Stern court did precisely that.
In Q C Corp., the court further held that the 1980 law was not intended
to narrow the scope of the contract immunity waiver, noting that the
Commission Report made clear the intent of the General Assembly in
enacting the waiver was to establish a broad waiver of immunity.
238
Yet the Stern court not only narrowly construed the statute, 239 but did
so wholly without reference to the statute's remedial purpose.
(3) The Practical and Legal Effect of Competing Construc-
tions.-Finally, the Stern court's interpretation of section 12-201 (a) ig-
nores potentially unconscionable practical and legal consequences.
As Judge Wilner noted in his dissent, the court's interpretation may
place severe and potentially unconscionable burdens on those to
whom the legislature sought to provide a remedy unavailable at com-
mon law.24 0 He notes, for example, that the holding in Stern allows
the Board to retroactively bill the students after the completion of a
semester, or to shut down school as a cost-saving measure after stu-
dents have paid tuition.2 4 1 On the other hand, an interpretation of
section 12-201 (a) that limits its waiver to written contracts rendered
legally binding by an authorized state official, whether by signature,
letterhead, or other evidence of assent poses no discernable threat to
the State's control over the public treasury or to the operation of gov-
ernment.24 2 While this interpretation may have placed a burden on
235. See id. at 731, 846 A.2d at 1019 (Wilner, J., dissenting) (noting that section 12-
201(a) was passed to correct the injustice of allowing the State to breach solemn
contracts).
236. 1980 Md. Laws 775.
237. See Q C Corp. v. Md. Port Admin., 68 Md. App. 181, 194, 510 A.2d 1101, 1108-09
(1986).
238. Id. at 190, 510 A.2d at 1106.
239. Stem, 380 Md. at 720, 846 A.2d at 1012-13.
240. Id. at 729-30 & n.3, 846 A.2d at 1018 & n.3 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
241. Id. (Wilner,J., dissenting).
242. See supra notes 226-228 and accompanying text.
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the Board to meet its budget shortfall in the short term, such a predic-
ament would not have been the result of the State's vulnerability to
unpredictable contract actions, but of its failure to provide minimal
notice of the tuition increase before accepting payment for the initial,
agreed-upon price. 4 As Judge Wilner noted, had the Board notified
the students of the possibility of a tuition increase when it first consid-
ered the measure in November 2002, it would have avoided liability
for breach of contract. 24 4 Whereas the Board can avoid similar con-
tract actions in the future by providing minimal notice of pending
tuition hikes, Stern now subjects Maryland students to the prospect of
unannounced and retroactive tuition hikes even after the university
has accepted payment for the initially announced price as payment in
full. 2 4 5
c. The Court's Narrow Construction of Section 12-201(a) Improp-
erly Elevated Its Own Policy of Disfavoring Sovereign Immunity Waivers Above
the Statute's Remedial Purpose.-The Stern court's decision to interpret
section 12-201 (a) in a narrow light without considering the statute's
remedial purpose departs from court precedent in several respects.
The court reasoned that as an unfavored legislative waiver of sover-
eign immunity, section 12-201 (a) must be read in a narrow light to
further the policy of preventing interference with the State's control
over government functions and the public treasury. 24 6 Yet in doing so
without reference to the statute's remedial purpose, the court's ap-
proach ran afoul of its prior decisions strictly construing statutes in
derogation of the common law;247 the countervailing canon that re-
medial statutes should be liberally construed;248 and recent decisions
emphasizing that even unambiguous statutory language should not be
read without reference to its underlying purpose.2 4 9
First, the Stern court's application of a policy-driven strict con-
struction at the plain language stage of the interpretation 25 0 breaks
with its prior applications of the canon that statutes in derogation of
sovereign immunity should be strictly construed. Whereas in Romm
the court invoked the canon only after finding the statute at issue am-
243. Stern, 380 Md. at 727 n.1, 846 A.2d at 1016 n.1 (Wilner,J., dissenting).
244. Id. (Wilner, J., dissenting).
245. See id. at 698, 846 A.2d at 1000 (noting that most students had received $0 account
balances after paying the initial tuition price announced).
246. Stern, 380 Md. at 722, 846 A.2d at 1013-14.
247. See infra notes 250-254 and accompanying text.
248. See infra notes 255-257 and accompanying text.
249. See infra notes 258-262 and accompanying text.
250. Stern, 380 Md. at 722, 846 A.2d at 1013-14.
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biguous and considering its legislative purpose and history,25 ' the
Stern court strictly construed section 12-201 (a) while asserting that the
statute was unambiguous, and without consulting any surrounding in-
dicia of legislative intent.25 2 Indeed, if a statute is unambiguous, a
court should not have to resort to a canon of strict construction in
order to effectuate its underlying legislative intent.253 The Stern court
therefore applied the canon favoring strict construction of statutes
that abrogate the common law in a manner that abandoned the cau-
tion with which the court applied the canon in prior decisions.
Second, in narrowly interpreting section 12-201 (a),254 the Stern
court failed to address the countervailing principle that remedial stat-
utes are to be liberally construed to effectuate the remedy.2 55 Like the
statutes at issue in Pak and Harrison, section 12-201 (a) altered the
common law, but did so to remedy an injustice.25 6 However, whereas
the Pak and Harrison courts took pains not to so strictly construe those
statutes as to undermine their respective remedial mandates, the Stern
court avoided addressing the purpose of section 12-201 (a) alto-
gether.2 57 Avoiding inquiry into the purpose of section 12-201 (a) in
turn precluded any discussion of whether the statute is remedial, and
if so, whether the remedy the legislature intended to create was availa-
ble to the students. Even if strict rather than liberal construction was
appropriate, the court should have, at a minimum, taken stock of sec-
251. Romm v. Flax, 340 Md. 690, 698, 668 A.2d 1, 5 (1995). The Romm court also con-
sidered the effect of competing constructions. Id. While the Stem court based its narrow
interpretation specifically on the principle that statutes abrogating the specific common-
law doctrine of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed, 380 Md. at 722, 846 A.2d at
1013-14, the Court of Special Appeals has noted that this principle comports with the ca-
non that statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed. Dep't of
Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs. v. ARA Health Servs., Inc., 107 Md. App. 445, 457, 668 A.2d 960,
966 (1995), affd per curiam, 344 Md. 85, 685 A.2d 435 (1996).
252. See Stern, 380 Md. at 720-22, 846 A.2d at 1013-14 (declaring section 12-201 (a) unam-
biguous and noting that court's interpretation was guided by policy disfavoring sovereign
immunity waivers and dictionary definitions).
253. See Harrison v. John F. Pilli & Sons, Inc., 321 Md. 336, 342, 582 A.2d 1231, 1234
(1990) (holding that it is not necessary or preferable to invoke canons of strict or narrow
construction where the statute is not ambiguous); N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 61.2 (6th ed. 2004) (noting that strict construction is applied most con-
clusively when it is corroborated by other tools of interpretation).
254. Stem, 380 Md. at 720, 722, 846 A.2d at 1013-14.
255. See Harrison, 321 Md. at 341-42, 582 A.2d at 1234 (recognizing the canon).
256. Id. at 341, 582 A.2d at 1234; Pak v. Hoang, 378 Md. 315, 324-28, 835 A.2d 1185,
1190-92 (2003); Stern, 380 Md. at 731, 846 A.2d at 1019 (WilnerJ., dissenting) (noting that
the legislative history of section 12-201 (a) makes clear it was intended to be remedial in
nature).
257. See Stern, 380 Md. at 719-23, 846 A.2d at 1012-14 (interpreting statute based on
policy-driven strict construction and dictionary definitions).
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tion 12-201 (a)'s remedial purpose to ensure that it was not defeated
by an overly strict construction.
Finally, the court's failure to inquire into section 12-201 (a)'s un-
derlying purpose cannot be justified on the basis that the court found
the statute to be unambiguous. While the court typically looks to leg-
islative purpose only after deeming a statute ambiguous, 25 8 in Deny,
the court resorted to the legislative purpose of the statute at issue even
though it found the statute was not ambiguous.259 In contrast to both
of these approaches, the Stern court avoided the purpose of section 12-
201 (a) altogether, seemingly in adherence to the principle that courts
are to look beyond a statute's plain language only where the statute is
ambiguous. 260 True adherence to this principle, however, would have
also precluded the court's decision to look beyond the plain language
of section 12-201 (a) to the policy rationale of the doctrine it was de-
signed to abrogate.2 11 If the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is
to effectuate the intention of the legislature, 262 where a statute is de-
signed to abrogate a court created doctrine, a proper interpretation
of that statute should not give greater weight to the purpose of the
court created doctrine than to the purpose of the statute itself.
5. Conclusion.-In Stern, the Court of Appeals held that the
Board of Regents' sovereign immunity was not waived under section
12-201 (a) of the State Government Article in an action alleging that
the Board's approval of a mid-year tuition increase breached its mem-
ber institutions' contracts with their respective students. 26 3  After
deeming section 12-201 (a) unambiguous,2 64 the court held that the
statute implicitly limits its waiver to actions arising from written con-
tracts bearing a duly authorized State official's signature, and that tui-
tion bills bearing university seals did not meet the statute's signature
requirement. 265 In so holding, the court improperly placed its policy
258. See, e.g., Comptroller of the Treasury v. Clyde's of Chevy Chase, Inc., 377 Md. 471,
483, 833 A.2d 1014, 1021 (2003) (stating that it is appropriate to examine material that
bears on the legislative purpose once the statute has been found ambiguous); Liverpool v.
Bait. Diamond Exch., 369 Md. 304, 318, 799 A.2d 1246, 1272 (2002) (noting that when a
statute is capable of more than one meaning, the court interprets statutory language in
light of legislative purpose).
259. Derry v. State, 358 Md. 325, 336, 748 A.2d 478, 483-84 (2000).
260. Stern, 380 Md. at 720, 846 A.2d at 1013.
261. See id. at 722, 846 A.2d at 1013-14 (noting that § 12-201 (a) "must be viewed within
the context of an unfavored limitation on a well-recognized and ancient doctrine with a
strong public policy . . .").
262. Holbrook v. State, 364 Md. 354, 364, 772 A.2d 1240, 1245-46 (2001).
263. Stern, 380 Md. at 719-23, 846 A.2d at 1012-14.
264. Id. at 720, 846 A.2d at 1013.
265. Id. at 722-23, 846 A.2d at 1014.
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of disfavoring sovereign immunity waivers above the remedial purpose
266 Ateaof the statute, ignored the ambiguity of the statute's plain lan-
guage, 26 7 and failed to examine a body of extra-textual evidence
weighing against its interpretation.268 As a result, the court reached a
decision that allows the State to escape liability for even egregious
breaches of contract clearly within section 12-201 (a)'s intended
scope.269
ADAM CONNOLLY
266. See supra notes 246-261 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 183-215 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 216-245 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 240-245 and accompanying text.
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III. CRIMINAL LAW
A. A Missed Opportunity to Apply the Doctrine of Transferred Intent to
Inchoate Crimes
In Harrison v. State,' the Court of Appeals of Maryland examined
whether the transferred intent doctrine2 should be applied to permit
the charge of attempted second-degree murder for an unintended vic-
tim.3 The court held that transferred intent does not apply to incho-
ate offenses.4 In so doing, the court failed to recognize that its
reasons for rejecting the application of transferred intent to inchoate
crimes apply equally to the application of concurrent intent,5 which
the court, nonetheless, found to be applicable to attempt offenses.6
Furthermore, the court's decision in Harrison will allow chance to im-
properly alter criminal liability by treating two defendants differently
whose conduct results in the same level of harm to their victims and
who are equally culpable for their actions.7 The court should have
applied transferred intent to inchoate offenses only where bystanders
are injured, thus providing an appropriate standard to limit liability.8
By applying transferred intent to attempt crimes where a bystander
suffers physical injury, the court would have better served public pol-
icy by punishing criminals with proportionate penalties and deterring
dangerous violent conduct.9
1. 382 Md. 477, 855 A.2d 1220 (2004) [hereinafter Harrison I]].
2. The transferred intent doctrine is "[t]he rule that if one person intends to harm a
second person but instead unintentionally harms a third, the first person's criminal or
tortious intent toward the second applies to the third as well." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1563 (8th ed. 2004).
3. Harrison I, 382 Md. at 480, 855 A.2d at 1221-22.
4. Id. An inchoate offense is a "step toward the commission of another crime."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 1108. Attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation are
the three types of inchoate crimes. Id.
5. Concurrent intent is a theory of liability "when the nature and scope of [an] attack,
while directed at a primary victim, are such that we can conclude the perpetrator intended
to ensure harm to the primary victim by harming everyone in that victim's vicinity." Ford v.
State, 330 Md. 682, 716, 625 A.2d 984, 1000 (1993).
6. See infra notes 150-161 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's failure to
recognize that its reasons for rejecting the application of transferred intent to inchoate
offenses apply to concurrent intent as well).
7. See infra notes 162-176 and accompanying text (exploring the problematic conse-
quences of the court's willingness to allow chance to alter criminal liability).
8. See infra notes 177-180 and accompanying text (criticizing the court's failure to
discuss approaches to limit the scope of criminal liability when applying transferred intent
to inchoate crimes).
9. See infra notes 181-206 and accompanying text (discussing the positive policy impli-
cations of adopting such an approach).
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1. The Case.-On July 27, 2001, James Cook was standing on a
sidewalk in Baltimore City talking with friends when he was struck in
the neck with a bullet.1 ° Gerard Harrison and a man known as Twin
Shitty"' fired shots at a man named Valentine.' 2 Harrison fired six
shots from a .38 caliber handgun; all of the bullets missed Valentine
and instead one of the bullets struck Cook.'" Cook was taken to Sinai
Hospital where he underwent surgery and ultimately survived his
injuries. 4
A witness to the incident was shown a photo array and identified
Harrison as one of the shooters.' 5 In a statement to police on August
22, Harrison said that he and his cohort shot at Valentine because
Valentine was selling drugs and he had previously told Valentine not
to deal in the area. 6
Subsequently, Harrison was charged in a nine-count indictment
in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.' v On June 12, 2002, the cir-
cuit court convicted Harrison of attempted second-degree murder
and unlawful use of a handgun in the commission of a crime.' Harri-
son was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of twelve years for the
former offense and five years for the latter. 9
On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, Harrison claimed that
the agreed statement of facts was not adequate to support his convic-
tion for attempted murder because there was no evidence that he har-
bored the specific intent to kill Cook.20 The Court of Special Appeals
held that the doctrine of transferred intent could not be used to sup-
port Harrison's conviction because the Court of Appeals stated in Poe
10. Cook was standing on the fifteen hundred block of Clifton Avenue. Harrison II, 382
Md. at 483, 855 A.2d at 1223-24.
11. "Twin Shitty" is the only name by which the second shooter is known. Harrison v.
State, 151 Md. App. 648, 652 n.2, 828 A.2d 249, 251 n.2 (2003) [hereinafter Harrison 1].
12. Harrison II, 382 Md. at 483, 855 A.2d at 1224.
13. Id. at 484-85, 855 A.2d at 1224. Harrison fired all of the bullets in his gun and Twin
Shitty fired shots from the two guns that he carried; the two men then fled the scene. Id at
484, 855 A.2d at 1224.
14. Id at 484, 855 A.2d at 1224.
15. Id. at 483, 855 A.2d at 1224.
16. Id. at 484-85, 855 A.2d at 1224.
17. Id. at 480-83, 855 A.2d at 1222-23. Harrison was charged with attempted first-
degree murder; attempted second-degree murder; first-degree assault; second-degree as-
sault; reckless endangerment; use of handgun in the commission of a felony or crime of
violence; the wearing, carrying, and transportation of a handgun; possession of a regulated
firearm after having been previously convicted of a misdemeanor carrying a penalty of
more than two years imprisonment; and possession of a regulated firearm after having
been previously convicted of a crime of violence. Id.
18. Id. at 483, 487, 855 A.2d at 1224.
19. Id. at 485, 855 A.2d at 1224.
20. Harrison I, 151 Md. App. 648, 657, 828 A.2d 249, 254 (2003).
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v. State t that the transferred intent doctrine cannot be used in cases
where the unintended victim is not killed. 2 However, the court
found that there was sufficient evidence that Harrison and his fellow
shooter created a "kill zone" around Valentine by firing a "hail of bul-
lets."23 Consequently, the court affirmed Harrison's conviction be-
cause there was concurrent intent that satisfied the mens rea
requirement for attempted second-degree murder. 24
Harrison then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which granted
certiorari to determine whether transferred or concurrent intent
could be applied in attempted murder cases.
2 5
2. Legal Background.-The Court of Appeals has considered the
applicability of transferred intent to attempt crimes several times over
the past sixteen years2 6 and its stance on the issue has shifted signifi-
cantly over this time.27 Maryland recognizes the doctrine of trans-
ferred intent,28 which originates from English common law,2 9 and
eventually expanded it to apply to inchoate crimes.3" However,
shortly after the application of transferred intent to inchoate offenses,
the Court of Appeals began to criticize the reasoning behind its own
extension of the doctrine." The inconsistency in Maryland case law
mirrors a division between other states concerning the application of
21. 341 Md. 523, 529-30, 671 A.2d 501, 504 (1996).
22. Harrison I, 151 Md. App. at 658, 828 A.2d at 254-55.
23. Id. at 661, 828 A.2d at 257.
24. Id
25. Harrison II, 382 Md. at 486-87, 855 A.2d at 1225.
26. Poe, 341 Md. at 525, 671 A.2d at 502; Ford v. State, 330 Md. 682, 709, 625 A.2d 984,
997 (1993); State v. Wilson, 313 Md. 600, 609, 546 A.2d 1041, 1045 (1988).
27. Compare Wilson, 313 Md. at 609, 546 A.2d at 1045 (holding that transferred intent
applies to inchoate crimes), with Ford, 330 Md. at 709, 625 A.2d at 997 (stating that trans-
ferred intent is not applicable to attempt crimes).
28. Gladden v. State, 273 Md. 383, 405, 330 A.2d 176, 189 (1974) (finding that trans-
ferred intent is the law of Maryland). The court stated that the doctrine of transferred
intent had "lost none of its patina by its application over the centuries down unto modern
times; its viability is recognized by its current acceptance and application." Id. at 392, 330
A.2d at 181.
29. The Queen v. Saunders & Archer, 75 Eng. Rep. 706, 707 (K.B. 1576).
30. Wilson, 313 Md. at 609, 546 A.2d at 1045 (applying the doctrine of transferred
intent to attempted murder by relying on the specific intent of a defendant as to his in-
tended victim).
31. See Poe, 341 Md. at 529-30, 671 A.2d at 504 (stating that transferred intent only
applies in cases where the unintended victim dies); Ford, 330 Md. at 709, 625 A.2d at 997
(stating, in dicta, that transferred intent does not apply to inchoate crimes even though the
court recognized that its opinion conflicted with precedent).
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transferred intent to inchoate offenses.32 States that have approved
this application of transferred intent have relied largely on policy ra-
tionales of ensuring proportionate punishment for criminals and de-
terrence to support their decisions.3  Courts prohibiting the
application of transferred intent to inchoate crimes, however, have ar-
gued primarily that it is an unnecessary extension of the doctrine.34
Maryland courts that oppose the application of transferred intent
to inchoate offenses have articulated an alternative to convict defend-
ants charged with intent crimes against unintended victims. 3 5 Instead
of applying transferred intent, these courts have reasoned that con-
current intent is a better jurisprudential tool where an unintended
victim is not fatally injured.36
a. Maryland Transferred Intent Case Law.-The English com-
mon-law doctrine of transferred intent was incorporated into Mary-
land common law through the Declaration of Rights in 1776.37 In
1576, The Queen v. Saunders &Archer was one of the first cases to out-
line the theory of transferred intent in its traditional form.3" Saun-
ders tried to kill his wife by giving her a poisoned apple, but instead
his wife gave the poisoned apple to their daughter who ate it and
died.39 Saunders was convicted of murdering his daughter even
though he did not intend to kill her.4"
32. See, e.g., State v. Hinton, 630 A.2d 593, 601 (Conn. 1993) (prohibiting the use of
transferred intent to inchoate offenses); Blanche v. State, 690 N.E.2d 709, 712 (Ind. 1998)
(holding that the transferred intent doctrine applies to attempted murder).
33. See, e.g., State v. Fennell, 531 S.E.2d 512, 517 (S.C. 2000) (concluding that it was
necessary to apply transferred intent to make sure defendants using deadly force are ade-
quately punished).
34. See, e.g., Hinton, 630 A.2d at 601 (holding that transferred intent was not necessary
to convict the defendant of attempted murder because a defendant can still be prosecuted
for his intent and conduct towards the intended victim). One prominent jurist, Justice
Stanley Mosk, advocated eliminating the use of transferred intent in all circumstances.
People v. Scott, 927 P.2d 288, 294 (Cal. 1996) (Mosk, J., concurring).
35. See Ford, 330 Md. at 716, 625 A.2d at 1000 (stating, in dicta, that concurrent intent
could be used to justify a prior case erroneously applying transferred intent to attempted
murder); Harvey v. State, 111 Md. App. 401, 434-35, 681 A.2d 628, 645 (1996) (stating that
there was sufficient evidence under the concurrent intent theory to uphold the defen-
dant's conviction for assault with intent to murder).
36. Ford, 330 Md. at 716, 625 A.2d at 1000; Harvey, 111 Md. App. at 434-35, 681 A.2d at
645.
37. See MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art 5 ("That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled
to the Common Law of England... as existed on the Fourth day of July, seventeen hun-
dred and seventy-six.").
38. 75 Eng. Rep. 706 (KB. 1576).
39. ld. at 707.
40. Id
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Despite the deep English common-law roots of transferred intent
in Maryland, the Court of Appeals did not address the doctrine until
1974 in Gladden v. State.4 1 In Gladden, the defendant fired four or five
shots at his intended victim, but he missed his target and instead one
bullet went through the window of a nearby home, killing a twelve-
year-old boy who was sitting in his living room. 42 Gladden was con-
victed of first-degree murder of the boy.43 Addressing the transferred
intent to kill, the court concluded that the death of Gladden's unin-
tended victim produced the same societal harm as the death of an
intended victim. 44 Therefore, the court transferred the intent to kill
from the intended victim to the twelve-year-old boy. The Court of Ap-
peals acknowledged the "ancient vintage" of the transferred intent
doctrine and affirmed its application in Maryland. 4' The court up-
held Gladden's murder conviction because the offense he completed
against his unintended victim was the same as the crime he attempted
to commit against his intended victim. 46
The Court of Special Appeals limited the doctrine of transferred
intent by requiring injury to the unintended victim in Harrod v. State7
eleven years after the doctrine's initial application in Gladden.48 In
Harrod, the court considered whether the transferred intent doctrine
should be extended to cases where the unintended victim was not at
all injured.4" The defendant in Harrod threw a hammer at his wife's
male friend during a dispute. 0 The hammer hit the wall above his
baby's crib but the baby was not injured.5 Harrod was subsequently
convicted of attempted battery-type assault against his son.5 2 How-
ever, the court overturned the defendant's conviction, holding that to
transfer intent where the victim was not injured would lead to the
absurd result of making the defendant criminally liable where there
was no intent and that victim was not injured.53
41. 273 Md. 383, 405, 330 A.2d 176, 189 (1974). Transferred intent was discussed in
Jones v. State, but the court did not rule on its applicability. 188 Md. 263, 272-73, 52 A.2d
484, 489 (1947).
42. 273 Md. at 385, 330 A.2d at 177.
43. Id. at 386, 330 A.2d at 178.
44. Id. at 405, 330 A.2d at 188.
45. Id at 392, 330 A.2d at 181.
46. Id. at 405, 330 A.2d at 188.
47. 65 Md. App. 128, 499 A.2d 959 (1985).
48. Id. at 137-38, 499 A.2d at 963-64.
49. Id. at 132, 499 A.2d at 961.
50. Id. at 131-32, 499 A.2d at 960-61.
51. Id. at 132, 499 A.2d at 961.
52. Id. at 130, 499 A.2d at 960.
53. Id. at 137-38, 499 A.2d at 963-64.
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The court's most significant extension of the transferred intent
doctrine occurred in 1988 in State v. Wilson.54 The Court of Appeals
extended the doctrine of transferred intent to attempted first-degree
murder of an unintended victim. 55 Transferred intent was applied to
convict Wilson of first-degree attempted murder of an unintended vic-
tim where he shot at and missed his intended victim, but instead hit
and injured a bystander.56 The Court of Appeals interpreted Gladden
to permit transferred intent in situations where the defendant's con-
duct affects or harms an unintended victim. 57 The Wilson court,
therefore, reasoned that intent does not have to be directed at an
unintended victim to satisfy a specific intent mens rea element of an
offense against that victim.
58
The Court of Appeals initiated a significant turn in its transferred
intent doctrine jurisprudence with dicta in Ford v. State that ques-
tioned the validity of the Wilson precedent only five years after it was
decided.59 In Ford, the defendant and three of his cohorts threw large
rocks at vehicles driving on the Capital Beltway, injuring several pas-
sengers in the vehicles.6" The court upheld a conviction for assault
with intent to disable both drivers and passengers, reasoning that the
jury could have found that Ford had the requisite intent towards both
drivers and passengers. 61 The court went on to address, in dicta, the
trial court's jury instruction that if it found Ford assaulted with intent
to disable the drivers, the intent could be transferred to the passen-
gers.62 The court indicated that a defendant's conviction for assault
with intent to disable could not be based on transferred intent,6" be-
cause transferred intent was not applicable to crimes against unin-
tended victims where the crime against the intended victim was
completed.64 The Court of Appeals in Ford approved of the result in
54. 313 Md. 600, 546 A.2d 1041 (1988).
55. Id at 609, 546 A.2d at 1045.
56. Id. at 601-02, 546 A.2d at 1042.
57. Id. at 604, 546 A.2d at 1043.
58. Id at 605, 546 A.2d at 1043.
59. 330 Md. 682, 713-18, 625 A.2d 984, 999-1001 (1993).
60. Id. at 689, 625 A.2d 987.
61. Id. at 708, 625 A.2d at 996. Ford was also convicted of the malicious destruction of
property, and assault and battery. Id, at 698-99, 625 A.2d at 991-92.
62. Id at 708-09, 625 A.2d at 996-97.
63. Id, at 709, 625 A.2d at 997.
64. Id, at 713, 625 A.2d at 999. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that this interpre-
tation of the transferred intent doctrine was contrary to the court's holding in Wilson
where the doctrine was applied to attempted murder. Id The Ford court criticized Wilson
for extending transferred intent beyond its traditional application. Id at 715-16, 625 A.2d
at 1000. The court noted that transferred intent was designed to combine a defendant's
intent toward his intended victim with the harm inflicted on this unintended victim into
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Wilson but reinterpreted its reasoning under the theory of concurrent
intent.65 The court explained that concurrent intent differs from
transferred intent in that the former is a legal fiction where the nature
of a defendant's conduct is said to create a zone of danger such as to
permit a finding of intent to injure a bystander whereas with the lat-
ter, the defendant's mens rea from an intended victim is simply im-
posed on conduct that harms a bystander without any further
examination of the nature of the conduct.6 6
Judge McAuliffe, in a concurring opinion in Ford, explained that
the policy rationale favoring the application of transferred intent to
inchoate offenses still supported the Wilson holding.67 He stated that
there is a stronger deterrent effect in holding a defendant criminally
liable for purposeful conduct that results in harm to unintended as
well as intended victims.68
In Poe v. State, the court ruled in accordance with the dictum in
Ford when it applied transferred intent where the intended target was
injured but not killed by the defendant and the unintended victim was
killed.69 In Poe, the defendant and his wife were arguing. Mr. Poe
retrieved a shotgun from his car and fired a slug at Ms. Poe.7" The
shot went through Ms. Poe's arm and hit Kimberly Rice, a six-year-old
girl, who was standing directly behind Ms. Poe.71 Rice died instanta-
neously from the wound to her head.72 Mr. Poe was convicted of first-
one crime. Id. at 712, 625 A.2d at 998. The court stated that transferred intent was not
meant to create additional criminal liability but instead was intended to prevent defend-
ants from escaping punishment where the mens rea and actus reus elements of an offense
were present but could not be established for any one victim. Id. at 711, 625 A.2d at 998.
Because there is already one completed crime against the intended victim of the same
severity as one that could be charged with respect to the unintended victim, the court
determined that transferred intent was not necessary to punish the defendant twice. Id. at
711-12, 625 A.2d at 998. Moreover, the court observed that attempted murder does not
require a victim to be physically harmed and thus it would be impossible to create a logical
approach to determine to whom the defendant's intent should be transferred. Id. at 715-
16, 625 A.2d at 1000.
65. Id. at 715-16, 625 A.2d at 1000.
66. Id. at 717, 625 A.2d at 1001. The court noted that a concurrent intent analysis
focuses on the mode of attack and whether the degree of escalation of its means justified a
finding that the defendant created a "kill zone" around the intended victim. Id. at 717-18,
625 A.2d at 1001.
67. Id. at 725-26, 625 A.2d at 1005 (McAuliffe, J., concurring).
68. Id. (McAuliffe, J., concurring).
69. 341 Md. 523, 525, 671 A.2d 501, 502 (1996). The court reconciled its opinion in
Poe with its previous dicta in Ford regarding the applicability of transferred intent by argu-
ing that both decisions stood for the proposition that transferred intent could not be ap-
plied where the unintended victim did not die. Id. at 529-30, 671 A.2d at 504.
70. Id. at 526, 671 A.2d at 502.
71. Id.
72. Id.
1104
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS
degree murder of Rice and first-degree attempted murder of Ms.
Poe.73 The court rejected the argument that the defendant could not
be convicted of the first-degree murder of Rice because the crime of
attempted murder had been completed against Ms. Poe.7 ' The court
held that transferred intent was applicable where an unintended vic-
tim was killed because the doctrine was required to ensure that the
defendant was properly punished.75
In a concurring opinion in Poe, Judge Raker stated that Wilson
and Ford should be interpreted as applying the doctrine of transferred
intent only when an unintended victim is physically injured.76 She
explained that both history and policy favor an extension of the doc-
trine to inchoate crimes where the unintended victim is harmed.77
Judge Raker noted that the policy behind transferred intent was to
prevent offenders from avoiding criminal liability for their "bad aim"
or misidentifying their victims. 78 She then argued that the policy ra-
tionale supporting transferred intent in other situations also favored
its application to cases where the unintended victim was injured but
not killed.7" Moreover, Judge Raker reasoned that criminals may es-
cape liability in "bad aim" or mistaken identity cases if transferred in-
tent is not applicable to prove concurrent intent.80 Judge Raker
noted that because separate intent would have to be established in
such circumstances there may be situations where that additional evi-
dence will be hard to prove.
The Court of Special Appeals in Harvey v. State followed the high
court's dictum in Ford and Poe by holding that transferred intent did
not apply to assault with intent to commit murder of an unintended
victim.82 The defendant in Harvey fired nine shots at his intended
73. Id. at 527, 671 A.2d at 503.
74. Id. at 529-30, 671 A.2d at 504. The court held that intent is never "used up" such
that the completion of one crime would prohibit transfer of intent to another crime. Id. at
528, 671 A.2d at 503.
75. Id. The court reasoned that Mr. Poe's offense was consistent with the policy ratio-
nale behind transferred intent that a defendant should not avoid conviction for a murder
where all of the elements of a crime were committed, except that an unintended victim was
killed instead of an intended victim. Id. at 530, 671 A.2d at 504.
76. Id. at 535, 671 A.2d at 507 (Raker, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 536, 671 A.2d at 507 (Raker, J., concurring). Historically, the common law in
both England and the United States favored the application of transferred intent to by-
standers who were injured. Id. (Raker, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 539, 671 A.2d at 509 (Raker, J., concurring).
79. Id. (Raker, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 539-40, 671 A.2d at 509 (Raker, J., concurring).
81. Id. (Raker, J., concurring).
82. 111 Md. App. 401, 432-33, 681 A.2d 628, 644, cert. denied, 344 Md. 330, 686 A.2d 635
(1996).
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victims and missed them all.8" An unintended target was hit in the leg
by a stray bullet, but she survived her injuries.8 4 The court deter-
mined that the defendant's criminal liability toward the unintended
victim was not affected by what happened to the intended victims.8"
The court concluded that transferred intent plays a necessary role in
murder prosecutions because where an unintended victim is killed,
there may not be another way to convict a defendant of that murder.86
However, the court determined that the same problems facing the
State in obtaining convictions for murder are not present for ob-
taining convictions for unintended battery because the sentence for
battery can be adjusted accordingly without resorting to the doctrine
of transferred intent.87 Subsequently, the court found that applying
transferred intent to inchoate offenses extended the doctrine beyond
its needed scope. 8
b. Transferred Intent Case Law in OtherJurisdictions.-The con-
flicting case law in Maryland is a microcosm of the split between juris-
dictions throughout the United States on the applicability of
transferred intent.8 9 Because the case law in Maryland and the rest of
the country is sharply divided, it is instructive to examine how other
jurisdictions have addressed the extension of transferred intent to in-
choate offenses.9" The split between states regarding the applicability
of transferred intent is largely over the policy implications of its exten-
sion."' States favoring the application of transferred intent to incho-
83. Id. at 405, 681 A.2d at 630.
84. Id.
85. Id, at 420, 681 A.2d at 637. The intended victims could have been killed, injured,
or missed entirely and the defendant's liability to the bystander would not change. Id.
86. Id. at 429, 681 A.2d at 642.
87. Id- at 429-30, 681 A.2d at 642.
88. Id. at 432, 681 A.2d at 644.
89. Compare Ochoa v. State, 981 P.2d 1201, 1204 (Nev. 1999) (applying transferred
intent to incohate offenses), with State v. Brady, 745 So. 2d 954, 958 (Fla. 1999) (holding
that transferred intent is not applicable to incohate offenses).
90. See, e.g., State v. Hinton, 630 A.2d 593, 601 (Conn. 1993) (prohibiting the use of
transferred intent to inchoate offenses); Blanche v. State, 690 N.E.2d 709, 712 (Ind. 1998)
(holding that transferred intent applies to attempted murder).
91. Compare State v. Gilman, 69 Me. 163, 171 (1879) (applying transferred intent to
ensure defendants are punished for their conduct), and Ochoa, 981 P.2d at 1204 (finding
that both proportionate punishment and deterrence were served by application of trans-
ferred intent to inchoate offenses), and State v. Worlock, 569 A.2d 1314, 1325 (N.J. 1990)
(stating that the state's policy of deterrence was better served by applying transferred in-
tent), and People v. Fernandez, 673 N.E.2d 910, 913 (N.Y. 1996) (finding that luck should
not impact a defendant's punishment if a different victim was injured or killed than was
intended), and State v. Fennell, 531 S.E.2d 512, 517 (S.C. 2000) (holding that transferred
intent was necessary to ensure proportionate punishment), with Ramsey v. State 56 P.3d
675, 681 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002) (holding that transferred intent was unnecessary to ensure
1106
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ate offenses have held that its extension was necessary to ensure
proportionate punishment as well as to deter crime.92 In contrast,
states that have opposed the use of transferred intent in attempt cases
argue that its application would lead to disproportionate punishment
and it is unnecessary to ensure culpability. 3 The division between
states that apply transferred intent to attempt crimes and those that
do not is essentially over how far the policy rationale favoring trans-
ferred intent should be extended.94
In State v. Gilman, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine became
one of the first courts in the United States to examine the applicability
of transferred intent to inchoate crimes.95 The Gilman court based its
extension of the transferred intent doctrine, in part, on a policy argu-
ment that its prohibition would make prosecutions for assault with
intent to kill almost impossible.9 6 In State v. Gillette,97 a New Mexico
court employed public safety arguments when it held that transferred
intent was applicable to inchoate crimes because the defendant's ac-
tions endangered bystanders' lives and proved a willingness to kill.9 8
The court in Gillette extended the doctrine to the imposition of crimi-
nal liability even where there was no injury whatsoever to the unin-
tended victims.99
criminal liability), and Hinton, 630 A.2d at 601 (stating that transferred intent inappropri-
ately extends criminal liability), and Brady, 745 So. 2d at 958 (finding that liability could be
imposed without resorting to transferred intent).
92. See, e.g., Gilman, 69 Me. at 171 (stating that transferred intent was necessary to en-
sure that the defendant was punished for his conduct); Ochoa, 981 P.2d at 1204 (stating
that transferred intent ensures proportionate punishment and promotes deterrence when
applied to inchoate offenses); Worlock, 569 A.2d at 1325 (holding that deterrence was bet-
ter served by applying transferred intent to attempt crimes); Fennell 531 S.E.2d at 517
(finding that transferred intent was needed to ensure proportionate punishment).
93. See Ramsey, 56 P.3d at 681 (holding that transferred intent was unnecessary to en-
sure liability and too expansive in its scope); Hinton, 630 A.2d at 601 (stating that the
defendant can be punished for actions directed toward the intended victim and he there-
fore will be subject to criminal liability and transferred intent should not extend to in-
crease that liability); Brady, 745 So. 2d at 958 (stating that transferred intent was
unnecessary to establish criminal liability).
94. Compare Ochoa, 981 P.2d at 1205 (applying transferred intent to its fullest extent,
including inchoate offenses), with Hinton, 630 A.2d at 601 (noting that transferred intent
applies in cases where the unintended victim dies, but finding that it is unnecessary where
a bystander is only nonfatally injured).
95. 69 Me. at 171.
96. Id.
97. 699 P.2d 626 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985).
98. Id. at 635-36.
99. Id. at 634-36. The defendant attempted to poison his intended victim by putting
pentobarbital in a can of Dr. Pepper. Id. at 630. The unintended victims drank very small
amounts from the can but were not injured. Id. at 630, 634.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
The New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Worlock100 addressed
additional policy rationales to support its use of transferred intent.10 '
Relying on a state statute 1"2 permitting the use of transferred intent,
the court found that transferred intent should apply where a defen-
dant killed both his intended victim and also an unintended by-
stander. 10 3 After analyzing the legislative history of the statute, the
court stated that transferred intent prohibited a defendant from es-
caping criminal liability because of bad aim and it deterred people
from acting on impulses to injure others. 10 4 The court concluded that
people would be deterred more forcefully by extending the doctrine
of transferred intent to cases where both intended and unintended
victims were killed. 10 5
The Supreme Court of Nevada also addressed the justifications
for applying transferred intent to inchoate offenses in Ochoa v.
State.10 6 The court concluded that, as a policy matter, transferred in-
tent should apply to inchoate offenses where the intended victim is
killed and the unintended victim is injured but not killed.'0 7 In
Ochoa, the court determined that to prevent the defendant from es-
caping liability for his poor aim and to better deter similar conduct,
the extension of transferred intent was the best public policy.'0 8 In
addition to the above cases that articulate a rationale for the applica-
tion of transferred intent to attempt crimes, several states have ap-
plied the doctrine without explanation.0 9
100. 569 A.2d 1314 (N.J. 1990).
101. Id. at 1324.
102. The statute provided: "A defendant shall not be relieved of responsibility for caus-
ing a result if the only difference between what actually occurred and what was designed,
contemplated or risked is that a different person or property was injured or affected or
that a less serious or less extensive injury or harm occurred." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-3d
(1990).
103. Worlock, 569 A.2d at 1324.
104. Id. at 1325.
105. Id.
106. 981 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Nev. 1999).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1204-05.
109. See State v. Rodriguez-Gonzales, 790 P.2d 287, 288 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (interpret-
ing a state statute that codified the transferred intent doctrine and extended it to inten-
tional criminal conduct that causes an unintentional result and applying transferred intent
to attempted first-degree murder); People v. Ephraim, 753 N.E.2d 486, 497 (Il1. App. Ct.
2001) (applying transferred intent to attempted murder of an unintended victim who was
injured but not killed); Blanche v. State, 690 N.E.2d 709, 712 (Ind. 1998) (holding that the
transferred intent doctrine applies to attempted murder); State v. Alford, 151 N.W.2d 573,
575 (Iowa 1967) (affirming the defendant's conviction for assault with intent to commit
murder where he shot at an intended victim and instead wounded an unintended victim);
State v. Thomas, 53 So. 868, 869 (La. 1910) (affirming the defendant's conviction for in-
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3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Harrison v. State, the Court of Ap-
peals reversed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, finding
that the application of the concurrent intent doctrine to support Har-
rison's conviction for attempted second-degree murder was in error
because there was insufficient evidence to establish that the victim was
in the "kill zone" created by Harrison's gunfire."' t In a 5-1 decision,
Judge Battaglia, writing for the majority, t ' held that transferred in-
tent could not be used to establish the requisite mens rea element for
attempted murder.1 1 2
a. The Court's Analysis of Concurrent Intent.-The Court of
Appeals evaluated the Court of Special Appeals' holding that the spe-
cific intent necessary to support a conviction for attempted second-
degree murder was established through the doctrine of concurrent
intent.' 13 The court went on to describe a concurrent intent analysis
as an evaluation of the scope of the method used to perpetrate an
offense and the degree to which those means increase the level of
danger to bystanders."t 4 The court created a two-pronged approach
to evaluating whether the application of concurrent intent is justified:
"(1) whether a fact-finder could infer that the defendant intentionally
escalated his mode of attack to such an extent that he or she created a
'zone of harm,' and (2) whether the facts establish that the actual
victim resided in that zone when he or she was injured."' 15
The court then evaluated the facts of Harrison's case against that
standard for concurrent intent to determine if there was sufficient evi-
dence to support his conviction. The court observed that other courts
have found that a shooter created a zone of harm when firing several
shots at an intended victim. 1 6 Therefore, the court held that the six
tent to murder where he missed his intended victim and instead wounded a bystander);
State v. Ford, 539 N.W.2d 214, 229 (Minn. 1995) (applying the doctrine of transferred
intent to charge the defendant with the attempted murder of a bystander who was injured,
even though the intended victim was killed); State v. Andrews, 572 S.E.2d 798, 802 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2002) (holding that transferred intent is applicable whenever an unintended vic-
tim is injured regardless of the injury to the intended victim); Short v. State, 980 P.2d 1081,
1098 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999) (holding that transferred intent applied where the defen-
dant injured unintended victims).
110. Harrison II, 382 Md. at 480, 486, 855 A.2d at 1222, 1225.
111. ChiefJudge Bell along with Judges Wilner, Cathell, Harrell, and Greene joined the
majority opinion. Id. at 479, 855 A.2d at 1220-21.
112. Id. at 487, 855 A.2d at 1225.
113. Id. at 491-98, 855 A.2d at 1228-32.
114. Id. at 491, 855 A.2d at 1228 (citing Ford v. State, 330 Md. 682, 717, 625 A.2d 984,
1001 (1993)).
115. Id. at 495, 855 A.2d at 1231.
116. Id.
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shots Harrison fired at his intended victim created an inference that a
kill zone was established around Valentine and that Harrison in-
tended to kill anyone in that zone. 17
However, the court held that the State failed to prove the second
prong of the concurrent intent standard."' The court found that
there was no evidence that Cook was within the kill zone when Harri-
son's bullet struck him. 19 The court observed that although the state-
ment of facts established where Cook generally was located when the
stray bullet hit him, the State did not provide evidence of his relative
position to Valentine or Harrison during the shooting. 2 ° The court
reasoned that a failure to provide evidence indicating the relative po-
sitions of Harrison, Valentine, and Cook prohibited a finding that
Cook actually was in the zone of danger. 2' Therefore, the court over-
turned Harrison's conviction for attempted second-degree murder be-
cause of the Court of Special Appeals' misapplication of the
concurrent intent standard. 122
b. The Courts Analysis of Transferred Intent.-The court re-
jected the State's argument that transferred intent applies to inchoate
offenses and held that transferred intent cannot be used to establish
the mens rea element of attempted second-degree murder.123 Judge
Battaglia approvingly cited Ford, which criticized the court's opinion
extending the doctrine of transferred intent to attempted murder in
Wilson, a case almost factually identical to Harrison.1 24 The majority
also noted that many other courts have similarly held that transferred
intent is not applicable to inchoate offenses.125 The court stated that
its holding did not present the pitfalls related to the creation of un-
limited liability or disproportionate punishment that it found inher-
ent in the use of transferred intent to support convictions for inchoate
crimes. 126
The court noted that injury to a victim is not necessary for the
State to secure a conviction for attempted murder against a defen-
dant. 27 Therefore, in order to limit the scope of a defendant's liabil-
117. Id. at 496, 855 A.2d at 1231.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 497, 855 A.2d at 1231-32.
121. Id., 855 A.2d at 1232.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 508, 855 A.2d at 1238.
124. Id. at 507-08, 855 A.2d at 1237-38.
125. Id. at 506-07, 855 A.2d at 1237.
126. Id. at 507-08, 855 A.2d at 1237-38.
127. Id. at 507, 855 A.2d at 1238.
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ity, the court held that transferred intent only applies to bystanders
that are killed and not just injured.1 21
The court stated that its most compelling reason for rejecting the
application of transferred intent to inchoate offenses was that it was
not necessary to create a whole crime by joining the intent directed
towards one victim with the harm inflicted on another victim because
proportionate punishment could be achieved without the extension
of transferred intent.1 29 The court concluded that a defendant can be
held criminally liable for the actual injuries sustained by an unin-
tended victim without applying the doctrine of transferred intent.
13 °
Furthermore, the court determined that the State was free to use the
concurrent intent doctrine to satisfy mens rea requirements for spe-
cific intent offenses to pursue prosecution for injuries to unintended
victims and therefore it was not necessary to extend the doctrine of
transferred intent to cover inchoate offenses because a defendant
could be punished appropriately without the use of transferred in-
tent. 1 1 The court also reasoned that in cases such as Harrison there
already was a completed crime committed against the intended target
and additional charges such as criminal battery could be brought for
harm caused to unintended victims in order to ensure that the defen-
dant was adequately punished and transferred intent was thus not
necessary. 13 2
In her dissenting opinion, Judge Raker argued that Harrison's
conviction for attempted second-degree murder should be affirmed
through the application of transferred intent.1 3 3 She argued that
where a defendant evinces intent to kill there should be no distinction
between the applicability of transferred intent to unintended victims
that die and unintended victims that are harmed but not fatally in-
jured.1 34 Judge Raker reasoned that because transferred intent
should be applicable to inchoate offenses, Harrison should be held
accountable for the attempted second-degree murder of Cook.
1 31
128. Id. at 506, 855 A.2d at 1237.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 508, 855 A.2d at 1238.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 508-09, 855 A.2d at 1238-39 (Raker, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 510, 855 A.2d at 1240 (Raker, J., dissenting). Judge Raker characterized the
majority's limitation of the transferred intent doctrine to unintended victims that die as
artificial." Id. at 511, 855 A.2d at 1240 (Raker, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 508-09, 855 A.2d at 1238-39 (Raker, J., dissenting).
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Moreover, Judge Raker argued that Maryland should follow the many
states that apply the transferred intent doctrine to inchoate crimes. 136
Judge Raker then refuted a criticism raised by the majority that
applying the doctrine of transferred intent to inchoate offenses would
create confusion as to when attempted murder should be charged be-
cause injury to the victim is not an element of the offense. 37 The
dissent explained that this problem could be resolved by permitting
intent to be transferred only when the unintended victim is injured.138
Judge Raker observed that because of the court's decision in Poe,
the transferred intent doctrine applies when an unintended victim
dies even when the defendant has committed a completed crime
against the intended victim.3 9 The dissent thus criticized the court's
argument that because Harrison already committed a completed
crime against Valentine, his intended victim, that transferred intent
could not be used to charge him with a crime against Cook, his unin-
tended victim. 4 0
Judge Raker concluded that neither precedent nor public policy
considerations favor prohibiting transferred intent from being ap-
plied to inchoate offenses, 14' noting that both English and American
courts have applied transferred intent to inchoate crimes.'42 Judge
Raker explained that the majority's limitation of the transferred in-
tent doctrine will make it difficult to prosecute defendants charged
with inchoate offenses against unintended victims. 43 Although the
majority contended that the doctrine of concurrent intent is sufficient
to permit the State to hold defendants accountable for inchoate of-
fenses, Judge Raker concluded that the requirement of additional evi-
dence needed to establish concurrent intent will reward defendants
that have bad aim with reduced sentences or acquittals.1 44
4. Analysis.-In Harrison v. State, the court held that transferred
intent was not applicable to inchoate offenses.' 45 The court failed to
recognize that its primary rationales for prohibiting the use of trans-
ferred intent to inchoate offenses apply equally to excluding concur-
136. Id. at 510, 855 A.2d at 1239-40 (Raker, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 510 n.2, 855 A.2d at 1240 n.2 (Raker, J., dissenting).
138. Id. (Raker, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 511, 855 A.2d at 1240 (Raker, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 511, 512 n.4, 855 A.2d at 1240, 1241 n.4 (Raker, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 512 n.3, 855 A.2d at 1241 n.3 (RakerJ., dissenting) (citing Poe v. State, 341
Md. 523, 536, 671 A.2d 501, 507 (1996) (RakerJ., concurring)).
142. Id. (Raker, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 518, 855 A.2d at 1244 (Raker, J., dissenting).
144. Id. (Raker, J., dissenting).
145. 382 Md. at 480, 855 A.2d at 1222.
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rent intent, which the court nonetheless employs. 146 Moreover, the
court's decision will permit chance to inappropriately alter criminal
liability.' 47 In arguing that no boundary can be established to limit
liability for the application of transferred intent to inchoate offenses,
the court failed to recognize that harm to the victim is a logical and
appropriate limiting principle. 148 Requiring that an unintended vic-
tim suffer physical injury before applying transferred intent to incho-
ate offenses provides a workable standard consistent with the court's
usage of concurrent intent and ensures that violent conduct is de-
terred and defendants are punished appropriately.
1 49
a. The Rejection of Transferred Intent Where Concurrent Intent Is
Applied Is Problematic Because the Rationales for Excluding Transferred In-
tent Apply Equally to Both Theories.-The Harrison court rejected the ap-
plication of transferred intent to inchoate offenses, but accepted the
application of concurrent intent to inchoate crimes even though the
court's primary rationales for rejecting the former apply with equal
force to prohibit the latter.15 The court's primary argument for re-
jecting transferred intent-that it was not necessary to join intent
from an intended victim and harm from an unintended victim be-
cause Harrison could already be charged with attempted murder
against his intended victim and other charges could be brought to
ensure appropriate punishment for harm caused to his unintended
victim-also applies to concurrent intent.151 The court failed to rec-
ognize that both doctrines are legal fictions that require imposition of
a mens rea element toward an unintended victim where there was no
intent to harm.1
52
146. See infra notes 150-161 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's flawed
reasoning in rejecting transferred intent but accepting the application of concurrent in-
tent at the same time).
147. See infta notes 162-176 and accompanying text (criticizing the court for allowing
defendants to be punished differently as a result of the improper application of chance in
criminal law).
148. See infta notes 177-180 and accompanying text (arguing that the court erred in
failing to consider injury to the victim as an appropriate limiting standard for controlling
liability in the extension of transferred intent to inchoate offenses).
149. See infra notes 181-206 and accompanying text (exploring the positive policy bene-
fits of extending the doctrine of transferred intent to inchoate offenses with physical harm
to the victim as a liability cut-off).
150. Harrison I1, 382 Md. at 509, 855 A.2d at 1238-39 (Raker, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 511, 855 A.2d at 1240 (Raker,J., dissenting).
152. See id. at 509, 855 A.2d at 1239 (Raker, J., dissenting) (calling concurrent intent a
legal fiction); Poe v. State, 341 Md. 523, 529, 671 A.2d 501, 504 (1996) (stating that trans-
ferred intent is a legal fiction). A legal fiction is "[a]n assumption that something is true
even though it may be untrue, made esp[ecially] in judicial reasoning to alter how a legal
rule operates." BLACK's LAw DIcrIONARY, supra note 2, at 913. The majority glossed over
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The court also failed to recognize that under both transferred
and concurrent intent, a defendant that has no actual intent to injure
a bystander is nonetheless implied to have such intent to injure the
bystander as a consequence of his intent to harm his intended vic-
tim. 53 Although the court correctly noted that under the doctrine of
transferred intent a defendant's intent to injure a bystander is manu-
factured by the legal system to ensure that criminals do not go unpun-
ished for their violent conduct, it nonetheless ignores the fact that
under concurrent intent a defendant is said to create a zone of danger
intended to harm bystanders even though no proof is required that
the defendant actually intended to harm any bystander or even that
the defendant was aware of the unintended victim's presence.1 54
The court's second reason for rejecting transferred intent also
applies to concurrent intent.1 55 The court reasoned that it was possi-
ble to bring additional charges for the harm caused to his unintended
victim against Harrison to increase his punishment because this pun-
ishment could come close to the sentence permitted for attempted
murder of the intended victim without using transferred intent.156
This reasoning also applies to concurrent intent, because there is not
a difference in a prosecutor's discretion to charge defendants with
additional crimes under either doctrine. 157 If the court prohibited
the use of concurrent intent for inchoate crimes, prosecutors could
similarly bring multiple charges against a defendant in order to in-
crease a defendant's potential sentence and make it closer to what the
sentence could have been for attempted murder. 158 The court, how-
ever, did not recognize that prosecutors would have the same discre-
the fact that both transferred and concurrent intent are legal fictions by only distinguish-
ing concurrent intent from depraved heart mens rea and not comparing it to transferred
intent. Harrison I1, 382 Md. at 492 n.14, 855 A.2d at 1229 n.14.
153. See Harrison 11, 382 Md. at 500, 855 A.2d at 1233.
154. See id. at 495, 855 A.2d at 1230-31.
155. See MD. CODE ANN., CruM. LAw § 1-201 (2001) (noting no difference inprosecutorial charging discretion when concurrent intent is applied as compared with
transferred intent).
156. See id. at 508, 855 A.2d at 1238 (discussing part of a larger argument by the Court of
Special Appeals in Harvey v. State, 111 Md. App. 401, 429-30, 681 A.2d 628, 642-43 (1996),
that other charges could compensate for not applying transferred intent to inchoate
offenses).
157. See MD. CODE ANN., CRM. LAw § 1-201 (limiting "the punishment of a person who
is convicted of an attempt to commit a crime [to] the maximum punishment for the crime
attempted" and not placing any limitations on maximum punishment depending on
whether transferred or concurrent intent was applied to establish the mens rea element of
attempted murder).
158. See Harrison 11, 382 Md. at 508, 855 A.2d at 1238 (noting that additional charges are
available to increase a defendant's punishment in cases of injury to bystanders for inchoate
offenses but failing to recognize that the same remedy is available for concurrent intent).
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tion in charging defendants under both concurrent and transferred
intent.1 5 9 Because both doctrines have the same limitations,
1 60 to
avoid inconsistency the court should have applied or rejected both
transferred and concurrent intent to attempt offenses. 61
b. The Court's Decision Will Improperly Allow Chance to Alter
Criminal Liability.-The rule in Harrison improperly allows chance to
affect outcomes in criminal cases.' 6 2 Under Harrison, defendants in
different cases whose conduct involves equivalent criminal liability fac-
tors of harm, culpability, and danger are subject to conviction for dif-
ferent crimes under the application of transferred intent based solely
on the fact that one defendant hit his intended target, while the other
had bad luck and hit an unintended victim.' 6 3 Instead, the court
should have applied transferred intent so that if the conduct of de-
fendants in diferent cases involves the same degree of harm, culpabil-
ity, and danger, then the two defendants should be subject to the
same charges. 164 Chance should only be permitted to affect criminal
liability when luck alters the harm resulting from a defendant's con-
duct and not where chance merely changes the person who is
injured. 1 65
An example will illustrate how the Harrison decision lets chance
play an impermissible role in determining liability. In a situation
where an intended victim is wounded and a bystander is killed, just as
the Court of Appeals in Poe permitted the use of transferred intent to
convict the defendant of the first-degree murder of the bystander and
159. See id.
160. Id. at 509, 855 A.2d at 1238-39 (Raker, J., dissenting).
161. Id. (Raker, J., dissenting).
162. See id. at 513, 855 A.2d at 1241 (Raker, J., dissenting) (criticizing the court's deci-
sion because it will allow a defendant with good luck who kills his intended victim to re-
ceive a lighter punishment than a defendant who kills a bystander).
163. See id. at 508, 855 A-2d at 1238 (applying transferred intent such that a defendant
who kills an unintended victim and injures an intended target is subject to charges with
more severe sentences than a defendant who kills his intended victim and only harms a
bystander).
164. See Mitchell Keiter, With Malice Toward All: The Increased Lethality of Violence Reshapes
Transferred Intent and Attempted Murder Law, 38 U.S.F. L. REv. 261, 261, 263 (2004) (stating
that the three factors that impact culpability operate on a sliding scale where more of one
can compensate for less of another).
165. See People v. Fernandez, 673 N.E.2d 910, 913 (N.Y. 1996) (holding that chance
should not alter criminal liability where luck only changed the victim and not the injury);
see also Kimberly D. Kessler, The Role of Luck in the Criminal Law, 142 U. PA. L. Rav. 2183,
2183-84 (1994) (discussing different possible outcomes when luck plays a role in criminal
conduct and that concluding that under our current criminal justice system a defendant is
punished less if she shoots at someone and misses because she is lucky than if she kills her
target as intended).
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the first-degree attempted murder of the intended victim,16 6 under
Harrison, the court would reach the same result. 16 7 However, assume
the facts are similar to those of Ochoa and the intended victim is killed
and a bystander is injured but not killed. 168 Under the court's deci-
sion in Harrison, the defendant could be charged with first-degree
murder of the intended victim, but he could not be charged with at-
tempted murder of the bystander using transferred intent. 69
Society suffers an equivalent amount of harm in either the Poe or
Ochoa scenario: one person is killed and a second person is injured. 7 1
An equally culpable mental state also exists in both scenarios: there is
intent to kill only one person.1 7 ' Moreover, the dangerousness of the
defendant's conduct is the same in both Poe and Ochoa: their shots
were aimed at one intended victim with one lone bystander in the
direction of their shooting. 72 Despite the same levels of harm, culpa-
bility, and danger that determine criminal liability in both Poe and
Ochoa, the court's decision in Harrison permits prosecutors to charge
Poe with one count of murder and one count of attempted murder
but prosecutors could only charge Ochoa with one count of murder
and one count of assault, or another similar lesser offense.1 73 Under
the Harrison court's decision, a defendant with bad aim, such as Poe,
who kills the "wrong" person (i.e., the unintended victim) will be con-
victed of more serious offenses than a defendant with better aim, such
as Ochoa, who kills the "right" person (i.e., the intended victim). 1 74
Because the criminal liability factors were held constant for Poe and
Ochoa, the only difference between the two is that Ochoa killed the
person whom he attempted to harm. 175 As this comparison demon-
strates, the court's decision in Harrison will inappropriately allow de-
fendants whose conduct involves like levels of harm, culpability, and
166. Poe v. State, 341 Md. 526, 526, 671 A.2d 501, 502 (1996).
167. See Harrison II, 382 Md. at 506, 855 A.2d at 1237 (stating that transferred intent only
applies in cases where the unintended victim is killed and not just wounded, in a manner
consistent with the court's decision in Poe).
168. These facts are similar to those of Ochoa v. State, 981 P.2d 1201, 1202-04 (Nev.
1999), where the Nevada court found that the defendant could be charged with attempted
murder against the bystander using transferred intent in contrast to the Court of Appeals's
decision in Harrison. Id at 1205.
169. Harrison II, 382 Md. at 506, 855 A.2d at 1237.
170. Poe, 341 Md. at 526, 671 A.2d at 502; Ochoa, 981 P.2d at 1202.
171. Poe, 341 Md. at 526, 671 A.2d at 502; Ochoa, 981 P.2d at 1202.
172. Poe, 341 Md. at 526, 671 A.2d at 502; Ochoa, 981 P.2d at 1202.
173. Harrison II, 382 Md. at 506, 508, 855 A.2d at 1237-38.
174. Id. at 508-10, 855 A.2d at 1238-39 (Raker, J., dissenting).
175. Compare Ochoa, 981 P.2d at 1202 (Ochoa killed his intended victim and only injured
his unintended victim), with Poe, 341 Md. at 526, 671 A.2d at 502 (Poe killed an unin-
tended bystander and only wounded his intended target).
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danger to be subject to different charges based on bad aim or
chance. 
17 6
c. Application of Transferred Intent to Inchoate Offenses Where an
Unintended Victim Is Injured Limits the Scope of Liability, Results in Judicial
Consistency, and Advances Good Public Policy.-The Harrison court ar-
gued that transferred intent should not be used because there is no
coherent way to apply the doctrine to inchoate offenses even though
other states1 77 and Maryland case law178 both provide a logical ap-
proach to limit the scope of transferred intent. The court should have
limited transferred intent to instances where physical injury to the un-
intended victim occurs. 1 7 9 Instead, even though prior precedent in
Maryland has adopted harm to the victim as a limiting principle for
applying transferred intent, the court relied on flawed reasoning from
the Court of Appeals in Ford that argued no reasonable standard
could be implemented for limiting the scope of liability under trans-
ferred intent as applied to inchoate offenses.180
Creating a clear limit on the application of transferred intent by
requiring unintended victims to suffer injury eliminates concerns of
unlimited liability, permits courts to apply transferred and concurrent
intent consistently, ensures that defendants are punished appropri-
ately, and acts to deter violent conduct.181 Past Maryland precedent
favors applying transferred intent to satisfy the mens rea requirement
176. See People v. Fernandez, 673 N.E.2d 910, 913 (N.Y. 1996) (stating that punishment
should be the same for a defendant regardless of whether he killed his intended victim or
an unintended victim); Keiter, supra note 163, at 263 (arguing that culpability, danger, and
harm can be used to determine culpability by putting each on a sliding scale where more
of one can compensate for less of another and thus if all three elements are held constant
criminal liability should be unchanged).
177. See State v. Martin, 119 S.W.2d 298, 302 (Mo. 1938) (limiting transferred intent to
where an unintended victim is injured); Ochoa, 981 P.2d at 1205 (holding that transferred
intent applies where an unintended victim is harmed).
178. See State v. Earp, 319 Md. 156, 163, 571 A.2d 1227, 1231 (1990) (holding that trans-
ferred intent could be applied to attempted murder where an unintended victim suffered
injury); Harrod v. State, 65 Md. App. 128, 137, 499 A.2d 959, 963 (1985) (holding that
transferred intent only applied in attempted battery-type assault cases where an unin-
tended victim suffered injury).
179. See Poe, 341 Md. at 535, 671 A.2d at 507 (Raker, J., concurring) (stating that trans-
ferred intent should not apply to inchoate crimes where the unintended victim is not
harmed).
180. Harrison 11, 382 Md. at 507, 855 A.2d at 1238. The majority in Harrison relied on
the arguments from Ford even though Judge Raker's concurring opinion in Poe noted that
transferred intent should only be applied where a victim is physically injured. Id; Poe, 341
Md. at 535, 671 A.2d at 507 (Raker, J., concurring).
181. Harrison I, 382 Md. at 509, 510 n.2, 855 A.2d 1238-39, 1240 n.2 (Raker, J., dissent-
ing); Poe, 341 Md. at 539, 671 A.2d at 509 (Raker, J., concurring).
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for attempted murder,l8 2 but the court in Harrison overruled its hold-
ing from Wilson that transferred intent was applicable to inchoate of-
fenses. 183  Wilson involved the exact same fact pattern at issue in
Harrison where the defendant shot at his intended victim and missed
and hit a bystander.1 8 4 The court departed from its holding in Wilson
and abandoned the principle of stare decisis when there was not a
clear error in judgment in Wilson. The court's decision in Harrison
also departed from the spirit of its opinion in Gladden, in which Mary-
land first recognized the doctrine of transferred intent as a means of
ensuring that violent conduct was appropriately punished even
though a defendant's actions may have inflicted harm upon someone
other than an intended victim. 8 5 Although Harrison is consistent with
dicta in Ford186 and Poe'8 7 as well as the Court of Special Appeals'
holding in Harvey in that each favored prohibiting the application
of transferred intent to attempt crimes, in light of the Court of Ap-
peals' decision in Wilson and its extension of transferred intent in Poe
where a bystander was killed and given the willingness of the court to
apply concurrent intent to attempt crimes, the most logically consis-
tent approach would be to extend transferred intent to inchoate of-
fenses.18 9 Because the Court of Appeals has been willing to expand
the use of transferred intent to cases where an unintended victim is
killed l9 ° and in Harrison it has even stated that application of another
legal fiction in concurrent intent is appropriate for attempt offenses,
the court creates an arbitrary distinction when it refuses to apply
transferred intent to inchoate crimes.' The Harrison court should
have followed the majority of other states that have extended the doc-
182. State v. Wilson, 313 Md. 600, 609, 546 A.2d 1041, 1046 (1988).
183. Harrison II, 382 Md. at 480, 855 A.2d at 1222.
184. Wilson, 313 Md. at 601-02, 546 A.2d at 1042.
185. See Gladden v. State, 273 Md. 383, 405, 330 A.2d 176, 188 (1974) (stating that the
defendant could not escape criminal liability for his conduct because he had harmed
someone other than his enemy). Instead, Harrison prohibits defendants in two separate
cases whose conduct results in the same harm and who possess the same level of culpability
from being charged with the same offenses. See infra notes 162-176 and accompanying text(discussing how the court's decision in Harrison permits chance to play an inappropriate
role in establishing criminal liability).
186. 330 Md. 682, 708-09, 625 A.2d 984, 996-97 (1993).
187. 341 Md. 523, 525, 671 A.2d 501, 502 (1996).
188. 111 Md. App. 401, 432-33, 681 A.2d 628, 644 (1996).
189. See Poe, 341 Md. at 529-30, 671 A.2d at 504 (holding that the doctrine of transferred
intent applied where the intended victim was injured by the same bullet that killed an
unintended victim); Gladden, 273 Md. at 404-05, 330 A.2d at 188 (applying transferred
intent where the intended victim was not injured but an unintended victim was killed).
190. Poe, 341 Md. at 529-30, 671 A.2d at 504.
191. See Harrison II, 382 Md. at 511, 855 A.2d at 1240 (Raker, J., dissenting).
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trine of transferred intent to its fullest logical scope by applying the
doctrine to inchoate offenses but limiting its application to injured
bystanders. 92 The Court of Appeals should also have paralleled the
rationale of the jurisdictions extending transferred intent by basing its
decision on the negative policy ramifications-lack of proportionate
punishment and failure to deter-that rejecting the doctrine of trans-
ferred intent would cause.' 93
The Harrison court missed an opportunity to encourage propor-
tionate charges by permitting transferred intent's application to in-
choate offenses.' 94 As far back as 1879 in Gilman, courts in the United
States have recognized that prosecutions for inchoate offenses against
unintended victims are more burdensome if transferred intent cannot
192. LeEllen Coacher & Libby Gallo, Criminal Liability: Transferred and Concurrent Intent,
44 A.F.L. Rev. 227, 232 (1998) (stating that the rejection of transferred intent to attempted
murder is the stance in a minority of states); see State v. Rodriguez-Gonzales, 790 P.2d 287,
288 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that transferred intent was appropriately applied in an
attempted first-degree murder conviction); People v. Ephraim, 753 N.E. 486, 497 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2001) (holding transferred intent can be applied for attempted murder of an unin-
tended victim); Blanche v. State, 690 N.E.2d 709, 712 (Ind. 1998) (holding transferred
intent doctrine applies to attempted murder); State v. Afford, 151 N.W.2d 573, 575 (Iowa
1967) (affirming the defendant's conviction for assault with intent to commit murder
where he tried to shoot at an intended victim and wounded an unintended victim instead);
State v. Thomas, 53 So. 868, 869-70 (La. 1910) (extending the doctrine of transferred
intent to inchoate crimes and also discussing the English common-law history supporting
the court's holding); State v. Gilman, 69 Me. 163, 171 (1879) (concluding that public
policy and the danger caused by defendants warranted the application of transferred in-
tent to inchoate crimes); State v. Ford, 539 N.W.2d 214, 229 (Minn. 1995) (applying the
doctrine of transferred intent to the attempted murder charge of a bystander where the
defendant shot and killed a police officer); Ochoa v. State, 981 P.2d 1201, 1204 (Nev.
1999) (stating that transferred intent applies where "there is intent to commit a criminal
act and the only difference between the actual result and the contemplated result is the
nature of the personal or property injuries sustained"); State v. Andrews, 572 S.E.2d 798,
802 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that transferred intent is applicable whenever an unin-
tended victim is injured regardless of whether or not the intended victim was injured);
Short v. State, 980 P.2d 1081, 1098 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999) (applying transferred intent
where the defendant threw an explosive into an apartment and injured unintended vic-
tims). But see Ramsey v. State, 56 P.3d 675, 681 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002) (holding that trans-
ferred intent was too expansive in scope when applied to inchoate crimes); State v. Hinton,
630 A.2d 593, 601 (Conn. 1993) (holding that transferred intent was not necessary to en-
sure proportionate punishment); State v. Brady, 745 So. 2d 954, 958 (Fla. 1999) (refusing
to extend transferred intent to inchoate offenses).
193. Gilman, 69 Me. at 171 (expressing concern that defendants would not be punished
for inchoate offenses if transferred intent was not applied); Ochoa, 981 P.2d at 1204 (hold-
ing that transferred intent was needed to ensure proportionate punishment and maintain
a deterrent effect to discourage criminal activity); State v. Worlock, 569 A.2d 1314, 1325
(N.J. 1990) (finding that there was a more powerful deterrent effect when transferred in-
tent was applied to inchoate crimes); State v. Fennell, 531 S.E.2d 512, 517 (S.C. 2000)
(holding that transferred intent was appropriate and necessary for punishing defendants
who commit inchoate offenses).
194. Poe, 341 Md. at 539, 671 A.2d at. 509 (Raker, J., concurring).
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be used.' 95 Prohibiting the use of transferred intent in attempt crimes
means that separate evidence of intent will have to be given by the
State and there may be circumstances where that additional proof will
be difficult to establish.196 In concurrent intent cases, for example,
the State may not be able to establish that a "kill zone" was created by
a defendant's actions where there were only one or two bullets fired,
as opposed to the six by the defendant in Harrison.'97 As discussed
above, there is no logical difference between when a defendant shoots
and injures an intended victim but also kills a bystander, as in Poe, and
when a defendant kills an intended victim but a bystander is also
wounded. 98  The societal harm, culpability, and danger are
equivalent in each case and thus prosecutors should be able to charge
the defendants with the same offenses and not be unduly hindered in
bringing those charges by the court's rejection of transferred intent to
inchoate offenses. 199
Although the doctrine of transferred intent would permit punish-
ment for crimes not directly within the defendant's actual intent, the
dangerousness demonstrated by the specific intent to cause harm to
someone and the actions taken in furtherance of that intent make
punishment for crimes to both intended and unintended victims just
and in the best interests of public policy as a deterrent. ° ° The dan-
gerousness exhibited by defendants, such as Harrison, warrants the
extension of criminal liability for unintended victims of shootings who
are only injured.'' With proportionate punishment in mind, the
court in Harrison should have held that the specific intent to cause
harm to someone in conjunction with action taken in furtherance of
that intent makes harm by bystanders a foreseeable and thus avoida-
ble consequence and defendants should be punished for increased
dangerousness just as they are when felony murder charges are
brought even where no death was intended.20 2
Similarly, it is a stronger deterrent to hold a defendant liable for
the attempted murder of an unintended victim that is injured regard-
195. 69 Me. at 171.
196. Poe, 341 Md. at 539-40, 671 A.2d at 509 (Raker, J., concurring).
197. Id. (Raker, J., concurring).
198. Id. at 525-26, 671 A.2d at 502.
199. People v. Scott, 927 P.2d 288, 291 (Cal. 1996).
200. See Ochoa v. State, 981 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Nev. 1999) (concluding that transferred
intent acts as a deterrent); State v. Worlock, 569 A.2d 1314, 1325 (N.J. 1990) (holding that
transferred intent should be applied to deter criminals who intend to kill another).
201. See State v. Gillette, 699 P.2d 626, 635 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985).
202. See Worlock, 569 A.2d at 1325.
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less of what happened to the intended victim. 2 °3 A defendant that
uses deadly force must know that he will be punished to the fullest
extent of the law for the harm caused by his conduct regardless of
whether or not it is an intended or unintended victim that is in-
jured.2 4 Through ensuring that a defendant will be punished to the
fullest extent that the harm, culpability, and danger elements of liabil-
ity warrant when an unintended victim is injured, it may be possible to
deter or alter her conduct. 20 5 Therefore, the court should have per-
mitted the application of transferred intent to inchoate offenses
where the unintended victim was injured but not killed.20 6
5. Conclusion.-In Harrison v. State, the Court of Appeals re-
versed its holding in Wilson and ruled that transferred intent did not
apply to inchoate offenses.20 7 The court's opinion is misguided in its
willingness to apply concurrent intent but reject transferred intent,
because the arguments for rejecting transferred intent apply to con-
current intent with equal force.20 8 Moreover, prohibiting the applica-
tion of transferred intent to inchoate offenses will allow chance to play
an improper role in the criminal justice system.20 9 By arguing that no
logical standard could be devised to limit the application of trans-
ferred intent to inchoate crimes the court failed to consider that in-
jury to the unintended victim could serve as a reasonable point to cut
off criminal liability.210 Instead of rejecting transferred intent, the
court should have applied transferred intent to attempt crimes where
bystanders suffer physical harm because it provides a workable stan-
203. Ford v. State, 330 Md. 682, 725, 625 A.2d 984, 1005 (1993) (McAuliffe, J., concur-
ring); Ochoa, 981 P.2d at 1205.
204. State v. Fennell, 531 S.E.2d 512, 517 (S.C. 2000).
205. Ochoa, 981 P.2d at 1205.
206. Harrison II, 382 Md. at 510 n.2, 855 A.2d at 1240 n.2 (Raker, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 508, 855 A.2d at 1238.
208. See supra notes 150-161 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's failure to
recognize that its arguments for rejecting the application of transferred intent to inchoate
offenses apply with equal force to concurrent intent).
209. See supra notes 162-176 and accompanying text (arguing that transferred intent
should be applied to inchoate offenses so that chance does not inappropriately allow de-
fendants in bad aim cases to be punished less severely than other defendants whose con-
duct results in the same degree of harm).
210. See supra notes 177-180 and accompanying text (criticizing the court for failing to
consider approaches to limit criminal liability when applying transferred intent to inchoate
crimes that the Court of Appeals previously utilized).
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dard and ensures that defendants are adequately punished and better
deters criminal conduct. 211
TRAVIS E. ROBEY
211. See supra notes 181-206 and accompanying text (discussing how transferred intent
serves to ensure proportionate punishment and deter violent conduct).
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IV. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. A Missed Opportunity to Protect Incompetent Pro Se Criminal
Defendants in Maryland
In Gregg v. State,' the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered
whether a trial court's failure to conduct a sua sponte competency
inquiry, based on a defendant's bizarre behavior 2 and mental health
history, violated the defendant's right to due process guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment.3 The court held that the trial court's
sua sponte duty, imposed by Criminal Procedure Article § 3-104(a) of
the Maryland Code,4 to determine the defendant's competency was
not triggered by the defendant's erratic behavior at trial absent a clear
showing of mental health issues.' In its holding, the court failed to
consider all of the factors indicative of incompetence and narrowly
defined the trial court's sua sponte duty to investigate the competency
of a defendant.6 The Gregg court failed to employ the approach
adopted by the United States Supreme Court, which requires the trial
court to consider several non-exclusive factors in determining
whether a competency inquiry is warranted.' The court should have
1. 377 Md. 515, 833 A.2d 1040 (2003).
2. Consistent with the unusual nature of the crime for which Gregg stood trial, evi-
dence was introduced by the police and his neighbors that demonstrated a pattern of er-
ratic and strange behavior including, inter alia, appearing naked at the community beach
with a bag over his head, crawling on his hands and knees through his home, and knock-
ing children off their bicycles. Id. at 564, 833 A.2d at 1068 (Bell, C.J., dissenting). Further,
Gregg's behavior at the circuit court included several instances of irrational behavior. Id.
at 559-63, 833 A.2d at 1066-68 (Bell, C.J., dissenting). During his two appearances at the
circuit court, Gregg demonstrated difficulty understanding his right to representation by
the public defender and a lack of knowledge concerning the outcome of his competency
evaluation, displayed paranoia in stating that he believed his food at the detention center
was drugged by the government, and engaged in an unusual colloquy with the judge con-
cerning a "walking restriction" that prevented him from standing in court. I& (Bell, C.J.,
dissenting).
3. Id. at 526, 833 A.2d at 1047-48; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (requiring that
states provide due process of law).
4. MD. CODE ANN., CrM. PROC. § 3-104(a) (2001) (imposing a duty on trial court
judges to make a competence determination if the defendant appears to be incompetent
to stand trial).
5. Gregg, 377 Md. at 547, 833 A.2d at 1059. The court concluded that the record
contained no basis for doubting the defendant's competency and affirmed the conviction.
Id.
6. See infra notes 176-196 and accompanying text (contrasting the Court of Appeals's
repeated professions to consider all of the relevant circumstances with its failure to con-
sider factors other than the defendant's behavior at trial).
7. See infra notes 197-210 and accompanying text (contrasting the Supreme Court's
use of the multi-factor approach with that taken by the Court of Appeals). The Supreme
1123
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included Gregg's request to proceed without counsel as a factor in
determining when the duty to conduct a competency inquiry is trig-
gered because the defendant no longer had an advocate to raise
doubts concerning his competence.' Failure of the Court of Appeals
to adopt such a modified multi-factor approach leaves the constitu-
tional rights of criminal defendants unprotected and makes the sua
sponte trial court duty to determine competence entirely discretion-
ary in the hands of Maryland trial court judges.9
1. The Case.-On August 12, 2000, John Leon Gregg struck a
ten-year-old girl with a bag as she passed him on her bicycle on a side-
walk in their neighborhood.1 ° The blow caused the girl to fall off her
bicycle." Gregg was charged in the District Court for Anne Arundel
County with second degree assault. 12 The district court ordered
Gregg to undergo a competency evaluation, which was conducted at
Crownsville Hospital Center from September 14, 2001, to November
19, 2001.13 The written report prepared by the hospital staff and sub-
mitted to the district court concluded that Gregg had delusion disor-
der, persecutory type and schizoid, avoidant and dependent
personality disorder.14 The hospital staff advised the court that Gregg
was incompetent to stand trial because he could not understand the
nature of the proceedings against him nor assist in his own defense. 15
Court has identified the defense counsel's doubts regarding competency, evidence of a
defendant's irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on
competence to stand trial as relevant factors in considering whether further inquiry into
the defendant's competence to stand trial is warranted. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162,
177 n.13, 180 (1975).
8. See infra notes 211-221 and accompanying text (arguing that the defendant's re-
quest to proceed without counsel should be included as a factor in determining whether a
sua sponte competency inquiry is required). Application of this modified multi-factor ap-
proach would have resulted in a correct finding that the circumstances of Gregg's case
triggered a sua sponte competence inquiry.
9. See infra notes 209-210 and accompanying text (discussing the consequences of the
court's failure to define the sua sponte duty).
10. Gregg v. State, No. 2413, slip op. at 1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Oct. 7, 2002).
11. Gregg, 377 Md. at 518, 833 A.2d at 1042.
12. Id. Following Gregg's arrest, a district court commissioner set bail in the amount of
$2,500, but Gregg declined bail review and was committed to the Anne Arundel County
Detention Center. Gregg, No. 2413, slip op. at 2-3.
13. Gregg, 377 Md. at 518, 833 A.2d at 1042.
14. Id. The report included information concerning Gregg's bizarre behavior at the
hospital including crawling on his knees, rapidly pacing the hallway, shaving his beard
while kneeling on the floor, yelling and cursing, and being isolative. Id. at 559, 833 A.2d at
1066 (Bell, C.J., dissenting). Additionally, the report stated that Gregg's paranoia included
a belief that the government harassed him, videotaped him, poisoned his food, and
bugged his house. Id. (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 518, 833 A.2d at 1042.
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The district court held a competency hearing on November 19,
2001, where the judge questioned Gregg concerning the charges. 16
Dr. Mohammed Ajanah, one of Gregg's evaluators at the Crownsville
Hospital Center, testified and reiterated his professional belief that
Gregg was not competent to stand trial.1 7 Dr. Ajanah explained that
Gregg did not have a rational understanding of the charges against
him because he believed them to be fabricated and a product of a
conspiracy between the judicial system and his neighbors.' 8 To ex-
plain why Gregg appeared to, at times, understand the charges and
the proceedings, Dr. Ajanah testified that competency is a "day-to-day
issue."19 Dr. Ajanah also expressed fear that Gregg would be a danger
to his neighborhood if he returned. 0
In spite of Dr. Ajanah's testimony, the district court judge deter-
mined that Gregg was competent to stand trial.21 Gregg requested a
jury trial, and the case was transferred to the Circuit Court for Anne
Arundel County.2 2 Neither the Crownsville Hospital competency re-
port nor the transcript of the district court competency hearing were
transferred with the case to the circuit court, and the circuit court did
not hold a competency hearing of its own. 2 3 The circuit court did
hold a hearing on December 5, 2001, to consider Gregg's request to
waive his right to counsel. 24 Gregg explained to the court that he
wished to waive his right to counsel because he preferred not to pay
for an attorney and expressed a belief that he would be forced to pay
16. Id. at 519, 833 A.2d at 1042.
17. Id. at 520, 833 A.2d at 1043.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 521, 833 A.2d at 1043.
21. Id. at 522, 833 A.2d at 1044. The district court judge recognized that Gregg may
have been suffering from mental illnesses that may have caused problems in the past and
could result in future problems, but determined that Gregg was sufficiently competent to
stand trial at that moment. Id.
22. Id. at 523, 833 A.2d at 1044-45. Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 4-302(e)(1) di-
vests the district court's jurisdiction "if a defendant is entitled to and demands ajury trial at
any time prior to trial in the District Court." MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 4-
302(e)(1) (2002). Gregg was entitled to a jury trial because the maximum penalty for
second degree assault exceeded ninety-days imprisonment. See Gregg, 377 Md. at 523, 833
A.2d at 1045.
23. Gregg, 377 Md. at 523, 833 A.2d at 1045. The CR-51 form, employed by the courts
to order commitment to the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene for a competency
evaluation, was the only document regarding the competency issue received by the circuit
court. Id. at 522-23, 833 A.2d at 1044-45. ChiefJudge Bell concluded from the record that
the trial court did not read the report and did not discover the outcome of the evaluation
from its cursory inquiry into the status of the Crownsville Hospital report. Id. at 564, 833
A.2d at 1069 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 523, 833 A.2d at 1045.
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for a public defender's services. 25 The court referred Gregg to the
Public Defender's Office again before setting the case for trial.26
The December hearing covered several issues, but Gregg's com-
petence to stand trial was not addressed.27 When questioned as to
whether he was under the influence of any alcohol, drugs, medica-
tions, or pills, Gregg responded that his food was drugged in jail.28
The judge failed to remark on the statement or question Gregg fur-
ther on the issue after Gregg stated that the drugging would not affect
his ability to understand his actions. 29 The circuit court judge also
questioned Gregg regarding his past hospitalizations at mental health
facilities.3 0 The inquiry terminated with Gregg stating that he did not
know the results of the competency report completed by his examin-
ers at Crownsville.31 The circuit court judge proceeded through the
hearing without asking any further questions concerning Gregg's
competency.3 2
On the day of the trial, January 10, 2002, the circuit court ac-
cepted Gregg's request to waive counsel as knowing and voluntary.3 3
Prior to the discussion concerning Gregg's waiver of counsel, how-
ever, an exchange occurred between Gregg and the trial judge;
Gregg, appearing somewhat confused, explained that he had a walk-
ing restriction.3 4 Gregg stated that he had been unaware that the trial
would be held that day and that an orthopedic condition restricted his
walking and standing.3 5 Despite repeated requests by the judge for
Gregg to remain standing, he insisted on sitting and finally professed
that he just did not want to stand.3 6 At the conclusion of the trial, the
jury convicted Gregg of second degree assault and he was sentenced
25. Id. Despite the circuit court judge's efforts to explain the free nature of the ser-
vices of the Public Defender's Office, Gregg stated that he was not willing to accept the risk
that he would be charged if he did not qualify for the services at no cost. Id. Gregg ex-
pressed his belief that his case was straightforward and that he could handle it himself. Id.
26. Id During questioning concerning Gregg's request for a jury trial, he expressed
apprehension about the jury selection and stated that he would leave that to the prosecu-
tor and the judge. Gregg, No. 2413, slip op. at 7. The circuit court judge advised Gregg
that an attorney could help him through the process and Gregg repeated that he preferred
not to be assisted by counsel. Id. at 7-8.
27. Gregg, No. 2413, slip op. at 3-6.
28. Id. at 5.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 5-6.
31. Id at 6.
32. Id. at 6-8.
33. Gregg, 377 Md. at 523, 833 A.2d at 1045.
34. Id. at 561-63, 833 A.2d at 1067-68 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 563, 833 A.2d at 1068 (Bell, CJ., dissenting).
36. Id. (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
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by the court to five years' imprisonment. All but six months of the
sentence were suspended, and he received five years' probation.37
Gregg, represented on appeal by the State Public Defender's Of-
fice, argued that the circuit court erred in (1) failing to consider his
competency to stand trial, (2) failing to consider his competency to
waive counsel, and (3) failing to follow the requisite procedures of
Maryland Rule 4-215 in accepting his waiver of counsel.38 The de-
fense argued that the court should have investigated Gregg's compe-
tency to stand trial sua sponte based on his bizarre behavior at trial
and history of mental illness, and further that the same behaviors
should have triggered the court's sua sponte duty to ensure Gregg's
competency to waive counsel.39 The Court of Special Appeals re-
jected the arguments and held that, despite his erratic and unex-
plained behavior, Gregg understood the proceedings against him, was
capable of defending his rights throughout the trial, and waived his
right to counsel knowingly and intelligently.4 °
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to decide whether the
trial court had a sua sponte duty to inquire into Gregg's competency
to stand trial and waive the right to counsel, and whether competency
to stand trial conclusively determines competency to waive counsel.41
2. Legal Background.-Maryland and federal law adhere to the
common-law prohibition against allowing an incompetent defendant
to stand trial.42 The United States Supreme Court has long held that
the conviction of a legally incompetent defendant violates his right to
37. Id. at 523, 833 A.2d at 1045.
38. Id. at 523-24, 833 A.2d at 1045. Gregg claimed that the advisements concerning the
charges, the penalties, and the importance of assistance from counsel required by the rule
were not given to him in full by the circuit court as required by the rule. Id. at 524-25, 833
A.2d at 1045-46. The Court of Special Appeals, rejecting Gregg's argument, found that he
cumulatively received each of the required advisements from a circuit court judge, as re-
quired by the rule and prior interpretations of the rule. Id. at 526, 833 A.2d at 1046.
Gregg raised additional issues on appeal, which were summarily rejected by the court, in-
cluding (1) whether Gregg was given adequate notice under Maryland Rule 4-342(d) of
the letters from his neighbors considered by the court during sentencing, (2) whether the
trial judge abused his discretion in failing to investigate Gregg's claims of jury tampering
or (3) his allegations that the state's witnesses were instructed to falsely testify, and (4)
whether the trial court erred in permitting the state to violate Maryland Rule 4-236. Id. at
523 n.2, 833 A.2d at 1045 n.2.
39. Id. at 524, 833 A.2d at 1045.
40. Id. at 525, 833 A.2d at 1046.
41. Id. at 526, 833 A.2d at 1046-47. The Court of Appeals also considered whether the
combined advisements given by two different circuit court judges, first, at the December 5,
2001 hearing concerning Gregg's request to waive counsel and, second, at the proceedings
on the day of the trial, met the requirements of Rule 4-215. Id.
42. Raithel v. State, 280 Md. 291, 298, 372 A.2d 1069, 1073 (1977).
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due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.4 The Supreme
Court and the Maryland Court of Appeals apply the same competency
standard, but take different approaches to determining when to apply
the standard to ensure the competence of criminal defendants.44 In
1960, the Supreme Court established a two-prong test that defendants
must meet to be deemed competent.45 The Maryland legislature has
adopted this federal standard46 and allocated the duty to determine a
defendant's competence to stand trial to the trial courts.47 In consid-
ering the circumstances that indicate that a defendant may fail to
meet the competency standard, thus triggering a sua sponte compe-
tency inquiry, the Supreme Court applies a multi-factor approach.48
However, Maryland courts have failed to adopt a uniform approach
for trial courts to employ in determining when such a sua sponte duty
is triggered. Despite this difference in approaches, the Supreme
Court and the Maryland Court of Appeals have both adopted the
same standard for determinations of competence to waive counsel as
for competence to stand trial.49
a. Competence to Stand TiaL-The Supreme Court has char-
acterized competence to stand trial as the foundational right that en-
ables the defendant to effectively exercise all other constitutional
rights in a criminal trial.5" The Court has established a two-prong test
to ensure the protection of this right and defendants' right to due
process. 5' In Maryland, the legislature has adopted this standard52
and has codified the trial court's duty to make sua sponte competency
43. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966).
44. See infra notes 176-210 and accompanying text (describing the multi-factor ap-
proach employed by the Supreme Court and the failure of the Maryland Court of Appeals
to adopt the same test).
45. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam) (establishing the
standard for competence to stand trial).
46. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 3-101(f)(1-2) (2001).
47. Id. § 3-104; Roberts v. State, 361 Md. 346, 363-66, 761 A.2d 885, 894-96 (2000).
48. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 177 n.13, 180 (1975).
49. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402 (1993) (holding that the standard for
competence to waive the right to counsel is the same as that to stand trial); see also Thanos
v. State, 332 Md. 511, 519-20, 632 A.2d 768, 772 (1993) [hereinafter Thanos I] (citing
Godinez as support for the conclusion that the competence standards are the same).
50. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 457 (1992).
51. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam). The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states, "nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without the due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
52. See Raithel v. State, 280 Md. 291, 298, 372 A.2d 1069, 1073 (1977) (noting that the
Maryland test tracks the federal standard). The relevant Maryland statute at the time the
court decided Raithel was MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 23 (1972), now codified as MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 3-101 (2004).
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inquiries in accordance with due process.53 Competency determina-
tions of Maryland defendants must meet the due process require-
ments of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 21 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights.
54
In 1960, the Supreme Court established the federal standard for
competence to stand trial in Dusky v. United States.55 The two-prong
test requires that the accused have the ability to understand communi-
cations with his lawyer and have a rational and factual understanding
of the proceedings against him.5 6 In Dusky, the defendant pled not
guilty to charges of kidnapping, and the district court, at the sugges-
tion of the court-appointed defense counsel, ordered a psychiatric
evaluation. Based on the findings of several psychiatric evaluations
that the defendant was "oriented as to time, place, and person," but
unable to assist counsel in his defense, the district court found the
defendant competent to stand trial at a hearing on the issue.5" Re-
jecting Dusky's claim of insanity, the jury convicted him of kidnap-
ping.59 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit found that the trial court properly applied the "oriented in
time, place, and person" competence standard and affirmed the con-
viction,6 ° but the Supreme Court disagreed and found that the district
court judge incorrectly applied the standard that the defendant be
oriented in time and place and have some recollection of events.61
Instead, the Court held that the defendant must have had the ability
to understand communications with his lawyer and a rational and fac-
tual understanding of the proceedings against him. 62 Under this stan-
dard, the Court found that the doubts and ambiguities surrounding
the psychiatric testimony, as well as the difficulty in retrospectively de-
53. CRIM. PROC. § 3-104.
54. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. XXI. The Maryland Declaration of Rights states
"[t]hat in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath the right to be informed of the accusa-
tion against him; to have a copy of the Indictment, or charge, in due time (if required) to
prepare for his defence; to be allowed counsel; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have process for his witnesses; to examine the witnesses for and against him on
oath; and to a speedy trial by an impartial jury, without whose unanimous consent he
ought not be found guilty." Id.
55. 362 U.S. at 402.
56. Id.
57. Dusky v. United States, 271 F.2d 385, 387 (8th Cir. 1959).
58. Id. at 387-90.
59. Id. at 386-87.
60. Id. at 401-02. The court reasoned that the determination of competence to stand
trial was a question of fact for the trial court and therefore deferred to the judgment of the
trial judge. Id. at 397.
61. Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402.
62. Id.
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termining the defendant's competency more than a year later, pre-
vented an accurate determination of the defendant's competency to
stand trial.63 The Court reversed and remanded the case to the dis-
trict court for a determination of the defendant's competency to
stand trial.64
Federal district court judges employ the Dusky standard in deter-
mining whether defendants are competent to stand trial.65 Defend-
ants have been found competent under the test despite a history of
depression, possible mental health issues, learning impairments, and
suicidal tendencies where the court determined that the defendant
exhibited understanding of the proceedings through his behavior in
court, the testimony of experts, or statements of defense counsel.6 6
The Maryland legislature and courts have adopted the Dusky stan-
dard for determining competence to stand trial.67 The Maryland leg-
islature codified the federal two-prong test in section 3-101 of the
Criminal Procedure Article, which defines a defendant who is incom-
petent to stand trial as one who is not able "(1) to understand the
nature or object of the proceeding; or (2) to assist in one's defense."6"
In 1977, the Court of Appeals, in Raithel v. State, interpreted this stat-
ute61 in considering whether the trial court improperly found the de-
fendant, who was convicted by a jury of first degree murder, assault
with intent to rape, and carrying a dangerous weapon openly, compe-
tent to stand trial. 70 The defendant was charged with the murder of a
female customer who suffered a fatal stab wound in the restaurant
63. Id. at 403.
64. Id.
65. E.g., United States v. Boigegrain, 155 F.3d 1181, 1190 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding the
defendant incompetent to stand trial based on the defendant's behavior in court and the
psychologist's testimony that the defendant's delusions prevented him from understanding
the proceedings and thinking rationally about the case); United States v. Morrison, 153
F.3d 34, 40, 47 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding the defendant competent to stand trial because a
psychologist testified that the defendant understood the charges and proceedings and
could assist his counsel in the defense).
66. See, e.g., Coleman v. Mitchell, 244 F.3d 533, 545 (6th Cir. 2001) (determining that
the defendant met the standard for competence to stand trial because he assisted with his
defense as co-counsel); Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 194 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding the
defendant competent due to behavior at trial exhibiting an understanding of the trial pro-
ceedings and appeal process despite history of depression, severe learning impairment,
and suicidal tendencies); United States v. Zarnes, 33 F.3d 1454, 1472-73 (7th Cir. 1994)
(finding defendant competent after defense counsel's statement that he was competent
and an exchange with the trial court indicating his understanding of the proceedings).
67. Raithel v. State, 280 Md. 291, 298, 372 A.2d 1069, 1073 (1977).
68. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 3-101(f)(1)-(2) (2001).
69. Raithel, 280 Md. at 298, 372 A.2d at 1073 (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1970)).
70. Id. at 292-93, 372 A.2d at 1070.
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where the defendant worked as a busboy.7" The defendant confessed
to the murder and claimed insanity at the time of the event, as well as
incompetence to stand trial. 72 The trial court conducted a compe-
tency hearing and heard the testimony of a psychiatrist, who recited
the defendant's extensive history of emotional illness and provided his
opinion, based on four examinations of the defendant, that the defen-
dant suffered from schizophrenia and was incompetent to stand
trial.7' However, the trial judge struck the psychiatrist's testimony af-
ter a determination that the doctor did not know the statutory stan-
dard for competence to stand trial.7 ' The trial judge then found the
defendant competent to stand trial.75 Specifically, the judge found
that the defendant was aware of the nature of the proceedings, but
failed to make a determination as to the defendant's ability to assist in
his own defense.76
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in finding
the defendant competent to stand trial, and reversed and remanded
the case for a new trial.77 The court held that under the statutory
standard for competence to stand trial78 the trial court must deter-
mine both that the defendant is able to understand the nature and
object of the proceeding against him and that he is able to assist in his
defense. 79 The court held that the trial court erred in failing to make
a determination of the defendant's ability to assist in his defense and
in striking the psychiatrist's testimony.8"
Since Raithel, Maryland courts have continued to apply the Dusky
standard to ensure the competence of criminal defendants. In 2000,
the Court of Appeals in Ware v. State'1 reiterated that the standard
must be met to prevent a mentally incompetent defendant from being
subjected to trial in violation of his constitutional right not to be tried
71. Id. at 293, 372 A.2d at 1070.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 293-94, 372 A.2d at 1071. The trial judge also recessed the hearing to enable
the psychiatrist to conduct an additional examination of the defendant, and subsequently,
the doctor reiterated his belief that the defendant was not competent to stand trial. Id. at
294, 372 A.2d at 1071.
74. Id. at 296, 372 A.2d at 1072.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 304, 372 A.2d at 1076.
78. The court stated that the statutory test for competence, formerly found in Article
59, section 23, closely tracks the federal test established in Dusky and codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 4244. Id. at 298, 372 A.2d at 1073. The Maryland test has since been recodified at MD.
CODE ANN., CRIM. PRoc. § 3-101(f)(1)-(2) (2001).
79. Raithel, 280 Md. at 300, 372 A.2d at 1074.
80. Id. at 300, 303, 372 A.2d at 1074, 1076.
81. 360 Md. 650, 759 A.2d 764 (2000).
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while incompetent.8 2 In Ware, the defendant was convicted by a jury
of two counts of first degree murder and related handgun violations
in the deaths of his former girlfriend and her friend.8" The defen-
dant then elected to be sentenced by the jury despite his counsel's
strong recommendation for a court sentencing and his previous
agreement with that course of action.8 4 Ware was sentenced to
death.8 5 On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that there was no
evidence in the record that Ware did not meet the Dusky standard for
competence and his decision to proceed with jury sentencing was in-
sufficient to trigger the trial court's sua sponte duty to make a compe-
tency inquiry.8'
b. Multi-Factor Approach to Determining Need for Inquiry into De-
fendant's Competence.-The United States Supreme Court has adopted
a multi-factor approach in considering the facts that would trigger a
trial court judge's sua sponte duty to inquire into a defendant's com-
petency.87 The Maryland legislature has codified the duty of the state
trial courts to determine a defendant's competency to stand trial.88
The Maryland Court of Appeals has considered the issue of when such
a duty is triggered but, unlike the Supreme Court, has not adopted a
uniform approach to determining the circumstances under which a
sua sponte inquiry is required.89
In 1966, the Supreme Court held in Pate v. Robinson that a trial
court's failure to investigate a defendant's competency to stand trial
violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. 90 Charged
with the murder of his common law wife, Robinson was defended by
court-appointed counsel who raised the issue of incompetence to
stand trial, in addition to a defense of insanity at the time of the shoot-
ing." The Court held that the defendant's history of mental illness
82. Id. at 702, 759 A.2d 791.
83. Id. at 660-61, 759 A.2d at 769.
84. Id. at 696, 759 A.2d at 788.
85. Id. at 660, 759 A.2d at 769.
86. Id. at 705-06, 759 A.2d at 793.
87. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385-86 (1966).
88. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 3-104 (2001).
89. See infra notes 176-196 and accompanying text (examining the approach taken by
the Maryland Court of Appeals).
90. 383 U.S. at 385.
91. Id. at 376.
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and erratic and violent behavior represented sufficient evidence to re-
quire an inquiry into Robinson's competency.
9 2
Nine years later, in Drope v. Missouri,9 3 the Court reiterated the
significance of its decision in Pate and found that doubt expressed by
the defense counsel regarding competency, evidence of irrational be-
havior or an unusual demeanor at trial, and any past medical evalua-
tion determining competence to stand trial are all relevant factors in
determining whether a competence inquiry is triggered; in some in-
stances, one of these factors alone could constitute sufficient doubt to
require an inquiry.94 Under this multi-factor approach, the Court
held that the irrational behavior of Drope, charged with forcible rape
of his wife, including an attempted suicide during the trial, warranted
a sua sponte inquiry by the trial court into his competency despite
evidence of his seemingly competent demeanor at trial.95 The Court
further cautioned that trial courts bear the duty of looking for
changes in circumstances throughout the trial that could render the
defendant incompetent to stand trial.96
The Maryland legislature has similarly placed the duty of making
the determination of competency on the trial courts.9 7 Section 3-104
of the Criminal Procedure Article requires that "[i]f, before or during
a trial, the defendant in a criminal case appears to the court to be
incompetent to stand trial or the defendant alleges incompetence to
stand trial, the court shall determine, on evidence presented on the
record, whether the defendant is incompetent to stand trial."" The
Court of Appeals summarized the trial court's duty to conduct a com-
petence inquiry as triggered upon either allegations by the accused or
the defense counsel of incompetence or upon the trial court's sua
sponte decision that the accused appears incompetent to stand trial.99
92. Id. at 385-86. The Court found that, under Illinois law, the trial judge's duty to
conduct an inquiry was triggered where the evidence raised doubt about the defendant's
competence to stand trial. Id. at 385.
93. 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
94. Id. at 177 n.13, 180.
95. Id. at 164, 178-80. The Court reasoned, as in Pate, that a trial court should not
ignore evidence of a history of significant irrational behavior solely due to a defendant's
rational demeanor at trial. Id. at 179.
96. Id. at 181. The Court stated that even if the defendant is competent at the begin-
ning of his trial, a trial court must always be attuned to changes that would render the
accused incompetent to stand trial. Id.
97. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 3-104(a) (2001).
98. Id.
99. Thanos v. State, 330 Md. 77, 85, 622 A.2d 727, 730 (1993) [hereinafter Thanos 1].
The Court of Appeals has also recognized that the issue of the defendant's competence
can be introduced and considered at any time before or during trial. Roberts v. State, 361
Md. 346, 364, 761 A.2d 885, 895 (2000).
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The Court of Appeals has consistently recognized that the trial court
bears a duty to determine sua sponte competency to stand trial in
some situations, even where the issue was not raised by the defense.1"'
In Thanos v. State, the Court of Appeals considered whether the
trial court had erred in failing to inquire sua sponte into the defen-
dant's competence to stand trial in a first degree murder case.' 1 The
defendant had confessed to the murder and led police to the body of
the victim, who had picked up the defendant hitchhiking in a rural
area.1" 2 Although neither the defendant nor his counsel argued that
he was incompetent during the trial, he offered witnesses at the sen-
tencing proceedings to testify concerning his extensive mental health
history."0 3 The defendant was convicted and sentenced to the death
penalty.10 4 On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court's sua
sponte duty to consider the defendant's competence to stand trial was
raised by his history of mental illness and a series of unusual and un-
explained behaviors at trial and sentencing. 10 5
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court's sua sponte duty
to conduct a competency inquiry was not triggered where the defen-
dant initially opposed the State's request for a competency evaluation
and made lucid and articulate statements throughout the trial, despite
some peculiar remarks. 0 6 The court found that the duty of the trial
judge to investigate the defendant's competency was not triggered be-
cause the record indicated that the defendant met the Dusky test for
competence to stand trial.'0 7 While the court stated that the decision
was made after considering all of the circumstances,' 08 its reasoning
focused exclusively on Thanos's demeanor at trial and sentencing and
emphasized the fact that neither he nor his counsel raised the issue of
competence prior to appeal. 0 9
100. See Thanos I, 330 Md. at 85, 622 A.2d at 730; Roberts, 361 Md. at 364, 761 A.2d at 895.
101. Thanos I, 330 Md. at 84, 622 A.2d at 730.
102. Id. at 81, 622 A.2d at 729.
103. Id. at 82, 622 A.2d at 729.
104. Id. at 82-83, 622 A.2d at 729.
105. Id. at 85, 622 A.2d at 730-31. Thanos argued that his history of mental illness and
his behavior at trial, including his request to absent himself from court and subsequent
decision to attend the proceedings, his whimsical decisions to waive his right to ajury trial
and sentencing, and his strange remarks to the judge, which included a comment concern-
ing his age in dog years and a question as to whether his death sentence would be carried
out by "roo-roo," were sufficient to trigger an inquiry into his competence by the trial
court. Id.
106. Id. at 86-87, 622 A.2d at 731.
107. Id. at 87, 622 A.2d at 731.
108. Id. at 86, 622 A.2d at 731.
109. Id. at 86-87, 622 A.2d at 731.
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In Ware v. State, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed Thanos I, holding
that a sua sponte competency evaluation was not triggered where the
defendant appeared competent during the trial.1"' The court found
that Ware, convicted of two counts of murder and two counts of use of
a handgun in the commission of a felony,111 appeared to have a rea-
sonable degree of rational or factual understanding of the proceed-
ings throughout the trial.1 2 The court affirmed the conviction and
held that Ware's decision to proceed with jury sentencing against his
counsel's advice was insufficient without other indications of mental
illness to trigger the trial court's sua sponte duty to inquire into his
competency.'1
13
c. Competence to Waive the Right to Counsel-The Sixth
Amendment grants an accused the right to be assisted by counsel,'14
as well as the right to proceed without counsel if he so chooses."'
The Supreme Court has held that the same competence standard ap-
plies to competence to waive the right to counsel as to stand trial. 116
While the Court has allowed states the option of applying a higher
standard for assessing competency than that required by the federal
Due Process Clause, 7 the Maryland Court of Appeals has adopted
the federal standard." 8
In 1974, the Supreme Court, in Faretta v. California, established
the constitutional right of defendants to proceed without counsel
where they voluntarily and intelligently decide to do so."' The Faretta
trial court had made a preliminary ruling to allow the defendant to
represent himself against charges of grand theft after determining
that the defendant had previously represented himself in a criminal
prosecution, had completed high school, and preferred not to be ap-
110. 360 Md. 650, 705-06, 759 A.2d 764, 793 (2000).
111. Id. at 663, 759 A.2d at 770.
112. Id. at 706, 759 A.2d at 793.
113. Id.
114. The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial... and to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
115. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1974) (stating that the right to self-repre-
sentation is necessarily implied by the structure of the Amendment).
116. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 398 (1993) (rejecting the argument that the stan-
dard for competence to waive counsel should be higher than, or different from, the Dusky
standard).
117. Id. at 402.
118. See Thanos II, 332 Md. 511, 519-20, 632 A.2d 768, 772 (1993) (applying the standard
for determining competence to stand trial to evaluate the defendant's competence to
waive counsel).
119. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807.
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pointed a public defender because he believed that the office would
not spend adequate time on his case. 120 However, after observing the
defendant's demeanor and hearing the defendant's responses to in-
quiries into his legal knowledge at a sua sponte hearing on the defen-
dant's competence to waive counsel, the trial court determined that
the defendant was not competent to waive counsel, reversed its pre-
liminary ruling, and appointed a public defender.1 21 As a result of the
competency hearing, the trial court held that the defendant had no
constitutional right to proceed pro se. 1 22
After granting certiorari, the Court held that the trial judge's de-
cision violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to proceed
pro se and instructed that an accused must only make an intelligent
and knowing waiver of counsel. 123 While the trial judge had found
the defendant lacking in sufficient legal knowledge to represent him-
self adequately, the Court held that a defendant competently choos-
ing self-representation is not required to have the skills and
experience acquired by a lawyer. 124
In an effort to resolve a circuit split and to further clarify the
federal standard for competency to waive the right to counsel, the Su-
preme Court held, in Godinez v. Moran,125 that the standard for com-
petence to waive counsel was not higher than the standard for
competence to stand trial In Godinez, the Court held that the Dusky
standard applied to the defendant's competence to waive counsel, as
well as his competence to stand trial. 126 Godinez, charged with three
counts of first degree murder, confessed to the crimes after attempt-
ing suicide. 127 The defendant pled not guilty, and at the court's or-
der, two psychiatrists examined the defendant and both concluded
that he was competent to stand trial.128 Thereafter, at the defendant's
second appearance at the trial court, he expressed his desire to dis-
charge his counsel and change his pleas to guilty. 129 Based on the
findings of the psychiatric evaluations, the trial court determined that
120. Id. at 807-08.
121. Id. at 808-10.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 835-36.
124. Id.
125. 509 U.S. 389, 391 (1993).
126. Id. at 398.
127. Id. at 391. The defendant shot himself in the abdomen and attempted to slit his
wrists after the murder of his ex-wife. Id. He then confessed to all three murders to police
from his hospital bed. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 392. The defendant professed a desire to stop the presentation of mitigating
evidence at his sentencing. Id.
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the defendant met the Dusky standard for competence to stand
trial. 30 The trial court accepted the defendant's waiver of counsel as
given knowingly and intelligently, accepted his guilty pleas, and subse-
quently sentenced him to death for each of the murders.
1 3
'
The Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause requires
the same standard for competence to stand trial and for competence
to waive counsel.'32 The Court noted that the proper competency in-
quiry is whether the defendant is competent to make the decision, not
whether he is able to represent himself.13 3 However, the Court ac-
knowledged that more is needed to allow a defendant to waive his
right to counsel than simply a finding that he is competent.13 4 In ad-
dition to meeting the requirements of the Dusky test, to find a proper
waiver of counsel, the court must verify that the decision to waive the
right to counsel was made knowingly and voluntarily.
3 5
In Maryland, a defendant's waiver of counsel must be made pur-
suant to Rule 4-215, which requires the trial court to follow specific
procedures to advise the defendant of his right to counsel.1 36 In 1993,
the Maryland Court of Appeals considered the standard for compe-
tence to waive the right to counsel in light of Godinez.1 7 In Thanos I
and Thanos II, the Court of Appeals upheld first degree murder con-
victions and death sentences in two separate cases against Thanos.' 38
In the latter proceeding, the court considered Thanos's competence
130. Id. at 392.
131. Id. at 392-93.
132. Id. at 402. The Court reasoned that the decision to waive counsel is a choice of self-
representation, which is no more complicated than other decisions the defendant must
make over the course of the trial. Id. at 398-400.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 400.
135. Id.
136. MD. R. 4-215. At the defendant's first appearance in court without counsel, Mary-
land Rule 4-215(a) requires the trial judge to (1) ensure that the defendant received a
copy of the charging document with notice concerning the right to counsel, (2) inform
the defendant of the right to counsel and the importance of such assistance, (3) advise the
defendant of the nature of the charges and possible penalties, (4) determine, based on an
examination of the defendant, that the waiver of counsel was done knowingly and volunta-
rily where the defendant indicates such a desire to waive counsel, and (5) advise the defen-
dant that the court could proceed to trial with the defendant unrepresented by counsel if
the defendant so appears on the date of the trial. Id.
137. Thanos II, 332 Md. 511, 518-20, 632 A.2d 768, 771-72 (1993).
138. One conviction resulted from the murder of one teenager in St. Mary's County,
who picked Thanos up when he was hitchhiking in the area. Thanos I, 330 Md. 77, 622
A.2d 727 (1993); see supra notes 101-109 and accompanying text (discussing the trial
court's sua sponte duty to inquire into Thanos's competence to stand trial). The other
conviction resulted from the murder of two teenagers committed in Garrett County.
Thanos II, 332 Md. 511, 632 A.2d 768 (1993).
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to waive counsel in relation to his murder conviction in Garrett
County.' 3 9 In Thanos II, the defendant elected not to file a petition
for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court or pursue other
postconviction remedies and expressed his desire to terminate the
public defender's representation of him while his appeal was pending
before the Court of Appeals. 140 Subsequent to the Court of Appeals'
decision affirming his conviction for the Garrett County murders, the
State filed a Motion for Hearing and Determination Regarding Waiver
of Further Review Proceedings, and the court refused to rule on the
validity of Thanos's waiver of postconviction remedies before a com-
petency determination was made. 41  The trial court ordered a compe-
tency evaluation and found the defendant competent to discharge his
counsel and waive his right to post conviction review at the hearing.142
The Office of the Public Defender then appealed the competency
finding on behalf of the defendant. 4 3
The Court of Appeals held that the same standard should be ap-
plied to determine the defendant's competence to waive the right to
counsel as is used to determine competence to stand trial.' 4 4 Mirror-
ing the reasoning of the Godinez Court, the Court of Appeals first
found that the record supported the trial court's determination that
the defendant was competent to waive counsel.1 45 The court further
found that the decision to allow the defendant to discharge his coun-
sel was proper because the defendant had done so knowingly, volunta-
rily, and intelligently.'46
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Gregg v. State, the Court of Appeals
rejected the defendant's contentions that the trial court failed to ob-
serve its sua sponte duty to inquire into Gregg's competency to stand
trial and that a further inquiry was necessary to determine his compe-
tency to waive the right to counsel.147 Writing for the majority, Judge
139. 332 Md. at 518-19, 632 A.2d at 771.
140. Id. at 515-16, 632 A.2d at 770.
141. Id. at 516-17, 632 A.2d at 770.
142. Id. at 517, 632 A.2d at 770-71. The hearingjudge also presided at the defendant's
trial in Garrett County. Id. The court received testimony from a psychiatrist and a forensic
psychologist, who disagreed on the defendant's competence. Id.
143. Id. at 518, 632 A.2d at 771.
144. Id. at 519-20, 632 A.2d at 772.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 520, 632 A.2d at 772.
147. Gregg, 377 Md. at 547-49, 833 A.2d at 1059-60. The court also rejected Gregg's
argument that the advisements provided to him piecemeal did not meet the requirements
of Rule 4-215, concluding that the trial court properly advised Gregg concerning his right
to counsel. Id. at 554, 833 A.2d at 1063.
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Harrell held that nothing in the record justified the activation of the
trial court's sua sponte duty to order a competency evaluation.14 The
majority further determined, in following the Supreme Court's estab-
lished standard for assessing competency to waive the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel, that no further scrutiny of his competency was
necessary prior to acceptance of his waiver of counsel.1 4 9 Therefore,
the Court of Appeals found that Gregg competently and effectively
waived his right to counsel and affirmed his conviction.
15 0
The majority rejected Gregg's argument that the trial court failed
to recognize its sua sponte duty to conduct an inquiry into his compe-
tency to stand trial based on his mental health history, the results of
the competency evaluation conducted as a result of the district court
order, his erratic behavior at the trial court, and his decision to pro-
ceed pro se. 151 The majority acknowledged that section 3-104 of the
Criminal Procedure Article of the Maryland Code places a burden on
the trial court to determine the defendant's competency to stand
trial 5 2 and further recognized that the district court proceedings, in-
cluding the competency determination, were not binding on the trial
court and that the proceedings began anew without any determina-
tion of Gregg's competency. 151 Accordingly, the majority determined
that the circuit court made no ruling on the issue of competence, as it
was not presented to the court by either of the parties, and that the
facts referenced by Gregg were insufficient to trigger the trial court's
sua sponte duty to make an inquiry.1 5" The majority concluded that
there was no basis for the trial court judge to question Gregg's ability
to understand the object and nature of the proceedings or to assist in
148. Id. at 547, 833 A.2d at 1059. Judges Harrell, Raker, Wilner, Cathell, and Battaglia
formed the majority, while Chief Judge Bell wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Judge
Eldridge. Id. at 516, 833 A.2d at 1041.
149. Id. at 547-49, 833 A.2d at 1059-60.
150. Id. at 554, 833 A.2d at 1063.
151. Id. at 547, 833 A.2d at 1059.
152. Id. at 542-43, 833 A.2d at 1056. Section 3-104(a) provides that "[i]f, before or dur-
ing a trial, the defendant in a criminal case appears to the court to be incompetent to
stand trial... the court shall determine, on evidence presented on the record, whether the
defendant is incompetent to stand trial." MD. CODE ANN., CiM. PROC. § 3-104(a) (2001).
153. Gregg, 377 Md. at 542-43, 833 A.2d at 1056. The majority stated that the issue of the
defendant's competency to stand trial must be raised anew in the circuit court proceedings
either by motion of the defendant or defense counsel or by the defendant's conduct if
sufficient to trigger a sua sponte inquiry. Id. at 545, 833 A.2d at 1058.
154. Id. at 543, 833 A.2d at 1056-57. The court characterized Gregg's behavior at trial as
no more than stubborn and argumentative and found that there was no evidence in the
circuit court record of a history of mental illness, noting that the brief mention of the
Crownsville competency report constituted the only reference to Gregg's mental health.
Id. at 546-47, 833 A.2d at 1059.
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or mount his own defense. 155 The court therefore upheld the trial
court's failure to investigate Gregg's competency.156
The majority also rejected Gregg's contention that a heightened
standard for competence should be applied in the determination to
accept a defendant's waiver of the right to counsel.1 7 While Gregg
advocated the use of a standard that would evaluate the defendant's
mental capability and ability to defend himself, the court determined
that Maryland law required only that the waiver of counsel be made
knowingly and voluntarily. 15' The majority recognized that the Mary-
land test tracks the federal standard for competency to waive counsel,
which excludes a consideration of the defendant's knowledge of the
law or ability to defend himself effectively. 159 The majority further
acknowledged that the Supreme Court has left the door open for
states to employ a higher standard than that required by the Sixth
Amendment, but declined to do so under the circumstances of
Gregg's case."' The majority concluded that Gregg's waiver of coun-
sel met the legal requirements of a knowing and voluntary decision
and that the trial court had no duty to make an additional inquiry into
his competency to waive counsel.'61
In his dissent, Chief Judge Bell, joined by Judge Eldridge, dis-
agreed with what he viewed as the majority's misapplication of the
law.16 2 While not objecting to the majority's statement of the law as
placing a duty on the trial court to notice indications that the defen-
dant may not be competent to stand trial and make a subsequent com-
155. Id. at 547, 833 A.2d at 1059. Section 3-101 (f) defines "incompetent to stand trial"
as "not able (1) to understand the nature or object of the proceeding; or (2) to assist in
one's defense." CRIM. PROC. § 3-101 (f); see also Ware v. State, 360 Md. 650, 705-06, 759 A.2d
764, 793 (2000) (determining whether defendant lacked sufficient ability to communicate
with his attorneys with a reasonable degree of rational and factual understanding of the
proceedings).
156. Gregg, 377 Md. at 547, 833 A.2d at 1059.
157. Id. at 549, 833 A.2d at 1060.
158. Id. at 547, 833 A.2d. at 1059.
159. Id. at 548, 833 A.2d at 1059-60.
160. Id. at 549, 833 A.2d at 1060.
161. Id. at 547, 833 A.2d at 1059. The court also rejected Gregg's argument that the
failure of the circuit court to provide him with all of the required advisements denied him
his right to be properly advised of his right to counsel. Id. at 549, 833 A.2d at 1060. The
court reasoned that compliance with Rule 4-215 requires the defendant to receive each of
the enumerated advisements from a circuit court judge. Id. at 554, 833 A.2d at 1063; see
MD. R. 4-215. Accordingly, the court found the requirements met because the circuit court
provided Gregg with all of the required advisements that were applicable. Gregg, 377 Md.
at 554, 833 A.2d at 1063.
162. See Gregg, 377 Md. at 556-57, 833 A.2d at 1064 (Bell, C.J., dissenting) (disagreeing
with the majority's application of the facts in determining whether the trial court's sua
sponte duty to make a competence inquiry was triggered).
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petency determination, the Chief Judge argued that the record in this
case triggered that duty to make an inquiry into Gregg's competency
prior to proceeding with the trial.1 6 The dissent asserted that suffi-
cient basis existed in the record to create doubt as to Gregg's compe-
tency to stand trial.'
6 4
Chief Judge Bell argued that several factors must be considered
in determining whether further inquiry into a defendant's compe-
tency is required by the trial court.'65 These factors include doubts
concerning competency expressed by the defense counsel, evidence
of irrational behavior, the defendant's demeanor at trial, and any past
medical evaluation used to evaluate competence to stand trial. 66 The
dissent further argued that, while all of the factors are relevant in rais-
ing the trial court's sua sponte duty to inquire into competency, one
of the factors alone can be sufficient to trigger the duty.167 The Chief
Judge concluded that Gregg's history of mental illness, the absence of
the district court competency hearing transcript, the strange dialogue
with the trial court concerning his inability to stand, Gregg's state-
ment concerning the drugged food provided to him in jail, Gregg's
apparent misunderstanding of the role and cost of the public de-
fender, and Gregg's desire to proceed pro sel 68 warranted an inquiry
by the trial court into Gregg's competency to stand trial.169 In deter-
mining that a number of factors present in Gregg triggered the trial
court's sua sponte duty to determine Gregg's competence to stand
trial, the dissent stated that trial courts may not ignore common sense
or the totality of the circumstances.170
4. Analysis.-In Gregg v. State, the Court of Appeals held that a
criminal defendant's right to due process was not violated by a trial
court's failure to conduct a sua sponte competence inquiry when the
defendant's demeanor in court indicated that he met the legal com-
petency standard to stand trial.17" ' In so concluding, the court nar-
163. Id. (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
164. Id. (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 557, 833 A.2d at 1065 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
166. Id. (Bell, C.J., dissenting); see Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 177 n.13, 180 (1975)
(considering the above factors in determining whether further inquiry into the defen-
dant's competency was justified).
167. Gregg, 377 Md. at 557, 833 A.2d at 1065 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 566 n.5, 833 A.2d 1070 n.5 (Bell, C.J., dissenting). ChiefJudge Bell identified
the refusal of representation as one factor that the trial court should consider in determin-
ing the defendant's competence to stand trial. Id. (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 566, 833 A.2d at 1069-70 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
170. Id. (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 547, 833 A.2d at 1059.
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rowly defined the trial court's sua sponte duty by focusing on only one
factor indicative of incompetence, and it missed an opportunity to
clarify the obligation of Maryland trial courts to investigate the compe-
tence of criminal defendants. 17 2 The court failed to consider all of
the factors indicative of incompetence to stand trial and mistakenly
concluded that a sua sponte competency inquiry was not required, in
turn upholding Gregg's conviction. 173 The Gregg court should have
employed the multi-factor approach adopted by the Supreme Court,
which provides several non-exclusive factors for the trial court to con-
sider in determining whether a competency inquiry is warranted.' 74
Further, the court should have included the defendant's request not
to be represented by counsel as a factor in the determination. 175
a. The Court Narrowly Defined the Trial Court's Sua Sponte
Duty.-In Gregg, the Court of Appeals considered only the defendant's
behavior at trial in holding that the trial court's sua sponte duty to
investigate Gregg's competency was not triggered because it found
nothing in the record indicating that he failed to meet the Dusky stan-
dard for competence to stand trial.' 7 6 In so doing, the Gregg court
followed the general trend of the Court of Appeals by professing to
require the trial courts to consider all of the circumstances that could
indicate incompetence to stand trial in determining whether a compe-
tency inquiry is warranted, 177 while narrowly focusing its decision on
the criminal defendant's behavior at trial. 178 The Court of Appeals
continues to acknowledge the trial courts' duty to raise the issue of
172. See infra notes 176-196 and accompanying text (describing the court's repeated fail-
ure to consider all factors indicative of incompetence despite professions to do so).
173. See Gregg, 377 Md. at 566, 833 A.2d at 1070 (Bell, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that trial
courts may not rely on only one factor indicative of competence to the exclusion of
others).
174. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 177 n.13, 180 (1975) (considering multiple
factors in determining the need for a competency inquiry); infra notes 197-210 and accom-
panying text (examining the Supreme Court's use of the multi-factor approach in contrast
to the undefined approach taken by the Maryland courts).
175. Gregg, 377 Md. at 566 n.5, 833 A.2d at 1070 n.5 (Bell, C.J., dissenting); see infra
notes 211-221 and accompanying text (discussing the need to include consideration of the
defendant's request to proceed without counsel as a factor in determining whether the
trial court's sua sponte duty to make a competence inquiry is triggered).
176. Gregg, 377 Md. at 546-47, 833 A.2d at 1058-59.
177. See, e.g., Thanos I, 330 Md. 77, 86-87, 622 A.2d 727, 731 (1993) (emphasizing the
consideration of all circumstances in concluding that the court did not have an obligation
to order a competency hearing, while basing the determination almost exclusively on his
behavior at trial).
178. See infra notes 182-186 and accompanying text (describing the failure of the Court
of Appeals in prior Maryland cases to consider all of the circumstances indicative of
incompetence).
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competence when triggered; however, it has once again failed to give
the duty any substantive meaning. 179 In Gregg, the court's failure to
consider all of the indices of incompetence led to the finding that the
trial court's sua sponte duty to make a competence inquiry was not
triggered. 8 0
In Gregg, the Court of Appeals professed consideration of all of
the circumstances indicative of incompetence in determining whether
the trial court's sua sponte duty to make a competence inquiry was
required, while actually failing to implement that approach.""' In so
doing, the court followed the approach taken in previous decisions,
including Thanos I, where the court found that the sua sponte duty to
make a competence determination was not triggered after consider-
ing only that the defendant initially opposed the State's request to
establish competency and that the issue of competence to stand trial
was never raised by the defense counsel.182 Similar to Thanos I, the
court in Gregg professed to take all relevant factors into account, yet
failed to give weight to the defendant's very unusual behavior at trial
and sentencing, as well as his history of mental illness.18
The approach taken in Gregg is also similar to that taken in Ware,
where the Court of Appeals failed to weigh all factors indicative of
incompetence in considering whether the defendant's sudden deci-
sion to proceed with jury sentencing triggered the court's sua sponte
duty to make a competency inquiry.1 84 Following ajury conviction of
two counts of murder, Ware elected to be sentenced by the jury de-
spite his counsel's strong recommendation for a court sentencing and
his previous expressions of agreement to do so. 185 The Court of Ap-
peals found that Ware's decision to proceed with jury sentencing was
insufficient to trigger the trial court's sua sponte duty to make a com-
petency inquiry, but failed to consider the change in circumstances in
179. See Gregg, 377 Md. at 539, 833 A.2d at 1054 (stating that the circumstances that
warrant a sua sponte competency inquiry by the court remain unclear).
180. Id. at 556-57, 833 A.2d at 1064-65 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
181. See id. at 539-47, 833 A.2d at 1054-59 (discussing the court's prior considerations of
the circumstances that would trigger the trial court's sua sponte duty to make a compe-
tence inquiry and determining that the duty was not triggered by the circumstances in
Gregg).
182. Thanos I, 330 Md. at 86-87, 622 A.2d at 731.
183. Id. In Gregg the court found, after considering the whole record, that there was
not an adequate basis for a sua sponte competency evaluation. Gregg, 377 Md. at 547, 833
A.2d at 1059.
184. Ware v. State, 360 Md. 650, 704-06, 759 A.2d 764, 792-93 (2000).
185. Id. at 696, 759 A.2d at 788.
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connection with the other factors that could have indicated that Ware
was not competent or had become incompetent to stand trial.' 86
In Gregg, the court again failed to consider the totality of the cir-
cumstances in finding that there was no basis in the record to trigger
the trial court's sua sponte duty to determine Gregg's competence to
stand trial. 8 7 While the Gregg court properly articulated the Dusky
standard for competence to stand trial, it failed to give sufficient
weight to the factors indicating that Gregg may have failed to meet
that standard. 8 8 The court properly recognized that Dusky requires
that to stand trial, the accused must have the ability to understand
communications with his lawyer and have a rational and factual un-
derstanding of the proceedings against him. The Gregg court found
that there was no indication in the record that Gregg failed to meet
the Dusky standard for competence to stand trial1 89 and reasoned that
the record indicated that Gregg had the ability to consult with his
attorneys with a rational and factual understanding of the proceed-
ings because his participation at trial was coherent. 19°
Although the court professed to consider all of the factors indica-
tive of incompetence to stand trial, it based its determination that the
trial court's sua sponte duty to make an inquiry was not triggered
solely on Gregg's behavior at trial. 191 The majority found no evidence
on the record of a history of mental illness despite Gregg's statement
that a competency evaluation had been conducted by the district
court.192 The majority found the missing evaluation indicative of an
absence of a history of mental illness and relied solely on what it char-
186. Id. at 705-06, 759 A.2d at 793.
187. 377 Md. at 566, 833 A.2d at 1070 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 555-57, 833 A.2d at 1064-65 (Bell, C.J., dissenting). The Supreme Court es-
tablished the Dusky standard in 1960 to be employed by courts in making competency
determinations in order to protect the due process rights of criminal defendants. Dusky v.
United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960); see also Raithel v. State, 280 Md. 291, 298, 372 A.2d
1069, 1073 (1977). In 1977, in Raithe4 the Court of Appeals required Maryland courts to
employ the Dusky standard in determining competence. Raithel, 280 Md. at 300, 372 A.2d
at 1074. The Maryland legislature adopted the Dusky standard and codified the trial
court's duty to make sua sponte competency inquiries where the judge has reason to doubt
that the defendant meets the Dusky standard. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 3-101 (f), 3-
104(a) (2001).
189. Gregg, 377 Md. at 546, 833 A.2d at 1058.
190. Id. (citing Ware, 360 Md. at 706, 759 A.2d at 793).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 546, 833 A.2d at 1059. The court stated that it found only a single reference
to Gregg's history of mental illness in the circuit court record and that Gregg's sixty-six-day
stay at the Hospital Center for a competency evaluation and ten-day evaluation at the Anne
Arundel Hospital was not substantial enough to compel the court to inquire into his com-
petency. Id.
[VOL. 64:11231144
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
acterized as Gregg's "appropriate" responses to the judge's questions
to find that the trial court judge's sua sponte duty to make an inquiry
was not triggered."' 3 Missing from the majority's reasoning were the
strange nature of the offense that consisted of pushing a child off of
her bicycle, the results of the competency evaluation conducted by
order of the district court, Gregg's statements concerning his belief
that the judicial system and his neighborhood were involved in a con-
spiracy against him, his remark regarding the "drugging" of his food
in jail, his unexplained walking and standing impairment, and his ap-
parent misunderstanding of the role of the public defender. 194 The
court should also have considered the fact that Gregg was proceeding
pro se and had no advocate to raise issues such as incompetence.1 95
Had the court correctly considered all of the circumstances and indi-
ces of mental incompetence, as it professed, it would have found the
trial court's sua sponte duty to make a competence inquiry
triggered. 196
b. Mayland Trial Courts Should Be Held to the Multi-Factor Ap-
proach.-Although it professed to consider all of the circumstances in-
dicative of incompetence, the Gregg court failed to employ the multi-
factor approach adopted by the Supreme Court to determine when a
trial court's sua sponte duty to make a competency inquiry is triggered
and thus failed to hold Maryland trial courts to a uniform standard.197
The Court of Appeals acknowledged in Gregg that the question of
whether the evidence at trial raises suspicion about the defendant's
competence is often difficult,19 but nonetheless failed to employ the
multi-factor approach established in Drope to better determine
whether the court had a sua sponte duty to make a competence in-
193. Id. at 545-47, 833 A.2d at 1058-59. The court found no evidence in the record of a
history of incompetency and characterized Gregg's behavior as "stubborn and argumenta-
tive at most." Id.
194. Id. at 557-66, 833 A.2d at 1064-69 (Bell, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Bell declared
that a court should consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the
court's duty is triggered, rather than base the decision on only a portion of the facts. Id. at
565, 833 A.2d at 1069 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 565-66, 833 A.2d at 1069-70 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
196. Id. (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
197. See infra notes 208-210 and accompanying text (discussing the failure of the Gregg
court to employ the multi-factor approach and the likely consequences for criminal
defendants).
198. Gregg, 377 Md. at 545, 833 A.2d at 1058 (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180
(1975)).
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quiry.199 The multi-factor approach adopted in Drope includes consid-
eration of the defendant's behavior prior to and during trial and
opinions regarding the defendant's competence to stand trial.
20 1
The Gregg court missed an opportunity to determine the circum-
stances that would demand a competency inquiry and define the in-
stances in which the sua sponte duty to conduct such an inquiry is
triggered. The Gregg court should have followed the Supreme Court's
multi-factor approach for determining whether a competency inquiry
is required. 20 ' Although the Supreme Court has not identified a spe-
cific quantum of evidence that would trigger the trial court's sua
sponte duty, the multi-factor approach includes consideration by the
trial judge of (1) doubts expressed by counsel as to the defendant's
incompetence; (2) evidence of a defendant's irrational behavior; (3)
his demeanor at trial; and (4) any prior medical opinion on compe-
tence to stand trial in determining the need for a competence in-
202quiry. While any one of the factors alone could lead to a
conclusion that a competence inquiry is warranted,20 3 the court may
not solely act as the Gregg court did and rely on one factor and ex-
clude other factors from consideration to conclude that a competence
inquiry is not triggered.2 4 The Gregg court failed to employ the multi-
factor approach by considering only Gregg's demeanor at trial to the
exclusion of other factors, such as his court-ordered competency eval-
uation and history of mental illness.2
05
The Gregg court's decision is not consistent with Supreme Court
precedent, which has found the trial court's sua sponte duty to make
an inquiry triggered after consideration of the identified factors. In
Pate, the Court found that despite the defendant's seemingly rational
demeanor at trial, a competence inquiry was required based on his
history of irrational and violent behavior and treatment for mental
illness. 20 6 Subsequently, in Drope, the Court again found the trial
court's duty to investigate the defendant's competence to stand trial
199. See supra notes 187-196 and accompanying text (discussing the Gregg court's im-
plicit acknowledgment of the multi-factor approach by claiming to consider the totality of
the circumstances and failure to do so).
200. Drpe, 420 U.S. at 177 n.13, 180.
201. See id. (identifying the factors to consider in determining whether a competency
inquiry is necessary); but see supra notes 176-196 and accompanying text (discussing the
failure of the Court of Appeals to consider all of the factors indicative of incompetence).
202. Drope, 420 U.S. at 177 n.13, 180. However, the Court cautioned that there are no
definite signs that automatically warrant the need for further inquiry. Id.
203. Id. at 180.
204. Gregg, 377 Md. at 566, 833 A.2d at 1070 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 565-66, 833 A.2d at 1069-70 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
206. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385-86 (1966).
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triggered where the defendant appeared competent at trial, but had a
history of irrational behavior including a suicide attempt.
20 7
In Gregg, the Court of Appeals should have employed the multi-
factor approach used by the Supreme Court to clarify the trial court's
duty to conduct an inquiry into Maryland criminal defendants' com-
petence to stand trial. The totality of the circumstances required the
trial court sua sponte to conduct an inquiry into all factors influencing
Gregg's competence to stand trial.2 °s In determining that a compe-
tency inquiry is not warranted, the trial judge should at least consider
those factors identified by the Supreme Court. The failure of the
Court of Appeals to hold Maryland trial courts to the multi-factor ap-
proach results in a failure to conduct competence inquiries where
they are warranted and increases the risk that incompetent defend-
ants will be forced to stand trial. Adoption and implementation of the
multi-factor approach would safeguard the constitutional due process
rights of Maryland's criminal defendants.20 9
The Gregg court's failure to clarify the trial court's duty to raise
the issue of competency to stand trial inefficiently protects the due
process rights of criminal defendants suffering from mental illness in
Maryland and leaves the frontier of competency open to complete dis-
cretion by the trial court judges. The consequences of complete dis-
cretion will include unpredictable and inconsistent results for
defendants, trial judges, and the state court system. By providing no
guidance to the trial judges in permitting them to determine haphaz-
ardly when a competence inquiry is warranted, the Court of Appeals
has essentially made the sua sponte trial court duty, dictated by the
state legislature, discretionary at the hands of individual trial judges.
As long as the duty remains undefined and unenforced by the Court
of Appeals, the rights of many mentally ill criminal defendants in
Maryland remain unprotected despite the legislature's attempt to in-
stitute a safeguard.210
c. Waiver of Counsel Should Be Considered as a Factor in the
Multi-Factor Approach.-The Gregg court should have considered the
request by Gregg to proceed pro se as a factor in the multi-factor ap-
proach to determine whether the trial court's sua sponte duty to con-
duct a competence inquiry was triggered. The court followed
207. Drope, 420 U.S. at 180-81.
208. Gregg, 377 Md. at 565-66, 833 A.2d at 1069 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
209. The conviction of a legally incompetent defendant while he is legally incompetent
violates his right to due process. Pate, 383 U.S. at 378.
210. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 3-104(a) (2001).
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precedent in applying the Dusky standard to competence to stand trial
as well as competence to waive the right to counsel t.2 1  However, while
the Gregg court properly refused to adopt a standard for determining
competence to waive counsel that was higher than the standard for
determining competence to stand trial, the court should have consid-
ered the request by Gregg to proceed pro se as a factor in the multi-
factor approach used to determine whether a sua sponte competence
inquiry was required.
The Gregg court followed federal and state precedent by ensuring
that Gregg's waiver of counsel was made intelligently and knowingly
by applying the Dusky standard to determine competence to waive rep-
resentation. In Faretta, the Court found that a criminal defendant
need not have the skill and experience to represent himself effec-
tively, but must only make an intelligent and knowing decision to
waive counsel.21 2 In Thanos II, the Court of Appeals adhered to the
standard established by the Supreme Court in Godinez, requiring the
trial court to apply the Dusky standard in determinations of compe-
tence to waive counsel. 213 Thus, the Gregg court followed established
precedent in determining competence to waive representation, but
failed to consider Gregg's request to waive counsel in light of the
other circumstances indicating incompetence to stand trial.
The Gregg court should have considered the request by Gregg to
proceed pro se as a component of the multi-factor approach due to
the absence of a defense counsel to recognize and raise the issue of
competence on Gregg's behalf.214 The multi-factor approach estab-
lished by the Supreme Court to determine the need for a competence
evaluation includes a consideration of doubts expressed by counsel as
to the defendant's competence. 15 The Court of Appeals previously
considered this factor in Thanos I, where it emphasized the failure of
the defense counsel to raise the issue of incompetence as a primary
reason for its determination that the trial court's sua sponte duty to
211. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 398 (1993); Thanos II, 332 Md. 511, 519-20, 632
A.2d 768, 772 (1993). In addition to ensuring that the Dusky standard is satisfied, the trial
court must verify that the decision to waive the right to counsel was made knowingly and
voluntarily. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975).
212. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835-36.
213. Thanos II, 332 Md. at 519-20, 632 A.2d at 772; Godinez, 509 U.S. at 398.
214. See Gregg, 377 Md. at 566 n.5, 833 A.2d at 1070 n.5 (Bell, CJ., dissenting) (stating
that the defendant's refusal of representation should be considered as one factor indica-
tive of incompetence).
215. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 177 n.13 (1975) (finding a defense counsel's
doubts as to the competence of the defendant not determinative, but deserving of signifi-
cant consideration).
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investigate Thanos's competence was not required.21 6 However,
where the defendant appears for trial without counsel and requests a
waiver of the right to representation, as in Gregg, the defendant is de-
nied the opportunity for counsel to raise the issue of competence, as
no doubts could be expressed by an absent defense counsel. Rather
than eliminate consideration of doubts expressed by counsel as to the
defendant's competence as a factor in determining the need for a
competency evaluation for defendants proceeding pro se, the trial
court should replace this factor with consideration of the request to
waive counsel.217 Gregg's inability to understand the role and cost of
the public defender and his decision to proceed without counsel
should have been weighed with the other factors indicative of
incompetence.21 8
Gregg's request to proceed pro se represented a change in cir-
cumstances that should have been weighed with the other factors in-
dicative of incompetence in determining whether the trial court's sua
sponte duty to make a competence inquiry was required. In making
such a determination, the Gregg court could have relied on section 3-
104 of the Criminal Procedure Article, which requires the trial court
to reconsider competency to stand trial, even after an initial compe-
tency determination was made, as circumstances change. 219 The Gregg
court failed to recognize that, where the circumstances up to the
point of request by the defendant to waive his right to counsel have
not indicated a need for an inquiry into his competence, such a re-
quest could represent a changed circumstance. A sua sponte obliga-
tion of the trial court would then be triggered to reevaluate the
defendant's ability to meet the Dusky standard to stand trial because
the defendant no longer has an advocate to alert the court concern-
ing competency issues or to protect the defendant's rights. The multi-
factor approach requires a weighing of the identified factors, and the
Gregg court should have recognized that a request by Gregg to pro-
ceed pro se, weighed with the other factors, created doubts as to
216. Thanos I, 330 Md. 77, 86-87, 622 A.2d 727, 731 (1993).
217. See Gregg, 377 Md. at 566, 833 A.2d at 1069-70 (Bell, CJ., dissenting) (arguing that
Gregg's request to proceed pro se, in combination with other factors, triggered the trial
court's duty to make a competence inquiry).
218. Id.
219. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 3-104(c) (2001). The Supreme Court has held that
the issue of competence to stand trial can become evident at any point in the trial by a
change in circumstances, Drope, 420 U.S. at 181, and the Court of Appeals has acknowl-
edged that the duty of the trial court to raise the issue is extended throughout the trial.
Roberts v. State, 361 Md. 346, 364, 761 A.2d 885, 895 (2000).
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Gregg's competency.22° Because no competence evaluation or hear-
ing had been conducted at the circuit court, the Gregg court should
have considered Gregg's request to waive counsel, along with his bi-
zarre behavior at pretrial proceedings and history of mental illness, in
determining whether the sua sponte duty to inquire into Gregg's com-
petence to stand trial was triggered.22'
5. Conclusion.-The Court of Appeals failed to weigh all of the
factors in Gregg that would cumulatively trigger the trial court's sua
sponte duty to make a competence inquiry and instead placed empha-
sis on Gregg's demeanor at trial.222 In holding that a criminal defen-
dant's right to due process was not violated by a trial court's failure to
make a competence inquiry, the court missed an opportunity to clarify
the sua sponte duty of the trial court to order a competence inquiry
where circumstances indicate that the defendant may not meet the
Dusky standard for competence to stand trial.223 The court should
have employed the multi-factor approach, to determine when a com-
petence inquiry is warranted, established by the Supreme Court to
protect Maryland's incompetent criminal defendants from violations
of their right to due process. 224 The court should also have weighed
the defendant's request to proceed without counsel as a factor with
the other circumstances indicating that Gregg failed to meet the Dusky
standard for competence to stand trial because he lacked an advocate
to raise the issue on his behalf.22
5
Amy R. KLEMT
220. See Gregg, 377 Md. at 566, 833 A.2d at 1069-70 (Bell, CJ., dissenting) (including
Gregg's decision to proceed without counsel as a factor leading to the determination that a
sua sponte competence inquiry was required).
221. Id. (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
222. Gregg, 377 Md. at 547, 833 A.2d at 1059.
223. See supra notes 176-196 and accompanying text (discussing the Court of Appeals's
repeated failure to consider all of the indices of incompetence in determining whether the
sua sponte duty was triggered).
224. See supra notes 197-210 and accompanying text (contrasting the federal approach
and that taken by the Gregg court).
225. See supra notes 211-221 and accompanying text (arguing for the substitution of the
request to proceed pro se in place of the consideration of defense counsel's doubts regard-
ing competency in the multi-factor approach).
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B. Failed Analysis and Policy Reasoning Undercut Maryland Citizens'
Rights to Privacy and Security in Their Homes
In Brown v. State,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland examined a
practice whereby police, acting without probable cause or reasonable
articulable suspicion,' used deception to induce a person to open the
door of his motel room, and then once the door was open, identified
themselves as police officers and asked for permission to enter the
room and conduct a search.' Specifically, the court considered
whether the initial use of a subterfuge to prompt the opening of the
door eroded the subsequent consent to enter and search, thereby vio-
lating the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable
searches.4 The court held that the method employed by the police
did not erode the consent to enter or search because the deception
only induced the opening of the door.5 The court reasoned that once
the door was opened, the consent to enter was voluntary because the
occupant of the motel room knew that he was allowing police into his
room when he agreed to their entry.6
In reaching this decision, the court failed to analyze a majority of
factors that undermined the voluntary quality of the search, and thus
did not meaningfully apply the prescribed "totality of the circum-
stances" test7 to determine whether the consent to enter and search
was truly voluntary.8 Further, the court undermined honest citizens'
1. 378 Md. 355, 835 A.2d 1208 (2003).
2. Reasonable articulable suspicion requires that the police have rational inferences
based on specific, objective, and articulable facts which reasonably warrant the intrusion
into the home. E.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Stokes v. State, 362 Md. 407, 415-
16, 765 A.2d 612, 616-17 (2001). Reasonable articulable suspicion is a less demanding
standard than probable cause and significantly less demanding than the standard of pre-
ponderance of the evidence. E.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000); Stokes, 362
Md. at 415-16, 765 A.2d at 616-17.
3. Brown, 378 Md. at 359, 835 A.2d at 1210.
4. Id. at 360, 835 A.2d at 1211.
5. Id. at 365, 835 A.2d at 1213.
6. Id.
7. The totality of the circumstances test, prescribed by the Supreme Court in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, see infra note 64, directs the court to carefully scrutinize all of the
surrounding circumstances of a search in order to determine whether the search was con-
ducted pursuant to voluntary consent. 412 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1973).
8. See infra notes 201-233 and accompanying text (explaining that, although the Brown
court claimed to apply the test, it did so superficially and did not consider all of the evi-
dence). In determining that the consent to search was voluntary, the court most notably
failed to consider the police officers' lack of justification for initially approaching the sus-
pect's motel room, and the police officers' use of deception and its effect on the suspect.
Infra notes 210-225 and accompanying text.
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rights to privacy and security in their homes by failing to align itself
with the majority of state courts that have limited the use of deception
to situations where there is a reasonable basis for believing that crimi-
nal activity is taking place in the home.9 By allowing the police to use
deception in the absence of reasonable articulable suspicion of wrong-
doing, the court has left citizens vulnerable to arbitrary and selective
invasions of their privacy and has infringed upon their Fourth Amend-
ment rights.'"
1. The Case.-On the morning of January 31, 2001, Maryland
State Trooper George Wooden, working with a Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration interdiction group, received an anonymous tip about
possible drug activity in Room 109 at the Super Eight Motel in Aber-
deen, Maryland." In response to the anonymous tip, Wooden and
two other officers went to the motel at 10:00 A.M. that morning and
knocked on the door to Room 109.12 Roger Brown, one of two occu-
pants of the room, asked who was knocking.' 3 Wooden, dressed in
plain clothes, responded that he was maintenance and asked that he
be allowed in the room to check the thermostat.14
Brown consequently opened the door in his boxer shorts, at
which point Wooden smelled the odor of burnt marijuana coming
from the room.15 Wooden then flashed his police badge, identified
himself as a police officer, and asked if he could enter the room to
talk with Brown. 6 Brown said yes, and stepped away from the door to
allow Wooden and one other officer to enter; the third officer re-
9. See infra notes 234-243 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 244-262 and accompanying text.
11. Brown, 378 Md. at 359, 835 A.2d at 1210. The facts of the case recited in this sec-
tion are as testified to at a hearing on defendant's motion to suppress evidence found in
the motel room. Id. at 360, 835 A.2d at 1210.
12. Id. at 359, 835 A.2d at 1210. The tip did not rise to the level of reasonable articul-
able suspicion because it was uncorroborated and anonymous, and the officers had no
prior history as to the credibility of the information. Joint Record Extract at 18-19, Brown
v. State, 378 Md. 355, 835 A.2d 1208 (2003) (No. 140).
13. Brown, 378 Md. at 359, 835 A.2d at 1210.
14. Id.
15. Id.; Brief for Appellant at 9, Brown v. State, 378 Md. 355, 835 A.2d 1208 (2003)
(No. 0683).
16. Brown, 378 Md. at 359, 835 A.2d at 1210.
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mained outside.' 7 Brown then proceeded to lie down on one of the
beds in the room.18
Upon Wooden's entry into the room, the smell of marijuana be-
came more potent, and he observed a burnt marijuana cigarette sit-
ting in an ashtray on the night table between the two beds. 9 Brown
grabbed the cigarette and placed it entirely in his mouth.2 ° Wooden
told Brown he had already observed the cigarette, and Brown thus
took the cigarette out of his mouth and returned it to the ashtray.2'
After confirming that Brown had rented the room, Wooden
asked for permission to search the room, and Brown consented.
22
Wooden found a scale with white powder on it underneath a shirt on
the floor, cocaine in one of the dresser drawers, and $926 in cash in
the night table drawer. 3 Wooden consequently placed Brown and
the other occupant of the room under arrest.
24
Brown was tried in the Circuit Court for Harford County.25 In
September 2001, there was a hearing on defendant's motion to sup-
press the evidence found in the motel room.2 6 The defense argued
that the evidence found in the search was tainted because the police
used subterfuge to trick Brown into opening his motel room door,
thereby eroding the consensual search. 27 The trial court rejected the
defense's argument.28 Noting that it found Officer Wooden's testi-
mony to be more credible than that of Brown, the court determined
that there was express consent to enter and search. 29 Therefore, the
court denied the motion to suppress.30
17. Id. Although Brown acknowledged that Wooden identified himself as a police of-
ficer before asking to enter the room, he stated that he thought he had to comply with the
officers' request, and thus backed away from the door to avoid a confrontation. Id. at 360,
835 A.2d at 1210.
18. Id. at 359, 835 A.2d at 1210. The other occupant of the room was in the second
bed. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 359-60, 835 A.2d at 1210.
23. Id.
24. Id. Wooden testified that no force or coercion was used during the incident, and
that Brown was cooperative. Id.
25. Id. at 357, 835 A.2d at 1208.
26. Id. at 360, 835 A.2d at 1210.
27. Joint Record Extract at 61, Brown (No. 140).
28. Brown, 378 Md. at 360, 835 A.2d at 1210.
29. Id.
30. Id. In reaching its decision, the trial court distinguished the present case from
Perkins v. State, 83 Md. App. 341, 341-50, 574 A.2d 356, 356-60 (1990). The court reasoned
that while the police in Perkins used subterfuge to actually gain entry into the defendant's
home, thereby eradicating consent, the police in the present case used subterfuge solely to
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Brown was subsequently tried and convicted of possession with
intent to distribute cocaine. 3' He was sentenced to prison for ten
years, with all but five years suspended.32 Brown filed an appeal to the
Court of Special Appeals but, prior to argument, the Court of Appeals
granted certiorari to decide whether the use of deception to trick
Brown into opening his door had an erosive effect on the voluntari-
ness of Brown's consent to enter and search.33
2. Legal Background.-The Fourth Amendment protects the pri-
vacy of peoples' homes and generally requires that police officers have
probable cause and obtain search warrants before entering private
residences.3 4 This command yields, however, when searches are con-
ducted pursuant to valid consent.35 When individuals voluntarily con-
sent to a search of their home, police may enter and search the home
without having probable cause or obtaining a warrant. 36 Voluntary
consent must be freely and voluntarily given, and it must be free from
express or implied duress or coercion. 37 When police employ decep-
tion to gain entry into a home, the voluntariness of the consent to
enter and search is called into question, and the totality of the circum-
stances must be carefully examined to determine whether the consent
was coerced or freely given.3 8
a. Fourth Amendment Protections.-The Fourth Amendment
to the Constitution, made applicable to the States through the Four-
teenth Amendment,39 states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
induce Brown to open his door. Joint Record Extract at 69-71, Brown (No. 140). Once the
door was opened, the police received express consent from Brown to enter the room. Id.
at 70. Thus, because Brown was not tricked into letting the police enter his room, his
consent was preserved and was not eradicated by the previous deception. Id. at 70-71.
31. Brown, 378 Md. at 357, 835 A.2d at 1208.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 360, 835 A.2d at 1211. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari pursuant to
section 12-305 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which allows the Court of
Appeals to grant certiorari when there are "special circumstances rendering it desirable
and in the public interest." MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 12-305 (2002).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
35. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
36. Id.
37. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548, 550 (1968).
38. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49.
39. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
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and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.4"
The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable govern-
mental intrusions into areas in which they have a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy.4" Central to the protections afforded by the Fourth
Amendment is the protection of the sanctity of the home, where peo-
ple have the greatest right to privacy.42 Under the Fourth Amend-
ment, a hotel or motel room is afforded the same protection as an
individual's home for the period of its use and occupancy.43
The privacy of an individual's home is protected by the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.44 The warrant requirement
provides the foremost protection against unnecessary or arbitrary
physical intrusions into the home by police officers seeking to arrest a
suspect or search a home.45 Accordingly, because the warrant is so
vital in protecting the privacy of the home, warrantless searches and
seizures of a home are per se unreasonable, with only a few specific
exceptions. 46 In order to counter the presumption of unreasonable-
ness that accompanies a warrantless search, the state bears the burden
of proving the existence of an exception to the warrant require-
ment.47 Consent is one such exception."
b. The Consent Exception.-A search that is conducted pursu-
ant to a valid consent is excepted from the probable cause and war-
rant requirements.49 The philosophy underlying this exception is that
there is nothing unfair, unreasonable, or constitutionally suspect
about conducting a search when an individual has freely consented to
that search.5" Moreover, the community has an interest in promoting
consensual searches because evidence found in such a search may al-
low for the speedy and efficient prosecution of the crime, and may
consequently decrease the chance that an innocent person will be
40. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
41. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984).
42. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980).
43. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51-52 (1951).
44. Perkins v. State, 83 Md. App. 341, 344, 574 A.2d 356, 357 (1990).
45. Id.
46. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); see also Doering v. State, 313 Md.
384, 397, 545 A.2d 1281, 1287-88 (1988) (stating that because individuals have such a sub-
stantial privacy interest in their homes, there are few exceptions to the warrant
requirement).
47. Jeffers, 342 U.S. at 51.
48. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 243.
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wrongly charged with the crime. 51 Thus, it is well settled that a war-
rantless search of a home conducted with the consent of the occupant
is constitutionally permissible under the Fourth Amendment.52
The parameters of a valid consent, however, are not well-estab-
lished and continue to evolve. In Bumper v. North Carolina, the Su-
preme Court articulated the meaning of a valid consent, and held that
consent must be freely and voluntarily given in order for the state to
rely on consent as the justification for a searchY.5  In Bumper, law en-
forcement officials told a woman that they had a search warrant to
search her house, but then later relied solely on her consent tojustify
the search.54 The Court determined that the search was unlawful; the
woman's consent was not freely and voluntarily given because it was
given in submission to the officers' representation that they had a
search warrant.5 The Court held that mere acquiescence to an asser-
tion of lawful authority does not qualify as a valid consent.56 Thus, the
main issue involving an alleged consent to search is often whether the
consent was given voluntarily or whether the consent was coerced or
given in obedience to an improper claim of authority.5 7
c. Voluntary Consent.-The principal case addressing the is-
sue of voluntary consent is the 1973 case Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.58
In Schneckloth, a police officer stopped a car with a headlight and li-
cense plate light burned out and asked one of the occupants if he
could search the car.59 The occupant of the car consented, and then
proceeded to open the trunk and glove compartment for the of-
ficers.6" On these facts, the Court was presented with the question of
whether knowledge of a right to refuse consent is a necessary prereq-
uisite to making a voluntary consent.6'
In determining the meaning of voluntary consent, the Court rec-
ognized that it had to balance two opposing concerns: (1) the need
51. Id.
52. Id. at 222.
53. 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968).
54. Id. at 547-48.
55. Id. at 548-49.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 548-50.
58. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
59. Id. at 220.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 232-33.
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for effective law enforcement 62 and (2) the requirement that a con-
sent be made free from express or implied coercion.6 3 To address
both of these concerns effectively, the Court reasoned that voluntari-
ness is a fact-specific inquiry to be determined by analyzing the totality
of the circumstances. 64 The Court also held that while the subject's
knowledge of a right to refuse a search is one factor to be taken into
account, it is not determinative of whether the consent is voluntary.
65
However, the Court warned that when the subject of a search has not
been informed of his rights, the Court must thoroughly scrutinize the
circumstances of the search to ensure that the consent was truly
voluntary.6 6
Several Maryland cases also address the issue of voluntary con-
sent. In determining whether a consent is voluntary, Maryland courts
have applied the Schneckloth totality of the circumstances analysis and
have considered a variety of different factors.6 7 They have considered
the number of officers present, the age and intelligence of the con-
senting party, the experience that the consenting party has had with
the law, the behavior of the officers, and the duration, location and
time of the encounter.6" Maryland courts have also looked at whether
the police used force or threats to coerce the consent, whether the
consent was given in submission to a claim of legal authority, or
whether the police used implicitly coercive threats to gain consent.
69
In State v. Wilson,7 ° for example, the Court of Appeals held that a
suspect's consent was involuntary because the consent was obtained by
62. Id. at 227. The Court noted that consent searches are an important investigatory
tool used to obtain critical evidence when the police have some evidence of illegal activity
but lack probable cause to search. Id. at 227-28.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 248-49. The Court derived the totality of the circumstances test from the test
for determining whether a defendant's confession is voluntary under the Due Process
Clause. Id. at 223. In making voluntariness determinations under the Due Process Clause,
courts engaged in a fact-specific inquiry and examined factors such as the youth and edu-
cation of the accused, the length of the detention, and the psychological impact of the
detention on the accused. Id. at 226.
65. Id. at 249. The Court emphasized the impracticality of imposing a litmus test re-
quiring the state to affirmatively prove that the search subject knew he had the right to
refuse consent. Id. at 230. The Court reasoned that any defendant could successfully pre-
vent the introduction of evidence at trial by simply stating that he was not aware of his right
to refuse consent. Id. at 230-31. The Court also declared that it is highly impractical in the
unstructured context of consent searches to require officers to inform subjects of their
rights to refuse consent before every search. Id. at 231.
66. Id. at 248.
67. Scott v. State, 366 Md. 121, 142, 782 A.2d 862, 875 (2001).
68. Id.
69. Doering v. State, 313 Md. 384, 402, 545 A.2d 1281, 1290 (1988).
70. 279 Md. 189, 367 A.2d 1223 (1977).
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coercion. 71 Three police officers arrived at the suspect's home and
were invited inside by the suspect's housemate. 72 One of the officers
advised the suspect of his Miranda rights and then explained that they
observed and verified stolen property in his home the night before.7 3
At the officers' request, the suspect then surrendered the stolen
property. 4
In deciding that the consent was involuntary, the court followed
the Schneckloth rule and looked at the totality of the circumstances.75
The court found the following factors particularly relevant to its deter-
mination that the consent was obtained by coercion: (1) three officers
arrived at the suspect's home;7 6 (2) the suspect's housemate had al-
ready acquiesced to the officer's request to search, leaving the suspect
with no other option but to consent to the search as well;7 7 (3) the
officers read the suspect his Miranda rights but conspicuously failed to
inform the suspect of his right not to consent to the search, thereby
communicating to the suspect that he had no right to refuse the
search;71 (4) the officers explained their presence by referring to the
search conducted the night before-the court reasoned that this rea-
sonably communicated to the suspect that the police were still acting
under the authority granted by the search warrant used the night
before, and that he therefore had no right to resist the search;7 9 (5)
the suspect's consent was likely influenced by his belief that his in-
volvement in the crime was already determined because the police
had seen the stolen goods in his house the night before; ° and (6) the
officers' request that the suspect surrender the property, coupled with
the presence of three officers, could be construed as a demand rather
than a request.8 " The totality of these factors led the court to hold
that the suspect's consent was given involuntarily.8 2
71. Id. at 202, 367 A.2d at 1231.
72. Id., 367 A.2d at 1231-32.
73. Id. at 193, 367 A.2d at 1226.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 201, 367 A.2d at 1231.
76. Id. at 202, 367 A.2d at 1231.
77. Id., 367 A.2d at 1231-32.
78. Id., 367 A.2d at 1232.
79. Id. at 203, 367 A.2d at 1232.
80. Id. at 204, 367 A.2d at 1233. The court warned that subtle police conduct must be
considered and noted that a consent to search can be unjustly influenced when a suspect
believes he has already admitted involvement in the crime that is the focus of the search.
Id.
81. Id. at 203, 367 A.2d at 1232.
82. Id. at 202, 367 A.2d at 1231.
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The Court of Appeals added to the concept of voluntary consent
in Doering v. State.8" The court held that a suspect's consent to a
search of the bus he was living in was voluntary even when the police
displayed weapons because the police made no threats and did not
claim to have authority to search the bus.84 Most importantly, how-
ever, the court found that the consent was voluntary because the con-
sent was volunteered by the suspect.85 The court reasoned that when
the idea for the search originates with the suspect, it is difficult to view
the consent as acquiescence to the commanding presence of police.86
In Gamble v. State,87 the Court of Appeals of Maryland again ad-
dressed the issue of voluntary consent, but declined an opportunity to
adopt a rule that consent given to a superior in a military or law en-
forcement situation is always deemed involuntary.88 Specifically, the
court held that a police officer's consent to his sergeant's request to
search his car trunk was voluntary, and was not in obedience to a com-
mand.89 Despite the fact that the request to search was made by the
officer's superior, the court held that the consent was voluntary be-
cause: (1) the suspect had four years of police experience and clearly
was more aware than most civilians of his Fourth Amendment rights;
(2) the suspect admitted to cooperating with the request that he open
his trunk; and (3) the superior officer did not use threats, force, or an
express command to open the trunk, or insistence on an actual or
supposed legal right to enter the trunk.9 ° Further, the court noted
that the incident involved no trickery. 1 Thus, after examining the
totality of these circumstances, the court held that the consent was
voluntary. 92
Lastly, in 2001, the Court of Appeals had occasion to decide a
case of first impression involving the issue of voluntary consent in Scott
v. State.93 The court examined a police investigatory technique called
"knock and talk," and held that a person's knowledge of his right to
refuse a search or limit the scope of the search is just one factor to
83. 313 Md. 384, 545 A.2d 1281 (1988).
84. Id. at 402, 545 A.2d at 1290.
85. Id. The police did not request permission to enter the bus; rather, when the police
asked if there was anyone on the bus, the suspect stated "go check for yourselves." Id. at
401, 545 A.2d at 1289.
86. Id. at 402, 545 A.2d at 1290.
87. 318 Md. 120, 567 A.2d 95 (1989).
88. Id. at 128, 567 A.2d at 99.
89. Id. at 128-29, 567 A.2d at 100.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 127, 567 A.2d at 99.
92. Id. at 129, 567 A.2d at 100.
93. 366 Md. 121, 123-24, 782 A.2d 862, 864 (2001).
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take into consideration when determining whether a consent is volun-
tary.94 The knock and talk technique involves officers who, without
probable cause or reasonable articulable suspicion, randomly knock
on motel room doors in hopes that the occupants will allow the police
to enter and consent to a search. 5 The police identify themselves as
police officers, request entry in order to talk about illegal activity in
the area, and then once inside the room, request permission to
search. 6
In Scott, four officers approached a random motel room at 11:30
P.M., knocked on the door, and identified themselves as police officers
prior to the opening of the door. 7 Once the occupant of the room
opened the door, the officers explained the many drug problems af-
flicting the area and asked if they could enter the room to talk with
the occupants.9" The occupants agreed, and once in the room, the
officers requested permission to search the room.99 The occupants
consented to the search, and the officers subsequently found cocaine
and drug paraphernalia.1 ° ° Following the Schneckloth precedent that
rejected litmus tests of voluntariness, the Scott court rejected the argu-
ment that a search is per se involuntary unless the subject of the
search is advised that he has the right to refuse or limit the scope of
the search.101 Instead, the court followed the totality of the circum-
stances analysis. 102 The court found the following factors persuasive
in determining that the consent was voluntary: (1) the encounter with
the police took only two to three minutes; (2) Scott had previously
been convicted of a drug offense and thus had experience with the
law; (3) Scott's own testimony admitted an awareness of his right to
refuse the officers entry; (4) Scott exposed the officers to a marijuana
cigar immediately upon entry; and (5) the police did not use force or
threats. 10 3 Thus, the court declared that the consent to search pursu-
ant to the knock and talk technique was voluntary.'04
d. Deception and Its Effect on Voluntainess.-In certain situa-
tions, most notably when police lack probable cause or reasonable ar-
94. Id. at 123, 142, 782 A.2d at 864, 874-75.
95. Id. at 124, 782 A.2d at 864.
96. Id. at 124-25, 782 A.2d at 864.
97. Id. at 125-26, 782 A.2d at 864-65.
98. Id. at 125, 782 A.2d at 865.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 125-26, 782 A.2d at 865.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 142, 782 A.2d at 875.
103. Id. at 143, 782 A.2d at 875.
104. Id.
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ticulable suspicion to search a home, the use of deception by police
officers to gain entry into the home may erode the voluntariness of
consent.10 5 However, when there exists reasonable articulable suspi-
cion that the occupants of a home are engaged in crime, and the of-
ficers are subsequently invited into the home to engage in an illegal
activity, most often the purchase of drugs, the use of deception by the
police is constitutionally permitted."0 6
(1) Supreme Court and Maryland Cases Addressing the Effect of
Deception on Voluntary Consent.-The only Supreme Court case that di-
rectly considers the effect of deception on the voluntariness of a con-
sent to search is the 1966 case Lewis v. United States.1 07 In Lewis, the
Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment was not violated
when an undercover agent obtained an invitation to the suspect's
home, successfully purchased illegal drugs from the suspect, and con-
sequently had the drugs admitted as evidence at the suspect's criminal
trial. 10 8 In support of its decision, the Court noted that the misrepre-
sentation of officers as purchasers of drugs is a practical necessity in
effectively combating narcotics traffic because, unlike with other
crimes, there are rarely complaining witnesses to report the of-
fense. 10 9 More specifically, however, the Court stated that a ruse entry
was permissible because the defendant converted his home into a
commercial center and invited outsiders into his home to engage in
illegal transactions.1 0 The Court reasoned that a government agent,
just like any private person, may accept an invitation to do business
and may enter the home precisely for the purposes considered by the
occupant.1i ' Thus, in holding that the use of deception was constitu-
tionally permissible, the Court found it persuasive that the suspect
105. See, e.g., State v. Ahart, 324 N.W.2d 317, 319 (Iowa 1982) (holding that police of-
ficers may not use deception to enter homes in the absence of at least reasonable articul-
able suspicion because doing so would be patently unreasonable and would violate the
Fourth Amendment).
106. See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 212 (1966).
107. Id.; see also Sorrels v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441-42 (1932) (discussing the
defense of entrapment and observing that artifice is an important part of law enforcement
because it can be used to expose those engaged in criminal activity).
108. Lewis, 385 U.S. at 206-07.
109. Id. at 210-11 n.6.
110. Id. at 211.
111. Id. The Court cautioned, however, that an invitation into the home does not au-
thorize the officer to engage in a general search for illicit materials. Id.; see also Gouled v.
United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921) (holding that the Fourth Amendment was violated
when an informant obtained entry to a suspect's home by falsely stating that he was paying
a social visit, but then acted outside of the scope of a social visit when, in the suspect's
absence, he secretly rummaged through the office and took private papers).
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willingly waived his right to privacy in his home by inviting unlawful
traffic into his home.1 12
In Killie v. State,1 3 the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland fol-
lowed Lewis and held that the Fourth Amendment was not violated
when an undercover police agent socially befriended the suspect at a
bar, obtained an invitation to the suspect's home where a group of
people smoked marijuana, and then placed the suspect under arrest
and seized the drugs.1 14 In holding that the deception used by the
police to gain entry into the suspect's home did not violate the Fourth
Amendment, the court stated that the Fourth Amendment does not
protect the rights of people who unwisely issue invitations into their
home.11 Rather, the Fourth Amendment protects people from un-
wanted and arbitrary invasions of the home executed without the con-
sent of the victim." 6 Thus, because the suspect in this case issued the
undercover officer an invitation to enter his home and the officer en-
tered the suspect's home for the precise reason contemplated by the
suspect, the court determined that the officer's use of deception did
not violate the Fourth Amendment.' 1 7
Another Maryland case that addresses the use of deception is Per-
kins v. State." 8 Perkins addressed the use of deception to gain entry
into a motel room and the effects that the deception has on the volun-
tariness of the consent.'1 9 In Perkins, two police officers received in-
formation from a motel desk clerk that the occupant of one of the
rooms was wanted in a criminal matter.120 After running a back-
ground check on the occupant and finding that there were no out-
standing warrants on the occupant, the officers nonetheless obtained
a pass key to the room from the desk clerk and approached the motel
room.1 2 1 The officers knocked on the door, and when the occupant
asked who was there, the police identified themselves and com-
112. See Lewis, 385 U.S. at 213 (Brennan,J., concurring) (stating that the suspect waived
his right to privacy in his home when he opened his doors to business and invited people
in to trade with him).
113. 14 Md. App. 465, 287 A.2d 310 (1972).
114. Id. at 467-68, 472-73, 287 A.2d 310, 313-15.
115. Id., 287 A.2d at 314.
116. Id.
117. Id., 287 A.2d at 315.
118. 83 Md. App. 341, 574 A.2d 356 (1990).
119. Id. at 349-50, 574 A.2d at 360-61.
120. Id. at 343, 347, 574 A.2d at 357-59.
121. Id. at 347-48, 574 A.2d at 359. Based on these facts, the court emphasized that the
officers' justification for approaching the room in the first place was questionable. Id. at
347, 574 A.2d at 359. The court also stated its misgivings as to the reason why the officers
obtained the pass key if they actually intended to honor the occupant's right to refuse the
officers' entry. Id. at 348, 574 A.2d at 359.
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manded that the occupant open the door.12 2 Upon entering the
room, the police misrepresented that they were there to investigate a
noise complaint.
121
The court held that the entry into the room was not consensual
on the basis of three primary factors: (1) the fact that the officers ob-
tained the pass key to the room;1 24 (2) the contradiction in the police
officer's testimony and the police report in reference to whether he
asked for consent to enter the room;1 25 and (3) the deception involv-
ing the false noise complaint that was used to induce consent to
enter.126 The court emphasized its disdain for the use of deception,
stating that the affirmative misstatement used to obtain entry called
into question the voluntariness of the consent.' 27
In concluding that the deception eroded the voluntary quality of
consent, the court found case law on the comparable subject of war-
rantless doorway arrests to be instructive. 12  The court cited case law
holding that consensual entries for the purpose of doorway arrests ex-
ist where no deception is used to induce the opening of the door, and
where the defendant is aware of who is asking for admission into the
home.129 Based on these holdings, the court concluded that the use
of deception to obtain the opening of the door diminishes the volun-
tary quality of that opening.'1 ° The court then extended this analysis,
and argued that the use of deception to obtain entry into a residence
following the opening of a door also erodes the voluntary quality of
that entry. 3' Thus, the court in Perkins concluded that the occupant's
consent to entry was coerced rather than voluntary, and that the evi-
dence found incident to the entry and search was consequently
inadmissible. 3 2
122. Id. at 348, 574 A.2d at 359-60.
123. Id. at 349, 574 A.2d at 360. Although one of the officers testified that he requested
consent to enter to investigate the noise complaint, his police report stated that he simply
walked in and told the occupants he was there to investigate a noise complaint. Id. The
appellant testified that the officer entered uninvited. Id.
124. Id. at 347-48, 574 A.2d at 359.
125. Id. at 349, 574 A.2d at 360.
126. Id. at 349-51, 574 A.2d at 360-61.
127. Id. at 349-50, 574 A.2d at 360-61.
128. Id., 574 A.2d at 360. Specifically, the court looked to Smith v. State, 72 Md. App.
450, 466-67, 531 A.2d 302, 310-11 (1987), which surveyed case law on warrantless doorway
arrests and found that even those jurisdictions which allow warrantless doorway arrests at
the threshold of the home require that the opening of the door be consensual. Perkins, 83
Md. App. at 349-50, 574 A.2d at 360.
129. Perkins, 83 Md. App. at 350, 574 A.2d at 360.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 350-52, 574 A.2d at 361-62.
20051 1163
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
(2) Deception Allowed when Reasonable Articulable Suspicion of
Wrongdoing Exists.-In addition to the few Maryland cases that discuss
the effect of deception on the voluntariness of consent, there is a sig-
nificant amount of case law from other jurisdictions that sheds light
on the issue. Manyjurisdictions allow officers to use deception to gain
entry into a home when there is reasonable articulable suspicion that
criminal activity is taking place in the home.133 However, when no
such reasonable suspicion exists, courts have been stricter in allowing
deception, and many courts have held that the use of deception in
such cases is unconstitutional.13 4
When police officers have reasonable suspicion that criminal ac-
tivity is taking place in the home, the use of deception to gain entry
into the home has often been held to be constitutional. For example,
in United States v. Raines, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit held that it was permissible under the Fourth Amend-
ment for an officer to gain entry into a suspect's home by misrepre-
senting that he wanted to talk about the arrest of a mutual friend
because the police, after speaking with someone who identified the
suspect as his source for heroin, had reasonable articulable suspicion
that the suspect was dealing heroin. 131
In United States v. Wright,"'36 the Eighth Circuit further upheld the
use of deception to conduct a plain view search because it was con-
ducted pursuant to reasonable suspicion. 137 In Wright, undercover of-
ficers pretending to have car trouble knocked on the suspect's door
asking to borrow a flashlight and tools to fix their car.' From the
doorway of the house, the officers observed a white powdery substance
133. See, e.g., United States v. Raines, 536 F.2d 796 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that it was
permissible for an officer, who had a reasonable articulable basis for believing that the
suspect was involved in criminal activity, to gain entry into the suspect's home by misrepre-
senting that he wanted to talk about the arrest of a mutual friend).
134. See, e.g., State v. Ahart, 324 N.W.2d 317 (Iowa 1982) (holding that ruse entries that
are not justified by at least a reasonable suspicion are unconstitutional).
135. 536 F.2d 796, 799-800 n.3 (8th Cir. 1976); see also State v. Poland, 645 P.2d 784, 792-
93 (Ariz. 1982) (holding it permissible under the Fourth Amendment for an officer with
reasonable articulable suspicion to pose as a potential buyer of a home to gain entry into
the home, and then to use plain view observations of contraband to obtain a warrant to
search the home); Commonwealth v. Morrison, 418 A.2d 1378, 1378-79, 1382 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1980) (holding that a police officer who misrepresented his identity as one interested
in converting his barn into a photography studio in order to induce the suspect to show
the officer the interior of his converted barn, which contained large quantities of mari-
juana, was constitutionally permissible because the officer had reasonable suspicion that
the suspect was storing drugs in his barn).
136. 641 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1981).
137. Id. at 603-05.
138. Id. at 603.
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and drug paraphernalia in plain view on a desk.139 The officers used
their observations of the white powdery substance to obtain a search
warrant for the home.140 The court concluded that the officers did
not see anything more than a member of the general public would
have observed upon the opening of the door.' 4 ' The court therefore
reasoned that the plain view search was constitutional under the
Fourth Amendment because the suspect's reasonable expectation of
privacy was not offended and the use of deception was based on a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
142
Additionally, in United States v. Garcia,1 41 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that it was constitutionally per-
missible for officers to pretend that they were interested in renting a
home in the neighborhood in order to induce the suspect to open his
door.' Because the Ninth Circuit had previously held in United States
v. Bosse145 that a federal agent cannot obtain entry by misrepresenting
the scope or purpose of a search, 146 the Garcia court upheld the use of
deception by drawing a distinction between the opening of a door and
entry into a home.'47 The court reasoned that because the officers
identified themselves as police after the door was opened and before
the request to enter and search, the initial use of the ruse did not
erode the suspect's consequent consent to search because the ruse
had ended by the time the suspect gave consent.148 Thus, courts have
validated the use of deception to gain entry into homes when there is
reasonable articulable suspicion that the occupants of the home are
engaged in criminal activity.
(3) Use of Deception Unconstitutional Without Reasonable Ar-
ticulable Suspicion of Wrongdoing.-When there is no reasonable articul-
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 604; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment does not protect what a person knowingly exposes to the public).
142. Wright, 641 F.2d at 604-05.
143. 997 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1993).
144. Id. at 1280.
145. 898 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1990)
146. Id. at 115. In Bosse, a federal agent posed as a license inspector in order to gather
evidence to support a search warrant. Id. at 114. The court held that the use of deception
violated the Fourth Amendment because the suspect did not know a federal officer was
searching his house. Id. at 115.
147. See Garcia, 997 F.2d at 1282 (noting that whereas in Bosse a federal agent used de-
ception to enter and search a house, the officers in the Garcia case used deception only to
induce the opening of the door, and then identified themselves as officers before request-
ing entry).
148. Id.
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able suspicion that occupants of a home are engaged in criminal
activity, many courts do not allow deception to be used as a tool to
induce individuals to open up their homes to government agents. For
instance, in State v. Ahart, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that ruse
entries are invalid unless there is, at a minimum, a reasonable suspi-
cion that criminal activity is occurring inside the home.'49 Recogniz-
ing that protection against arbitrary and unreasonable intrusions is at
the core of the Fourth Amendment, the court declared that ruse en-
tries that are not justified by at least a reasonable suspicion are uncon-
stitutional.15 ° The court emphasized that a search conducted
pursuant to a consent obtained by deception is unwarranted and pa-
tently unreasonable, unless there is a justifiable reason for the
deception.
1 5 1
Similarly, the Supreme Court of New York County in People v. Ra-
mirez152 held that without an articulable reason to invade an individ-
ual's privacy, the police cannot use deception to trick an individual
into opening his door.15 Specifically, the court held that police of-
ficers, acting without reasonable suspicion, unlawfully used subterfuge
when they misrepresented themselves in order to induce the occu-
pants of the motel room to open the door.154 The court reasoned
that the police must have a predicate before they can use deception to
intrude upon a person's privacy. 155 The court further stated that be-
cause the officers unlawfully used deception to trick the occupants
into opening the door, the plain view doctrine was inapplicable, and
thus any evidence observed upon the opening of the door was sup-
pressed. 156 The Ramirez court found that the suspect's reasonable ex-
149. 324 N.W.2d 317, 319 (Iowa 1982). The Ahart court stated that before the police
can rely on consent to conduct a warrantless entry and search of a home, there must be a
show of cause or an articulable reason for targeting and searching the particular home.
Id; see also United States v. Montoya, 760 F. Supp. 37, 39 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that there
is no justification for a ruse entry when officers do not have reasonable suspicion that the
occupants are engaged in crime); State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 134, 140 (Kan. 1993) (holding
that officers must have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in order to execute a valid
ruse entry).
150. Ahart, 324 N.W.2d at 319.
151. Id.
152. 747 N.Y.S.2d 711 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002).
153. Id. at 716 (emphasis added).
154. Id.
155. Id. n.3. The court noted that to hold otherwise would eviscerate the Fourth
Amendment because it would allow police to randomly knock on anyone's door, use trick-
ery to have the occupants open the door, and use the plain view doctrine to look inside to
see anything that was not in their direct line of sight. Id.
156. Id. at 716. The plain view doctrine gives officers the authority to make warranless
seizures of weapons and contraband in plain view in nonpublic places when the police
have lawful access to the place from which the item can be plainly viewed. Arizona v.
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pectation of privacy in his motel room, as protected by the Fourth
Amendment, was violated as soon as the suspect was tricked into open-
ing his door.
15 7
In United States v. Maldonado Garcia,"5 8 the United States District
Court for the District of Puerto Rico also required reasonable suspi-
cion of criminal activity occurring in the home as a prerequisite for
using deception or ruse to gain access to private premises.1"9 The po-
lice in Maldonado Garcia, who used deception to enter a home in or-
der to search for stolen mail, acted solely on an anonymous tip and
thus did not have the necessary reasonable suspicion to lawfully use
deception to further the search. 60 The court reasoned that in order
to use a ruse, the police must have more than mere conjecture that
illegal activity is taking place in the residence.1 61 As the court noted,
"[t] o hold otherwise would be to give police a blanket license to enter
homes randomly in the hope of uncovering incriminating evidence
and information."' 62 Not all jurisdictions, however, have accepted this
position. 1
61
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Brown v. State, the Court of Appeals
considered whether police officers' use of deception to induce a sus-
pect to open the door to his motel room eroded the voluntary quality
of the suspect's subsequent consent to enter and search the room.
1 64
The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and held that the
deception did not erode the voluntariness of the consent.1 65 Writing
for the majority, Judge Wilner began by noting the similarities be-
tween the present case and Scott, a case decided by the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland thirteen months prior to the Brown decision.
166
Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325-26 (1987). The Ramirez court reasoned that because the officers
improperly used deception to gain entry into the motel room in the absence of reasonable
suspicion, the officers were not lawfully in a position to make observations of the inside of
the motel room. Ramirez, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 716. The plain view doctrine was thus inapplica-
ble. Id.
157. Ramirez, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 716.
158. 655 F. Supp. 1363 (D.P.R. 1987).
159. Id at 1367.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. At least two jurisdictions have rejected this position. See People v. Catania, 398
N.W.2d 343, 352 (Mich. 1986) (refusing to limit use of deception to cases where reasona-
ble suspicion exists); State v. Hastings, 830 P.2d 658, 660-61 (Wash. 1992) (rejecting the
artificial limitation on use of deception).
164. 378 Md. at 360, 835 A.2d at 1210-11.
165. Id. at 365, 835 A.2d at 1213.
166. Id. at 357, 835 A.2d at 1209. Judge Wilner was joined by Judges Cathell, Harrell,
and Battaglia. Id. at 355-57, 835 A.2d at 1208. Judge Raker concurred. Id. at 365, 835 A.2d
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Accordingly, the court reaffirmed the three holdings made in Scott.
(1) a nighttime "knock and talk" is constitutionally permissible and
does not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment; (2) the
correct test for determining the validity and voluntariness of a consent
to search or enter is the totality of the circumstances test enunciated
by the Supreme Court in Schneckloth;167 and (3) upon examination of
the totality of the circumstances, the consent given pursuant to the
knock and talk technique was voluntary.'68
Next, recognizing that the appellant relied heavily on Perkins in
arguing that the use of deception eroded the voluntariness of the con-
sent to enter and search, the Brown court agreed with the Perkins court
that the voluntary quality of a consent may be eroded when the police,
lacking any lawful reason to enter a residence, obtain consent to enter
through the use of deception. 69 The court was careful, however, to
clarify that the use of deception in such circumstances does not make
the consent per se involuntary. 170 Rather, the court emphasized that
the use of deception is just one factor, "albeit an important one," to
be examined under the totality of the circumstances test laid out in
Schneckloth. 1
7 1
Next, the court discussed Supreme Court cases that upheld the
use of deception as a valid police investigatory tool to demonstrate
that the use of deception and ruses to gain access into peoples' homes
are not new and alarming techniques, but are rather a standard and
long-recognized police practice.1 72 The court also observed that most
federal and state courts that have addressed this issue have admitted
at 1213. The court noted that there were only two factors that distinguished the present
case from Scott, 366 Md. 121, 782 A.2d 862 (2001) discussed supra notes 93-104 and accom-
panying text. The first distinction was that the search occurred at 11:37 P.M. in Scott, and at
10:00 A.M. in the present case. Brown, 378 Md. at 357, 359, 835 A.2d at 1209-10. Second,
whereas the police in Scott did not use deception in their encounter with the occupants of
the motel room, the police in Brown used deception to induce the occupants of the motel
room to open the door. Id. at 360, 835 A.2d at 1210-11.
167. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
168. Brown, 378 Md. at 357-58, 835 A.2d at 1209.
169. Id. at 362, 835 A.2d at 1211.
170. Id. In Perkins, the Court of Special Appeals considered three factors which together
weakened the validity of the consent: (1) the officer's attainment of a pass key to the motel
room prior to knocking on the motel door; (2) the fact that the testimony of the officer
stating that he requested permission to enter the room conflicted with his police report of
the incident; and (3) the use of deception to gain entry into the room. Id. at 361-62, 835
A.2d at 1211.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 362-63, 835 A.2d at 1211-12. The court cited to the following Supreme Court
cases: Sorrels v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932), discussed supra note 107, and Lewis v.
United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966), discussed supra notes 107-112 and accompanying text.
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evidence seen in plain view or found pursuant to a valid search after
officers gained entry into homes by deception or ruse.
1 73
The court then considered state court decisions limiting the use
of deception or ruse to situations where there is, at the very least, rea-
sonable articulable suspicion that the occupants of the home are en-
gaged in criminal activity. 174 Ultimately, the court rejected putting
such an artificial limit on the use of deception because it conflicts with
the holding of Schneckloth, which instructs courts to determine the vol-
untariness of consent to enter or search by examining the totality of
the circumstances.
1 7 5
Next, the court reaffirmed its agreement with the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals' observation in Perkins that when deception is used to
trick individuals to consent to an officer's entry into an area in which
the person has a legitimate expectation of privacy, the voluntariness
and validity of that consent is vitiated. 176 However, the court then
noted that the present case is distinguishable from Perkins, and thus
does not fall into the category of cases in which deception destroys the
voluntariness of consent.'77
The court reasoned that the critical distinction between the pre-
sent case and Perkins is that in Brown, the deception induced the ap-
pellant solely to open his door;' 78 it did not induce him to consent to
the officer's request to enter or search.' 79 Thus, the court reasoned
that while in Perkins the police entered the motel room under the ruse
that they were there to investigate a noise violation, the police in
Brown did not enter the motel room under any such ruse.' 80 Brown
knew that Officer Wooden and his colleague were police officers
before he consented to their entry and the subsequent search of the
motel room.1 81 Accordingly, the court held that the previous decep-
tion used to trick appellant into opening the door did not erode his
subsequent consent to enter or consent to search.182
173. Brown, 378 Md. at 363, 835 A.2d at 1212.
174. Id. at 364, 835 A.2d at 1213.
175. Id. The court noted the observations of the Washington Supreme Court that re-
strictions on the use of deception are "an unnecessary limitation on undercover police
investigations" and serve "no valid purpose." Id. at 364-65, 835 A.2d at 1213 (quoting State
v. Hastings, 830 P.2d 658, 660 (Wash. 1992)).
176. Id. at 365, 835 A.2d at 1213. The court again emphasized that although deception
does not necessarily eradicate the consent, it does indeed erode the consent. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
11692005]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
In her concurrence, Judge Raker stated her continuing disagree-
ment with the court's decision in Scott, which upheld the knock and
talk technique, and noted that if it were not for the principle of stare
decisis, she would dissent in the present case and urge the court to
overrule Scott.' s 3 However, because Scott is the controlling law in
Maryland, she concurred in the judgment of the court.'1 4
In his dissent, ChiefJudge Bell disagreed with the majority's hold-
ing because it expands the already questionable policy of knock and
talk and gives police officers too much discretion in using deception
to invade the privacy of peoples' homes.'15 Chief Judge Bell distin-
guished the present case from Scott by pointing out that there was no
deception involved in the knock and talk technique in Scott. l s 6 Specif-
ically, Chief Judge Bell stated that there is a critical difference be-
tween knowing from the beginning of an encounter that the police
are involved, and thus knowingly choosing to open the door to the
police, and finding out that the police are involved halfway through
the encounter after already having opened the door to
maintenance.I8
7
ChiefJudge Bell also noted that the majority opinion erroneously
dismissed the warning of the Perkins court that the use of deception
erodes the voluntary quality of consent."88 He observed that the ma-jority dismissed this warning by unrealistically splitting a single
event-an unwarranted entry obtained by deception-into two sepa-
rate events consisting of the opening of the door and the entry into
the motel room.18 9 Moreover, ChiefJudge Bell stated that a search is
a functional process, and as such the deceptive act is inseparable from
the remainder of the event, and thus erodes the voluntary quality of
the consent to enter and search.19 °
Chief Judge Bell further observed that the bewilderment and
shock that necessarily result from the realization that one has been
tricked diminishes the voluntary quality of the consent.' 9 ' Addition-
ally, he noted that the appellant's realization in Brown that the police
183. Id., 835 A.2d at 1214. Judge Raker dissented in that case. See Scott v. State, 366 Md.
121, 145-57, 782 A.2d 862, 877-83 (2001).
184. Brown, 378 Md. at 365-66, 835 A.2d at 1214.
185. Id. at 366, 835 A.2d at 1214 (Bell, CJ., dissenting). Chief Judge Bell was joined in
his dissent by Judge Eldridge. Id. at 378, 835 A.2d at 1221 (Bell, CJ., dissenting).
186. Id. at 367, 835 A.2d at 1214 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 367-68, 835 A.2d at 1214-15 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 370, 835 A.2d at 1216 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
189. Id. (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 371, 835 A.2d at 1217 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
191. Id. (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
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had smelled marijuana upon the opening of the door also tainted the
voluntariness of the subsequent consent to enter.192 Thus, Chief
Judge Bell concluded that when the use of deception is viewed as part
of the totality of the circumstances in the Brown case, the voluntariness
of the consent is undermined. 93
Lastly, ChiefJudge Bell discussed his agreement with those courts
in other jurisdictions that have held that the use of deception is valid
only when there is reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity
taking place in the home. 194 He observed that allowing police officers
to use deception to invade the privacy of peoples' homes when they
have no probable cause or reasonable articulable suspicion to do so
constitutes bad public policy. 9 ' He argued that the majority's hold-
ing sanctions violations of Fourth Amendment protections of the
home, and enables the police to subject the citizens of Maryland to
discriminatory, vague, and disproportionate police action.196 Thus,
Chief Judge Bell concluded that when the police use deception to in-
duce a person to open his door when no probable cause or reasonable
articulable suspicion exists, the quality of that person's consent should
be viewed as diminished.
197
4. Analysis.-In Brown v. State, the Court of Appeals held that
the police, in the absence of reasonable articulable suspicion or prob-
able cause, lawfully used deception to trick appellant into opening his
motel room door, whereafter they successfully requested permission
to enter and search the motel room.19 In so deciding, the court
failed to properly apply the prescribed totality of the circumstances
test to determine whether appellant's consent to the police officers'
entry and search of his motel room was voluntary, thus improperly
upholding the police practice of using deception to induce entry into
peoples' homes.'99 Further, by failing to align itself with the majority
of state courts that have limited the use of deception to those situa-
tions where a reasonable basis exists for believing that illegal activity is
taking place in the home, the court sanctioned arbitrary invasions into
192. Id. at 371-72, 835 A.2d at 1217 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 372, 835 A.2d at 1217 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 375-78, 835 A.2d at 1219-21 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 377-78, 835 A.2d at 1221 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 377, 835 A.2d at 1221 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 378, 835 A.2d at 1221 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 365, 835 A.2d at 1213.
199. See infta notes 201-233 and accompanying text.
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the homes of honest citizens, thereby weakening the protections of
the Fourth Amendment. 200
a. The Court's Failure to Meaningfully Apply the Totality of the
Circumstances Test Weakens Fourth Amendment Protections.-The Brown
court failed to follow the Supreme Court's instruction in Schneckloth
that requires courts to carefully examine all of the circumstances sur-
rounding a consent in order to determine whether the consent is vol-
untary.2 ° t Although the majority claimed it was following the totality
of the circumstances test, it did not meaningfully apply the test.20 2
The Brown court neglected to make a fact-specific determination of
voluntariness, and instead attempted to determine voluntariness by a
cursory review of only a few select factors.20 1 In fact, the majority lim-
ited its discussion in Brown mainly to the issue of whether deception
eroded the quality of consent and did not look critically at any of the
other factors affecting the voluntariness of appellant's consent.204
Had the majority carefully scrutinized all the surrounding circum-
stances in Brown, it likely would have concluded that the consent to
enter and the consent to search were involuntary.20 5
In failing to meaningfully apply the totality of the circumstances
test, the Brown court first ignored the fact that Brown did not know
that he had a right to refuse the search. 20 6 Although the Supreme
Court in Schneckloth held that the subject's knowledge of a right to
refuse is just one factor in assessing the voluntariness of the consent,
the Supreme Court nonetheless acknowledged that it was an impor-
200. See infra notes 234-262 and accompanying text.
201. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973).
202. See Brown, 378 Md. at 371, 835 A.2d at 1217 (Bell, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the
court did not actually apply the totality of the circumstances test, despite its claim to the
contrary).
203. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 226.
204. See Brown, 378 Md. at 370-71, 835 A.2d at 1216-17 (Bell, C.J., dissenting) (stating
that the court's analysis of the totality of the circumstances was limited to the simple asser-
tion that the deception employed by the police induced nothing more than the opening of
the door). Although the court mentioned the strong similarities between the present case
and Scott, in which a motel occupant's consent to a police officer's entry was determined to
be voluntary, the Brown court did not engage in any significant discussion of voluntary
consent in the present case. Id. at 357-59, 835 A.2d at 1208-10.
205. See id. at 370-72, 835 A.2d at 1216-17 (Bell, C.J., dissenting) (stating that an analysis
of the totality of the circumstances, including the use of police deception, indicates that
the consent was involuntary).
206. Id. at 360, 835 A.2d at 1210. The officers did not inform Brown of his right to
refuse the search, and Brown testified at the suppression hearing that he believed he had
no right to prevent the officers from entering. Id. Brown had previously been convicted of
a drug offense, however, and his prior experience with the law is a factor that supports a
finding that Brown may have had knowledge of his right to refuse the search.
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tant factor to be considered.217  The Brown court ignored the
Schneckloth Court's warning that when subjects have not been in-
formed of their rights, the voluntariness of their consent must be care-
fully scrutinized to ensure that the consent was voluntarily given.2 °8
The court failed to address the fact that the officers did not inform
Brown of his right to refuse the search, and ignored its own recogni-
tion in Wilson that the conspicuous absence of any reference to the
defendant's right not to consent to the search is a factor that nega-
tively impacts the voluntariness of the defendant's consent.
209
The second factor that the Brown court failed to consider as part
of the totality of the circumstances test is the police officers' lack of
justification for initially approaching the motel room.2 10 The Brown
court ignored Perkins, in which the court noted that the police of-
ficers' strained justification for approaching the motel room was one
factor that contributed to the court's conclusion that the consent was
involuntary.211 In Brown, the police based their action on an anony-
mous and uncorroborated tip, and thus similarly lacked a credible jus-
tification for approaching the motel room.21 2 The lack of reasonable
articulable suspicion as the basis for the search in Brown is an addi-
tional factor that the court should have addressed and that negatively
impacts the assessment of whether the consent was voluntary.
The third factor that the Brown court failed to properly address,
and which has significant bearing on the voluntariness of the consent
to search, was the deception that was used to induce Brown to open
his motel room door. 1 Even accepting the court's decision sub
judice to allow the use of deception in cases where no reasonable sus-
picion exists, deception remains a factor that erodes the voluntary
quality of an encounter with the police, and thus should be examined
as part of the totality of the circumstances test. The Brown court ig-
207. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49.
208. Id. at 248.
209. State v. Wilson, 279 Md. 189, 202-03, 367 A.2d 1223, 1232 (1977).
210. See Perkins v. State, 83 Md. App. 341, 347-48, 574 A.2d 356, 359 (1990) (discussing
the officers' lack ofjustification for approaching the motel room as a factor that negatively
impacts the quality of consent).
211. Id. at 347, 574 A.2d at 359. The court in Perkins emphasized its apprehension over
the fact that the officers approached the motel room even after learning that there were
no outstanding warrants for the occupant of the room. Id.
212. See Brown, 378 Md. at 367-68, 835 A.2d at 1214-15 (Bell, CJ., dissenting).
213. Perkins, 83 Md. App. at 348-50, 574 A.2d at 359-61 (examining the deception used
by the police as a significant factor leading to the determination that the suspect's consent
was involuntary); see also State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 134, 140 (Kan. 1993) (stating that
deception is one factor that should be examined as part of the totality of the
circumstances).
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nored precedent in failing to meaningfully examine the deceptive
misrepresentation of the officers as part of the totality of the circum-
stances analysis.214 Although courts have sanctioned the use of decep-
tion in certain circumstances, the Perkins court stated its general
disdain for the use of deception, and the Court of Appeals in Gamble
noted the absence of trickery as a factor in favor of a voluntary con-
sent. 2 15 Further, the Supreme Court in Lewis warned that there are
forms of deception that violate the Fourth Amendment.216 The Brown
court ignored these warnings in failing to properly analyze the of-
ficers' use of deception as part of the totality of the circumstances test.
The Brown court failed to consider that as a result of the subter-
fuge, appellant was unaware that the persons knocking on his door
were police officers, and that consequently appellant did not con-
sciously choose to relinquish some of his privacy to the officers when
he opened his door.217 The court also failed to consider that as a
result of the subterfuge, the appellant, who was awakened by the of-
ficers' knock and consequently answered the door in his boxer shorts,
had significantly little time and physical space to decide whether he
wanted to allow the police to enter.21' The court ignored these im-
portant factors and failed to consider them as part of the totality of
the circumstances test.2 19 Rather, the court simply made the blanket
statement that the deception that was used to induce the opening of
the door did not have a negative effect on the quality of the consent to
enter or the consent to search. 220 This determination was made in a
214. See Brown, 378 Md. at 371-72, 835 A.2d at 1217 (Bell, C.J., dissenting) (stating that
the court failed to consider the negative effect of the police officer's subterfuge on the
appellant's consent to enter).
215. Perkins, 83 Md. App. at 350, 574 A.2d at 361; see Gamble v. State, 318 Md. 120, 127,
567 A.2d 95, 99 (1989) (noting, as part of the discussion on voluntary consent, that the
incident did not involve trickery).
216. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966). The Court in Lewis noted that the
law should attempt to distinguish between permissible and impermissible deceits. Id. n.6.
217. Brief for Appellant at 9, Brown (No. 0683).
218. Id. at 9-10. The court failed to recognize that the situation in Brown, where decep-
tion was used, is critically different from the knock and talk situation in Scott, where the
occupants of the motel room had both time and space (behind their closed door) to con-
sider whether they wanted to part with some of their privacy and open their door to police
officers. Id.
219. See Brown, 378 Md. at 371-72, 835 A.2d at 1217 (Bell, C.J., dissenting) (stating that
the court failed to consider the negative effect of the police officer's subterfuge on the
appellant's consent to enter).
220. See id. at 370-71, 835 A.2d at 1217 (Bell, C.J., dissenting) (noting that rather than
fully examining the use of police deception, the court simply concluded, without explana-
tion, that the deception induced nothing more than the opening of the door and there-
fore did not erode the consent to enter and search).
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vacuum, and was not part of a meaningful analysis of the totality of the
circumstances.
22 1
An additional circumstance that the Brown court neglected to
consider is the psychological impact that the use of deception has on
the person who has been tricked. 222 The Brown court failed to adhere
to Schneckloth by ignoring the confusion and surprise that accompany
the realization that one has been tricked by the police as factors that
taint and undermine the voluntariness of the subsequent consent.223
The confusion and surprise that accompany the realization that one
has been duped by the police are heightened when the police officers
have no probable cause or even reasonable suspicion to approach the
particular residence in the first place.224 A person who has no reason
to suspect an encounter with the police, and who suddenly finds him-
self looking into the faces of police officers after having been duped
by those same officers, will undoubtedly presume that the police are
entitled to be present at his home, and will more likely acquiesce to
the officers' requests to search.225 The voluntariness of consent is cer-
tainly eroded by such circumstances. The psychological impact that
the use of deception had on the appellant was therefore a factor that
the Brown court should have assessed in the totality of the circum-
stances analysis.
The next factor that the Brown court failed to address as part of
its totality of the circumstances test is that a defendant's consent to a
search is likely eroded when the defendant believes he already dis-
closed his involvement in the crime.226 Thus, in determining whether
221. See id.
222. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973). The Supreme Court in
Schneckloth established that the voluntariness standard that is used to determine consent in
police confessions under the Due Process Clause is similar to the standard used to deter-
mine voluntary consent in search and seizure cases. Id. at 223-29. Thus, as is done in the
context of police confessions, the Court noted that a factor to be considered in determin-
ing whether a consent is voluntary is the psychological impact on the accused of the police
action. Id.
223. Brown, 378 Md. at 371, 833 A.2d at 1217 (Bell, CJ., dissenting); see also Scott v.
State, 366 Md. 121, 155, 782 A.2d 862, 882 (2001) (Raker, J., dissenting) (citing Washing-
ton v. Ferrier, 960 P.2d 927, 933 (1998)) (stating that in the less invasive knock and talk
context, subjects of the knock and talk technique would be too shocked by the circum-
stances to make a reasoned decision about whether or not to consent).
224. Brown, 378 Md. at 371, 833 A.2d at 1217 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
225. See Bumper v. South Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968) (stating that when people
believe the police have a valid reason for being at their home, their consents to police
entry are not given voluntarily, but are rather made in acquiescence to a claim of lawful
authority).
226. State v. Wilson, 279 Md. 189, 204, 367 A.2d 1223, 1233 (1977). In Wilson, the court
stated that the voluntary nature of the suspect's consent was eroded by his belief that his
involvement in the crime was already determined. See also State v. Ramirez, 747 N.Y.S.2d
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Brown's consent was voluntary, the court should have considered that
when Brown consented to the officers' entry into his motel room, he
was likely aware that the officers had already smelled the potent odor
of burnt marijuana upon the initial opening of his motel room
door.227 This fact should have weighed against voluntary consent be-
cause Brown likely felt as if his guilt was already established, and there-
fore more likely acquiesced, rather than consented, to the officers'
consequent entry and search.228
Additionally, the Brown court ignored the coercive environment
created by the presence of three officers who flashed their badges at
Brown's motel room door.2 2 9 In so doing, the court failed to follow its
own reasoning set forth in Wilson, where the court noted that the pres-
ence of three officers at a search is a factor that can illustrate that the
defendant's consent was obtained by coercion.23 °
And lastly, the final factor ignored by the Brown court in its failed
totality of the circumstances analysis is the timing of the search.231
When the officers knocked on Brown's door at 10:00 A.M., claiming to
be maintenance, Brown was asleep and in his boxer shorts. 232 The
trial judge in Brown, likely aware of the appellant's privacy interests,
stated his concern with the awakening of the defendant under these
circumstances.233 Nonetheless, the Brown court ignored the timing of
the search, determining the voluntariness of consent. While these fac-
711, 717 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002) (holding that the voluntariness of the defendants' consent
was eroded because the defendants knew that the police had already seen some of the
drugs in open view when they gave their consent to search, and it would have been point-
less to deny the police actual entry when they already had entry in fact).
227. See Brown, 378 Md. at 371, 835 A.2d at 1217 (Bell, C.J., dissenting) (stating that it is
unlikely that a person who knew the police were at the door would open the door despite
the obvious smell of marijuana). In reference to Brown's consent to the officers' search of
his motel room, the court also should have considered that Brown testified that he felt
apprehended after the officers entered the room because he knew that one officer had
seen the burnt marijuana cigarette in the ashtray. Id. at 360, 835 A.2d at 1210.
228. See id. at 371, 835 A.2d at 1217 (Bell, C.J., dissenting) (noting that a person who
exposes the police to the smell of burning marijuana after being tricked into opening his
door is undoubtedly confused and rattled, and that this erodes the voluntariness of his
consent).
229. See Scott, 366 Md. at 142, 782 A.2d at 875 (noting that courts have considered the
number of officers present at a search as a factor to be examined as part of the totality of
the circumstances analysis).
230. See Wilson, 279 Md. at 202, 367 A.2d at 1231. But see Scott, 366 Md. at 143, 782 A.2d
at 875 (failing to examine the presence of three or four officers in plain clothes as a factor
weighing against a voluntary consent).
231. Scott, 366 Md. at 142, 782 A.2d at 875 (noting that courts have considered the time
of a search as a factor to be examined as part of the totality of the circumstances analysis).
232. Joint Record Extract at 70, Brown (No. 140).
233. Id.
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tors would have provided further support for the court's conclusion,
the court's failure to analyze them is further evidence of the court's
failure to meaningfully apply the totality of the circumstances test.
b. The Brown Court Missed an Opportunity to Make Good Public
Policy and Limit Police Use of Deception to Gain Entry into Private Residences
to Only Those Situations Where There Is a Reasonable Articulable Suspicion
That Criminal Activity Is Taking Place in the Home.-In Brown, the court
condoned the use of police deception in the absence of reasonable
articulable suspicion of wrongdoing,2"4 thereby leaving the citizens of
Maryland vulnerable to arbitrary and unreasonable intrusions on their
privacy. 35 The court in Brown thus failed to take advantage of the
opportunity to limit the use of police deception as an investigatory
technique to only those situations where there is a reasonable and
justifiable basis for suspecting wrongdoing. 23 6 Instead, the court
adopted a policy that grants the police discretion to use deception to
invade the privacy of honest citizens' homes without the justification
of a warrant, probable cause, or even reasonable articulable suspicion,
thereby violating citizens' Fourth Amendment rights.
23 7
In deciding not to limit the use of deception to those situations in
which there is reasonable articulable suspicion of wrongdoing, the
Brown court argued that putting such a generic limitation on the use
of deception is inconsistent with the instruction in Schneckloth that vol-
untariness be determined by analyzing the totality of the circum-
stances.23 "8 The court thus determined that the best approach is not
to place predetermined limitations on deception, but to analyze the
use of deception as part of the totality of the circumstances of each
particular situation where deception is involved. 239 The court's rea-
soning is consistent with the stance taken by the Supreme Court of
Michigan and the Supreme Court of Washington, which have both
found that a predicate requirement of reasonable articulable suspi-
cion for ruse entries is an unnecessary limitation on police investiga-
tions, and serves no legitimate purpose.2 4 °
234. Brown, 378 Md. at 359, 365, 835 A.2d at 1210, 1213.
235. Id. at 366, 835 A.2d at 1214 (Bell, CJ., dissenting).
236. Id. at 375-78, 835 A.2d at 1219, 1221 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 366, 835 A.2d at 1214 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
238. Brown, 378 Md. at 364, 835 A.2d at 1213.
239. Id.
240. See People v. Catania, 398 N.W.2d 343, 352 (Mich. 1986) (refusing to limit use of
deception to cases where reasonable suspicion exists); State v. Hastings, 830 P.2d 658, 660-
61 (Wash. 1992) (rejecting artificial limitation on use of deception).
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However, the Brown decision is inconsistent with the majority of
state courts that have ruled on the issue and have held that ruse en-
tries must be justified by at least reasonable articulable suspicion. 241
These courts have recognized that deception used in the absence of
reasonable articulable suspicion violates the Fourth Amendment and
notions of fundamental fairness because it is an arbitrary intrusion on
the privacy of peoples' homes.24 2 While deception may be fairly used
when the officer is invited into the home by the suspect to engage in
an illegal activity, or when there is reasonable suspicion that criminal
activity is taking place in the home, deception is not fairly used when
there is no reasonable basis to suspect wrongdoing. 243 Thus, the
Brown court, in failing to limit the use of police deception to instances
in which the police have reasonable articulable suspicion of wrongdo-
ing, failed to align itself with the majority of state courts that have
recognized that such a decision constitutes bad public policy.
By failing to limit the use of police deception to those situations
where there is at least reasonable articulable suspicion of wrongdoing,
the Brown court also enabled violations of the Fourth Amendment
and left the citizens of Maryland vulnerable to arbitrary and unreason-
able intrusions into their privacy.2 ' Every aspect of Fourth Amend-
ment law requires that there is ajustifiable predicate before the police
may invade a person's home.24 5 A rule that allows police to invade
private residences without first having a reasonable and articulable ba-
sis for doing so therefore violates the Fourth Amendment. 24 6 Thus, by
stating that it was strictly adhering to Schneckloth's totality of the cir-
cumstances test while recognizing that it may not be good public pol-
icy, 247 the Brown court lost sight of its greater responsibility to uphold
and accommodate the constitutional command of the Fourth Amend-
ment. The Brown court ignored the danger that increased expansions
241. See supra notes 149-163 and accompanying text (noting that the police must have a
reasonable and justifiable suspicion of illegal activity before they can use deception to in-
trude upon a person's privacy).
242. See, e.g., State v. Ahart, 324 N.W.2d 317, 319 (Iowa 1982), discussed supra notes 149-
151 and accompanying text.
243. Ahart, 324 N.W.2d at 319.
244. See id. (holding that ruse entries that are not justified by at least reasonable suspi-
cion are unconstitutional because they violate the core of the Fourth Amendment, which
protects against arbitrary and unreasonable intrusions).
245. People v. Ramirez, 747 N.Y.S.2d 711, 715 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002).
246. Id.
247. See Brown, 378 Md. at 364, 835 A.2d at 1213 (2003) (stating that putting an artificial
limitation on the use of deception "may or may not be good public policy").
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and deviations from accepted legal procedures can ultimately result in
unconstitutional practices.248
Undoubtedly, the use of police deception has significant investi-
gative benefits.249 Certain types of covert criminals may not be con-
victed without the use of deception, and the War on Drugs may not be
waged as effectively. 250 However, considerable losses accompany these
251same gains. Judge Spaeth of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
stated in 1980:
The law of search and seizure is not concerned with protect-
ing the criminal's right of privacy but the honest citizen's
right. If we are to be able to enjoy liberty and pursue happi-
ness, we must know what part of our world is real and what
part is illusion-that our home is our castle, and not a broad-
casting center for hidden police transmission devices; that a
repairman is a repairman, a business associate a business as-
sociate, and not a police agent. Permit the police to make
our world an illusion, and no one, neither criminal nor hon-
est citizen, will be free.25 2
Thus, when defining the limits of police deception, the question is
always whether the losses are worth the gains. When the police have
probable cause or at least reasonable articulable suspicion to suspect
wrongdoing in the home, the gains of using deception are often
worth the losses because the deception aids in the legitimate detec-
tion of covert criminal activity.25 3
However, the Brown court's decision to not limit deception to in-
stances where the police have reasonable articulable suspicion pro-
duces considerable losses that outweigh any gains because honest
citizens' rights to privacy are violated. The Brown decision allows po-
lice officers to randomly approach a home, without any reasonable
articulable suspicion for doing so, and use deception to induce the
248. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886) (warning that unconstitutional
practices often begin with slight deviations from procedure).
249. Commonwealth v. Morrison, 418 A.2d 1378, 1386 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (Spaeth,J.,
concurring).
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. See Brown, 378 Md. at 372-73, 835 A.2d at 1217-18 (Bell, C.J., dissenting) (stating
that the use of police deception may be appropriate when there is probable cause or rea-
sonable articulable suspicion because it furthers the goal of detecting criminal activity); see
also State v. Ahart, 324 N.W.2d 317, 319 (Iowa 1982) (stating that the use of deception is
legitimate to secure entry to execute a valid search or arrest warrant, to engage in an illegal
transaction, or to investigate the premises of a home where there is a reasonable suspicion
that criminal activity is afoot).
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occupants to open their door, thereby gaining a view of the room and
infringing on the privacy of the occupant. 254 A search occurs when-
ever something becomes visible to police officers in plain view. 255
Thus, a search does occur when officers use a subterfuge to trick indi-
viduals into opening the doors of their homes, thereby gaining a view
of the rooms that they did not previously have. This search occurs
before the police even ask the occupants for permission to enter their
residence. In such circumstances, the opening of the door and the
search are co-extensive. 256 The Brown decision therefore leaves hon-
est citizens vulnerable to searches of their homes when the police
have no reasonable articulable suspicion to be there, and the citizens
have not consented to the search. This is clearly inconsistent with the
protections of the Fourth Amendment, which demand that the police
have a reasonable, articulable basis for invading a person's privacy.
The Brown decision is further alarming because it provides of-
ficers with unchecked opportunities to randomly invade homes, gain
probable cause, and use the plain view doctrine to seize illegal contra-
band by inducing the opening of a door through deception.257 Once
the door is opened, if there is illegal contraband in plain view, or if
officers smell marijuana in the home, the officers have probable
cause. 258 They can then obtain a search warrant and return to the
home, or they can use the plain view doctrine to seize any contraband
in plain view. 259 Thus, armed with the sanctioned use of deception
and the plain view doctrine, officers are given an alarming amount of
power and discretion that will likely lead to discriminatory, vague, and
disproportional use.260 The Brown decision undercuts Maryland citi-
254. See People v. Ramirez, 747 N.Y.S.2d 711, 716 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002) (noting that the
police, after tricking motel occupants into opening their door, attempted to use the plain
view doctrine to make observations of the room).
255. Turner v. State, 133 Md. App. 192, 199, 754 A.2d 1074, 1079 (2000) (citing Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324-25 (1987)).
256. See id. at 215, 754 A.2d at 1088 (noting that the officers' entry into the home and
their search were co-extensive because the officers saw the contraband in plain view imme-
diately upon entering the apartment).
257. The plain view doctrine gives officers the authority to make warrantless seizures of
weapons and contraband in plain view in nonpublic places when the police have lawful
access to the place from which the item can be plainly viewed. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 325-26.
But see Ramirez, 747 N.Y.S.2d 711, 716 (2002) (holding that the plain view doctrine, which
requires that the police lawfully be in a position to make their observation, is inapplicable
because the police did not have reasonable articulable suspicion of wrongdoing and thus
unlawfully tricked the defendants into opening their door).
258. See Ford v. State, 37 Md. App. 373, 379, 377 A.2d 577, 580 (1977) (holding that the
smell of marijuana alone constitutes probable cause).
259. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 326.
260. Brown, 378 Md. at 366, 835 A.2d at 1214 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
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zens' expectations of privacy and leaves them susceptible to arbitrary
intrusions of their homes.
In broadening the policy of knock and talk and sanctioning the
use of deception in situations where no reasonable suspicion exists,
the Brown court went one step too far and endorsed an unconstitu-
tional practice that allows police officers to arbitrarily and unreasona-
bly invade the privacy of peoples' homes. 261 Rather than affirmatively
halting the gradual deterioration of Maryland citizens' Fourth
Amendment rights, which began with the sanctioning of the knock
and talk technique in Scott, the Brown court chose to contribute to that
deterioration.
262
5. Conclusion.-In Brown v. State, the Court of Appeals limited
Maryland citizens' Fourth Amendment rights by holding that the po-
lice can use deception to induce people to open their doors and ulti-
mately gain entry into their homes in the absence of reasonable
articulable suspicion that the occupants of the home are engaged in
illegal activity. 263 In making this decision, the court failed to examine
the circumstances surrounding the deception and the consent to
enter and search. The court therefore did not meaningfully apply the
prescribed totality of the circumstances test to determine whether the
use of deception in such situations erodes the voluntary quality of the
consent to enter and consent to search. 264 Had the court properly
applied the test and engaged in a thorough, fact-specific analysis, the
court would have determined that the totality of the circumstances in
the case combined to erode the voluntary nature of the appellant's
consent. Further, in sanctioning the use of deception in situations
where there is no reasonable basis to suspect that individuals are in-
volved in wrongdoing, the court missed an opportunity to join a ma-
jority of state courts that have limited the use of such deception to
comport with the demands of the Fourth Amendment. 265 Conse-
quently, the Brown court's decision to allow police to use deception in
261. Id. (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
262. See id. (Bell, C.J., dissenting) (stating that the majority's holding broadens the al-
ready questionable policy of knock and talk to the point where police may invade the
privacy and sanctity of peoples' homes without a justifiable reason, thereby violating the
privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment).
263. Id. at 365, 835 A.2d at 1213.
264. See supra notes 201-233 and accompanying text (stating that the court failed to con-
sider key circumstances surrounding Brown's encounter with the police that eroded the
voluntary quality of his consent).
265. See supra notes 234-243 and accompanying text (noting that many courts have lim-
ited the use of deception to instances where at least reasonable articulable suspicion exists
in order to comport with Fourth Amendment protections of privacy).
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the absence of reasonable articulable suspicion of wrongdoing com-
promises the protections of the Fourth Amendment, and leaves the
citizens of Maryland vulnerable to arbitrary, selective, and unconstitu-
tional invasions of the privacy of their homes.2 66
MEGAN M. RECTOR
266. Brown, 378 Md. at 366, 835 A.2d at 1214 (Bell, C.J., dissenting); see supra notes 244-
262 and accompanying text.
1182 [VOL. 64:1151
V. LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
A. Weakening Trade Secret Protection and Encouraging Commercial
Immorality by Rejecting the Doctrine of Inevitable Disclosure
In Lejeune v. Coin Acceptors, Inc.,' the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land considered for the first time whether Maryland should recognize
the doctrine of inevitable disclosure.2 Specifically, the court ex-
amined whether under the Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act
(MUTSA),' a plaintiff could use the doctrine of inevitable disclosure
to enjoin a former employee from working for a competitor where the
employee would inevitably disclose the trade secrets of his former em-
ployer while working for the new employer.4 The Court of Appeals
vacated a preliminary injunction enjoining William LeJeune from
working for Mars Electronics, Inc. (Mars), holding that the theory of
inevitable disclosure cannot serve as the basis for an injunction under
MUTSA because the doctrine violates Maryland's public policy favor-
ing employee mobility.5
The court based its conclusion that inevitable disclosure restricts
employee mobility in part on the determination that the doctrine al-
lows courts to infer the inevitable disclosure of trade secrets from only
an individual's exposure to a trade secret.6 The court misconstrued
the doctrine of inevitable disclosure set forth in PepsiCo, Inc. v. Red-
mond,7 the seminal case on inevitable disclosure, which established
that the doctrine should only be applied to employees who show more
than simple knowledge of a former employer's trade secret.8 The
court found that the inevitable disclosure doctrine offends Maryland's
1. 381 Md. 288, 849 A.2d 451 (2004).
2. Id. at 320, 849 A.2d at 470. Under the doctrine of inevitable disclosure, a plaintiff
may prove a claim of trade secret misappropriation by showing that a defendant em-
ployee's new employment will inevitably lead him to use his former employer's trade
secrets. Id. at 319, 849 A.2d at 470.
3. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II §§ 11-1201 to -1209 (2000).
4. LeJeune, 381 Md. at 293, 849 A.2d at 454.
5. Id. at 322, 849 A.2d at 471.
6. Id.
7. 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that under the Illinois Uniform
Trade Secrets Act, a plaintiff may prove a claim of trade secret misappropriation by demon-
strating that the defendant's new employment will inevitably lead him to rely on the plain-
tiffs trade secrets); see infra notes 184-196 and accompanying text.
8. See PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1271 (concluding that an injunction is proper when there is a
demonstrated inevitability that a former employee will rely on a former employer's trade
secrets and the employee's bad faith behavior makes it unlikely that the employee will
refrain from disclosing trade secrets in the employee's new job).
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policy favoring employee mobility.' Moreover, the court's rejection of
inevitable disclosure has set a dangerous precedent where employees
who are not bound by noncompetition agreements may dishonestly
and in bad faith use their knowledge of a former employer's confiden-
tial trade secrets to further their own economic interests.10 Accord-
ingly, the court should have adopted the doctrine of inevitable
disclosure, and upheld the injunction prohibiting Lejeune from work-
ing for Mars.
1. The Case.-In 1993, William Lejeune began working for Coin
Acceptors, Inc. (Coinco), a Missouri corporation engaged in the busi-
ness of designing, manufacturing, and servicing coin acceptors, coin
changers, bill validators, and other coin operated machines."
Lejeune initially worked with Coinco as a Sales and Field Service Rep-
resentative selling currency equipment and servicing machines. 2 In
1997, LeJeune received a promotion to Baltimore Branch Manager;
he thus assumed responsibility for supervising sales and field service
throughout Maryland, Delaware, Virginia, and West Virginia. 3 Fol-
lowing a restructuring of its operations in 2002, Coinco changed
Lejeune'sjob title to Area Account Manager; his new job duties con-
sisted strictly of supervising vending sales in the expanded region.' 4
Throughout his employment at Coinco, Lejeune worked prima-
rily in sales and developed an extensive knowledge of Coinco's prod-
ucts through his service and sales experience. 5 Additionally, during
his employment with Coinco, Lejeune was given access to Coinco's
pricing strategies, marketing plans, business initiatives, selling strate-
gies, and product specifications.' 6
9. See infra notes 197-224 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 225-236 and accompanying text.
11. LeJeune, 381 Md. at 293-94, 849 A.2d at 454-55. Coinco's business was divided into
three segments: (1) Vending, which includes beverage and snack food companies such as
Coke and Pepsi; (2) Amusement, which includes video game manufacturers and distribu-
tors; and (3) Specialty Markets, which includes self-checkout services and transportation
service providers. Id. at 294, 849 A.2d at 454-55.
12. Id. at 294, 849 A.2d at 455. LeJeune'sjob duties also involved leading seminars on
the maintenance and repair of Coinco machines. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. Aside from a brief project in Specialty Markets, Lejeune spent the majority of
his time on the Vending market. Id. at 294-95, 849 A.2d at 455.
15. Id. at 295, 849 A.2d at 455. While employed at Coinco, Lejeune never participated
in research and development or manufacturing. Id.
16. Id. Lejeune never received complete access to information regarding Coinco's
contracts with customers. Id. To maintain the confidentiality of company information,
Coinco restricted access to company documents on a need-to-know basis, and guarded its
computer mainframe system with a password. Id. at 297, 849 A.2d at 457. In addition,
Coinco negotiates nondisclosure agreements with its customers regarding pricing informa-
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In May and June of 2003, LeJeune contemplated new employ-
ment opportunities and had several interviews with Mars, Coinco's pri-
mary competitor in the currency acceptor industry. 17  During
Lejeune's two interviews with Mars, he described his work experience
at Coinco, and informed his interviewer about several of Coinco's new
products and strategic concerns.'
8
On July 7, 2003, LeJeune signed a job-offer letter with Mars, and
accepted a position as an Amusement Original Equipment Manager
(OEM)." As an Amusement OEM, Lejeune would primarily sell
Mars's products to the amusement industry, but would also have con-
tact with full line distributors in the vending market.2z On July 14,
2003, LeJeune met with his superior at Coinco, William Morgan, and
informed him that he had accepted a position at Mars. z" During their
conversation, Lejeune told Morgan that based on his experience at
Coinco, he would be in a "unique" position at Mars. 2 At the time,
Morgan believed that Lejeune's statement alluded to the future use
and disclosure of Coinco's confidential information; however,
Lejeune later claimed that his statement referred to how his vending
experience at Coinco would be unique in an amusement position at
Mars.23 Following his meeting with Morgan, Lejeune returned his
company laptop and a box of company documents to Coinco.24
However, after Lejeune returned his company computer, Coinco
determined that he transferred files from his Coinco laptop to a CD
on three separate occasions after he had accepted employment at
Mars.25 The transferred files included Coinco's budgeting software,
manufacturing costs, and profit margins.26 After copying information
from his Coinco laptop to a CD, Lejeune made a second copy of the
CD.2 7 Lejeune also kept hard copies of Coinco's price and cost infor-
tion, designates company pricing and strategy documents as confidential, and specifically
states in the Coinco Employee Handbook that all business methods are proprietary and
that employees should protect company information as confidential. Id.
17. Id. at 295, 849 A.2d at 455.
18. Id., 849 A.2d at 455-56.
19. Id., 849 A.2d at 456.
20. Id. at 295-96, 849 A.2d at 456.
21. Id. at 296, 849 A.2d at 456.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. Lejeune claimed that he copied the company files because he did not know
how to transfer individual files to a CD, and therefore to copy the personal files he kept on
his company laptop, he copied the entire "My Documents" folder instead of his individual
personal files. Id. at 296-97, 849 A.2d at 456. However, an expert in computer forensics
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mation, Coinco's service pricing, a list of Coinco's preferred distribu-
tors, and technical manufacturing specifications of several Coinco
products. 2
8
After learning that Lejeune allegedly possessed its trade secrets,
Coinco filed for injunctive and other relief and moved for a Tempo-
rary Restraining Order against Lejeune in the Circuit Court for Anne
Arundel County.21 Specifically, Coinco sought injunctive relief under
Section 11-1202(a) of MUTSA claiming that Lejeune had misappro-
priated Coinco's trade secrets.3 0 The circuit court granted the Tem-
porary Restraining Order, which prohibited Lejeune from working
for Mars in the Vending, Amusement, and/or the Specialty Markets
Industries pending the outcome of Coinco's Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction.3
Following a hearing, the trial judge concluded that Coinco would
likely succeed on the merits of its case against LeJeune. 2 The court
also found that it would be impossible for Lejeune to work in his new
position at Mars without utilizing or considering the confidential in-
formation he misappropriated while working for Coinco.33 Addition-
ally, the trial judge concluded that Coinco would suffer a significant
loss of market share and irreparable harm if the injunction were de-
nied, 4 and that the issuance of a preliminary injunction against
Lejeune would not harm the public interest."
testifying on behalf of Coinco stated that Lejeune copied Coinco's Executable Budgeting
Software, which was not part of the My Documents folder. Id. at 297, 849 A.2d at 456. In
addition, Coinco's computer expert, with the help of computer forensic specialists, discov-
ered that Lejeune had erased information from his computer in an attempt to cover-up his
copying of Coinco documents. Id.
28. Id., 849 A.2d at 456-57.
29. Id. at 298, 849 A.2d at 457.
30. Id. Section 11-1202(a) of MUTSA provides that "actual or threatened misappropri-
ation may be enjoined." MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-1202(a) (2000).
31. LeJeune, 381 Md. at 298, 849 A.2d at 457.
32. Id. Particularly, the trial judge noted that Coinco would likely succeed at trial in
establishing that Lejeune maintained possession of Coinco's technical information and
overall strategy which would qualify as trade secrets under MUTSA. Id. Furthermore, the
trial judge concluded that for the purpose of Coinco's Motion for a Preliminary Injunc-
tion, Coinco had presented sufficient evidence that Lejeune misappropriated Coinco's
trade secrets by downloading confidential company documents from his company laptop.
Id.
33. Id. at 298-99, 849 A.2d at 457.
34. Id. at 299, 849 A.2d at 457-58. Specifically, the trial judge observed that Mars could
use Coinco's trade secrets to push Coinco out of its market, and that monetary damages
could not fairly compensate Coinco for the irreparable injuries it would suffer. Id., 849
A.2d at 458.
35. Id.
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Lejeune appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, 6 and the
Court of Appeals then acted on its own initiative and issued a writ of
certiorari. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to consider
whether under MUTSA, Lejeune misappropriated Coinco's trade
secrets, and if so whether he should be prohibited from working in
the Vending, Amusement, and Specialty Markets at Mars because he
would inevitably disclose Coinco's trade secrets. 8
2. Legal Background.-Maryland courts have not accepted or re-
jected the doctrine of inevitable disclosure under MUTSA.39 How-
ever, courts outside of Maryland have applied the doctrine of
inevitable disclosure to allow an employer to enjoin a former em-
ployee from working for a competing company, in some cases without
regard to the absence of a confidentiality or noncompete agree-
ment.4° The doctrine of inevitable disclosure is typically applied when
a court finds that it is inevitable that a former employee will use or
disclose his former employer's trade secrets while working for a com-
petitor employer. 4' The landmark case supporting the adoption of
the inevitable disclosure doctrine is PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, in which
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld an
injunction against a former PepsiCo employee finding that the de-
parted employee would inevitably disclose PepsiCo's trade secrets
while working for PepsiCo's competitor, Quaker.42 In decisions fol-
lowing PepsiCo, courts have relied upon and further developed the fac-
tors used in PepsiCo to analyze whether, based on the inevitable
disclosure doctrine, an injunction is warranted. 3  In deciding
whether to reject or accept the doctrine of inevitable disclosure,
courts balance the competing social interests of employee mobility
36. Id.
37. LeJeune v. Coin Acceptors, 379 Md. 224, 841 A.2d 339 (2004); see also MD. R. 8-
301(a) (3) (2004) (allowing the Court of Appeals to take a case from the Court of Special
Appeals by issuing a writ of certiorari on its own initiative).
38. LeJeune, 381 Md. at 299-300, 849 A.2d at 458.
39. See, e.g., Padco Advisors, Inc. v. Omdahl, 179 F. Supp. 2d 600, 611 (D. Md. 2002)
(stating that Maryland state courts have not adopted the doctrine of inevitable disclosure
under MUTSA).
40. Emery Indus., Inc. v. Cottier, 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 829 (S.D. Ohio 1978); see also
PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995); Novell, Inc. v. Timpanogos
Research Group, Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1197 (D. Utah 1998); Surgidev Corp. v. Eye
Tech., Inc., 648 F. Supp. 661 (D. Minn. 1986); Cardinal Freight Carriers, Inc. v. J.B. Hunt
Transp. Servs., Inc., 987 S.W.2d 642 (Ark. 1999); Nat'l Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Parker
Chem. Corp., 530 A.2d 31 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987).
41. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1269.
42. Id. at 1271-72.
43. See infra notes 120-132 and accompanying text.
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and the employer's legally recognized countervailing interests in trade
secret protection and commercial morality.44 At the present time, the
doctrine of inevitable disclosure is accepted or viewed favorably by
courts in eighteen states and three states reject the doctrine; the re-
maining states lack adequate case law on the doctrine.45
a. The Competing Social Policies of Employee Mobility, Trade Secret
Protection, and Commercial Morality in Maryland.-While the doctrine of
inevitable disclosure is a new issue for Maryland courts, Maryland
courts have addressed cases in which an employer sought to enjoin a
former employee with access to the employer's trade secrets from
working for a competitor. In attempting to balance the right of an
employee to enter into competition with a former employer, and the
countervailing right of an employer to restrict a former employee's
competitive behavior after employment, Maryland courts balance the
social interest of employee mobility with the conflicting social policies
of commercial morality and trade secret protection.46
Maryland common law and statutes are concerned with enforcing
high standards of commercial morality and fairness in the market-
place.4 7 To encourage innovation and technological development in
the corporate business structure, the employer-employee relationship
necessitates that the employer entrust its employees with confidential
information and place a substantial amount of trust in high-level em-
ployees.48 As a result, however, there exists the possibility that an em-
ployee could abuse his employer's confidence for personal economic
benefit.49 Accordingly, the law's concern for the integrity of the em-
ployment relationship has led Maryland courts to establish a general
principle that an employee must be loyal to his or her employer.5"
For example, in Maryland Credit Finance Corp. v. Hagerty, the Court of
44. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1268.
45. See infra notes 118-119 and 133-137 and accompanying text (discussing individual
states' acceptance and rejection of the doctrine).
46. See Md. Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 3741, 382 A.2d 564, 567-70 (1978)(finding that the freedom of an employee to compete with a former employer is tempered
by a duty not to misuse a former employer's trade secrets, improperly use confidential
information, solicit customers prior to the end of employment, or massively entice fellow
employees).
47. See id. at 37, 382 A.2d at 568; Edmondson Vill. Theatre, Inc. v. Einbinder, 208 Md.
38, 48, 116 A.2d 377, 382 (1955).
48. Metzner, 282 Md. at 37, 382 A.2d at 568.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 37-38, 382 A.2d at 568; see also C-E-I-R, Inc. v. Computer Dynamics Corp., 229
Md. 357, 366, 183 A.2d 374, 379 (1962) (finding that the employment relationship is one
of confidence and trust and places a duty upon the employee to use his best efforts on his
employer's behalf); Md. Credit Fin. Corp. v. Hagerty, 216 Md. 83, 90, 139 A.2d 230, 233
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Appeals denied a former employee his right to a year-end bonus he
otherwise would have received because the employee breached his fi-
duciary duty to his employer by violating business ethics and becom-
ing a profit-sharing partner in, and accepting loans from, third-party
businesses whose finances the employee was responsible for
monitoring.5 1
Additionally, Maryland courts have recognized that a direct ex-
tension of the principle of employee loyalty is that a high-level em-
ployee is prohibited from competing with his employer during his
employment, even in the absence of an express noncompetition
agreement. 52 On the other hand, the social policy favoring free com-
petition and employee mobility has prompted Maryland's judicial rec-
ognition of an employee's right to make preparations to compete
against a former employer without violating the employee's duty of
loyalty to his employer." For example, in Ritterpusch v. Lithographic
Plate Service, Inc., the Court of Appeals concluded that an employee
can prepare to compete against his or her employer by purchasing a
business, but an employee's implied duty of good faith forbids him
from directly competing against his or her employer or soliciting the
employer's customers until the agency relationship has officially ter-
minated.54 Accordingly, the Ritterpusch court upheld an injunction
preventing an employee of a printing company from starting a com-
peting business because during the course of his employment, he had
solicited his employer's customers in preparation to start the
business.
In C-E-I-R, Inc. v. Computer Dynamics Corp., the Court of Appeals
issued an injunction against a former employee of a data processing
business who secretly accepted an offer to work for a competing com-
pany based on his knowledge of his former employer's trade secret
information and then inappropriately solicited his former employer's
employees.56 In its decision, the C-E-I-R court held that a breach of
fiduciary duty owed by an employee to his employer will entitle the
employer to an injunction against the employee's wrongful actions.
57
(1958) (holding that an agent's fundamental duties are loyalty to the interests of his em-
ployer and the need to avoid any conflicts between his interests and that of his employer).
51. 216 Md. at 91-92, 139 A.2d at 234.
52. Ritterpusch v. Lithographic Plate Servs., Inc., 208 Md. 592, 602-04, 119 A.2d 392,
397-98 (1956).
53. Id. at 602, 119 A.2d at 397.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 605-06, 119 A.2d at 398.
56. 229 Md. 357, 363-66, 183 A.2d 374, 377-79 (1962).
57. Id. at 369, 183 A.2d at 381.
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Following C-E-I-R, in Space Aero Products Co. v. Darling,58 the Court
of Appeals upheld an injunction against four former employees of a
business that manufactured oxygen breathing hoses who left to form a
competing business using their former employer's secret production
methods. 59 Specifically, the Space Aero Products court held that an in-
junction is a proper remedy to protect an employer's trade secret in-
terest against its inappropriate use in breach of an employee's
fiduciary duty.6 °
Employing similar considerations in Maryland Metals v. Metzner,
where Metzner, a high-level employee of Maryland Metals, ended his
employment to establish a competing business, the Court of Appeals
declined to enjoin Metzner from establishing a competing business
because Metzner acted in good faith towards his former employer.6"
However, the Metzner court noted that fairness and commercial moral-
ity dictate that an employee may not abuse the confidence of an em-
ployer to obtain an unfair economic advantage as a competitor.62
Moreover, the court recognized that the employee's right to make ar-
rangements to compete is not absolute.6" The court observed that an
employee's privilege to prepare to compete with a former employer
has never been applied to excuse an employee who has committed a
fraudulent or wrongful act in the course of preparing for future em-
ployment from his fiduciary duty of loyalty.6 4
Specifically, the Metzner court, citing Space Aero Products and C-E-I-
R noted that Maryland courts have traditionally held that the misap-
propriation of trade secrets" and the improper use of confidential
information66 can defeat an employee's right to prepare to compete
against a former employer.67 Ultimately, the court concluded that the
determination of whether an employee breached his fiduciary duty to
58. 238 Md. 93, 208 A.2d 74 (1965).
59. Id. at 101-03, 125, 208 A.2d at 77-78, 91.
60. Id. at 123, 208 A.2d at 89.
61. 282 Md. 31, 48, 382 A.2d 564, 573-74 (1978).
62. Id. at 37, 382 A.2d at 568.
63. Id. at 40, 382 A.2d at 569.
64. Id.
65. Id. (citing Space Aero Prods. Co., Inc. v. R.E. Darling Co., Inc., 238 Md. 93, 117,
208 A.2d 74, 86 (1965) (holding that an injunction is a proper equitable remedy to protect
the proprietor of a trade secret against the wrongful use of that secret in breach of an
employee's fiduciary duty)).
66. Id. (citing C-E-I-R, Inc. v. Computer Dynamics Corp., 229 Md. 357, 368-69, 183 A.2d
374, 380-81 (1962) (holding that an injunction is a proper equitable remedy to prevent
employees from competing against their former employer by improperly using confiden-
tial information of the employer in breach of their fiduciary duty)).
67. Id.
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his employer depends on the facts of each individual case.68 Looking
at the facts before it, the court found that the employees who left
Maryland Metals to form a competing venture did not violate their
duty to Maryland Metals because they acted in good faith, did not
inappropriately solicit Maryland Metals' customers, did not misappro-
priate trade secrets, and only used their general knowledge as op-
posed to specific confidential information to compete against their
former employer.69
Accordingly, while the Metzner court recognized the right of an
employee to compete against a former employer using his general ex-
perience, knowledge, skill, and memory, it also held that the right to
compete is tempered by the equally strong principle that an employee
may not use specialized, unique or confidential information to com-
pete against a former employer.71
Maryland courts, adhering to the principles of Metzner, have held
that even in the absence of an express contract, an employee is under
a duty not to disclose his former employer's trade secrets. 72 For in-
stance, in Tabs Association v. Brohawn, the Court of Special Appeals
affirmed an injunction against two former employees of a mail sorting
business from competing against the business using their employer's
confidential business model because the court concluded that the em-
ployees had violated their fiduciary duty by improperly using the em-
ployer's trade secrets.7 ' As such, in the Metzner line of cases, the Court
of Appeals firmly established the precedent that an injunction is ap-
propriate to prevent a former employee from using or disclosing trade
secrets and confidential information, in breach of an implied fiduci-
ary duty, to compete against his former employer. 74
The aforementioned cases were decided by Maryland courts prior
to Maryland's adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, codified as
MUTSA, on July 1, 1989. 7' The basic purpose of the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act was to codify and standardize the common law of trade
68. Id. at 41, 382 A.2d at 570.
69. Id. at 45-48, 382 A.2d at 572-74.
70. Id. at 46, 382 A.2d at 573.
71. Id.
72. Tabs Assocs. v. Brohawn, 59 Md. App. 330, 341, 475 A.2d 1203, 1209 (1984).
73. 59 Md. App. 330, 343, 475 A.2d 1203, 1210 (1984). The Court of Special Appeals
also noted that one of the former employees was in violation of a specific trade secret
agreement. Id.
74. See Metzner, 282 Md. at 38-41, 382 A.2d at 568-70.
75. Act ofJuly 1, 1989, ch. 598, 1989 Md. Laws 3642 (codified at MD. CODE. ANN., COM.
LAW II §§ 11-1201 to -1209 (2000)).
2005] 1191
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
secrets among the states.76 Similar to Maryland's common-law ap-
proach to trade secret protection, under MUTSA an injunction is an
appropriate remedy to prevent the actual or threatened disclosure of
a trade secret.77 Additionally, the relevant principles established by
the M~etznerline of cases are applicable to cases decided under MUTSA
because MUTSA expanded upon the common-law protection af-
forded trade secrets, and did nothing to alter the fiduciary duties that
Maryland courts have long recognized an employee owes to an em-
ployer with regards to protecting the confidentiality of trade secret
information.
b. The History of the Doctrine of Inevitable Disclosure.-Courts
have used the doctrine of inevitable disclosure when a traditional
trade secrets case cannot be brought because trade secrets have not
yet been disclosed, nor has disclosure been threatened, but rather it is
alleged that in the future the employee will inevitably use or disclose
the trade secrets of his former employer while working for a competi-
tor.78 Traditionally, the doctrine is applied to situations where an em-
ployee has not signed a noncompetition agreement with his former
employer and where the employee has not actually disclosed or
threatened to disclose the trade secrets of his former employer to his
new employer.79 In applying the doctrine, a court restrains an em-
ployee from working for a competitor as if the employee had actually
signed a noncompetition agreement with the employer.8 ° Conse-
quently, the doctrine of inevitable disclosure acts as a judicially cre-
81ated covenant not to compete.
The doctrine of inevitable disclosure originates from three factu-
ally similar cases decided in the mid-1960s in which a competitor em-
76. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 434, commissioners' prefa-
tory note (1990).
77. MD. CODE ANN., CoM. LAw II § 11-1202.
78. See, e.g, PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1272 (7th Cir. 1995) (granting an
injunction against an employee after finding that the employee would inevitably disclose
his former employer's trade secrets while working at a competing company, and that the
disclosure of those trade secrets would cause the former employer irreparable harm).
79. The inevitable disclosure doctrine is not typically applied in cases where an em-
ployee signed a noncompetition agreement because the issue could be tried as a breach of
contract case. Likewise, if there were a threatened disclosure or actual disclosure of trade
secrets, the case could be tried under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, as the act allows an
injunction for the actual or threatened disclosure of trade secrets. MD. CODE ANN., COM.
LAw II § 11-1202.
80. See Emery Indus., Inc. v. Cottier, 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 829, 836 (S.D. Ohio 1978)
(concluding that an injunction preventing a former employee from assuming new employ-
ment has the same effect as a noncompetition agreement).
81. Id.
[VOL,. 64:11831192
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND119
ployer hired away one of the industry leader's top scientists or
executives who had access to trade secrets that could help the compet-
itor compete in the market.82 In B.F Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, em-
ployer B.F. Goodrich was a pioneer and market leader in the
development and production of high altitude, full-pressure space suit
technology. 83 Employee Donald Wohlgemuth worked for B.F. Good-
rich as an engineer designing and developing space suit technology
and gained access to many of B.F. Goodrich's trade secrets, including
detailed knowledge of the production and design process of B.F.
Goodrich's space suits.84 After working for B.F. Goodrich for eight
years, Wohlgemuth accepted employment with International Latex
Corporation, one of B.F. Goodrich's competitors in the space suit
market.8 5 Prior to leaving B.F. Goodrich, Wohlgemuth stated to his
coworkers that "[o] nce he was a member of the Latex Team, he would
expect to use all of the knowledge that he had to their benefit. 8
s6
In response to Wohlgemuth's comments, B.F. Goodrich sought
to enjoin Wohlgemuth from working for International Latex in the
space suit industry, even though he had not signed a noncompetition
agreement.8 7 The Court of Appeals of Ohio granted the injunction
preventing Wohlgemuth from working for International Latex be-
cause the circumstances surrounding his departure from B.F. Good-
rich and the comments he made to coworkers established a
substantial threat of trade secret disclosure, and B.F. Goodrich would
sustain immediate and irreparable damage to its space suit business if
the injunction were denied. 8 While the B.F. Goodrich court did not
explicitly adopt the term "inevitable disclosure," the case established
that a court can enjoin a plaintiffs former employee from working for
a competitor in the absence of a noncompetition agreement.8 "
Following B.F Goodrich, the Delaware Court of Chancery decided
E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. American Potash & Chemical Corp. In
E.I. duPont de Nemours, the plaintiff, E.I. duPont de Nemours, was the
only company to successfully develop a chloride process for producing
82. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Cont'l Aviation & Eng'g Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645 (E.D.
Mich. 1966); E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Am. Potash & Chem. Corp., 200 A.2d 428
(Del. Ch. 1964); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 192 N.E.2d 99 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963).
83. 192 N.E.2d 99, 102 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963).
84. Id. at 101-03.
85. Id. at 102.
86. Id. at 104.
87. Id. at 103, 105.
88. Id. at 104-05.
89. Id. The court noted that another basis for the injunction would be to prevent the
employee from violating a confidentiality agreement he had signed with his former em-
ployer. Id. at 105.
2005] 1193
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
pigments." The defendant, American Potash & Chemical Corp.,
hired Donald Hirsch, an E.I. duPont employee who had an intimate
knowledge of E.I. duPont's chloride process, to help American Potash
develop its own chloride pigment production technology."1 E.I. du-
Pont then sought a permanent injunction to prevent Hirsch from
working for American Potash, arguing that such employment would
inevitably result in the disclosure of E.I. duPont's trade secrets. 2 The
Chancery court denied summary judgment for Hirsch and American
Potash, stating that "the degree of probability of disclosure, whether
amounting to an inevitability or not, is a relevant factor to be consid-
ered in determining whether a threat of disclosure exists." 3
Finally, in Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. v. Continental Aviation
& Engineering Corp., the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan became the first court to enjoin an employee
from assuming his new job based solely on a conclusion that the em-
ployee would inevitably disclose a former employer's trade secrets. 4
The plaintiff, Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company, was one of
only four diesel engine manufacturers to successfully develop a dis-
tributor pump fuel injection system, and its design possessed notewor-
thy advantages over its competitors.9" The defendant, George Wolff,
who headed Allis-Chalmers' fuel systems laboratory, was hired by Con-
tinental Aviation & Engineering Corporation to help develop a fuel
injection distributor pump for the production of a tank engine. 9 6 Im-
mediately following Wolff's departure from Allis-Chalmers, the com-
pany sought and received a temporary restraining order prohibiting
Wolff from working for Continental on the production of fuel injec-
tion pumps.97 The district court issued an injunction prohibiting
Wolff from working on fuel injector pumps at Continental based on
its determination that such employment would lead to "an inevitable
and imminent danger of disclosure of Allis-Chalmers trade secrets to
Continental."98
B.F. Goodrich, E.L duPont de Nemours, and Allis-Chalmers created the
doctrine of inevitable disclosure and established that to successfully
obtain an injunction prohibiting a former employee who had not
90. 200 A.2d 428, 430 (Del. Ch. 1964).
91. Id. at 430-31.
92. Id. at 431-32.
93. Id. at 436 & n.4.
94. 255 F. Supp. 645, 654 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
95. Id. at 648-49.
96. Id. at 650-51.
97. Id. at 646.
98. Id. at 654.
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signed a noncompetition agreement from working for a competitor, a
court must conclude that the employee would inevitably disclose the
trade secrets of his former employer while working in a similar capac-
ity for a competitor employer.99 Additionally, these cases reaffirmed a
policy discouraging employers from hiring employees of competing
companies in hopes of gaining access to competitors' trade secrets. 00
c. The Present Application of the Doctrine of Inevitable Disclo-
sure. -
(1) PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond: Rekindling Interest in the Doc-
trine of Inevitable Disclosure. -Following Allis-Chalmers, B.F. Goodrich,
and E.I. duPont de Nemours, few trade secret cases were decided on
the basis of the doctrine of inevitable disclosure.1" 1 Then, in 1995,
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided PepsiCo, Inc. v.
Redmond, the landmark case supporting the doctrine of inevitable
disclosure. The court in PepsiCo held that "a plaintiff may prove a
claim of trade secret misappropriation by demonstrating that a defen-
dant's new employment would inevitably lead him to rely on the plain-
tiff's trade secrets. 10 2
Redmond worked as an employee at PepsiCo in its North Ameri-
can Division from 1984 to 1994."03 In 1994, Redmond served as the
General Manager of the business unit covering all of California.
10 4
Redmond received access to confidential information and trade
secrets including PepsiCo's marketing plans, financial goals, and man-
ufacturing, production, packaging, and distribution information
through 1997.105 On November 8, 1994, Redmond accepted a posi-
tion with Quaker as Vice President of Gatorade's Field Operations. 10 6
PepsiCo and Quaker were direct competitors in the new age and
sports drinks markets, but Quaker dominated both markets.1 0 7
99. Id.; E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Am. Potash & Chem. Corp., 200 A.2d 428, 436
(Del. Ch. 1964); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 192 N.E.2d 99, 104-05 (Ohio Ct. App.
1963).
100. Allis-Chalmers, 255 F. Supp. at 654; E.L duPont de Nemours, 200 A.2d at 436-37; B.F.
Goodrich Co., 192 N.E.2d at 105.
101. E.g., FMC Corp. v. Varco Int'l, Inc., 677 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1982); Teradyne, Inc. v.
Clear Communications Corp., 707 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Emery Indus. Inc. v. Cot-
tier, 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 829 (S.D. Ohio 1978); A.B. Chance Co. v. Schmidt, 719 S.W.2d
854 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Air Prods. & Chems. v. Johnson, 442 A.2d 1114 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1982).
102. 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995).
103. Id. at 1264.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1265.
106. Id. at 1264.
107. Id. at 1263-64.
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Quaker produced the dominant sports drink, Gatorade, while Pep-
siCo produced its own sports drink, All Sport.' Throughout the ne-
gotiation process, Redmond never informed his superiors at PepsiCo
of his intentions to join Quaker.' 09 After accepting the offer, Red-
mond denied that he had accepted the position to his PepsiCo superi-
ors and did not inform them of his decision to leave until November
10, 1994.110
PepsiCo filed suit seeking to enjoin Redmond from working at
Quaker,1 1 ' and the district court granted the injunction solely on the
basis of the doctrine of inevitable disclosure.' 1 2
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit recognized the difficulty in bal-
ancing the interest in commercial morality and the incentive to inno-
vate underlying trade secret law against free competition and
employee mobility."' While the court ultimately upheld the trial
court's decision to grant an injunction on the theory of inevitable dis-
closure, it specifically noted that, "the mere fact that a person as-
sumed a similar position at a competitor does not, without more,
make it inevitable that he will use or disclose ... trade secret informa-
tion."'1 14 Accordingly, the court recognized that PepsiCo did not seek
simply to prevent Redmond from using his general skills and knowl-
edge at Quaker; rather, PepsiCo sought to prevent Redmond from
using actual marketing plans and confidential information that Pep-
siCo disclosed to Redmond during his employment." 5 Having con-
cluded that Redmond possessed knowledge of PepsiCo's trade secrets,
the court looked at Redmond's behavior at the time of his departure
from PepsiCo, and agreed with the trial court that Redmond's un-
truthfulness about his employment status and lack of candor demon-
strated that he "could not be trusted to act with the necessary
sensitivity and good faith" to preserve the confidentiality of PepsiCo's
trade secrets while working at Quaker.' 6 Accordingly, the Seventh
Circuit upheld the district court's finding of inevitable disclosure, and
affirmed the injunction against Redmond. 1 7
108. Id. at 1264.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1265.
112. Id. at 1267. The injunction prevented Redmond from assuming his position at
Quaker for approximately six months and permanently prohibited him from using or dis-
closing any of PepsiCo's trade secrets or confidential information. Id.
113. Id. at 1268.
114. Id. at 1269 (internal quotation marks omitted).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1270.
117. Id. at 1272.
1196 [VOL. 64:1183
2005] COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND 1197
(2) The Factors Courts Consider in Applying the Doctrine of In-
evitable Disclosure.-The doctrine of inevitable disclosure has been
adopted by courts in eight states: Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Minne-
sota, New Jersey, Ohio, Utah, and Washington. l" s In addition, courts
in six states-Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New York, North Car-
olina, and Texas-have adopted slightly limited versions of the doc-
trine of inevitable disclosure.1 1 9 Courts following the doctrine of
inevitable disclosure as established by the PepsiCo court will typically
enjoin an employee from working for a competitor employer if the
plaintiff can prove the following elements: (1) that the employee had
access to a trade secret; (2) that the employee will inevitably use or
disclose that trade secret while performing his or her newjob; and (3)
that the disclosure of the trade secret will cause irreparable harm to
the employer.
1 20
To establish the second factor, that an employee will inevitably
disclose a former employer's trade secrets, many courts require that
an employer show that the departing employee's behavior demon-
strates an intent to improperly use or disclose trade secrets while
working for his new employer.' 2 1 Courts rely heavily on the former
employee's behavior and candor in determining intent. 12 2 For in-
118. E.g., Cardinal Freight Carriers, Inc. v.J.B. Hunt Transp. Servs., Inc., 987 S.W.2d 642
(Ark. 1999); Am. Hoechst Corp. v. Nuodex, Inc., No. 7950, 1985 WL 11563 (Del. Ch. Apr.
23, 1985) (dicta); PepsiCo, 54 F.3d 1262; Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Tech., Inc., 648 F. Supp. 661
(D. Minn. 1986); Nat'l Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Parker Chem. Corp., 530 A.2d 31 (NJ.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987); Emery Indus., Inc. v. Cotfier, 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 829 (S.D.
Ohio 1978); Novell, Inc. v. Timpanogos Research Group, Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1197
(D. Utah 1998); Solutec Corp. v. Agnew, No. 16105-6-Ill, 1997 WL 794496 (Wash. Ct. App.
Dec. 30, 1997).
119. E.g., Branson Ultrasonics Corp. v. Stratman, 921 F. Supp. 909 (D. Conn. 1996);
Uncle B's Bakery, Inc. v. O'Rourke, 920 F. Supp. 1405 (N.D. Iowa 1996); C.R. Bard, Inc. v.
Intoccia, No. 94-11568, 1994 WL 601944 (D. Mass. Oct. 13, 1994); Bus. Intelligence Servs.,
Inc. v. Hudson, 580 F. Supp. 1068 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443
(M.D.N.C. 1996); Rugen v. Interactive Bus. Sys., Inc., 864 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1993, no writ). Moreover, Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, and Pennsylvania have expressed a
willingness to adopt inevitable disclosure, but lack definitive case law on the subject. E.g.,
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Lockhart, 5 F. Supp. 2d 667 (S.D. Ind. 1998); Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co. v. Cont'l Aviation & Eng'g Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Mich. 1966); H&R Block
E. Tax Servs., Inc. v. Enchura, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (W.D. Mo. 2000); Air Prods. & Chems.,
Inc. v. Johnson, 442 A.2d 1114 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).
120. See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, No. 94 C 6838, 1996 WL 3965 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2,
1996).
121. E.g., PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1270-71 (considering evidence of an employee's bad faith
determinative in upholding an injunction issued under the doctrine of inevitable disclo-
sure); Merck, 941 F. Supp. at 1457-61 & 1460 n.5, 1461 n.6 (noting that North Carolina
would probably require an employer to show an employee's bad faith before broadly en-
joining an employee under the doctrine of inevitable disclosure).
122. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1270-71.
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stance, in PepsiCo, Redmond's lack of candor and the untruthfulness
surrounding his decision to leave PepsiCo represented an important
consideration in the court's finding that Redmond would inevitably
disclose PepsiCo's trade secrets.1
23
Courts have generally shown a willingness to apply the doctrine of
inevitable disclosure only in cases where the plaintiff has presented
evidence that the employee acted in bad faith or an otherwise dishon-
est manner.' 24 As in PepsiCo, in Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 125 a North Caro-
lina federal district court, in its decision to issue an injunction based
on inevitable disclosure against the defendant, Lyon, found it deter-
minative that Lyon acted in a dishonest manner regarding his employ-
ment negotiations with the co-defendant employer, Glaxo, by
misrepresenting the truth to gain a better severance package from the
plaintiff, Merck.'2 6 Accordingly, because Lyon's bad faith behavior
created an inference that he would disclose his former employer's
trade secrets, the court crafted an injunction that prohibited Lyon
from working on a particular product line at Glaxo. 127
Similarly, in DoubleClick, Inc. v. Henderson, two employees were ac-
cused of misappropriating trade secrets from their former employer,
an Internet advertising company, to assist in their plan to form a com-
peting Internet advertising company.'2 8 Based on the evidence of ac-
tual misappropriation and the defendants' "cavalier attitude" towards
the fiduciary duties owed to their former employer, which included
soliciting DoubleClick's customers and using DoubleClick's confiden-
tial business plans to help establish a competing business while still
employed by DoubleClick, the court concluded that the defendants'
behavior created a reasonable inference that they would use their for-
mer employer's confidential information improperly.'2 9 For this rea-
son, the DoubleClick court issued a preliminary injunction preventing
123. Id.
124. See Merck, 941 F. Supp. at 1461 & n.6; DoubleClick, Inc. v. Henderson, No. 116914/
97, 1997 WL 731413, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 7, 1997).
125. 941 F. Supp. 1443 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
126. Id. at 1461.
127. Id. at 1464-65.
128. No. 116914/97, 1997 WL 731413, *34 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 7, 1997).
129. Id. at *6. As top executives of DoubleClick, the defendants had access to critical
information regarding the company, including financial statements, future business plans,
customer information and pricing strategies. Id. at *4. The DoubleClick court found that
the defendants misappropriated trade secrets largely based on the defendant's business
plan, which contained large portions of information copied directly from DoubleClick's
business plans. Id. at *5 n.3.
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the former employees from launching any company or working for a
competing advertising company for a period of six months.
1 30
In addition to properly balancing the competing social policies of
employee mobility and trade secret protection, courts have found that
because an injunction issued under the doctrine of inevitable disclo-
sure acts as a de facto covenant not to compete, it should be reasona-
ble in its restraint of activity, geography, and time."' For example,
the PepsiCo and DoubleClick courts limited the terms of injunctions to
approximately a six-month period, and the Merck and Allis-Chalmers
courts issued injunctions that allowed the enjoined employee to work
for his new employer, but not in a capacity that would involve the use
or disclosure of his former employer's trade secrets.
132
(3) States Rejecting the Doctrine of Inevitable Disclosure.-
While several states have adopted the doctrine of inevitable disclo-
sure, courts in California, Florida, and Virginia have explicitly rejected
the doctrine.133 The policy reasons typically expressed by courts re-
jecting the doctrine are outlined in the California case Whyte v. Schlage
Lock Co.13 4 The California Court of Appeals concluded that the doc-
trine permitted a court to enjoin a former employee without proof of
the employee's actual or threatened use of the former employer's
trade secrets based on an inference of future misappropriation.
135
Furthermore, the court noted that the doctrine altered the employ-
ment relationship by using a judicially created after-the-fact noncom-
pete agreement to enjoin an employee from working for the employer
of his or her choice. 13 6 Accordingly, the court rejected the doctrine
holding that it acted as an injunction against employment and thus
130. Id. at *8.
131. E.g., PepsiCo v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1272 (7th Cir. 1995) (affirming an injunc-
tion issued under the doctrine of inevitable disclosure that only prohibited an employee
from working for a new employer for approximately six months); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.
v. Cont'l Aviation & Eng'g Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645, 654-55 (E.D. Mich. 1966) (crafting an
injunction that allowed an enjoined employee to work for his new employer, but not in a
capacity that would involve the use or disclosure of his former employer's trade secrets).
132. See supra notes 125-131 and accompanying text (discussing the terms of the injunc-
tions in these cases).
133. Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277 (Ct. App. 2002); Del Monte Fresh
Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co., Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Gov't Tech.
Servs., Inc. v. Intellisys Tech. Corp., No. 160265, 1999 WL 1499548 (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 20,
1999).
134. 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277 (Ct. App. 2002).
135. Id. at 292.
136. Id. at 292-93.
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violated California's strong public policy favoring employee
mobility." 7
(4) Maryland Courts' Analysis of Restrictive Covenants.-
While Maryland courts have not issued a restraint on employment
based on the doctrine of inevitable disclosure, the Court of Appeals
held, in Becker v. Bailey,'38 that a restraint on employment will be con-
sidered valid if the restraint is no greater than what is reasonably nec-
essary in terms of scope, geography, and duration.'39 In Becker, an
employee, who was an unskilled worker and who acted in good faith
towards his former employer and did not possess any of his former
employer's trade secrets, was restrained from working in the automo-
bile title servicing industry for a period of two years in the Washington
D.C. area. The court concluded that the restraint on employment was
unenforceable because it was greater than necessary in terms of
length and geography.1 40 Furthermore, the Becker court determined
that while there is no justification for a restraint on employment when
an employee leaves to become a good faith competitor, a reasonable
restraint on employment is allowed for employees who seek to com-
pete by abusing the confidential relationship with their former
employer.'
4
'
Similarly, in Tawney v. Mutual System of Maryland, Inc.,' 42 the
Court of Appeals held that portions of a restrictive covenant that pro-
hibited a former employee of a loan company from competing against
his former employer in Baltimore City for a period of two years were
invalid because the restrictions exceeded reasonableness in terms of
time and geography. 143 Additionally, the Tawney court concluded that
restrictive convents that exceed what is necessary to protect an em-
ployer's business and place an undue hardship on an employee, stifle
competition and are therefore against the public interest.1 44
137. Id. at 292-94.
138. 268 Md. 93, 299 A.2d 835 (1973).
139. Id. at 96, 299 A.2d at 838. While the injunction in Becker was not issued under the
doctrine of inevitable disclosure, the Becker court's guidelines for the reasonableness of a
restrictive covenant on employment are frequently applied by Maryland courts to deter-
mine if a restrictive covenant is enforceable. See, e.g., Budget Rent A Car of Wash., Inc. v.
Raab, 268 Md. 478, 481-82, 302 A.2d 11, 13 (1973) (applying the Becker court's holding on
the reasonableness of restrictive covenants on employment in Maryland to determine if a
restrictive covenant was enforceable).
140. Becker, 268 Md. at 94-95, 99, 102, 299 A.2d 836-37, 839-40.
141. Id. at 97, 101, 299 A.2d at 838, 840.
142. 186 Md. 508, 47 A.2d 372 (1946).
143. Id. at 521, 47 A.2d at 379.
144. Id.
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3. The Court's Reasoning.-In LeJeune v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., the
Court of Appeals of Maryland vacated the trial court's preliminary in-
junction that restricted the scope of Lejeune's employment and re-
jected the adoption of the doctrine of inevitable disclosure in
Maryland.1 4 5 The court determined that the doctrine restricts em-
ployee mobility, allows an employer to enjoin an employee without
showing the actual or threatened disclosure of a trade secret, and sub-
jects employees to a de facto noncompetition agreement. 146 As such,
the court concluded that the trial court erred in using the doctrine as
the basis for injunctive relief under MUTSA.
1 4 7
Judge Battaglia, writing for a unanimous court, began by address-
ing the threshold matter of whether the computer files taken by
Lejeune, including budgeting software, marketing plans, and hard-
copy documents-containing pricing and cost information, and prod-
uct specifications-qualified as trade secrets under MUTSA. 148 After
setting forth the definition of a "trade secret" under section 11-
1201(e) of MUTSA and surveying several cases interpreting the
MUTSA definition, the court concluded that for information to be
considered a trade secret it must: (1) derive independent value from
its secrecy; (2) not be readily ascertainable to persons who could ben-
efit from the information; and (3) be subject to reasonable efforts to
protect its secrecy.
141
The court determined that Coinco's cost and profit information
derived value from its secrecy.1 51 In particular, the court concluded
that if Mars gained access to that information, it would gain an unfair
economic advantage because, as Coinco's only major competitor in
the coin acceptor business, it could use the information to undercut
Coinco's prices and steal Coinco's customers.1 5 ' The court also deter-
mined that knowledge of the technical specifications of Coinco's
products had economic value to Mars, as it could use the specifica-
tions to improve its own products in the unique and highly competi-
tive currency acceptor industry.
1 52
145. LeJeune, 381 Md. at 322-23, 849 A.2d at 471-72.
146. Id. at 321-22, 849 A.2d at 471.
147. Id. at 322-23, 849 A.2d at 471-72.
148. Id. at 306, 849 A.2d at 461-62. LeJeune claimed that Coinco failed to take the
necessary steps to protect the secrecy of its information and, therefore, the information he
retained did not qualify as trade secrets under MUTSA. Id., 849 A.2d at 462.
149. Id. at 306-11, 849 A.2d at 462-65; MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-1201 (e) (2000).
150. LeJeune, 381 Md. at 309-10, 849 A.2d at 464.
151. Id. at 310, 849 A.2d at 464.
152. Id.
120120051
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Next, the court recognized that Mars could not obtain Coinco's
cost and profit information in the marketplace because Coinco is a
privately held company that is not required to disclose financial infor-
mation through public Securities and Exchange Commission fil-
ings. 5 ' Ultimately, this conclusion led the court to determine that
Mars could not readily ascertain Coinco's information through proper
means.
1 54
Finally, after determining that Coinco's information possessed ec-
onomic value and could not be readily ascertained in the market-
place, the court dismissed Lejeune's contention that Coinco's
information did not qualify as trade secrets because Coinco did not
take reasonable measures to maintain their secrecy. 155 Specifically,
the court noted that Coinco took reasonable measures to protect the
secrecy of its information by negotiating nondisclosure agreements
with its customers to prevent them from discussing its tiered pricing
information, marking company documents and product specifications
as confidential, and informing its employees of the confidential na-
ture of business methods and manufacturing processes in the com-
pany's handbook. 156 Accordingly, the court held that Coinco's cost
and pricing information and technical product specifications quali-
fied as trade secrets under MUTSA because the information possessed
economic value, the information could not be readily ascertained,
and Coinco took reasonable measures to protect its secrecy.'57
The court next analyzed whether Coinco satisfied MUTSA's mis-
appropriation requirements for seeking injunctive relief.158 To obtain
injunctive relief under MUTSA, a plaintiff must establish that: the in-
junction will prevent either "(1) the actual or threatened acquisition
of a trade secret by improper means or (2) the actual or threatened
disclosure of a trade secret."' 59 The court concluded that Lejeune
acquired Coinco's trade secrets through improper means, as Lejeune
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 310-11, 849 A.2d at 464-65.
157. Id. at 309-11, 849 A.2d at 464-65. While the court held that information contained
in the files and documents taken by Lejeune, including the budgeting software, marketing
plans, cost and profit information and technical specifications, constituted trade secrets,
the court concluded that Coinco's preferred distributor list did not qualify as a trade se-
cret. Id. at 310 n.6, 849 A.2d at 464 n.6. The court based its decision not to consider the
preferred distributor list a trade secret on the ease through which Mars could obtain the
information through proper means on the open market. Id.
158. Id at 311, 849 A.2d at 465.
159. Id. at 312, 849 A.2d at 465-66; MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § ll-1201(a), (c)
(2000).
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copied specific confidential files from his company laptop, erased evi-
dence of his conduct, and lied about his possession of Coinco's files
and documents to his superiors at Coinco 6°
Concluding that Lejeune misappropriated Coinco's trade secrets,
the court then examined section 11-1202(a) of MUTSA, which sets
forth the instances when the misappropriation of a trade secret may
be enjoined.' 61 The court determined that MUTSA did not permit
the issuance of an injunction to remedy Lejeune's past misappropria-
tion of Coinco's trade secrets;1 62 rather, MUTSA only permits a court
to enjoin the actual or threatened acquisition of a trade secret by im-
proper means, or the actual or threatened disclosure of a trade se-
cret.163  Accordingly, the court concluded that because Coinco
presented insufficient evidence to show that Lejeune continued or
threatened to acquire more of Coinco's trade secrets, it could only
issue an injunction against Lejeune if the injunction protected
Coinco from threatened disclosure or use of its trade secrets by
LeJeune.164  The court observed that the evidence presented by
Coinco did not demonstrate that Lejeune had disclosed Coinco's
trade secrets and, therefore, Coinco could not receive an injunction
against Lejeune for the actual disclosure of its trade secrets.
165
Lejeune's comments and behavior relating to the misappropriation of
Coinco's trade secrets did create an inference that Lejeune would dis-
close trade secrets in the future.'6 6 For this reason, the court con-
cluded that Coinco would likely succeed on the merits of its claim of
threatened misappropriation by disclosure of trade secrets against
LeJeune.167
While the Court of Appeals held that Coinco would likely succeed
in its claim of threatened misappropriation, the circuit court issued its
preliminary injunction based on the theory of inevitable disclosure.
168
160. LeJeune, 381 Md. at 314-15, 849 A.2d at 467.
161. Id. at 315, 849 A.2d at 467.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. The Court observed that section 11-1202 (a) of MUTSA does not provide a rem-
edy for previous misappropriations because an injunction could not undo the past misap-
propriation of a trade secret. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 315 n.8, 849 A.2d at 467 n.8.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 316, 849 A.2d at 468. In issuing a preliminary injunction based on the doc-
trine of inevitable disclosure, the trial judge stated:
I know I don't have to make a final ruling on whether the inevitable disclosure
doctrine applies or not, but it is the court's position that with the knowledge that
[Lejeune] has, it would be inconceivable to the court how he could do his job as
the national accounts representative for the amusement industry without consid-
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As such, the Court of Appeals next considered whether Coinco could
receive an injunction against Lejeune based on inevitable disclo-
sure.' 69 Because this was an issue of first impression, 7 ' the court ex-
amined whether Maryland should recognize or reject the doctrine of
inevitable disclosure as a means for a plaintiff to seek an injunction
under MUTSA.
17 1
In making its decision, the court reviewed the history and policy
implications of the doctrine of inevitable disclosure. 172 In doing so,
the court relied mainly on California's rejection of the doctrine in
Whyte, where the Court of Appeals of California concluded that the
doctrine permitted an employer to enjoin a former employee from
working for a competitor without proof of the employee's actual or
threatened disclosure of trade secrets. 173 Furthermore, the Court of
Appeals observed that adopting the doctrine would allow an employer
to seek not only an injunction against a former employee's use of
trade secrets, but also an injunction restricting employee mobility. 174
By restricting employee mobility, the court opined, the doctrine of
inevitable disclosure violated Maryland's strong policy in favor of em-
ployee mobility, and would consequently allow employers the benefit
of confidentiality agreements and covenants not to compete that were
not bargained for with their employees. 175 Accordingly, the court re-
jected the doctrine of inevitable disclosure, as it concluded that the
doctrine inappropriately subordinated the public policy of employee
mobility to trade secret protection. 76 As such, the Court of Appeals
vacated the preliminary injunction issued against Lejeune, and re-
manded the case. 1 7 7
4. Analysis.-In Lejeune v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., the Court of Ap-
peals refused to adopt the doctrine of inevitable disclosure, reasoning
that it allows a court to infer the inevitable disclosure of trade secrets
ering or weighing or taking into consideration the information that he acquired
while he was employed with Coinco, and so for that reason, I do believe ... that
[Coinco] will suffer irreparable injury.
Id.
169. Id. at 316-18, 849 A.2d at 468-69.
170. Id. at 311, 849 A.2d at 465.
171. Id. at 315-22, 849 A.2d at 467-71.
172. Id. at 316-22, 849 A.2d at 468-71.
173. Id. at 320-22, 849 A.2d at 470-71 (citing Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 125 Cal. Rptr.
2d 277, 292 (Ct. App. 2002)).
174. Id. at 321, 849 A.2d at 471 (citing Whyte, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 292).
175. Id. at 322, 849 A.2d at 471.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 323, 849 A.2d at 472.
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merely from an individual's exposure to them and consequently does
not correctly balance the social policies of employee mobility and
trade secret protection. 7 This decision, however, is inconsistent with
the policy underlying the inevitable disclosure doctrine. 79 The test
for inevitable disclosure set forth in PepsiCo, and applied by courts fol-
lowing the doctrine, requires more than a mere showing that an indi-
vidual received access to trade secrets before a court can enjoin an
employee from working for a new employer. 8 ° If applied correctly,
the doctrine of inevitable disclosure carefully balances the competing
social policies of employee mobility, trade secret protection, and com-
mercial morality by only restricting the employment of individuals
who show a propensity to disclose trade secrets through an injunction
that meets reasonable standards of time, scope, and geography."8 1 In
rejecting the doctrine of inevitable disclosure the court reasoned that
the doctrine offends Maryland's social policy favoring employee mo-
bility,182 and in so doing the court allowed for the potential of in-
creased commercial immorality.'8 3 For this reason, the court should
have adopted the doctrine of inevitable disclosure and thus upheld
the injunction preventing Lejeune from working for Mars.
a. The Court of Appeals Misconstrued the Doctrine of Inevitable
Disclosure.-The Court of Appeals refused to adopt the doctrine of in-
evitable disclosure based in part on the mistaken belief that under the
doctrine, an employer can enjoin a former employee from working
for a competitor based solely on the employee's exposure to trade
secrets.18 4 Specifically, the court concluded that an inevitable disclo-
sure claim is based on the assertion that a former employee will, "even
if acting in the utmost good faith-inevitably be required to use or
disclose the former employer's trade secrets in order to perform the
newjob."' 5 In that regard, the court misconstrued precedent, which
requires an employer to illustrate more than an employee's exposure
to trade secrets in order to enjoin the employee from working for a
competitor in a similar field.'8 6
178. Id. at 321-22, 849 A.2d at 471.
179. See infra notes 184-196 and accompanying text.
180. E.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995); Merck & Co.,
Inc. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1457-61 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
181. See infra notes 184-196 and accompanying text.
182. See infra notes 197-224 and accompanying text.
183. See infra notes 225-236 and accompanying text.
184. Lejeune, 381 Md. at 322, 849 A.2d at 471.
185. Id. at 317, 849 A.2d at 468.
186. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995) (observing that
for a plaintiff to establish that a former employee will inevitably disclose its trade secrets, a
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Contrary to the Court of Appeals's understanding, courts apply-
ing the doctrine of inevitable disclosure have consistently held that
evidence that an employee with access to his former employer's trade
secrets left the company to work for a competitor in a similar position
is not enough to create an inference of the inevitable disclosure of a
trade secret."8 7 Based on the standard set forth in PepsiCo, to obtain
an injunction against a former employee under the doctrine of inevi-
table disclosure, an employer must show that: (1) the employee has
knowledge of a trade secret; (2) the employee will inevitably disclose
those trade secrets; and (3) the disclosure of the trade secrets will
cause irreparable harm to his former employer.188 In that regard, the
doctrine based on the PepsiCo standard does not, as the Court of Ap-
peals concluded in Lejeune, allow the finding of inevitable disclosure
based on an individual's mere exposure to a trade secret. 89
Additionally, the Court of Appeals failed to consider that in estab-
lishing the second factor under the doctrine of inevitable disclosure,
the employer must demonstrate the intent of the employee to disclose
the secrets through the employee's behavior or actions surrounding
his departure from the employer's business.19 ° Accordingly, based on
the PepsiCo standard, the inevitability of disclosure is typically only
found by courts in a limited set of circumstances, contradicting the
Court of Appeals's conclusion that the doctrine applies where the in-
evitability of disclosure can be inferred simply from an employee's ex-
posure to his employer's trade secrets.' 9 ' Specifically, as established
in PepsiCo, and subsequently interpreted by the Merck and DoubleClick
courts, the inevitability of disclosure is generally inferred only where a
high-level employee with access to trade secrets, whose disclosure
would cause irreparable harm to the former employer, acts with such
disregard for honesty and good faith dealing that there is a substantial
plaintiff must show more than that a former employee is working for a competitor in a
related field); see also Brandy L. Treadway, Comment, An Overview of Individual States'Appli-
cation of Inevitable Disclosure: Concrete Doctrine or Equitable Tool?, 55 S.M.U. L. REV. 621 (2002)
(providing a discussion of states' application of the doctrine of inevitable disclosure).
187. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1269.
188. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
189. LeJeune, 381 Md. at 322, 849 A.2d at 471.
190. See, e.g., PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1269 (noting that to apply the doctrine of inevitable
disclosure, courts typically require a plaintiff to show evidence that the former employee's
behavior creates an inference that he will not be able to act with the good faith necessary
not to disclose the former employer's trade secrets while working for a competitor).
191. See id. at 1268-71 (noting that cases involving the application of the doctrine of
inevitable disclosure arise less often than traditional trade secret cases and discussing the
limitations placed on the application of inevitable disclosure).
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likelihood that the trade secrets will be disclosed in the future.19 2 Fur-
thermore, the requirement that an employer show an employee's bad
faith limits the application of the doctrine to instances in which an
employee affirmatively commits an action which is outside of the nor-
mal course of honest and good faith commercial dealing.' Nonethe-
less, in rejecting the doctrine of inevitable disclosure, the Court of
Appeals reasoned that evidence of access to trade secrets is enough to
create an inference of the inevitable disclosure of a trade secret.
For example, applying the PepsiCo standard to the facts of LeJeune,
Coinco would be able to demonstrate an inference of inevitable dis-
closure if it could show not only that Lejeune had access to Coinco's
trade secrets, t94 but also that Lejeune exhibited a dishonest and de-
ceitful behavior towards Coinco,' 95 and the disclosure of Coinco's
trade secrets to Mars would potentially cripple Coinco's business.
196
b. The Doctrine of Inevitable Disclosure Does Not Offend Mary-
land's Social Policy Favoring Employee Mobility.-In its decision rejecting
the doctrine of inevitable disclosure, the Court of Appeals based its
holding principally on the negative effects that the doctrine would
have on employee mobility.197 Based on its misinterpretation of the
doctrine-finding that it permitted an employer to enjoin a former
employee without proving that the employee actually disclosed or
threatened to disclose his former employer's trade secrets-the
192. See id. at 1264-71; see also Merck & Co., Inc. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1457-1462
(M.D.N.C. 1996) (relying on PepsiCo to enjoin a high-level employee from working for a
competitor based on the conclusion that the employee has access to his former employer's
trade secrets and the employee's bad faith actions created an inference that he would
disclose his former employer's trade secrets).
193. See, e.g., PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1270-71 (considering the affirmative bad faith actions as
a determinative factor in upholding an injunction issued under the doctrine of inevitable
disclosure).
194. See Md. Metals Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 38, 382 A.2d 564, 568 (1978) (finding
that high-level employees are under an implied duty of loyalty and may not misuse their
employer's trade secrets).
195. LeJeune, 381 Md. at 295-97, 849 A.2d at 455-57. After Lejeune accepted employ-
ment with Mars, he insinuated to co-workers at Coinco that he would use his knowledge of
Coinco's trade secrets at Mars. Id. at 296, 849 A.2d at 456. Also, prior to leaving Coinco,
Coinco established that Lejeune physically misappropriated Coinco's trade secrets by steal-
ing hard copies of company files and intentionally downloading Coinco files from his com-
pany computer. Id, at 296-97, 849 A.2d at 456-57. Moreover, Lejeune lied to Coinco about
his possession of company documents. Id. at 297, 849 A.2d at 456-57.
196. If Lejeune were to disclose Coinco's trade secrets, which included marketing strate-
gies, pricing information, and technical specifications which were critical to Coinco's busi-
ness operations, it would give Mars, Coinco's chief competitor, a competitive and unfair
advantage over Coinco. Id. at 298-99, 849 A.2d at 457-58.
197. Id. at 321-22, 849 A.2d at 471.
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Lejeune court mistakenly concluded that the doctrine acted not only as
an injunction against the use of trade secrets, but also an injunction
against employment with competitors, and thus forced employees to
accept a non-negotiated covenant not to compete. 9 ' Accordingly,
the court failed to recognize that when applied correctly, the doctrine
of inevitable disclosure is a useful equitable tool through which courts
can protect trade secrets and commercial morality, while at the same
time allowing employees a reasonable degree of mobility.
Contrary to the Court of Appeals's finding that the doctrine of
inevitable disclosure acts as an injunction against employment with
competitors, adhering to the PepsiCo standard, the doctrine of inevita-
ble disclosure does not restrict employment based on a determination
that the disclosure of a trade secret is inevitable simply because an
employee has left to work for a competitor in a similar position.199
There are several limitations to the application of the doctrine. Based
upon PepsiCo and its interpretations by the Merck and DoubleClick
courts, the doctrine of inevitable disclosure will only apply to restrict
the employment mobility of individuals in limited circumstances
where a former high-level employee had access to a trade secret and
through his lack of candor and bad faith displayed a willingness to use
or disclose that trade secret. 20 If the doctrine of inevitable disclosure
is applied with judicial restraint, the doctrine will not restrict the mo-
bility of most employees, as typically only high-level employees gain
access to their employer's important trade secrets. 20 1
The doctrine only restricts the employment of employees whose
dishonest or bad faith behavior creates an inference that they will dis-
close their former employer's trade secrets. 20 2 For example, in Pep-
siCo, the circumstances surrounding the employee's departure from
PepsiCo and the employee's lack of candor were determinative in the
court's decision to issue an injunction based on inevitable disclo-
sure. 203 In Merck, the court enjoined an employee based on the em-
198. Id.
199. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995).
200. See supra notes 121-130 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrine of inevita-
ble disclosure's behavioral inference requirement).
201. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Expansion of Trade Secrecy Protection and the Mobility of
Management Employees: A New Problem for the Law, 47 S.C. L. REv. 659, 665-66 (1996) (observ-
ing that typically only high-level research, production, sales, and managerial employees
gain access to their employer's trade secrets and are thus subject to employment restraints
under trade secret law).
202. Merck & Co., Inc. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1460-62 & nn.5-7 (M.D.N.C. 1996);
PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1270-72; DoubleClick, Inc. v. Henderson, No. 116914/97, 1997 WL
731413, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 7, 1997).
203. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1271.
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ployee's lack of forthrightness and underhanded dealing with regard
to the employee's decision to leave Merck to work for a competing
company. 20 4 Moreover, in DoubleClick, the court issued an injunction
based on the defendants' repeated breach of their fiduciary duty, and
evidence that they had copied large portions of their former em-
ployer's trade secret information to assist in the formation of a com-
peting advertising company.
20 5
Finally, the Lejeune court overlooked that in applying the PepsiCo
standard, an injunction can only be issued under the doctrine of inevi-
table disclosure if an employee's disclosure of a former employer's
trade secret will cause irreparable harm to the former employer. 20 6
For example, courts have found that the following disclosures would
cause an employer irreparable harm: the disclosure of secret market-
ing plans in PepsiCo,207 the disclosure of cutting-edge fuel injection
distributor pump technology in Allis-Chalmers,2 °8 the disclosure of ad-
vanced space suit technology in B.F Goodrich,209 and the disclosure of
a complex chlorine pigment production process in E.I. duPont de
Nemours.21" Thus, the court failed to recognize that the doctrine does
not apply to protect every trade secret, but rather only those trade
secrets that are crucial to the operation and financial success of a busi-
ness and whose disclosure would cause a business irreparable harm.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the doctrine of inevitable
disclosure violates Maryland's public policy favoring employee mobil-
ity. In actuality, the doctrine only restricts employment mobility in
the limited instances in which an employee has breached the fiduciary
duty owed to his or her former employer and thus, consistent with the
Court of Appeals's holdings in the Metzner line of cases, may be en-
joined from working for a competitor employer.21 ' The Lejeune court
failed to recognize that by limiting the application of the doctrine of
inevitable disclosure to only those cases where an employee has knowl-
edge or possession of a trade secret, has shown a willingness to im-
properly use that trade secret, and the disclosure of the trade secret
204. Merck, 941 F. Supp. at 1462 n.7.
205. DoubleClick, 1997 AArL 731413, at *3-8.
206. See PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1269 (noting the importance of showing the inevitability of
disclosure and a resulting irreparable injury).
207. Id. at 1269-71.
208. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Cont'l Aviation & Eng'g Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645, 654
(E.D. Mich. 1966).
209. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 192 N.E.2d 99, 105 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963).
210. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Am. Potash & Chem. Corp., 200 A.2d 428, 432
(Del. Ch. 1964).
211. See supra notes 61-74 and accompanying text.
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would cause the former employer irreparable injury, the doctrine will
not apply in most trade secret cases, and thus would have only a mar-
ginal effect on employee mobility.212
By misinterpreting the scope of the doctrine of inevitable disclo-
sure, the Lejeune court failed to recognize that the doctrine actually
promotes employee mobility by allowing employees who leave their
employer on good terms and exhibit a good faith effort to maintain
the confidentiality of trade secret information to work for competi-
tors.21 3 Thus, an employee acting in good faith cannot be enjoined
under the doctrine of inevitable disclosure simply for his decision to
exercise his long-recognized freedom to utilize the general skills and
knowledge he gained during the course of his employment in a new
job opportunity. 214
For example, if the doctrine of inevitable disclosure were applied
in Lejeune, and Lejeune had acted in good faith towards Coinco, in
accord with the Court of Appeals's holdings in Metzner and Ritterpusch
establishing the right of a former employee to compete in good faith
with his former employer, the doctrine could not have been used to
restrict his future employment at Mars.215 Accordingly, the doctrine
of inevitable disclosure is consistent with the Court of Appeals's deci-
sions in the Metzner line of cases, which established that an employee
has a right to compete with his former employer using his general
training and experience, but not using a former employer's trade se-
cret information or otherwise violating his fiduciary duty.
2 16
Furthermore, while the Court of Appeals concluded that the doc-
trine of inevitable disclosure acts as an injunction against employment
with a competitor, 217 the doctrine can in fact serve to fairly balance
the interests of a departing employee and his former employer when
employed with judicial restraint. For instance, if the court deter-
212. See supra notes 120-132 and accompanying text (describing the factors limiting the
application of the doctrine of inevitable disclosure to a small percentage of trade secret
cases).
213. See, e.g., PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1270-71 (stating that an employee's bad faith towards his
former employer is a determinative factor in the doctrine of inevitable disclosure analysis).
214. See id. at 1268-69 (reviewing case law where no injunctions were granted against
skilled employees seeking simply to take their skills elsewhere).
215. Md. Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 37-38, 382 A.2d 564, 567-68 (1978); Rit-
terpusch v. Lithographic Plate Serv., Inc., 208 Md. 592, 602, 119 A.2d 392, 396-97 (1956);
see also supra notes 190-193 and accompanying text (observing that to enjoin an employee
under the doctrine of inevitable disclosure an employer must show evidence of the em-
ployee's behavior that creates an inference that he will disclose his former employer's trade
secrets).
216. See supra notes 52-74 and accompanying text.
217. LeJeune, 381 Md. at 321, 849 A.2d at 471.
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mined that an employee would inevitably disclose the trade secrets of
his former employer while working for a competitor, the court issuing
the injunction need not permanently and completely prohibit the em-
ployee from accepting his new position.21 8 Rather, the length and
scope of the injunction must conform to Maryland's requirements for
a valid noncompetition agreement established in Becker and Tawney,
and thus be reasonable in time, geography, scope, and not place an
undue burden on the employee.21 9 An injunction issued for a reason-
able period of time, such as the six-month injunctions in PepsiCo and
DoubleClick, would give the employer time to prepare for the possibility
that a former employee may disclose confidential information and
change its business strategies appropriately.
220
As such, the LeJeune court failed to recognize that an injunction
limiting Lejeune from working for Mars for a few months would have
satisfied the requirements for the enforceability of a restraint of em-
ployment set forth in Becker and Tawney, and allowed Coinco time to
alter its marketing strategies and tiered pricing scheme to mitigate
possible damage caused by Lejeune's potential disclosure of its trade
secrets. 22 ' In that regard, a brief injunction would fairly balance the
competing social policies of employee mobility and trade secret pro-
tection by giving the employer time to compensate for the misappro-
priation and likely disclosure of its trade secrets, while concurrently
allowing a former employee to work for a competitor following a brief
period of restraint.
Moreover, if the scope of an injunction is limited as in Merck and
Allis-Chalmers, an employee may begin working for the competitor, but
may be ordered by the court not to participate in the field with which
he has knowledge of his former employer's trade secrets. 222 In fact, in
Lefeune, the circuit court's injunction against Lejeune, like the injunc-
218. E.g., Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Cont'l Aviation & Eng'g Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645,
654-55 (E.D. Mich. 1966) (limiting an injunction to prevent an employee from producing
or designing only one specific type of pump and noting that the duration of the injunction
is limited to the time until a final hearing occurs or the confidential information comes to
the employer by legitimate means).
219. See Becker v. Bailey, 268 Md. 93, 96, 299 A.2d 835, 838 (1973); Tawney v. Mut. Sys.
of Md., Inc., 186 Md. 508, 521, 47 A.2d 372, 379 (1946).
220. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1272 (7th Cir. 1995); DoubleClick, Inc.
v. Henderson, No. 116914/97, 1997 WL 731413, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 7, 1997).
221. See LeJeune, 381 Md. at 309-10, 849 A.2d at 464 (noting the irreparable harm Coinco
might suffer if its trade secrets were immediately revealed by Lejeune).
222. See supra notes 131-132 and accompanying text; see also Kitch, supra note 201, at 665
(observing that managerial employees can often work for a company using their general
skills and do not necessarily need to work in the exact same field in which they have knowl-
edge of their former employer's trade secrets).
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tions against the employees in Merck and Allis-Chalmers, did not cause
him to miss a single day of work at Mars because he was allowed to
work for Mars in industries where his knowledge of Coinco's trade
secrets was not useful.223 These limitations placed on Lejeune's em-
ployment mobility are in accord with the Court of Appeals's holdings
in the Metzner line of cases, which established that while employees
have a right to compete against a former employer, that right is tem-
pered by the implied duty to act in good faith and not disclose a for-
mer employer's trade secrets. 224 As such, the doctrine of inevitable
disclosure fairly balances the social policies of trade secret protection
and commercial morality with Maryland's policy favoring employee
mobility.
c. Properly Applied, the Doctrine of Inevitable Disclosure Promotes
Increased Commercial Morality.-The Lejeune court failed to recognize
that without the doctrine of inevitable disclosure, it is more difficult
for employers to enjoin a former employee from disclosing trade
secrets while working for a competitor. Thus, the commercial moral-
ity aspect of the court's analysis is not given due consideration. Under
MUTSA, the employer must wait for the former employee to threaten
to disclose or actually disclose trade secrets before a court will issue an
injunction.225 In many cases, if a court waited for an employee to
threaten to or actually disclose his former employer's trade secrets
before enjoining the employee's conduct, the employee may have al-
ready caused substantial and irreparable harm to his former
employer.226
For instance, if Lejeune were allowed to disclose Coinco's tiered
pricing system to Mars, Mars could immediately use that information
to undercut Coinco's prices and steal Coinco's clients. 227 At that
point, relying on the Court of Appeals's interpretation of MUTSA in
LeJeune, although Coinco would have a claim for damages,228 irrepara-
ble harm to its business may have already occurred. The Lejeune court
failed to recognize that the doctrine of inevitable disclosure provides
223. Brief for Appellee at 5, LeJeune (No. 111).
224. See supra notes 52-74 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 161-163 and accompanying text (discussing what an employer must
establish to receive an injunction for trade secret misappropriation under MUTSA); see also
Peter B. Swann, Note, Maryland Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 49 MD. L. REv. 1056 (1990) (pro-
viding a detailed explanation and analysis of MUTSA).
226. See, e.g., LeJeune, 381 Md. at 309-10, 849 A.2d at 464 (discussing the potential devas-
tating effects on a business that may result from a competitor discovering its trade secrets
and confidential information).
227. Id.
228. Id.
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employers and courts with a more effective and timely means of
preventing dishonest employees from inappropriately disclosing trade
secret information than the remedies available under MUTSA.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that the
doctrine provides employers with a remedy to uphold Maryland's judi-
cially recognized principle that an employee is under an implied duty
not to abuse the trust and confidence of his employer. In that regard,
the doctrine of inevitable disclosure is in accord with the Court of
Special Appeals's holding in Tabs Associates, that even in the absence
of an express agreement, an employee is under a duty not to use or
disclose his former employer's trade secrets. 229 Furthermore, the doc-
trine is consistent with the Court of Appeals's decision in Metzner,
which established that employees may not violate their fiduciary duty
to gain an unfair commercial advantage as a competitor. 23 ° While the
Lejeune court largely ignored the issue of commercial morality, the
doctrine of inevitable disclosure promotes increased commercial mo-
rality by upholding an employee's fiduciary duty to act in the best in-
terests of his employer. 231 Accordingly, by failing to properly address
the doctrine of inevitable disclosure's beneficial impact on commer-
cial morality, the Lejeune court overlooked the possibility that its deci-
sion would encourage individuals in Lejeune's position to abuse their
employer's trust in order to gain a competitive advantage in the mar-
ketplace by making it more difficult to enjoin their behavior.
As recognized by the Court of Appeals in Space Aero Products and
later by the Court of Special Appeals in Tabs Associates, an employer's
failure to have an employee sign a confidentiality agreement does not
relieve the employee of his fiduciary obligations of good faith and
honesty towards his employer.2"2 Accordingly, the LeJeune court
missed an opportunity to illustrate to employers that good faith deal-
ing and fair competition are judicially protected principles, and that
hiring an employee from a competing firm to gain access to the for-
mer firm's confidential information and trade secrets violates the
principle of commercial morality and an employee's fiduciary duty to
229. Tabs Assocs. v. Brohawn, 59 Md. App. 330, 341, 475 A.2d 1203, 1209 (1984).
230. Md. Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 37, 382 A.2d 564, 568 (1978).
231. See E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Am. Potash & Chem. Corp., 200 A.2d 428, 436
(Del. Ch. 1964) (asserting that a court will grant an injunction where there is a threat of a
breach of confidence).
232. See Tabs Assocs., 59 Md. App. at 341, 475 A.2d at 1209; Space Aero Prods. Co., Inc. v.
R.E. Darling Co., Inc., 238 Md. 93, 115-17, 208 A.2d 74, 85-87 (1965). It is certainly good
practice, however, for employers to use express nondisclosure and noncompetition agree-
ments with their employees to protect confidential information.
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his employer.2 33 By ignoring the positive impact that the doctrine of
inevitable disclosure would have on commercial morality, the Court of
Appeals overlooked the fact that the doctrine promotes increased
commercial morality by rewarding employees who act in good faith
towards their employers.234 If an employee leaves a company to work
for a competitor and acts in a fair and honest manner with regard to
knowledge of his former employer's trade secrets, it is highly unlikely
that a court would enjoin him from subsequent employment.235 In
that regard, by overlooking the bad faith element required by the doc-
trine, the Court of Appeals failed to recognize that the doctrine is
consistent with the Court of Appeals' holdings in Metzner and Rit-
terpusch which recognized the right of an employee to compete with
his former employer using his or her general skills and knowledge
and good faith business practices. 236 On the other hand, when an
employee steals company documents in an attempt to parlay that in-
formation into a better job, consistent with the principles established
in the Metzner line of cases, a court applying the doctrine likely would
promote commercial morality by punishing that employee for violat-
ing his fiduciary duty by acting in bad faith towards his previous
employer.
5. Conclusion.-In LeJeune v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., the Court of Ap-
peals held that the doctrine of inevitable disclosure cannot serve as
the basis for an injunction under MUTSA because it allowed a court
to enjoin an employee based only on the employee's exposure to a
trade secret and would hinder Maryland's policy favoring employee
mobility.237 The court misconstrued the doctrine of inevitable disclo-
sure and, by rejecting the doctrine, failed to properly balance the so-
cial policies of trade secret protection, commercial morality, and
employee mobility. The court's conclusion that the doctrine restricts
employee mobility and allows an injunction against an employee for
mere exposure to trade secrets runs counter to precedent, which em-
phasizes great deference to employee mobility and limits the instances
233. See supra notes 140-141 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 121-123 and accompanying text (describing that most courts require
a showing of bad faith to enjoin an employee from working for a competitor).
235. See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1270-71 (7th Cir. 1995) (conclud-
ing that to be awarded an injunction under the doctrine of inevitable disclosure, an em-
ployer must show more evidence that trade secret misappropriation is likely than the fact
that a former employer has left and will use his general skills and knowledge at his new
place of employment).
236. Md. Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 37-38, 382 A.2d 564, 567-68 (1978); Rit-
terpusch v. Lithographic Plate Serv., Inc., 208 Md. 592, 602, 119 A.2d 392, 396-97 (1956).
237. See supra notes 173-175 and accompanying text.
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in which the doctrine can be employed to enjoin an employee from
working for a competitor.238 Consequently, by rejecting the doctrine
of inevitable disclosure, the court missed an opportunity to strengthen
trade secret protection and commercial morality in Maryland when it
condoned the underhanded behavior of an employee who violated his
fiduciary duty to his employer for his own personal economic bene-
fit.2 39 The court's decision actually encourages continued commer-
cial immorality in Maryland by leaving the door open for competitors
to compete through the misappropriation of trade secrets, rather than
innovation and technological development.
JOSHUA M. GOLDBERG
238. See supra notes 197-224 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 225-236 and accompanying text.
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A. Maryland Simplifies Its Analysis of Implied Easements
In Kobrine, L.L. C. v. Metzger' the Court of Appeals considered
whether lot owners in a waterfront subdivision had an implied recrea-
tional use easement in a parcel located within the subdivision on the
Patuxent River.2 In a 4-3 decision, the court held that markings on
the original plat of the subdivision created an implied easement be-
cause they clearly indicated the common grantor's intent to confer an
easement over the parcel.3 By not requiring additional, subjective evi-
dence to establish that an easement had been implicitly created, the
court appropriately extended prior case law and demonstrated that,
although a variety of subjective factors may be considered in an im-
plied easement analysis, clear, objective evidence alone is sufficient
for a court to find an easement.4 The court's holding in Kobrine was
an efficient extension of the objective analysis of implied easements
for abutting roadways, and a departure from prior case law where the
court had taken all surrounding circumstances into account when de-
termining whether an easement existed.5 The approach established
in Kobrine will likely allow increased efficiency in Maryland courts' fu-
ture analysis of implied easements.6
1. The Case.-Bruce R. Metzger is the owner of a nonriparian7
residential lot located in Section Two of the Harbor Light Beach
(HLB) subdivision, and Dr. and Ms. Kobrine are the owners of a wa-
terfront lot in the same section of the HLB subdivision.8 This contro-
l. 380 Md. 620, 846 A.2d 403 (2004).
2. Id. at 622, 846 A.2d at 404.
3. Id. at 641, 846 A.2d at 415. A plat is defined as, "[a] map describing a piece of land
and its features, such as boundaries, lots, roads, and easements." BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY
1188-89 (8th ed. 2004).
4. See infra notes 148-152 and accompanying text (describing how the Kobrine court
restricted its analysis of the grantor's intent to clear evidence and found that evidence
alone sufficient to establish an implied easement).
5. See infra notes 154-176 and accompanying text (analyzing the Kobrine decision in
light of prior case law).
6. See infra notes 177-182 and accompanying text (discussing how a more objective
analysis will save time).
7. By definition, a riparian property is located on the bank of a body of water.
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 1352. Owners of riparian properties, properties
bordering a body of water, generally have the right to "make reasonable use of the water."
Id.
8. Kobrine, 380 Md. at 623, 846 A.2d at 404. The subdivision was divided into two
sections, but the lot owners of Section One were not parties in this lawsuit. See id. at 623,
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versy arose when Dr. and Ms. Kobrine purchased a waterfront parcel
(the KLLC lot) through a limited liability company they created,
Kobrine, L.L.C. (KLLC), and precluded the other lot owners from
using the lot for recreational purposes.9
The HLB subdivision was originally developed by landowners J.
Earl Brown and his wife, Ruth. "' In 1955, the Browns recorded a plat
depicting Section One of the HLB subdivision." Section One con-
sisted of twenty-two residential lots, seventeen of which bordered Mill
Creek, a tributary of the Patuxent River. 2 In 1958, the Browns re-
corded a second plat, Harbor Light Beach Subdivision Section Two.
1 3
Section Two included thirty-nine numbered residential lots and two
unnumbered parcels bordering the Patuxent River.' 4 The KLLC lot
was one of the two unnumbered parcels in Section Two. 15 The legend
on the Section Two plat labeled the KLLC lot as an "Area Reserved
For The Use Of Lot Owners.'
6
After the Browns recorded the two plats in Calvert County, they
sold several lots from Section One and one lot from Section Two to
individual purchasers.17 In 1960, the Browns conveyed all but one of
the remaining lots from Section One and all of the remaining lots
from Section Two in the HLB subdivision to Beltway Industries, Inc.
(Beltway). 8 Twelve years after this conveyance, Beltway recorded a
Declaration of Covenants, Restrictions and Conditions (Declaration)
that was designed to protect the interests and investments of the lot
owners in the HLB subdivision. 9 Paragraph Five of the General Pro-
visions section of the Declaration stated:
LOT OWNERS, their heirs and assigns of the said remaining
56 lots, will pay a 1/56th share per lot of said maintenance
846 A.2d at 405 (noting that Metzger was the only lot owner in the subdivision seeking a
property interest in the Kobrines' lot). In its holding, the Court of Appeals concluded that
the lot owners in Section One of the subdivision were not intended to be beneficiaries of
an easement on the reserved area. Id. at 641, 846 A.2d at 415.
9. Id. at 623, 846 A.2d at 404.
10. Id., 846 A.2d at 405.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 624, 846 A.2d at 405.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. The legend on the plat omitted any specification regarding which lot owners
would have access to the KLLC lot. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. Overall, the deed to Beltway conveyed fifty-four numbered lots, four identified
parcels, the roads and paths in the subdivision, and the KLLC lot. Id. at 625, 846 A.2d at
405-06.
19. Id. at 625, 846 A.2d at 406.
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cost until such time as all 56 remaining lots are sold, at which
time the said LOT OWAERS, their heirs and assigns, will accept a
1/56th fee simple interest per lot in said roadways and reserved ar-
eas, thereby relieving DEVELOPER of all liabilities relative to
said roadways and beach areas.20
The General Provisions of the Declaration did not refer to the KLLC
lot specifically, nor did the provisions clarify the reference to "re-
served areas."2 Furthermore, the final section of the General Provi-
sions stated that the developer had authorization to organize an
association for the community to enforce the covenants in the Decla-
ration, and that the organization would be governed by its members.22
However, the wording of that section did not suggest that an individ-
ual lot owner in the subdivision could independently create a home-
owner's association to enforce the Declaration. 23
In June 1976, Beltway conveyed six lots from Section One, thirty-
eight lots from Section Two, the two unnumbered parcels in Section
Two, and all roads, parks, and "shore and reserved areas" as desig-
nated on the plats to Joseph Waters, Dorothy Owens, and Richard Al-
exander (the Waters group) .24 Four years later, the Waters group
conveyed six lots in Section Two, along with a part of the unnum-
bered parcel adjacent to the KLLC lot, to Mr. and Ms. Mychalus.25 In
1984, the Waters group conveyed two of the roads in Section Two to
the County Commissioners of Calvert County.2 6
Dr. and Ms. Kobrine purchased their first riparian lot in Section
Two of the HLB subdivision in 1991, and seven years later Bruce Metz-
ger was conveyed title to a nonriparian lot in the same subdivision. 27
Neither deed mentioned anything about the reserved KLLC lot, but
both deeds did reference the original plat of Section Two in the prop-
20. Id. at 626, 846 A.2d at 406 (emphasis added). The Declaration's reference to "56
lots" was not entirely accurate; the drafters had likely combined the two unnumbered par-
cels with the fifty-four numbered lots in reaching that number. Id. at 625, 846 A.2d at 406.
21. Id. at 646, 846 A.2d at 419 (Harrell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
22. Id. at 626-27, 846 A.2d at 407.
23. Id. The final part of the Declaration provided:
DEVELOPER, or its agent, as agent for said LOT OWNERS, is authorized to cause a
community protective corporation or association to be organized for the purpose
of assuring the perpetuation of Harbor Light Beach as a desirable community
and the safeguarding the investment of all LOT OWNERS. The management of
said organization shall be governed by its members.
Id.
24. Id. at 627-28, 846 A.2d at 407.
25. Id. at 628, 846 A.2d at 407.
26. Id., 846 A.2d at 408.
27. ld. at 628-29, 846 A.2d at 408.
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erty descriptions. 28 In September 1999, KLLC purchased the reserved
KLLC lot from the Waters group.29 The deed described the lot as
"[a] 11 that land which is shown and designated as 'AREA RESERVED
FOR THE USE OF LOT OWNERS' on a plat entitled 'Harbor Light
Beach Subdivision, Section Two." 3 The parties to the conveyance
also expressly agreed to restrictions on the lot, which prohibited
KLLC from erecting a residential dwelling on the property.31 Soon
after the acquisition, the Kobrines installed a stone revetment to pro-
tect the lot from erosion, and posted a no trespassing sign on the
property in response to loud parties and picnics held by other lot own-
ers on the lot.
32
In November 1999, Metzger and the owners of six other lots filed
suit against KLLC in the Circuit Court for Calvert County, claiming
that all of the lot owners in the subdivision held title to the KLLC lot
pursuant to the 1972 Declaration.3 3 Metzger and the six other lot
owners also argued that the markings on the Section Two plat granted
them an easement in the lot for lawful recreational purposes. 34 By
July 2000, when Metzger filed his Second Amended Complaint against
KLLC, the other individual lot owners had dropped out of the lawsuit,
and Metzger brought suit on behalf of himself and a homeowner's
association that he created, HLB Home Owner's Association, Inc.
(HOA).35 The complaint alleged that (1) the lot owners have a recre-
ational use easement in the KLLC lot according to the recorded plat
or, in the alternative, they have an easement by prescription, and (2)
that KLLC must convey title of the KLLC lot either to HOA or in 1/
56th interests to each of the lot owners.3 6
At trial in the Calvert County Circuit Court, Metzger testified that
he did not rely on the subdivision plat marking the KLLC lot as "Area
Reserved For The Use Of Lot Owners," or the 1972 Declaration, when
28. Id. at 629, 846 A.2d at 408.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See id. (stating that the complaint sought "an injunction to restrain the defendant
from interfering with their use of the KLLC lot").
35. Id. at 623, 846 A.2d at 405. Regarding the homeowner's association, the Court of
Appeals noted that "HOA owns no property in the subdivision and has no contractual or
other legally cognizable interest in any of the roads in the subdivision or in the KLLC lot."
Id. Later in the opinion the court expressed serious doubt as to whether HOA had stand-
ing to assert any easement in the KLLC lot, but did not resolve the issue because Metzger, a
lot owner, did have standing. Id. at 634, 846 A.2d at 411.
36. Id. at 630, 846 A.2d at 409.
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he purchased his lot in the subdivision." Nevertheless, the circuit
court held that the lot owners in the HLB subdivision had an express
easement in the KLLC lot to access the river by relying on the mark-
ings in the legend of the Section Two plat, the deed from the Browns
to Beltway referencing the plat, and the language in the Declaration.3 8
Judge Chappelle further authorized Metzger and HOA to remove the
stone revetment the Kobrines had installed at Dr. Kobrine's expense,
and concluded that KLLC's title to the KLLC lot was void.3 9 KLLC
filed an appeal in the Court of Special Appeals challenging the
decision.4 °
In May 2003, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the decision
of the circuit court on every point except for the payment of costs
associated with the removal of the revetment." The Court of Special
Appeals found that Paragraph Five of the Declaration was intended to
convey the KLLC lot to all of the lot owners when the fifty-six lots of
the subdivision were sold.4 2 In addition, the court noted that the Dec-
laration's provisions were not unusual, because developers frequently
set aside common areas for the members of the entire community to
use and enjoy.43
Addressing the easement issue, the Court of Special Appeals held
that the circuit court was correct in finding an implied easement
based on the general plan of the development.4 4 The court examined
the intent of the grantor, and considered the recorded subdivision
plat, the Declaration, and the historical use of the property before
concluding that the Browns and Beltway intended to create an ease-
ment for the lot owners in the KLLC lot.45
37. Id. at 648, 846 A.2d at 420 (Harrell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
38. Id. at 630-31, 846 A.2d at 409.
39. Id. at 631, 846 A.2d at 409. The court then transferred title to the HLB lot owners
who had purchased their lots since the Declaration was filed. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 632, 846 A.2d at 410.
42. Id. With respect to the ownership issue, the Court of Special Appeals rejected
KLLC's argument that the conveyance in the Declaration violated the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities and concluded that the developer intended to convey the property within a reasona-
ble time. Id. at 631, 846 A.2d at 409.
43. Kobrine, L.L.C. v. Metzger, 151 Md. App. 260, 283, 824 A.2d 1031, 1044 (2003).
The Court of Special Appeals specifically provided that the Declaration was "consistent
with the common practice in the development of subdivisions for developers to convey
common areas to the community as a whole, especially for use and maintenance." Id.
44. Kobrine, 380 Md. at 631, 846 A.2d at 409-10. The Court of Special Appeals found it
unnecessary to consider whether an express easement existed because it agreed with the
circuit court that there was an implied easement. Id.
45. Metzger, 151 Md. App. 291-92, 824 A.2d at 1048-49.
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KLLC appealed the decision, and the Court of Appeals granted
certiorari in order to resolve whether all of the lot owners in the HLB
subdivision had a right of entitlement and a recreational use easement
in the KLLC lot.4 6
2. Legal Background.-The Court of Appeals has broadly defined
an easement as a nonpossessory interest in another's real property,
which arises from an express grant or implication.47 The creation of
easements can be express or implied. Express easements can only be
acquired in the manner prescribed by the recording statutes.48 In
contrast, implied easements can be created by prescription, the filing
of plats, estoppel, or by implied grant or reservation. 49 Implied ease-
ments can also arise out of necessity.50 There are a variety of ways in
which an implied easement can be created in Maryland.5 1 The Mary-
land courts' approach to determining whether an implied easement
exists has varied depending on the facts of a case, but the predomi-
nant test has involved an analysis of the original grantor's intent.
52
When assessing a grantor's intent, the Court of Appeals has examined
many factors, including markings on a plat, the language in the
deed(s) of the property in question, reliance on any assurances made
to the grantees, the nature of the property conveyed, and whether the
easement at issue involves an abutting right of way.53 The analysis
46. Kobrine, 380 Md. at 632, 846 A.2d at 410.
47. Boucher v. Boyer, 301 Md. 679, 688, 484 A.2d 630, 635 (1984) (citations omitted).
48. Brehm v. Richards, 152 Md. 126, 131-32, 136 A. 618, 620 (1927); see also Baltimore
& Hanover R.R. Co. v. Algire, 63 Md. 319, 323 (1885) (stating the general rule that an
easement in land "must be acquired in the mode provided for the transfer of real estate").
In Maryland, an instrument granting an express easement must include "the names of the
grantor and grantee, a description of the property sufficient to identify it with reasonable
certainty, and the interest or estate intended to be granted." MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP.
§ 4-101 (a) (1) (2003). The recording statutes specifically state that no words of inheritance
are necessary to create an express easement, and that every grant or reservation of an
easement passes or reserves an easement in perpetuity unless a contrary intention appears.
REAL PROP. § 4-105.
49. Boucher, 301 Md. at 688, 484 A.2d at 635 (citations omitted).
50. Id. See generally Calvert Joint Venture #140 v. Snider, 373 Md. 18, 40-47, 816 A.2d
854, 866-70 (2003) (providing a discussion of the law of easements by necessity in
Maryland).
51. See infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (noting the different types of implied
easements, including easements by necessity, by the filing of plats, and by prescription).
52. See infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text (describing case law establishing that
an individual seeking an implied easement must show by clear and satisfactory proof that
the original grantor of the property intended to create an easement for subsequent
grantees).
53. See infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text (providing examples of factors consid-
ered in ascertaining intent, such as oral conversations or written correspondence demon-
strating intentions of the grantor).
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courts use to determine whether an implied easement exists has va-
ried depending upon whether the easement is being implied for the
use of an abutting road or street, or for recreational purposes in a
waterfront lot.
54
a. Law of Restrictions on Land Implied from a Uniform Plan of
Development.-To establish the existence of an implied easement aris-
ing out of a uniform plan of development, Maryland courts require a
clear manifestation of the grantor's intent at the time of the convey-
ance. 55 Maryland courts employ a similar analysis when determining
whether a restrictive covenant can be implied from a common scheme
of development.56 This test was used by the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land in McKenrick v. Savings Bank of Baltimore, where the court assessed
whether land restrictions existed on a parcel of property that the bank
sold to Mr. McKenrick In its analysis, the Court of Appeals stated
that a restriction would exist on the land conveyed to a grantee pro-
vided it was established that the parties intended to create a restriction
in the property.5" The McKenrick court also noted that the burden is
on the person seeking to enforce implicit land restrictions to show by
clear and satisfactory proof that the grantor intended the restriction
to affect the land in that manner, and that once a restriction is estab-
lished, it is binding on all subsequent owners of the parcels of land
involved.59 Ultimately, the court held that the common grantors, who
owned the property before the bank, intended to impose restrictions
on some of the lots in the development, but that the contract of sale
with the bank was enforceable because there was no common scheme
of development and thus no restrictions could be implied from the
deeds to the other lots. 60
The determination of the parties' intention is a question of fact,6 t
and Maryland courts examine all of the surrounding circumstances of
54. See infra notes 72-119 and accompanying text (describing the Court of Appeals'
analysis in a variety of cases involving either right of ways or waterfront lots).
55. Williams Realty Co., Inc. v. Robey, 175 Md. 532, 539, 2 A.2d 683, 686 (1938); see also
McKenrick v. Sav. Bank of Baltimore, 174 Md. 118, 122, 197 A. 580, 582 (1938) (adopting
the principle that an easement will be recognized if it appears that the grantor intended to
reserve an easement in the property granted).
56. Easements and covenants are similar in that they create a "right or obligation that
runs with the land or an interest in land." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: Servitudes
§ 1.1 (1998). As such, the Restatement (Third) of Property has created a servitude that encom-
passes both easements and covenants and thus employs the same rules for both. Id.
57. 174 Md. 118, 120-21, 197 A. 580, 581 (1938).
58. Id. at 122, 197 A. at 582.
59. Id. at 128, 197 A. at 584-85.
60. Id. at 131, 197 A. at 586.
61. Scholtes v. McColgan, 184 Md. 480, 489, 41 A.2d 479, 483 (1945).
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the conveyance rather than focus only on the language of the deed.62
Thus, extrinsic matters, including conduct, conversations, and written
correspondence are considered when determining intent.6 3 In Turner
v. Brocato, for example, the Court of Appeals was presented with the
issue of whether a developer of the appellants' subdivision had implic-
itly placed restrictions against use for business on all of the lots within
the residential development.64 The court held that the appellants
demonstrated, by clear and satisfactory evidence, that the grantor in-
tended all lots to be affected by the restrictions, according to a general
plan of development.65 In reaching its conclusion regarding the gran-
tor's intent, the court considered many factors extrinsic to the deed,
including the existence of a general plan at the time the sales began,
testimony of owners and the sales agent indicating that restrictions
were a selling point on which the purchasers relied, and the words on
the sign at the entrance to the property in question indicating that the
development was restricted.66 In its opinion, the court also empha-
sized that an inference of intent from any source should be consid-
ered by the court.67
Another element courts have required in prior case law regarding
restrictions on land is a demonstration that the grantor of an ease-
ment intended to impose restrictions in order to benefit the land, and
that the restrictions were not merely personal to the grantor.6" In
Scholtes v. McColgan, for example, the court held that certain restric-
tions in place in a residential development were not intended to be
passed to subsequent grantees because there was no evidence that the
grantor intended to pass on those restrictions with the land.69 The
original grantor had written racial restrictions into the deeds of the
properties in question, but the court found that the grantor had never
intended the restrictions to bind the land, and that they would not be
enforced against purchasers after the immediate grantees. 70 Thus,
the court's finding indicates that a person seeking to enforce an im-
plied land restriction may be required to demonstrate that the origi-
62. Id. at 489, 41 A.2d at 484; see also Boucher v. Boyer, 301 Md. 679, 688, 484 A.2d 630,
635 (1984) (stating that an implied easement is determined by circumstances surrounding
the conveyance, and courts generally rely on extrinsic factors in order to ascertain the
parties' intentions).
63. Turner v. Brocato, 206 Md. 336, 346-47, 111 A.2d 855, 861 (1955).
64. Id. at 339-40, 111 A.2d at 857.
65. Id. at 352, 111 A.2d at 864.
66. Id. at 349-50, 111 A.2d at 862-63.
67. Id. at 351, 111 A.2d at 863.
68. Scholtes v. McColgan, 184 Md. 480, 492, 41 A.2d 479, 485 (1945).
69. Id. at 493, 41 A.2d at 485.
70. Id.
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nal grantor intended the restriction to benefit the property
permanently after he conveyed it."
b. Easements Implied from a Plat Reference.-There are two
types of plat references7 2 from which an easement can be implied.
The first occurs when a deed instructs the reader to consult a plat,
and the plat markings indicate that an easement was created;73 the
second occurs when a deed itself mentions an area of land or a right
of way that is described in the same way on a plat of the area.7 ' These
references can be made regarding parcels of property,75 roads,76 or
similar rights of way. Regardless of the type or content of the plat
reference, the Court of Appeals has consistently approached these
cases by assessing whether or not the reference indicates that the
grantor intended to create an easement for the benefit of the land.77
Because the courts in the past have examined all of the circumstances
surrounding a potential easement, the factors considered when assess-
ing the grantors' intent have varied widely, depending on the circum-
stances surrounding the conveyance.
For example, in Williams Realty Co. v. Robey, a case in which the
Court of Appeals found an implied easement in a waterfront subdivi-
sion lot, the court considered many factors when assessing the intent
of the common grantor of lots in the subdivision. 71 In that case, the
court considered whether lot owners in a residential development had
an implied easement in an area marked "Community Beach and Park"
on a subdivision plat they were shown before they purchased their
lots. 79 The court held that an easement did exist, and entered an in-
junction against the company who had divided the reserved space into
71. Id. at 492, 41 A.2d at 485.
72. A plat reference consists of a deed mentioning a plat in its description of the land
being conveyed.
73. See, e.g., Boucher v. Boyer, 301 Md. 679, 689, 484 A.2d 630, 635 (1984) (explaining
that a deed that does not specifically mention a right of way, but mentions a plat that
depicts the right of way, creates a presumption that the parties intended to create an ease-
ment in that right of way).
74. See, e.g., Williams Realty Co. v. Robey, 175 Md. 532, 536-37, 2 A.2d 683, 684-85, 686
(1938) (noting that the deed to the subdivision property in question referred to the "Com-
munity Beach," and the plat of the subdivision included a lot labeled, "Community Beach
and Park").
75. See, e.g., id. at 535, 2 A.2d at 684 (involving a lot within a subdivision labeled on the
plat "Community Beach and Park").
76. See, e.g., Bouche, 301 Md. at 684, 484 A.2d at 633 (concerning an easement for a
fifty-foot-wide road depicted on a plat of the subdivision).
77. See id. at 688, 484 A.2d at 635 (stating that an implied easement is analyzed by
examining the grantor's intent at the time of the conveyance).
78. 175 Md. 532, 539-40, 2 A.2d 683, 686 (1938).
79. Id. at 535, 2 A.2d at 684.
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lots for sale and rented it out as a resort for the public.8 0 The court
applied equitable principles and reasoned that an easement should be
implied when lot purchasers rely on assurances of the existence of an
easement when buying property.8' The court also observed that a wa-
terfront subdivision is unique in that its nature and purpose is to pro-
vide the lot owners access to the water.8
2
Thus, in its analysis the court demonstrated that elements of fair-
ness and the nature of property in question can be considered as fac-
tors when assessing whether an implied easement was intended by the
grantor.
The Court of Appeals re-asserted the importance of the nature of
a waterfront subdivision in Klein v. Dove,83 where the court held that
interior lot owners in a waterfront development were entitled to use a
ten-foot right of way along the side of the appellant's lot in order to
access a lake.8 4 In Klein, the appellants had obstructed the right of
way for several years before the appellees filed a complaint seeking to
enjoin the appellants from interfering with their use of the lake
area.85 In reaching its decision, the court first examined the plat of
the subdivision and concluded that the only conceivable purpose of
the ten-foot right of way between the main road of the development
and the lake area was to provide the interior lot owners access to boat-
ing, bathing, swimming, and fishing. 6 The court further reasoned
that even though the developer had not specifically marked the lake
area as being reserved for the community, the developer's intent must
have been to designate the property for the use of the lot owners so
80. Id. at 539-40, 2 A.2d at 686.
81. Id. The court stated:
[W]hen a buyer is persuaded, as in this case, by the assurances of restricted facili-
ties in a community beach lying immediately across his front road or street, the
advantages appear with sufficient clearness and certainty to have been sold to him
as an incident, and in a court of equity repudiation must be prevented by
injunction.
Id.
82. Id. at 539, 2 A.2d at 686. It noted that "[t]here is naturally a greater dependence,
if, indeed, we should not say that access to the water is an essential, for in that access lies
the purpose of the settlement and the purchase of lots in [the subdivision]." Id.
83. 205 Md. 285, 107 A.2d 82 (1954).
84. Id. at 294, 107 A.2d at 87. The plaintiffs' lots were not contiguous to the right of
way. Id. at 288, 107 A.2d at 84. Although the recorded plat in this case was scantily
marked, the court believed it was clear the plaintiffs had bought their lot in reliance on the
plat, and in reliance on having access to the lake; it therefore found that the easement
existed. Id. at 294, 107 A.2d at 87.
85. Id. at 288, 107 A.2d at 83-84.
86. Id. at 291, 107 A.2d at 85.
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they would have access to the water.87 Overall, the court gave tremen-
dous weight to the nature of waterfront property, and explained that
individuals buying property in waterfront subdivisions generally ex-
pect to have access to the water.88
Thirty years later, in the hallmark easement case Boucher v. Boyer,
the Court of Appeals employed a different implied easement analysis
than in Williams Realty Co. and Klein because the claimants were seek-
ing an easement over a fifty-foot wide road providing access to their
lots, rather than an easement in a waterfront property.8 9 The court
concluded that the lot owners had an implied easement to use the
road based on the delineations on the plat of the subdivision and
their deed's reference to the plat.9°
In Boucher, the appellants purchased property comprising the
third lot within the Piper Estates subdivision in Frederick County,
Maryland. 9' The deed to the property directly referred to the original
plat of the subdivision in describing the property.92 The plat of the
subdivision depicted the appellants' lot, and it also showed a right of
way for the lot, labeled "George Street."93 The plat indicated that
George Street had been dedicated to public use, but the dedication
was never completed.94 At trial, it was established that George Street
was the only means of accessing the appellants' lot, and the appellants
argued that their use and maintenance of the street was sufficient to
create an easement for them in the right of way.95 In opposition, the
appellees sought to enjoin the appellants from using George Street,
and they argued that they were the fee simple owners of the road.96
After affirming that the appellee lot owners each held fee simple title
to the center of George Street,97 the Court of Appeals held that the
87. Id. at 292, 107 A.2d at 86. The court referred to the lower court's opinion, quoting
"[w]hile [the developer] did not designate the Lake area and the piers as 'community
property,' we all know they must have been intended for the use of all lot owners ... for
access to the water.'" Id.
88. Id. The court wrote, "[i]f a purchaser of a lot in a waterfront development did not
expect to get the right to use the water, few would purchase lots therein." Id. (citations
omitted).
89. 301 Md. 679, 691, 484 A.2d 630, 636 (1984) (explaining that a plat's depiction of a
right of way abutting a property is so probative that it creates a presumption that there is
an easement in that right of way).
90. Id. at 694, 484 A.2d at 638.
91. Id. at 684, 484 A.2d at 633.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 685, 484 A.2d at 633.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 687, 484 A.2d at 635.
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appellants had an implied easement to use George Street by virtue of
the plat reference.98
Three key facts formed the basis of the Court of Appeals' conclu-
sion that the appellants in Boucher had an implied easement in the
right of way. The first consideration was whether the deed contained
a reference to a plat that depicted a right of way.99 In Boucher, the
appellants' deed did not mention the right of way, but it did refer to
the plat of the subdivision, which depicted a right of way.' 00 The
court found this was sufficient to create a rebuttable presumption that
the grantor and grantees intended to include George Street in the
conveyance.101 The court noted this finding was in accordance with
the plat reference theory used by Maryland courts in prior case law,
which provides that when a deed references a plat, that plat is incor-
porated as part of the deed.10 2 The court declined, however, to ex-
tend the plat reference theory beyond its application to abutting
roads and right of ways.10 3 It stated that the purpose of the plat refer-
ence theory is to ensure that property owners have access to the prop-
erty via some right of way.104
The Court of Appeals then considered additional evidence of the
intent of the grantor.0 5 The court found that because all of the lot
owners were conveyed their property with a reference to the same
plat, and all of their lots were either bound by or abutting George
Street, there was additional evidence that the grantor intended to cre-
ate an easement for the appellants in George Street.10 6
The final fact that influenced the court's decision regarding the
implied easement was that the appellees had never submitted evi-
dence of the grantor's contrary intent.107 After considering these
three facts, the court held that the appellants had an implied ease-
ment in the right of way by virtue of the plat reference in their deed to
the property.'0 8 Regarding the future implications of their decision,
the court warned that their conclusion should not be applied to cases
98. Id. at 691, 484 A.2d at 636.
99. Id. at 688-89, 484 A.2d at 635.
100. Id. at 689, 484 A.2d at 635.
101. Id., 484 A.2d at 635-36.
102. Id., 484 A.2d at 636.
103. Id. at 694, 484 A.2d at 638.
104. Id. at 693-94, 484 A.2d at 638. Access to the property, according to the Court of
Appeals, will in turn grant the property owners "full use and enjoyment" of the property.
Id.
105. Id. at 691, 484 A.2d at 637.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 694, 484 A.2d at 638.
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involving non-abutting properties, except in cases where the existence
of the right of way was an essential factor in the purchasers' decision
to buy the property in the first place." °9
The considerations analyzed in Boucher, Williams Realty Co., and
Klein were all discussed in the Court of Appeals' analysis in Koch v.
Strathmeyer."0 In Koch the court held that two interior lot owners in a
waterfront subdivision had an implied easement in a road abutting
their properties that extended down to the water.11" ' The court rea-
soned that the water constituted the next public way,' 1 2 and access to
the water had been considered essential in previous cases involving
waterfront developments. 113
In its analysis, the court distinguished Koch from Williams Realty
Co. and Klein, because in Koch, unlike in the two earlier cases, the
easement in question existed over a road that abutted and bound the
properties of the plaintiffs," 4 and thus the general rule of easements
for contiguous roadways could be applied."' The general rule of
easements for contiguous roadways provides that when an original
grantor records a plat depicting lots with ways that bind certain
properties, the owners of the bound properties have an implied ease-
ment in those abutting roadways." 6 In contrast, the Koch court noted
that in Klein the plaintiffs' lots did not abut the right of way at issue."
7
Similarly, the court distinguished Koch from Williams Realty Co., be-
cause Williams Realty Co. involved a recreational easement in a beach
109. Id.
110. 357 Md. 193, 742 A.2d 946 (1999).
111. Id. at 203, 742 A.2d at 951. In its analysis, the Court of Appeals considered whether
a clear manifestation of the grantor's intent existed to establish that the scope of the ease-
ment extended for the entire length of the road leading to the water. Id. at 198, 742 A.2d
at 948. The parties did not dispute that all of the lot owners had an easement in the road.
Id. at 199, 742 A.2d at 949.
112. Id. at 203, 742 A.2d at 951.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 201-02, 742 A.2d at 950-51.
115. Id. at 203, 742 A.2d at 951.
116. Id. at 199, 742 A.2d at 949; see also Atlantic Const. Corp. v. Shadburn, 216 Md. 44,
51-52, 139 A.2d 339, 343-44 (1958) (explaining that an intention to convey an easement in
abutting roadways is presumed by the court when the grantor made a plat of the streets
and alleys and the lot and they border each other); Mullan v. Hochman, 157 Md. 213, 220-
21, 145 A. 554, 557 (1929) ("[W]hen a person subdivides property in a city and lays down
on a plat thereof, made or adopted by him, lots shown as bordering streets and alleys
delineated upon the plat, and then sells any of the lots with reference to the plat ... such
act there passes from the grantor to the grantee an implied easement of way over the
streets contiguous to the property sold."). The purpose of this rule, according to the Koch
court, is to ensure that property owners obtain the full use and enjoyment of their proper-
ties. Koch, 357 Md. at 203, 742 A.2d at 951.
117. Koch, 357 Md. at 201, 742 A.2d at 950.
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property, and thus the general rule for contiguous roadways could not
have been applied in that case.'1 8 Thus, the Court of Appeals held
that although the property involved in Koch was located in a water-
front community, the court did not need to analyze this case under
the plat reference theory as it had in Williams Realty Co. or Klein, be-
cause Koch involved a road abutting the property conveyed." 9
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Kobrine, L.L. C. v. Metzger, the Court
of Appeals held that the Section Two lot owners did not have a title
interest or an express easement in the KLLC lot, but that they did
have an implied easement to use the KLLC lot for recreational
activities.
12 0
Writing for the majority,12 1 Judge Wilner began the opinion by
addressing the issue of whether the lot owners of the HLB subdivision
had a right of title in the KLLC lot pursuant to the provisions in the
1972 Declaration. 122 In its analysis of this issue, the court first ex-
amined the language in Paragraph Five of the General Provisions of
the Declaration, and concluded that the provision never required the
developer to convey the KLLC lot to the lot owners. 123 Instead, the
court determined that the provision merely required the lot owners to
accept the conveyance if the developer chose to convey the lot to
them. 1 24 Furthermore, the court concluded that actions of various lot
owners in the subdivision, following the recordation of the 1972 Dec-
laration, indicated that none of the owners regarded Paragraph Five
of the General Provisions of the Declaration as a conveyance of the
KLLC lot.1 25 For these reasons, the court held that the Declaration
was not a covenant to convey.
1 26
118. Id. at 201, 742 A.2d at 950.
119. Id. at 203, 742 A.2d at 951. The Court was referring to the plat reference theory
established in Boucher v. Boyer, 301 Md. 679, 691, 484 A.2d 630, 636 (1984).
120. Kobrine, 380 Md. at 642, 846 A.2d at 416.
121. Judge Raker, Judge Cathell, andJudge Eldridgejoined in the majority opinion. Id.
at 632, 846 A.2d at 410.
122. Id. at 632, 846 A.2d at 410. "Title" is defined as "[t]he union of all elements (as
ownership, possession, and custody) constituting the legal right to control and dispose of
property; the legal link between a person who owns property and the property itself."
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 1522.
123. Kobrine, 380 Md. at 632-33, 846 A.2d at 410; see supra note 20 and accompanying
text (quoting language of Paragraph Five of the Declaration).
124. Kobrine, 380 Md. at 633, 846 A.2d at 410.
125. Id. at 634, 846 A.2d at 411. The actions indicating this fact included the Waters
Group's conveyance of part of the other unnumbered parcel in Section Two, the convey-
ance of the roads by the Waters Group, and KLLC's purchase of the KLLC lot. Id.
126. Id. The court also noted that as a result of its holding it was unnecessary to address
whether the provision would have violated the Rule Against Perpetuities had it been an
instrument of conveyance. Id.
122920051
MARYLAND LAW REVEW
After determining that the Declaration did not include a cove-
nant to convey, the Court of Appeals considered whether the HLB
subdivision lot owners had an express easement to use the KLLC
lot. 1 27 Applying Maryland's requirements for express easements,
which require the names of the parties and a description of the prop-
erty being conveyed, the court determined that no express easement
was granted by the plat of Section Two, the deeds from the Browns to
Beltway and from Beltway to the Waters, the Declaration, or the deeds
to the individual lot owners.
12
The Court of Appeals then addressed whether the lower courts
were correct in finding an easement in the KLLC lot by an implied
grant or reservation. 129 The court began its analysis by stating the
general rule in Maryland that easements by implication are based on
the presumed intent of the parties at the time of the conveyance, and
that the intent can be inferred from extraneous factors rather than
solely from the language in the deed.' The relevant circumstances
surrounding the conveyance in this case, according to the majority,
were the plat of Section Two, the deeds from the Browns to Beltway
and from Beltway to the Waters group, the Declaration, and the deeds
held by the individual lot owners in Section Two.' 3'
After discussing the applicable doctrine for implied easements
and the relevant circumstances in the case, the court discussed prior
Maryland case law involving implied easements. 132 The court first de-
scribed how the rules of implied easements had mainly been applied
to disputes concerning abutting roadways and alleys, but then noted
that the doctrine had also been extended to include circumstances
involving waterfront subdivisions.' 33 Following this discussion, the
court concluded that the legend of the Section Two plat clearly indi-
cated that the original grantor intended future lot owners to use the
KLLC lot, because the legend could serve no other purpose.3 4
Finding no indication that the lot owners in Section One of the
HLB subdivision were intended beneficiaries of the easement, the
127. Id. at 634-35, 846 A.2d at 411-12.
128. Id. at 636-38, 846 A.2d at 412-13; see also MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 4-101 (A) (1)
(2003) ("Any deed containing the names of the grantor and grantee, a description of the
property sufficient to identify it with reasonable certainty, and the interest or estate in-
tended to be granted, is sufficient, if executed, acknowledged, and, where required,
recorded.").
129. Kobrine, 380 Md. at 638, 846 A.2d at 414.
130. Id. (citing Boucher v. Boyer, 301 Md. 679, 688, 484 A.2d 630, 635 (1984)).
131. Id. at 638-39, 846 A.2d at 414.
132. Id at 639, 846 A.2d at 414.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 641, 846 A.2d at 415.
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court limited the benefits of the easement to the lot owners of Section
Two. 1 35 Additionally, the majority agreed with the circuit court that
the scope of the easement in the KLLC lot should be limited to acces-
sing the river and enjoying normal waterfront activities, which is con-
sistent with the court's decision in Klein v. Dove.
13 6
Judge Harrell wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part.137 In his opinion, while agreeing with the majority that Metz-
ger was not entitled to right of title in the KLLC or an express ease-
ment, Judge Harrell argued that the majority departed from prior
case law and incorrectly granted Metzger a limited implied recrea-
tional use easement.13 8 Judge Harrell argued that Metzger did not
demonstrate "clear and satisfactory proof' that the common grantor
intended the KLLC lot to be reserved for the HLB subdivision lot
owners. 1
39
In reaching this conclusion, Judge Harrell first emphasized that
the Declaration and the deeds to the Metzger and Kobrine lots never
referred to the KLLC lot, and thus an express easement was never
granted to the lot owners.' 4 ° Judge Harrell then criticized the ap-
proach used by the majority in determining whether there was an im-
plied easement, claiming the court inappropriately relied on Williams
Realty Co. and Klein, and that both cases were easily distinguishable
from Kobrine.1 4' He argued that Williams Realty Co. was distinguishable
because in that case the original grantees had bought their property
in reliance on a plat depicting a lot labeled, "Community Beach," and
in Kobrine there was no such reliance.' 4 2 Also, in Williams Realty Co.,
he noted all of the deeds to the lots in the subdivision referenced the
Community Beach that was marked on a plat of the subdivision, un-
like in Kobrine where Metzger's deed did not contain any reference to
the KLLC lot.'4 3 Judge Harrell then distinguished Klein, emphasizing
that Klein also involved reliance on the part of the original grantees,
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 645, 846 A.2d at 418 (Harrell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Chief Judge Bell and Judge Battaglia joined this opinion. Id.
138. Id. at 645-46, 846 A.2d at 418-19 (Harrell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
139. Id. at 646, 846 A.2d at 419 (Harrell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
140. Id. (Harrell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
141. Id. at 646-47, 846 A.2d at 419 (Harrell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
142. Id. at 647-49, 846 A.2d at 419-21 (Harrell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
143. Id. at 649, 846 A.2d at 421 (Harrell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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which Kobrine did not.14 4 Judge Harrell argued that without reliance,
there was no need for the court to imply an easement in the KLLC
lot.' 45 He also added that Metzger had ample means of accessing the
water other than using the KLLC lot, and that no other lot owners in
the subdivision were also seeking use of the reserved parcel. 4 6 He
believed this provided further evidence that the easement should not
have been implied. Judge Harrell concluded his opinion by stating
that he would have required Metzger to prove that he relied on either
the recorded plat or the Declaration when he purchased his lot before
finding an implied easement.1 47
4. Analysis.-In Kobrine L.L.C. v. Metzger, the Court of Appeals
held that there was an implied recreational use easement in a subdivi-
sion lot because the plat of the subdivision indicated the original gran-
tor had intended to create an easement for the subsequent
grantees.148 The court appropriately extended its doctrine of implied
easements by applying an objective analysis and limiting its assessment
of the grantor's intent to clear evidence from the recorded plat of the
HLB subdivision. 1 4  By focusing on the actions and writings of the
original grantor, rather than interpreting the actions and expecta-
tions of grantees, the Court of Appeals established that an implied
easement in a non-abutting lot could be created solely on the basis of
clear markings on a recorded plat. 5 ' Indeed, the court reduced the
essential elements for an implied easement to clear markings on a plat
and a reference to the plat in the deed, and demonstrated that where
these two elements exist, additional considerations of the surrounding
circumstances may be unnecessary.' 5 ' This was a departure from
prior Maryland case law that instructed courts to consider all of the
surrounding circumstances when determining whether a restriction
144. Id. at 647, 846 A.2d at 420 (Harrell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
145. Id. at 649, 846 A.2d at 420 (Harrell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
146. Id. at 650, 846 A.2d at 421 (Harrell,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
147. Id. (Harrell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
148. Kobrine, 380 Md. at 641, 846 A.2d at 415.
149. Id. at 636, 846 A.2d at 412. This approach is very similar to the court's approach to
implying easements over contiguous roadways. See supra note 116 and accompanying text
(discussing the general rile for implying easements over contiguous roadways).
150. See Kobrine, 380 Md. at 641, 846 A.2d at 415 (holding that the recorded plat of
Section Two of the HLB subdivision alone establishes an implied easement).
151. See id. at 636, 846 A.2d at 412 ("The ultimate source of any easement under the
facts in this case . . .must be the legend, 'Area Reserved For The Use Of Lot Owners,'
shown on the unnumbered parcel that became the KLLC lot on the plat of Section Two.").
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on land was implicitly granted. 15 2 The future application of this test
by the Maryland courts will increase administrative efficiency.
153
a. The Court Properly Extended the Doctrine of Implied Ease-
ments.-The Kobrine court properly extended Maryland precedent by
holding that easements in non-abutting parcels can be implied solely
on the basis of clear, objective markings on a plat, which demonstrate
that the original grantor intended to convey an easement in the par-
cel. 154 The holding was consistent with McKenrick, which required a
clear manifestation of the grantor's intent at the time of convey-
ance. 155 The Kobrine holding strayed from earlier holdings in which
the Maryland courts demonstrated a preference to consider all of the
circumstances surrounding a conveyance when ascertaining the intent
of the grantor, 156 including the extrinsic matters of conversation, con-
duct, and written correspondence set forth in Turner.157 By looking
solely to the clear, objective markings on a plat to demonstrate the
intent to convey an easement, the Kobrine court avoided addressing
the Scholtes requirement that the grantor intended the restrictions to
benefit the land and not the landowner. 158 Prior to Kobrine, the court
had never recognized an implied easement in a waterfront lot within a
subdivision where the claimants had not relied on any of the docu-
ments creating the easement.
1 59
The Kobrine holding demonstrated that it is not necessary to con-
sider factors such as the reliance of the grantees where there are clear
indications of the grantor's intent on the recorded plat of the prop-
erty at issue. While the Williams Realty Co. court suggested that reli-
ance was a factor in the creation of implied easements, 6 ' Kobrine
indicated that clear indications of the intent of the grantor are
152. See infra notes 154-176 and accompanying text.
153. See infra notes 177-182 and accompanying text (providing a discussion of the future
implications of the court's decision).
154. Kobrine, 380 Md. at 641, 826 A.2d at 415.
155. McKenrick v. Sav. Bank of Baltimore, 174 Md. 118, 128, 197 A. 580, 584-85 (1938).
156. See Turner v. Brocato, 206 Md. 336, 351, 111 A.2d 855, 863 (1955) (noting that any
indication of the grantor's intent should be examined by the court); see also Boucher v.
Boyer, 301 Md. 679, 688, 484 A.2d 640, 635 (1984) (explaining that the circumstances
surrounding a conveyance are examined when determining whether an implied easement
was conferred upon a grantee).
157. Turner, 206 Md. at 346-47, 111 A.2d at 861.
158. Scholtes v. McColgan, 184 Md. 480, 492, 41 A.2d 479, 485 (1945).
159. Kobrine, 380 Md. at 646, 846 A.2d at 419 (Harrell, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
160. See Williams Realty Co. v. Robey, 175 Md. 532, 540, 2 A.2d at 686 (1938) (stressing
that the court's finding of an implied easement was partially due to the buyer's reliance on
that easement at the time of purchase).
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enough to warrant finding an easement.161 In Williams Realty Co., the
Court of Appeals held that there was an implied easement in an area
within a waterfront subdivision based on equitable principles because
the lot purchaser had relied on assurances made to them by the gran-
tor that there would be an easement in the parcel in question. 6 2 The
facts of the case, however, also involved a recorded plat where the area
in question was labeled "Community Beach and Park."163 Because the
court did not weigh the markings on the plat very heavily, and focused
most of its reasoning on the reliance, the analysis of the court in Wil-
liams Realty Co. suggested that reliance was a necessary factor for im-
plied easements. 164
In Kobrine, the court was able to limit its analysis to the considera-
tion of evidence that clearly and objectively reflected the grantor's in-
tent, such as the legend on the plat, and the language in the deeds. 165
In so doing, it demonstrated that where clear objective evidence of
the original grantor's intent is available, it is not necessary to require
the reliance of the grantees on assurances about an easement before
finding an easement.'66
The Kobrine court's determination of the existence of an ease-
ment in a waterfront property also differed from the analysis it ap-
plied in Klein because it implied an easement based solely on evidence
of the grantor's intent, disregarding actions of subsequent grantees.
When deciding whether to grant an easement in Klein, the court was
greatly influenced by the nature of the property, and reasoned that
having access to water was the principle reason why individuals pur-
chased property in waterfront subdivisions. 167 In Kobrine, the Court of
Appeals discussed the analysis in Klein, but ultimately relied solely on
the plat that was recorded by the original grantor to hold that there
was an implied easement in the KLLC lot.'68 Thus, the Kobrine court
limited its analysis to the actions of the grantor, rather than consider-
ing the thoughts and actions of the subsequent grantees of the subdi-
vision lots.
161. See Kobrine, 380 Md. at 636, 846 A.2d at 412 (concluding the source of the implied
easement was the legend on the Section Two plat).
162. 175 Md. at 540, 2 A.2d at 686.
163. Id. at 535, 2 A.2d at 684.
164. Id. at 540, 2 A.2d at 686.
165. See Kobrine, 380 Md. at 641, 846 A.2d at 415 (asserting that the markings on the
recorded plat indicate that the original grantor intended to convey an easement in the
KLLC lot).
166. See id. at 638, 846 A.2d at 414 (stating the rule that an easement is implied where
the parties at the time of the original conveyance intended to confer an easement).
167. Klein v. Dove, 205 Md. 285, 292, 107 A.2d 82, 86 (1954).
168. Kobrine, 380 Md. at 636, 846 A.2d at 412.
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The Kobrine court's decision to limit its analysis of implied ease-
ments to clear, objective evidence was more consistent with its analysis
in Boucher and Koch, cases involving easements over contiguous road-
ways rather than non-abutting parcels of land. The Kobrine court ex-
tended the reasoning from Boucher and applied a strictly objective
inferred intent test when assessing whether an implied easement ex-
isted in a waterfront parcel.1 69 In Boucher, the court held that the ap-
pellants had an implied easement to use the abutting street under the
plat reference theory, because their deed referred to the plat of the
subdivision, and the plat depicted the street as a contiguous road-
way.17° The Kobrine court essentially used the same analysis, despite
the fact that the Boucher court had declined to extend the application
of the plat reference theory to cases involving non-abutting properties
where the right of way had not had an essential role in the decision of
the claimant to purchase the property. 7' In Kobrine, the Court of Ap-
peals applied the plat reference theory from Boucher by focusing on
the legend of the plat and the language of the deeds associated with
Section Two of the subdivision.172 The court held that the markings
on the plat could have no other purpose than to establish the gran-
tor's intent to create an easement in the KLLC lot.'
73
The Kobrine court's objective analysis of whether an easement ex-
isted in the KLLC lot was also consistent with its analysis in Koch. In
Koch, the court implied an easement in a sixteen-foot road because
the unrecorded plat of the subdivision established that the road abut-
ted the parties' properties, and the deed to the properties referred to
the plat.174 In its analysis, the Koch court focused only on objective,
written evidence of the original grantor's intent to determine whether
an easement existed. 175 Similarly, in Kobrine, the Court of Appeals fo-
cused principally on the legend of the recorded plat of the subdivision
before concluding that the lot owners had an easement in the KLLC
lot. 176 Overall, the Kobrine court's limited focus on objective evidence
of the grantor's intent and disregard for the actions and thoughts of
169. See id. (finding that the determining factor for implying an easement in this case
was the assertion on the legend of the plat, identifying the KLLC lot as an area reserved for
the lot owners).
170. Boucher v. Boyer, 301 Md. 679, 691, 484 A.2d 630, 636 (1984).
171. See id. at 694, 484 A.2d at 638 ("Our conclusion should not be construed to include
non-abutting properties, except in those cases where the ownership of the property made
the right of way an essential factor in the purchase of the property in the first instance.").
172. Kobrine, 380 Md. at 641, 846 A.2d at 415.
173. Id.
174. Koch v. Strathmeyer, 357 Md. 193, 197-98, 742 A.2d 946, 948 (1999).
175. Id. at 199, 742 A.2d at 949.
176. Kobrine, 380 Md. at 641, 846 A.2d at 415.
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the subsequent grantees extends Maryland precedent in cases involv-
ing easements in non-abutting parcels of land.
b. Relying Solely on Objective Evidence of a Grantor's Intent When-
ever Possible Will Prove Administratively Efficient for the Courts.-As a result
of the Court of Appeals' decision in Kobrine, Maryland courts will not
need to analyze all of the surrounding circumstances in cases involv-
ing potential implied easements in subdivision lots where there is
clear objective evidence the grantor intended to create an easement.
A clear indication of the intent of the common grantor in an extrinsic
document such as a plat is sufficient for the court to acknowledge an
implied easement.' 77 By applying the inferred intent test to the cir-
cumstances in Kobrine, and not shifting the focus to the element of
reliance and the subsequent actions of the grantee, the Court of Ap-
peals established a more administratively efficient test for future
decisions.
In its efforts to apply an objective approach to implied easements,
the Kobrine court simplified the test in a cost-effective manner. The
court's holding will reduce the determination of whether an implied
easement exists to an assessment of clear, objective evidence of the
grantor's intent in cases where such evidence exists."7 ' As a result,
Maryland courts will now be able to disregard subjective considera-
tions, such as reliance of the grantees, when there is other objective
evidence sufficient to establish that the grantor intended to create an
easement. 1
7 9
The objective inferred intent approach to implied easements will
also reduce the administrative burden on the courts and the parties.
Taking into consideration evidence of intent from any source in-
creased the court's burden considerably. 8 ° The variety of considera-
tions the courts had to consider under prior precedent, including the
177. See id. (finding that the markings on the plat of the KLLC lot clearly established an
implied easement).
178. See id. at 636, 641, 846 A.2d at 412, 415 (concluding that the only source of an
easement in Kobrine is the plat of the subdivision, and holding that it alone established an
easement).
179. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text (describing how Maryland courts have
conducted an extensive investigation into all surrounding circumstances when determin-
ing whether an easement exists). As a result of Kobrine, it will not be necessary for Mary-
land courts to consider anything beyond the writings on the plat and deed of the property
where the language and markings on those documents clearly indicate the grantor in-
tended to convey an easement.
180. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text (referring to Turner v. Brocato and
explaining that courts generally examine all of the circumstances surrounding a
conveyance).
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actions, intent, and reliance of the subsequent grantees, likely re-
quired substantial time and effort on the part of the courts and liti-
gants. In addition, implying an easement in a subdivision on the basis
of subjective actions of some grantees raises concerns about which
grantees are entitled to the easement, and how the easement can be
enforced. 8' It also created the potential for multiple lawsuits by indi-
vidual lot owners seeking easements in the same property.8 2 For
these reasons, the Kobrine court's decision to apply a strictly objective
test, limited to the language in the deeds and the markings on the
original plat of the subdivision, resulted in an administratively effi-
cient approach to apply to future easement cases where the evidence
clearly indicates the intent of the grantor.
5. Conclusion.-In Kobrine, L.L.C. v. Metzger, the Court of Ap-
peals vacated the lower courts' decisions and held that the lot owners
in Section Two of the Harbor Light Beach subdivision had an implied
recreational use easement in the KLLC lot bordering the Patuxent
River.' 83 In reaching this conclusion, the majority did not require the
lot owners seeking the easement to have relied on the documents cre-
ating it.'84 The court established that an easement in a parcel should
be implied whenever there is clear evidence that the common grantor
intended the grantees to have an easement in the parcel. 8 5 Thus,
where clear, objective evidence of the grantor's intent exists, courts
can limit their analysis to that evidence alone, and will no longer need
to consider all of the surrounding circumstances of the case.18 6 This
is an extension of the prior case law, because the court had never
181. For example, if a court were to decide that a recreational use easement existed in a
subdivision lot based on the fact that five out of twenty-five subdivision lot owners relied on
assurances that there would be an easement when they purchased their lots, would the
easement be implied only for those five residents or for the entire subdivision? Further-
more, how would the community prevent the other twenty lot owners from using the lot?
182. If courts were to grant an implied easement based solely on subjective actions of
grantees, and multiple individuals were seeking an easement in the same property but had
notjoined into one lawsuit, presumably they could each bring separate actions seeking an
easement in the same property.
183. Kobrine, 380 Md. at 641, 846 A.2d at 415.
184. See id. at 650, 846 A.2d at 421 (Harrell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(dissenting judges expressed that they would have required the plaintiff to have relied on
the plat and the Declaration before purchasing their subdivision lots in order to grant
them an easement in the KLLC lot).
185. See id. at 641, 846 A.2d at 415 (implying that because the plat clearly indicates that
the grantor. intended to create an easement in the KLLC lot, an easement must be
granted).
186. See supra notes 148-152 and accompanying text; Turner v. Brocato, 206 Md. 336,
351, 111 A.2d 855, 863 (1955) (noting that any indication of the grantor's intent should be
examined by the court); see also Boucher v. Boyer, 301 Md. 679, 688, 484 A.2d 630, 635
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before granted an implied easement in a subdivision lot where the lot
purchasers had not relied on written documents depicting the ease-
ment. 187 Kobrine's emphasis on objective analysis wherever possible
will result in increased administrative efficiency in the courts. 188
JULIA M. GONTRUM
(1984) (explaining that the circumstances surrounding a conveyance are examined when
determining whether an implied easement was conferred upon a grantee).
187. Kobrine, 380 Md. at 646, 846 A.2d at 419; see supra notes 154-176 and accompanying
text.
188. See supra notes 177-182 and accompanying text (providing a discussion of the fu-
ture implications of the Kobrine decision).
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VII. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A. The Use of Canons of Construction to Ignore Legislative Intent
Weakens the Consumer Protection Purpose of Maryland's
Secondary Mortgage Loan Law
In Drew v. First Guaranty Mortgage Corp.,1 the Court of Appeals of
Maryland considered whether, under Maryland's Secondary Mortgage
Loan Law (MSMLL),2 a lender who creates a balloon payment must
notify the borrower in writing on the loan agreement that the lender
must postpone the maturity date of the balloon payment one time at
the borrower's request.' In a 4-3 decision, the court held that MSMLL
does not require the lender to state in writing that the statutory post-
ponement period of six months is available to borrowers. 4 Although
the court stated that it looked to the statute's plain language and legis-
lative history,5 in actuality it used various canons of construction to
reach its decision and ignored the legislature's intent that the post-
ponement provision protect consumers from unscrupulous lenders.6
Instead, the court should have used the canons of construction as a
tool to ascertain legislative intent.7 Had the court taken this approach
and interpreted the statute in light of its context, looking to legislative
history8 and reading the statute as a whole9 and from a common-sense
perspective,' ° it would have discovered that the legislature's intent was
to protect consumers; this intent would be better served by requiring
lenders who create balloon payments to state in writing that the statu-
tory postponement period of six months is available to borrowers.11
Given the consumer protection purpose of MSMLL, the court should
have considered its remedial nature and liberally construed the post-
1. 379 Md. 318, 842 A.2d 1 (2003).
2. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW II §§ 12-401 to -415 (2000).
3. Drew, 379 Md. at 320, 842 A.2d at 2.
4. Id. at 321, 842 A.2d at 3.
5. Id. at 323, 842 A.2d at 4.
6. See infra notes 180-200 and accompanying text.
7. See Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 512, 525 A.2d 628, 631 (1987)
(discussing the use of canons of construction to determine legislative intent).
8. See infra notes 201-220 and accompanying text (finding that legislative history
evinces an intent to protect consumers).
9. See infra notes 221-231 and accompanying text (reading the statute as a whole to
determine legislative intent).
10. See infra notes 232-239 and accompanying text (discussing that a common-sense
reading supports protecting consumers).
11. See infra notes 201-239 and accompanying text (demonstrating that a consumer
protection purpose supports giving consumers written notice).
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ponement provision to effectuate the statute's intent.' 2 Furthermore,
the court should have considered past Maryland court interpretations
of MSMLL, which also found a consumer protection intent, and thus
provide further support for the requirement that the postponement
provision be in writing. 13
1. The Case.-The plaintiffs, Alton and Verne Drew, purchased a
new home from a builder, Ryan Homes.14 The Drews signed a loan
agreement on December 15, 2000, in order to pay part of the
purchase price. 15 The loan consisted of a note secured by a first mort-
gage in favor of First Guaranty Mortgage Corporation, and a junior
note secured by a secondary mortgage in favor of NVR Mortgage Fi-
nance, Inc., which is now held by Wilshire Credit Corporation. 6 The
secondary mortgage contained both a balloon payment, which was
not due until 2016, as well as the accompanying disclosure form at
issue in the instant case.' 7
As required by sections 12-404(c) (2) (i) and (ii) of the Commer-
cial Law Article,' 8 the balloon payment provision was expressly dis-
closed to the Drews, who agreed to the provision in writing.' 9
However, the loan documents did not reveal that section 12-
404(c) (2) (iii) of the Commercial Law Article 20 requires lenders to
12. See infta notes 240-262 and accompanying text (arguing that liberally construing
the statute would support its remedial nature).
13. See infra notes 243-250, 261 and accompanying text (discussing past court decisions
that found consumer protection intent).
14. Drew, 379 Md. at 322, 842 A.2d at 3.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 322 & n.3, 842 A.2d at 3 & n.3.
17. Id. at 322-23, 842 A.2d at 3-4.
18. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW II § 12404(c) (2) (i), (ii) (2000). These provisions state
the following:
A lender, including a seller who takes a mortgage or deed of trust to secure pay-
ment of all or a portion of the purchase price of a residence sold to a borrower,
may make a loan for the purpose of aiding the borrower in the sale of the bor-
rower's residence or the purchase price of a new residence, and may create a
balloon payment at maturity of this loan if the balloon payment is: (i) Expressly
disclosed to the borrower; (ii) Agreed to by both the borrower and the lender/
seller in writing ....
Id.
19. Drew, 379 Md. at 322, 842 A.2d at 3.
20. CoM. LAw II § 12-404(c) (2) (iii). This section provides that the balloon payment is
(iii) Required to be postponed one time, upon becoming due, at the borrower's
request, for a period not to exceed 6 months, provided that the borrower contin-
ues to make the monthly installments provided for in the original loan agree-
ment, and no new closing costs, processing fees or similar fees are imposed on
the borrower as a result of the extension ....
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postpone the maturity date of a loan one time for a period not to
exceed six months at the borrower's request.2' Instead, the balloon
payment provision stated in part:
Unless otherwise expressly disclosed in the Note, or in an
Addendum or a Rider to the Note, THE LENDER IN THIS
TRANSACTION IS UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO REFI-
NANCE THE OUTSTANDING PRINCIPAL BALANCE OF
THIS LOAN DUE ON MATURITY DATE. You may be re-
quired to payoff the entire principal balance, plus any un-
paid interest due thereon, on the maturity date using
personal assets. If this Lender, or any other Lender, agrees
to refinance the outstanding balance due on the maturity
date, you may be required to pay the then prevailing interest
rate, which may be higher or lower than the interest rate
specified in the Note, plus loan origination costs and fees as
are typically incurred when creating a new loan.22
As a result, the Drews filed a complaint in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Maryland, claiming that Wilshire Credit
Corporation violated MSMLL because it failed to inform the Drews in
writing that they had the right to postpone the balloon payment for
six months, without penalty, at maturity. 23 The district court submit-
ted a certification order 24 to the Court of Appeals to decide whether
the postponement provision under section 12-404(c) (2) (iii) of the
Commercial Law Article must be in writing on the loan document,
and if the answer was in the affirmative, whether the penalty provi-
sions in section 12-413 of the Commercial Law Article 25 applied to the
21. Drew, 379 Md. at 322, 842 A.2d at 3.
22. Id. at 322-23, 842 A.2d at 3-4.
23. Id. at 318-21, 842 A.2d at 1-3.
24. A certification order is set forth pursuant to MD. RULE 8-305 and the Maryland
Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 12-603
(2002). "[A] certifying court, on motion of any party or on its own initiative, may submit to
the Court of Appeals a question of law of this State... by filing a certification order." MD.
RULE 8-305(b). "The Court of Appeals of this State may answer a question of law certified
to it by a court of the United States . . . if the answer may be determinative of an issue in
pending litigation in the certifying court and there is no controlling appellate decision,
constitutional provision, or statute of this State." CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 12-603.
25. CoM. LAw II § 12-413. The penalty provision states:
Except for a bona fide error of computation, if a lender violates any provision of
this subtitle he may collect only the principal amount of the loan and may not
collect any interest, costs, or other charges with respect to the loan. In addition, a
lender who knowingly violates any provision of this subtitle also shall forfeit to the
borrower three times the amount of interest and charges collected in excess of
that authorized by law.
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Drews' loan.2
6
2. Legal Background.-In order to determine whether the legisla-
ture intended for the postponement provision in section 12-
404(c) (2) (iii) to be in writing, it is necessary to examine the history of
MSMLL, the rules and goals of statutory construction, the liberal con-
struction of remedial statutes, and previous court interpretations of
MSMLL. MSMLL was designed to regulate the persons and loans in
the secondary mortgage business and to provide penalties for viola-
tions of such regulations.2 7 Canons of statutory interpretation require
that this history be analyzed, and in addition, that the statute be read
as a whole and not construed contrary to common sense.28 Statutes
that are remedial in nature must also be liberally construed in order
to achieve their legislative objective. 29 Furthermore, prior judicial in-
terpretations of the legislative intent underlying MSMLL are consis-
tent with the statute's history, with interpreting the statute in
accordance with the rules and goals of statutory construction, and
with MSMLL's remedial nature.3 0
a. The History of Maryland's Secondary Mortgage Loan Law.-In
1967, the General Assembly of Maryland enacted the Secondary Mort-
gage Loan Law.3 1 The purpose was to regulate the secondary mort-
gage loan business, provide penalties for violations, and protect
consumers against lenders.3 2 The statute prohibited balloon pay-
ments in secondary mortgage loans and established maximum interest
rates. 3
As part of the ongoing process of Code revision in Maryland,
MSMLL was recodified in 1975 in its original form as part of the Com-
mercial Law Article.34 Later that year, the General Assembly revised
MSMLL to allow balloon payments to facilitate business and commer-
cial investment and to aid borrowers in the sale of their own resi-
26. Drew, 379 Md. at 319-20, 842 A.2d at 2.
27. 1967 Md. Laws 390.
28. See infra notes 58-103 and accompanying text (consulting legislative history and
reading the statute as a whole and from a common-sense approach when interpreting
statutes).
29. See infra notes 121-136 and accompanying text (finding that remedial statutes
should be liberally construed to support intent).
30. See infra notes 243-250, 261 and accompanying text (stating that past court deci-
sions also find consumer protection intent).
31. 1967 Md. Laws 390.
32. Id
33. Id § 61 (a).
34. 1975 Md. Laws 49.
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dence.35 However, for a balloon payment to be valid, the payment
had to be: "(I) expressly disclosed to the borrower, and (II) agreed to
by both the borrower and the lender/seller in writing."36
The General Assembly again revised MSMLL in 1982, in House
Bill 305,37 in order to increase the availability of mortgages and en-
courage home ownership during a period of heightened interest
rates." Opponents of the legislation argued that House Bill 305 elim-
inated the consumer protection requirements in its companion legis-
lation, House Bill 1853, 3  and provided for potential abuse of
borrowers.4 ° The Attorney General also expressed his strong opposi-
tion to House Bill 305, calling it an "end-run around" the consumer
protections of House Bill 1853 that were crafted with broad industry
and consumer support.4' Three days after the Attorney General ex-
pressed his opposition to the Chairman of the Senate Economic Af-
fairs Committee, the Committee adopted an amendment to House
Bill 305, and added the postponement provision as an additional re-
quirement to be met for balloon payments.4 9 The provision stated
that balloon payments are:
[r]equired to be postponed one time, upon becoming due,
at the borrower's request, for a period not to exceed 24
months, provided that the borrower continues to make the
monthly installments provided for in the original loan agree-
ment, and no new closing costs, processing fees or similar
fees are imposed on the borrower as a result of the
extension.43
35. 1975 Md. Laws 574; Drew, 379 Md. at 325, 842 A.2d at 5.
36. 1975 Md. Laws 574, § (c) (2) (I-II).
37. House Bill 305 established maximum interest rates, allowed collection of certain
fees, allowed balloon payments in some instances, required the option of an extension of
payments in some instances, and provided for certain consumer protection provisions,
along with other provisions relating to secondary mortgage loans. Md. H.B. 305, 1982 Sess.
38. Maryland Secondary Mortgage Loan Law: Hearing on H.B. 305 Before the Senate Economic
Affairs Comm., 1982 Leg., 396th Sess. (Md. 1982) [hereinafter Hearing] (testimony of Del.
Sauerbrey and Del. Quade, Members, Senate Economic Affairs Committee).
39. House Bill 1853 established maximum interest rates on various credit transactions,
imposed restrictions on certain finance charges, and prohibited balloon payments under
certain circumstances, among other consumer protection provisions. Md. H.B. 1853, 1982
Sess.
40. Hearing, supra note 38 (testimony of Del. Sklar, Member, Senate Economic Affairs
Committee and Eleanor Carey, Associate Deputy Attorney General).
41. Letter from Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General for the State of Maryland, to
HarryJ. McGuirk, Maryland Senator and Chairman of the Senate Economic Affairs Comm.
(Apr. 7, 1982) (on file with author).
42. Substitute Comm. Amend. No. 4 to H.B. 305 (Apr. 10, 1982).
43. Id.
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Subsequently, this amendment was incorporated into section 12-
404(c) (2) of the Commercial Law Article."
In 1985, the General Assembly changed the statutory postpone-
ment period from twenty-four to six months to resolve an inconsis-
tency in the law between section 12, and sections 9 and 10 of the
Commercial Law Article.45 During this session, the Committee Report
noted that, "balloon payment transactions must give the consumer the
right to request a postponement of the balloon payment once for a
period not to exceed six months. '46 MSMLL's provisions on balloon
payments have remained unchanged since 1985.47
b. Canons of Statutory Construction.-In interpreting statutes,
Maryland courts have declared that the "paramount goal . . . is to
identify and effectuate the legislative intent underlying the statute at
issue."48 In its search for legislative intent, courts attempt to deter-
mine the statute's "purpose, aim, or policy. ''49 To achieve this end,
courts begin by examining the words of the statute, otherwise known
as the plain-meaning rule.5 ° In some instances, the language itself
may convey legislative intent, which makes further scrutiny unneces-
sary. 5' However, the plain-meaning rule is not an all-encompassing
rule for determining legislative intent.5 2 When the statute's language
is ambiguous and fails to express any clear legislative intent, courts
must look beyond the statute's plain meaning.55 In this regard, courts
turn to the context within which the statutory language appears, in-
cluding legislative history and reading the statute as a whole. 54 In ad-
44. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 12-404(c)(2) (2000); 1982 Md. Laws 609,
§ 1 (c) (2) (iii).
45. 1985 Md. Laws 597, § 1(c) (2) (iii). Section 12 of the Commercial Law Article ad-
ded a twenty-four month postponement period in 1982, and sections 9 and 10 of the Com-
mercial Law Article added a six month postponement period in 1983. Floor Statement on
H.B. 195 (Md. 1985). This discrepancy became a problem because, in 1984, Senate Bill
418 redefined credit grantor to include homeowners selling a home, thus encompassing
sellers under section 12 of the Commercial Law Article. Id. Therefore, the reduction in
the postponement period to six months conforms the older law with the newer credit
provisions. Id.
46. Comm. Rep. on H.B. 195 at 2 (Md. 1985).
47. 1985 Md. Laws 597; COM. LAw II § 12-404(c) (2).
48. Pak v. Hoang, 378 Md. 315, 323, 835 A.2d 1185, 1189 (2003) (quoting Moore v.
Miley, 372 Md. 663, 677, 814 A.2d 557, 566 (2003); Derry v. State, 372 Md. 663, 677, 814
A.2d 557, 566 (2000)).
49. Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513, 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987).
50. Id.
51. Morris v. Prince George's County, 319 Md. 597, 604, 573 A.2d 1346, 1349 (1990).
52. Id. at 604, 573 A.2d at 1349.
53. Pak, 378 Md. at 323, 835 A.2d at 1189.
54. Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 514-15, 525 A.2d at 632.
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dition, courts should take a common-sense approach to statutory
interpretation and avoid results that are unreasonable or inequita-
ble.5 5 While these canons of statutory construction are used to deter-
mine legislative intent, courts have recognized that they are not
themselves rules of law, and thus should never be applied to override
an otherwise clear intent.
56
(1) Legislative Histoy.-Courts first consult legislative his-
tory in order to determine legislative intent. In Kaczorowski v. Mayor
and City Council of Baltimore, for example, the Court of Appeals consid-
ered the legislative history of the statutes at issue in order to deter-
mine their purpose.57 The court found that the General Assembly did
not intend to repeal the statute establishing the Industrial Develop-
ment Authority of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (Balti-
more Authority), even though a literal interpretation of the statutes
indicated otherwise.58 Although the express language of the statutes
in question did away with the Baltimore Authority, the court turned to
the legislative history to determine whether this was the General As-
sembly's actual intent.59 The court found that the legislature in-
tended for the statutes to enhance the effectiveness of the industrial
revenue bond process, but that something went awry during their en-
actment.60 As a result, the court concluded that the legislature did
not intend to do away with the Baltimore Authority.
61
55. Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 387, 614 A.2d 590, 594 (1992).
56. Kirkwood v. Provident Sav. Bank, 205 Md. 48, 55, 106 A.2d 103, 107 (1954).
57. 309 Md. at 515, 525 A.2d at 632.
58. Id. at 517, 525 A.2d at 634. In Kaczorowski, the Baltimore Authority, which author-
ized Baltimore City to create industrial development authorities and allowed these authori-
ties to issue revenue bonds to fund various industrial projects, was created under sections
266A-1 to A-3 of Article 41 of the Annotated Code. Id. at 507, 525 A.2d at 629; MD. ANN.
CODE art. 41, § 266A-1 to A-3 (1978). In 1982, legislators sought to enhance the industrial
development authorities' powers by repealing section 266A-I of Article 41 and enacting
new section 266A-I by Chapter 791 of the Acts of 1982. Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 508, 525
A.2d at 629. However, through the amendment process, the language repealing sections
266A-1 to A-3 was deleted from the bill, and thus there were parallel provisions pertaining
to the Baltimore Authority. Id. at 509, 525 A.2d at 629. In 1983, the General Assembly
determined that there had been an error, and that Chapter 73 of the Acts of 1983 repealed
sections 266A-1 to A-3, thus doing away with the Baltimore Authority itself. Id., 525 A.2d at
630. Seemingly, in the midst of this confusion, the legislature did not re-enact new legisla-
tion enhancing the Baltimore Authority's power as originally contemplated by Chapter 791
of the Acts of 1982. Id. at 511, 525 A.2d at 631. Therefore, the appellant claimed that the
Baltimore Authority was defunct and that the revenue bonds that it had issued were in-
valid. Id. at 510, 525 A.2d at 630.
59. Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 517, 525 A.2d at 633.
60. Id., 525 A.2d at 634.
61. Id. at 520, 525 A.2d at 635.
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Deny v. State provides a similar example of the Court of Appeals
interpreting statutory language in light of legislative history in order
to determine intent.6 2 There, the court considered, among other is-
sues, whether the language "'alleged to have been seized in violation
of the Constitution' . .. modifies both 'evidence offered by the State'
and 'property' or, conversely, qualifies only the latter term" in section
12-302(c) (3) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.6" The
State's interlocutory appeal from the trial court's exclusion of evi-
dence depended upon the latter interpretation.64 The court, how-
ever, concluded that the statute did not provide the State with the
right to appeal, as this right only existed for constitutionally based
exclusions.6" Analyzing legislative history, the court found that this
interpretation was consistent with the long-time unavailability of inter-
locutory appeals.66 This unavailability served as precedent to section
12-302(c) (3)'s passage, which created the State's right of interlocutory
appeal in only limited circumstances.67 The court also examined the
bill file on Senate Bill 39, the legislative proposal that became section
12-302(c) (3), which stated that "[t]he bill allows the State to appeal
from a pretrial ruling by the Court to exclude evidence obtained in viola-
tion of the defendant's constitutional rights."6 8 Thus, the court deter-
mined that section 12-302(c) (3) applied only to constitutional issues,
and that this reading was consistent with the legislature's cautious
approach.69
(2) Reading the Statute as a Whole.-In order to determine
the legislature's true intent, courts will also read all sections of a stat-
ute together and in conjunction with one another.7 0 State v. Crescent
Cities Jaycees Foundation, Inc.7 1 provides an example .72 The Jaycees court
62. 358 Md. 325, 341, 748 A.2d 478, 486 (2000).
63. Id. at 338-39, 748 A.2d at 485; MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JuD. PROC. § 12-302(c) (3)
(1998). That section provides that
the State may appeal from a decision of a trial court that excludes evidence of-
fered by the State or requires the return of property alleged to have been seized
in violation of the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of Mary-
land, or the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
Id.
64. Deny, 358 Md. at 339, 748 A.2d at 485.
65. Id. at 339, 748 A.2d at 485.
66. Id. at 340, 748 A.2d at 486.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 341, 748 A.2d at 486.
69. Id.
70. Breitenbach v. N.B. Handy Co., 366 Md. 467, 472, 784 A.2d 569, 572 (2001).
71. 330 Md. 460, 624 A.2d 955 (1993).
72. Id. at 468, 624 A.2d at 959.
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considered whether sections 255 (b) (1)7' and 258B74 of the Maryland
Code prohibited workers at casino night events in Prince George's
County from receiving tips from patrons.75 Section 255(b) (1) does
not specifically apply to casino nights, but it does prohibit individuals
from benefiting financially from certain charitable events. 76 In con-
trast, section 258B applies to casino nights, but does not expressly pro-
hibit individuals from benefiting financially from these events.
77
In its attempt to determine the legislative intent as to whether
section 255(b) (1) applied to casino nights, the court reasoned that
section 255(b) (1) could not be read in isolation, and that a reading of
the entire statute demonstrated that it did apply to casino nights.
78
The court turned to section 255 (b) (2), which mentioned various gam-
ing devices of the type used at casino nights, and section 255(f) (5),
which prohibited casino nights in Baltimore County. 7' The court also
determined that the General Assembly implicitly included the restric-
tions stated in section 255 (b) into section 258B because these statutes
were part of a single statutory scheme.8" The court found that these
interpretations were consistent with the rule against construing sec-
tions of a statute in isolation from one another without regard to ac-
tual legislative intent, and concluded that section 255(b) (1)
prohibited tips to casino night workers."'
As further support for determining legislative intent by reading
the statute as a whole, the Jaycees court considered an opinion of the
Attorney General of Maryland.8 2 The Attorney General noted that be-
cause sections 255(b) and 258B were enacted in the same General
73. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 255(b)(1) (1992). Section 255(b)(1) provides:
that it is not unlawful for a charitable organization "to conduct or hold a carnival,
bazaar, or raffle for [its] exclusive benefit.. . , if no individual or group of indi-
viduals benefits financially from the holding of any [such event] or receives or is
paid any of the proceeds from [the event], for personal use or benefit."
Jacyees, 330 Md. at 463, 624 A.2d at 957 (quoting MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 255(b)(1)).
74. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 258B (1992). "[C]asino night" is defined as "a benefit
performance conducted under the provisions of this section at which card games, wheels
of fortune, or roulette are played and prizes are awarded." § 258B(c) (2) (quoted inJacyees,
330 Md. at 464, 624 A.2d at 957). Moreover, section 258B(a) permits charitable organiza-
tions in Prince George's County "to conduct and operate any benefit performance ... at
which the public is invited or admitted . . d," I § 258B(a) (quoted in Jacyees, 330 Md. at
464, 624 A.2d at 957).
75. Jacyees, 330 Md. at 463, 624 A.2d at 957.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 465, 624 A.2d at 958.
78. Id. at 470, 624 A.2d at 960.
79. Id. at 470-71, 624 A.2d at 960-61.
80. Id. at 472, 624 A.2d at 961.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 469, 624 A.2d at 960.
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Assembly session, they should be read together.8 3 Given this cumula-
tive reading and effectuating of the restrictive provisions in section
255(b), the Attorney General also argued that tips by patrons to ca-
sino night workers violated section 255(b).84
Likewise, in Toler v. Motor Vehicle Administration,15 the Court of Ap-
peals recognized that section 16-405(b) of the Transportation Arti-
cle86 could not be read in isolation to determine legislative intent.8 7
Section 16-405(b) requires the accumulation of sixteen points for a
license suspension when a licensee "is required to drive a motor vehi-
cle in the course of his regular employment."8 In considering
whether this exception is limited to persons whose very job is driving a
motor vehicle or also includes persons who drive incidentally to their
work, the court read all parts of the statute dealing with the point
system together.89 The court determined that to construe section 16-
405 (b) to apply only to persons whose veryjob is driving a motor vehi-
cle would conflict with other provisions of the statute that specifically
apply to "professional drivers."9 Based on this holistic reading, and
the statute's legislative history, the court embraced the broader inter-
pretation of the statute, and concluded that section 16-405(b) also
includes persons who must drive in order to perform significant duties
of their employment.9
(3) Common-Sense Approach.-While legislative history and
reading the statute as a whole are important ways to discern legislative
intent, the Court of Appeals has also advocated for a common-sense
approach to statutory interpretation. 2 The court in Tucker v. Fire-
man's Fund Insurance Co.,9" took this approach when considering
whether a person, injured by an automobile while sitting on a stool in
a parking lot attendant's booth, was a "pedestrian" under section 539
of the Maryland Code94 and therefore eligible to receive personal in-
83. Id. at 470, 624 A.2d at 960.
84. Id. at 469, 624 A.2d at 960.
85. 373 Md. 214, 817 A.2d 229 (2003).
86. MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. II § 16-405(b) (2002).
87. Toler, 373 Md. at 221-23, 817 A.2d at 233-34.
88. TRANSP. II § 16-405(b) (quoted in Toler, 373 Md. at 221, 817 A.2d at 233).
89. Toler, 373 Md. at 221-28,.817 A.2d at 233-37.
90. Id. at 222-23, 817 A.2d at 234.
91. Id. at 228, 817 A.2d at 238.
92. See, e.g., Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 387, 614 A.2d 590, 594 (1992).
93. 308 Md. 69, 517 A.2d 730 (1986).
94. This section states that, "[a]mong the individuals who may receive [personal in-jury] benefits are: . . . 'pedestrians injured in an accident in which the insured motor vehicle is
involved.'" Id. at 71, 517 A.2d at 730-31 (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 539(a)
(1986)).
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jury protection benefits. 5 The court rejected the literal definition of
"pedestrian," a person traveling on foot, as applied in the context of
section 539, given the inequitable consequences that would result
from such an interpretation.96 In holding that the term pedestrian
applied to all persons outside of the motor vehicle, the court recog-
nized that in determining legislative intent it may consider the conse-
quences resulting alternate constructions and adopt the construction
"which avoids an illogical or unreasonable result, or one which is in-
consistent with common sense. 97
The court also employed the common-sense approach in Tracey v.
Tracey.9" In Tracey, the court considered whether, for a determination
of an alimony award, the term "all income" in section 11-
106(b) (11) (i) of the Family Law Article99 included income from tem-
porary, part-time employment.100 The court found that to construe
"all income" to include temporary, part-time work in addition to a
person's principle, full-time employment would be inconsistent with
the legislature's equitable objectives in deriving alimony awards.10'
The court further determined that requiring the appellee to work
sixty to sixty-five hours per week at two jobs would defeat these objec-
tives and would be unduly burdensome for the appellee. 102 Thus, the
court excluded temporary, part-time employment from the term "all
income" and recognized that statutory construction, which is inequita-
ble or contradictory to common sense should be avoided."0 3
(4) Canons Shall Not Be Used to Override Legislative Intent.-
The canons of statutory construction that courts utilize to discern leg-
islative intent vary from case to case. 10 4 In addition, opposing parties
95. Id. at 71-72, 517 A.2d at 731. Personal injury protection benefits afford "minimal
medical, hospital, lost income, and disability benefits to covered persons" injured in any
car accident. Id. at 71, 517 A.2d at 730.
96. Id. at 74, 517 A.2d at 732. For example, a literal definition of pedestrian would
deny recovery to a person who was struck by a motor vehicle while seated on the steps of a
building in front of a public highway, but another person walking on the steps of the same
building would be covered. Id. at 74-75, 517 A-2d at 732.
97. Id. at 75, 517 A.2d at 732.
98. 328 Md. 380, 388, 614 A.2d, 590, 595 (1992).
99. Section 11-106(b) (11) states that financial situations of each party including "all
income and assets, including property that does not produce income," should be taken
into consideration in alimony determinations. MD. CODE ANN., F m. LAW § 11-
106(b)(11)(i) (1991).
100. Tracey, 328 Md. at 387, 614 A.2d at 594.
101. Id. at 388, 614 A.2d at 594-95.
102. Id. at 390, 614 A.2d at 595.
103. Id. at 387, 389, 614 A.2d at 594-95.
104. See State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 717-23, 720 A.2d 311, 315-18 (1998) (using various
canons of interpretation to ascertain the legislative intent behind the statute in question,
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often advocate conflicting canons of construction. 10 5 The court in
Kaczorowski recognized this situation when the parties in that case in-
voked competing canons of construction to support each of their posi-
tions regarding the legitimacy of the Baltimore Authority. 10 6 As a
result, Maryland courts have recognized that these canons should
never be used as the sole basis for overriding legislative intent. 107
The Court of Appeals in Kirkwood v. Provident Savings Bank of Balti-
more, for example, refused to apply the rule of statutory construction
expressio unius est exclusio alterius ("the expression of one thing implies
the exclusion of another thing not mentioned") to override legislative
intent.'0 8 The court rejected the appellants' argument, which relied
on this canon, that an act authorizing mutual savings banks to estab-
lish branches outside the City of Baltimore with the approval of the
Bank Commissioner repealed an earlier act, granting the appellee this
right without requiring the Bank Commissioner's approval."0 9 The
court determined that the legislature gave no indication of an inten-
tion to repeal the earlier act.110 The court found that this canon was
not a rule of law, but was only a rule of construction used to assist in
determining legislative intent."' Thus, the court concluded that ca-
nons should be used with caution and should never be applied to
override legislative intent.1 12
Similarly, in Toler, the court noted that the canon of construction
stating that "when a legislature uses different words, especially in the
same section or in a part of the statute that deals with the same sub-
ject, it usually intends different things" is not an absolute rule of con-
struction.' 13  The court in Employment Security Administration v.
Weimer" 4 set forth this position when it found that the canon stating
that "a qualifying clause ordinarily is confined to the immediately pre-
including an analysis of the language itself, reading the language in context, and consider-
ing a proposed but later rejected amendment to the statute).
105. See Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 512, 525 A.2d 628, 631 (1987)
("Just as in the science of Physics every action has an equal and opposite reaction, so it
seems that every canon of statutory construction has an equal and opposite canon." (foot-
note omitted)).
106. Id at 510-12, 525 A.2d at 630-31.
107. See, e.g., Kirkwood v. Provident Say. Bank, 205 Md. 48, 55, 106 A.2d 103, 107 (1954).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 54-55, 106 A.2d at 106.
110. Id. at 57, 106 A.2d at 107-08.
111. Id. at 55, 106 A.2d at 107.
112. 1d
113. Toler v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 373 Md. 214, 223, 817 A.2d 229, 235 (2003). Al-
though the court found that this rule was not absolute, the court followed the rule in this
instance because it supported the legislature's intent. Id. at 224, 817 A.2d at 235.
114. 285 Md. 96, 400 A.2d 1101 (1979).
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ceding words or phrase" is not an absolute rule. 115 In Weimer, the Em-
ployment Security Administration argued that in section 6(h) of
Article 95A,116 the qualifying clause "under a private pension plan"
modified only the preceding word "annuity," and not "pension,"
which would have reduced the plaintiffs unemployment compensa-
tion. 11 v The Weimer court recognized that this canon should only be
used to assist in discovery of legislative intent and is not a rigid rule.118
Based on the language of the statute and its context, the court con-
cluded that the qualifying clause "under a private pension plan" was
not confined to the immediately preceding word "annuity," but en-
compassed both annuity and pension, and as a result section 6(h) did
not apply to the plaintiff.119 Therefore, canons are not to be followed
when the resulting interpretation would be inconsistent with legisla-
tive intent.1 2 °
c. Remedial Statutes Must Be Liberally Construed.-Remedial
statues are those designed to "correct existing law, to redress existing
grievances and to introduce regulations conducive to the public
good." '2 Remedial statutes also "provide a remedy, or improve or
facilitate remedies already existing for the enforcement of rights and
the redress of injuries."' 22 In Pak v. Hoang, the court determined that
section 8-203(e) of the Maryland Security Deposit Act, 121 which pro-
vides remedies for tenants seeking return of their security deposits,
was remedial in nature because it provided a remedy not available at
common law.t 24 Similarly, the court in Williams v. Standard Federal Sav-
ings & Loan Ass'n,t 25 found that MSMLL was remedial in nature be-
cause it provided remedies to borrowers.
126
115. Id. at 102, 400 A.2d at 1104 (quoting Sullivan v. Dixon, 280 Md. 444, 451, 373 A.2d
1245, 1249 (1977)).
116. Section 6(h) states that, only retirement benefits from "a pension or annuity under
a private pension plan" result in reduction of unemployment compensation. MD. ANN.
CODE art. 95A, § 6(h) (1979) (quoted in Weimer, 285 Md. at 98, 100, 400 A.2d at 1102-03).
117. Weime, 285 Md. at 100, 400 A.2d at 1104.
118. Id. at 102, 400 A.2d at 1104-05 (citing 2AJ. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 47.33 (4th ed. 1973)).
119. Weimer, 285 Md. at 102, 400 A.2d at 1104-05.
120. Id.
121. Pak v. Hoang, 378 Md. 315, 325, 835 A.2d 1185, 1190 (2003) (quoting Langston v.
Rifle, 359 Md. 396, 408-09, 754 A.2d 389, 395-96 (2000); State v. Barnes, 273 Md. 195, 208,
328 A.2d 737, 745 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, 326 Md. 663, 607 A.2d 8 (1992)).
122. Id. at 324, 835 A.2d at 1190.
123. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-203(e) (4) (2003).
124. 378 Md. 315, 326, 835 A.2d 1185, 1191 (2003).
125. 76 Md. App. 452, 545 A.2d 708 (1988).
126. Id. at 455-56, 545 A.2d at 709.
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Once a statute is found to be remedial in nature it "must be liber-
ally construed in order to effectuate [its] broad remedial purpose."'' 2 7
In Breitenbach v. N.B. Handy Co., the Court of Appeals held that section
9-660 (a) (1) of the Workers' Compensation Act 128 required employers
to reimburse employees for reasonable transportation costs incurred
with their medical treatment, even though there was no express men-
tion of transportation costs in the statute.129 The court determined
that it was unclear whether the language in section 9 -6 60(a) (1), "med-
ical, surgical, or other attendance or treatment," included transporta-
tion costs. 130 Given this uncertainty and the remedial nature of the
act, the court applied the rule of liberal construction, and found that
section 9-660 (a) (1) included transportation costs.''
The court in Pak also liberally construed the remedial statute at
issue in that case. 132 The court determined that "reasonable attor-
ney's fees" in section 8-203(e)(4) of the Maryland Security Deposit
Act,1 33 included fees for postjudgment motions to recover security de-
posits.134 Due to the small dollar amount of security deposits and the
difficulties often encountered by tenants seeking their return, land-
lords could effectively thwart section 8-203(e) (4)'s remedial purpose
if reasonable attorney's fees were not awarded for postjudgment mo-
tions. 13 1 As a result, the court found that the statute's reference to
reasonable attorney's fees must be liberally construed to include fees
for postjudgment motions, and that any other interpretation would
diminish the remedial nature of the statute.136
d. Maryland Courts Recognize the Consumer Protection Purpose of
MSMLL.-While Maryland courts have not interpreted the statutory
postponement provision of MSMLL, they have interpreted the overall
127. Pak, 378 Md. at 326, 835 A.2d at 1191.
128. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-660(a) (1) (2000). This section states that
"(a) ... if a covered employee has suffered an accidental personal injury, compensable
hernia, or occupational disease the employer or its insurer promptly shall provide to the
covered employee, as the Commission may require: (1) medical, surgical, or other attend-
ance or treatment."
129. 366 Md. 467, 482, 784 A.2d 569, 578 (2001).
130. Id. at 483-84, 784 A.2d at 578-79.
131. Id. at 484, 784 A.2d at 579.
132. Pak v. Hoang, 378 Md. 315, 328, 835 A.2d 1185, 1192 (2003).
133. See id. at 324, 835 A.2d at 1189 ("If the landlord, without a reasonable basis, fails to
return any part of the security deposit.... after the termination of the tenancy, the tenant
has an action of up to threefold of the withheld amount, plus reasonable attorney's fees.")
(quoting MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-203(e) (4) (2003)).
134. Id. at 321, 835 A.2d at 1188.
135. Id at 327-29, 335, 835 A.2d at 1192-93, 1196.
136. Id. at 335, 835 A.2d at 1196.
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purpose of the statute.13 7 In Duckworth v. Bernstein, the Duckworths,
borrowers, filed a complaint against Bernstein, a lender, and alleged
that he intentionally violated several provisions of MSMLL and that he
fraudulently required them to sign false statements indicating that
their loans were for commercial purposes when they were not.1 38 The
Court of Special Appeals found that MSMLL was intended to protect
unwitting borrowers or those already under severe financial pres-
sure. 39 The Duckworth court found that to achieve this purpose,
MSMLL punishes even the unsuspecting violator, which is consistent
with the State's strong policy on usury and consumer protection.
140
Given the legislature's intent to protect the borrower, the court deter-
mined that the statute's purpose was protective.
1 41
The court in Williams also recognized the consumer protection
purpose of MSMLL, and in addition, the court noted the remedies
available to borrowers whose rights under the statute have been vio-
lated.142 In Williams, the borrowers filed suit against Standard Federal
Savings and Loan Association alleging that Standard charged points in
excess of those permitted by the Commercial Law Article.143 The
court, relying on Duckworth, found that MSMLL was intended to pro-
tect consumers and, as a result, was remedial in nature.
144
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Drew v. First Guaranty Mortgage
Corp., the Court of Appeals held that section 12-404(c) (2) (iii) of the
Commercial Law Article does not require a seller or lender who takes
a secondary mortgage or deed of trust in order to secure all or a por-
tion of a residence's purchase price and creates a balloon payment, to
state in writing that the statutory postponement period of six months
is available to borrowers. 145 In a 4-3 decision, the majority rejected
137. See generally Williams v. Standard Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 76 Md. App. 452, 455, 545
A.2d 708, 709 (1988) (noting the remedial nature of MSMLL); Duckworth v. Bernstein, 55
Md. App. 710, 717, 466 A.2d 517, 520 (1983) (noting the statute's consumer protection
purposes).
138. 55 Md. App. 710, 712, 466 A.2d 517, 518 (1983).
139. Id. at 724, 466 A.2d at 524.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 725, 466 A.2d at 524-25.
142. Williams v. Standard Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 76 Md. App. 452, 455, 545 A.2d 708,
709 (1988).
143. Id. at 453, 545 A.2d at 708.
144. Id. at 455-56, 545 A.2d at 709.
145. Drew, 379 Md. at 321, 842 A.2d at 3. Based on this outcome, the court did not
reach the question of whether the penalty provisions in section 12413 were applicable to
the Drews' loan. Id.
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the Drews' argument that the borrower's postponement rights must
be disclosed in writing. 14 6
Writing for the majority,"' judge Battaglia began her discussion
by noting that balloon payment transactions have long been trouble-
some for consumer borrowers.14 The court also acknowledged that
state statutes restricting balloon payment transactions were designed
to provide borrowers with the knowledge and ability to refinance their
balloon payments without penalty, and to protect consumer borrow-
ers.'49 The court, detailing the history of MSMLL, noted that the stat-
ute was first enacted during a period when consumer protection
reform was sweeping the country; in this enactment, balloon pay-
ments were prohibited in secondary mortgages. 5 °
After looking to the history and reviewing the rules and goals of
statutory construction, the court turned to the statutory language of
the postponement provision, section 12-404(c) (2),'15' and determined
that sections (i) and (ii) require lenders to expressly disclose to bor-
rowers, in writing, that the loan contains a balloon payment.152 How-
ever, the court found that it was unclear whether the postponement
provision in section (iii) was subject to the express disclosure provi-
sions in sections (i) and (ii).5's To ascertain the legislature's intent,
the court relied on the canon of construction, expressio unius est ex-
clusio alterius, which means that "the expression of one thing implies
146. Id. at 321, 323-27, 842 A.2d at 3-6.
147. Judge Battaglia was joined by Judges Eldridge, Raker, and Cathell. Id. at 318-19,
842 A.2d at 1-2.
148. Id. at 323, 842 A.2d at 4 (describing the risk involved in balloon payments where
consumers must refinance the principal with a new loan or sell the house in order to cover
the balloon payment).
149. Id. at 324-25, 842 A.2d at 4-5.
150. Id.
151. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW II § 12-404(c)(2) (2000). This section states that
A lender, including a seller who takes a mortgage or deed of trust to secure pay-
ment of all or a portion of the purchase price of a residence sold to a borrower,
may make a loan for the purpose of aiding the borrower in the sale of the bor-
rower's residence or the purchase of a new residence, and may create a balloon
payment at maturity of this loan if the balloon payment is:
(i) Expressly disclosed to the borrower;
(ii) Agreed to by both the borrower and the lender/seller in writing; and
(iii) Required to be postponed one time, upon becoming due, at the bor-
rower's request, for a period not to exceed 6 months, provided that the borrower
continues to make the monthly installments provided for in the original loan
agreement, and no new closing costs, processing fees or similar fees are imposed
on the borrower as a result of the extension ....
Id.
152. Drew, 379 Md. at 329, 842 A.2d at 7.
153. Id.
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the exclusion of another."'5 4 The court concluded that, because the
legislature required express written notice in the first two sections of
the statute, the fact that it did not expressly require written notice in
the third section reveals an intent to exclude written notice for that
section.
55
In support of its reasoning, the court gave several examples of
consumer protection statutes that require that written notice be given
to the consumer.1 56 The majority noted that a statute outlining proce-
dures for automobile consumers to claim warranties required notice
to be conspicuously disclosed to the consumer in writing at the time
of the sale. 1 57 The majority also noted that a statute containing car
lease termination provisions required a dated written statement to be
furnished to the lessee.' 5 8 Thus, relying on the canon, "[i]n order for
one statute to alter or limit another, the intention of the legislature to
do so must be clear and manifest," the court concluded that the legis-
lature did not clearly manifest any intent to read the disclosure provi-
sions found in sections (i) and (ii) into section (iii), and held that the
postponement provision did not need to be in writing.1 59
In its analysis, the majority noted in a footnote that the Commit-
tee Report to House Bill 195, which amended section 12-
404(c) (2) (iii), stated that "balloon payment transactions must give the
consumer the right to request a postponement of the balloon pay-
ment once for a period not to exceed six months."'"6 Although the
court recognized that this statement could be interpreted as requiring
written disclosure, the court concluded that the term "transaction"
was ambiguous, and thus the Legislature did not clearly manifest an
intention to read the disclosure provisions found in sections (i) and
(ii) into section (iii).16 1
The court also rejected the Drews' argument that the Attorney
General's opinion from 1985 required the lender to give the borrower
written notice of the postponement right. 6 2 The Attorney General
determined that section 12-404(c)(3), which controls balloon pay-
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 329-30, 842 A.2d at 8.
157. Id. at 330, 842 A.2d at 8 (citing Gen. Motors Corp. v. Schmitz, 362 Md. 229, 236,
764 A.2d 838, 841 (2001)).
158. Id. (citing Anderson v. Ford Motor Credit Corp., 323 Md. 327, 335, 593 A.2d 678,
682 (1991)).
159. Id. (citing Mayor of Baltimore v. Clerk of Superior Court, 270 Md. 316, 319, 311
A.2d 261, 263 (1973)).
160. Id. at 330-31 n.9, 842 A.2d at 8-9 n.9.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 331-32, 842 A.2d at 8-9.
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ments in commercial loans, required the loan transaction to give the
borrower clear notice of the postponement provision, which was con-
sistent with section 12-404(c) (2) (iii) and the history and remedial na-
ture of MSMLL. 163 The Drew court, however, concluded that it was
not bound by opinions of the Attorney General.164 The court dis-
agreed with the Attorney General that section 12-404(c) (2) (iii) and
section 12-404(c) (3) (i) are parallel.165 The court found that the lan-
guage "if the borrower is authorized" in section 12-404(c) (3) (i)
placed the burden of notice with the lender, while the language
"[r]equired to be postponed one time, upon becoming due, at the
borrower's request" in section 12-404(c)(2)(iii) placed the burden
with the borrower. 166 Again relying on a canon of construction, the
court explained that "when a legislature uses different words, espe-
cially in the same section or in a part of the statute that deals with the
same subject, it usually intends different things," and concluded that
section 12-404(c) (2) (iii) did not require written notice.' 67
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Wilner 68 recognized the con-
sumer protection purposes of MSMLL and reasoned that the majority
failed to take into account its remedial nature. 169 He also found that
the balloon payment provision in the Drews' mortgage actually ne-
gates their right to postpone the balloon payment at maturity. 7 °
Judge Wilner further determined that the majority's interpretation of
the statute does not comport with the "commonsensical" approach to
statutory interpretation advocated by the majority. 7' As a result,
Judge Wilner concluded that the legislature intended for the lender
to disclose to the borrower in writing that the postponement provision
exists.172
163. Id. at 331, 842 A.2d at 9.
164. Id. at 332, 842 A.2d at 9.
165. Id.
166. Id
167. Id.
168. Judge Wilner was joined by Chief Judge Bell and Judge Harrell. Id. at 333, 842
A.2d at 10 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
169. Id. (Wilner, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 334, 842 A.2d at 10 (Wilner, J., dissenting). The Drews' balloon payment
provision stated in capital letters that the lender is not obligated to refinance the loan at
maturity. Id. (Wilner, J., dissenting); see supra note 22 and accompanying text (detailing
the Drews' balloon payment provision).
171. Drew, 379 Md. at 335, 842 A.2d at 11 (Wilner,J., dissenting). Judge Wilner asked,
"How are borrowers with fewer resources or less luck than the Drews supposed to know
that they have the right to a one-time postponement when the balloon payment comes due
[if this right is not disclosed in the agreement]?" Id. (Wilner, J., dissenting).
172. Id. (Wilner, J., dissenting).
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4. Analysis.-In Drew v. First Guaranty Mortgage Corp., the Court
of Appeals held that MSMLL does not require a lender who creates a
balloon payment to state in writing that the statutory postponement
period of six months is available to borrowers. 173 In doing so, the
court failed to utilize the canons of construction as a tool to deter-
mine legislative intent. 174 As a result, the court weakened MSMLL's
consumer protection purpose. 175 The court should have examined
the statute in light of its context, and looked to legislative history
while reading the statute as a whole and from a common-sense per-
spective. 176 If the court had taken this approach, it would have deter-
mined that the legislative intent to protect consumers would be better
served by requiring lenders to notify borrowers, in writing, about the
statutory postponement period. 177 Given the consumer protection
purpose of MSMLL, the court should have considered its remedial
nature and liberally construed the postponement provision to effectu-
ate the statute's intent.17 Furthermore, the court should have consid-
ered past Maryland court interpretations of MSMLL, which also found
a consumer protection intent and thus provide additional support for
the postponement provision to be in writing. 179
a. The Court Improperly Applied the Canons of Statutoiy Construc-
tion and Failed to Ascertain Legislative Intent.-The Drew court misap-
plied the canons of statutory construction because it failed to
effectuate the legislative intent underlying the postponement provi-
sion of MSMLL. The court did not use the canons of statutory inter-
pretation as a tool to determine the legislature's purpose, but instead
ignored this intent and reached the conclusion that MSMLL does not
require a lender to notify the borrower in writing of the one-time post-
ponement period. 8 ° The Drew court misinterpreted the statutory lan-
guage contained in section 12-404(c) (2), which states that "A
173. Id. at 321, 842 A.2d at 3.
174. See infra notes 180-200 and accompanying text (finding that the court erroneously
relied on the canons of construction and ignored legislative intent).
175. See infra notes 240-262 and accompanying text.
176. See infra notes 201-239 and accompanying text (employing this approach to ascer-
tain the legislative intent of MSMLL).
177. See infta notes 201-262 and accompanying text (discussing how legislative intent is
better served by requiring the postponement provision to be in writing).
178. See infra notes 240-262 and accompanying text (demonstrating how remedial pur-
pose supports liberal construction of statute).
179. See infta notes 243-250, 261 and accompanying text (showing that past court deci-
sions support written notice).
180. See Drew, 379 Md. at 327-32, 842 A.2d at 6-9 (ignoring the legislative intent when
analyzing the statute).
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lender ... may create a balloon payment at maturity... if the balloon
payment is: (i) Expressly disclosed to the borrower; (ii) Agreed to by
both the borrower and the lender/seller in writing; and (iii) Required
to be postponed one time, upon becoming due, at the borrower's re-
quest. '  Although the court in Drew recognized that the statutory
language was ambiguous, and that it needed to look beyond the plain
meaning of the statute to determine legislative intent, the court did
not follow its own advice. 182 Instead, the court used the canons of
construction to reach its conclusion without analyzing the legislature's
purpose. 8 ' In relying on these canons without support from the leg-
islature's intent, the court undermined the goal of statutory
interpretation. 184
In concluding that MSMLL does not require that the postpone-
ment provision be put into writing, the Drew court relied in large part
on the canon expressio unis est exclusio alterius.'8 5 However, in so doing
the court failed to state how this canon or result supports the legisla-
ture's intent.'86 In fact, the court made no mention of the statute's
purpose or objective in its analysis.'87 The court ignored its prior de-
cision in Kirkwood, where it held that this canon is not a rule of law
and should only be used to assist in determining legislative intent.'88
The Kirkwood court also found that this canon should be used with
caution, and should never be applied to override the manifest inten-
tion of the legislature.' 89 Had the court in Drew taken this approach,
it would have considered how the application of the canon would
have effectuated the intent of the legislature and would have ex-
plained how this intent is not served by failing to require that the post-
ponement provision be in writing."'
In its further analysis, the Drew court continued to ignore legisla-
tive intent, and supported its decision by relying on other canons of
181. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 12-404(c)(2) (2000) (quoted in Drew, 379 Md. at
326, 842 A.2d at 6).
182. Drew, 379 Md. at 329, 842 A.2d at 7.
183. See id. at 327-32, 842 A.2d at 6-9.
184. See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text (discussing the rules and goals of stat-
utory interpretation).
185. Drew, 379 Md. at 329, 842 A.2d at 7.
186. Id. at 327-32, 842 A.2d at 6-9.
187. Id.
188. Kirkwood v. Provident Sav. Bank, 205 Md. 48, 55, 106 A.2d 103, 107 (1954).
189. Id.
190. See id. (finding that the conditions do not warrant the application of this canon).
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construction. 9 1 The court noted that legislative history lends some
support to the proposition that balloon payment transactions must
give borrowers the right to request postponement.1 9 2 However, the
court gave a cursory look to this history and instead relied on the ca-
non " [i] n order for one statute to alter or limit another, the intention
of the legislature to do so must be clear and manifest." 9 3 The Drew
court determined that the legislature had not clearly manifested any
intent to read the disclosure provisions found in section 12-
404(c) (2) (i) and (ii) into section 12-404(c) (2) (iii), and thus the court
held that the postponement provision does not need to be in writ-
ing. 194 Although the court concluded that the legislature had not
clearly manifested any such intent, it did not attempt to discover this
intent in its analysis.' 9 5 In concluding that the postponement provi-
sion did not need to be in writing, the court failed to use the canons
to inquire into the legislature's intent.9 6 This analysis is contrary to
the rules and goals of statutory interpretation: to effectuate legislative
intent by determining the statute's purpose.'
97
Finally, the court, to support its decision, relied on the canon
"when a legislature uses different words, especially in the same section
or in a part of the statute that deals with the same subject, it usually
intends different things." '9 8 Again, the Drew court took this mis-
guided approach even though in Toler the court had found that this
canon is not absolute and should not override legislative intent.t 99 As
a result, the Drew court used the canons of statutory construction to
reach its conclusion and ignored the legislature's intent, which is con-
trary to the well-established principles of statutory interpretation.20 0
b. The Court Should Have Looked to the Statutory Context.-If
the Drew court used the canons of construction as a tool, by interpret-
ing the statutory language in light of its context, looking to legislative
history and reading the statute as a whole and from a common-sense
191. See Drew, 379 Md. at 332, 842 A.2d at 9 (noting the canon of interpretation that
states "when a legislature uses different words, especially in the same section or in a part of
the statute that deals with the same subject, it usually intends different things").
192. Id at 330-31 n.9, 842 A.2d at 8-9 n.9.
193. Id. at 330, 842 A.2d at 8.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Pak v. Hoang, 378 Md. 315, 323, 835 A.2d 1185, 1189 (2003) (quoting Moore v.
Miley, 372 Md. 663, 677, 814 A.2d 557, 566 (2003)).
198. Drew, 379 Md. at 332, 842 A.2d at 9.
199. Toler v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 373 Md. 214, 223-24, 817 A.2d 229, 235 (2003).
200. Drew, 379 Md. at 327-28, 842 A.2d at 6-7; Pak, 378 Md. at 323, 835 A.2d at 1189.
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perspective, it would have concluded that MSMLL was designed to
protect consumers and that this legislative intent would be better
served by requiring the postponement provision to be put in writing.
(1) Legislative Histoiy.-In effectuating legislative intent
while interpreting an ambiguous statute, Maryland courts have often
analyzed legislative history.2 ' The court in Kaczorowski followed this
approach, analyzing legislative reports, draft legislation, and the en-
actment process when it held that the legislature did not intend to
repeal the code provisions creating the Baltimore Authority even
though the statutes in question indicated otherwise. 2
The court in Drew detailed MSMLL's history, but it did not use
this history to ascertain the legislature's intent.203 MSMLL was en-
acted during a time when consumer protection reform was sweeping
the country.2 04 Its purpose was to regulate the secondary mortgage
loan business, provide penalties for violations, and protect consumers
against lenders. 2 5 The Drew court failed to analyze this history to de-
termine legislative intent; instead it used various canons of construc-
tion to reach its conclusion without discussing intent. 2 6 Had the Drew
court examined the legislative intent, it would have concluded that
201. See, e.g., Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515-16, 525 A.2d 628, 632-
33 (1987).
202. Id. at 517, 525 A.2d at 633-34.
203. See Drew, 379 Md. at 324-27, 842 A.2d at 4-6 (discussing the history of MSMLL).
204. Id. at 325, 842 A.2d at 5.
205. 1967 Md. Laws 390. As evidence of its consumer protection purpose, balloon pay-
ments were prohibited in secondary mortgage loans under the law's initial enactment in
1967. Id. § 61. It was not until 1975 that the General Assembly revised MSMLL to allow for
balloon payments under two limited circumstances: (1) for business or commercial invest-
ment and (2) to aid a borrower in the sale of his own residence. 1975 Md. laws 574. In
1982 the General Assembly again revised MSMLL to increase the availability of mortgages
and encourage home ownership during a period of heightened interest rates, and it added
the postponement provision. Hearing, supra note 38 (testimony of Del. Sauerbrey and Del.
Quade, Members, Senate Economic Affairs Comm.) (testifying that the bill was enacted to
increase the availability of mortgages to encourage home ownership); see also Pamela Con-
stable, Second-Mortgage Bill Attacked as overkill, BALT. SUN, Apr. 8, 1982 at DI (discussing
arguments for and against the bill). This provision was added to MSMLL after the Attor-
ney General and other opponents of the legislation advocated that House Bill 305 elimi-
nated the consumer protection provisions in its companion legislation, House Bill 1853,
and provided for potential abuse of borrowers. Hearing, supra note 38 (testimony of Del.
Sklar, Member, Senate Economic Affairs Comm. and Eleanor Carey, Associate Deputy At-
torney General) (advocating against the bill); see also Constable, supra (summarizing the
position of bill opponents). Even though the legislature chose to change MSMLL to allow
for balloon payments, it did so only under limited circumstances and added the postpone-
ment provision. Drew, 379 Md. at 325-27, 842 A.2d at 5-6.
206. See supra notes 180-200 and accompanying text (discussing the court's failure to
determine legislative intent).
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the intent was to protect consumers and that this intent would be bet-
ter served by requiring the postponement provision to be in writing.
This writing would provide borrowers with the knowledge and ability
to make informed decisions about refinancing and protect them from
deceitful lenders who might pressure them into unfavorable refinanc-
ing agreements. 20 7 This interpretation is also consistent with the goal
of similar statutes enacted in other states.20 8 However, as the dissent
in Drew recognized, if the postponement provision is not disclosed to
borrowers in writing, then they will not know that this right exists.20 9
Borrowers may even be led to believe that this right does not exist.
210
The court in Drew should have also followed the lead of the court
in Derry, and should have taken a cautionary approach to statutory
interpretation given the long-time unavailability of balloon pay-
ments. 21' The court in Deny considered the long-time unavailability
of interlocutory appeals when it determined that section 12-302(c) (3)
of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article did not provide the
state with a right to appeal from a trial court's exclusion of evi-
dence.212 Although the General Assembly later created a right of in-
terlocutory appeal for the state, this right, like the balloon payment in
Drew, was only available in limited circumstances. 213 The Deny court,
therefore, determined that section 12-302(c) (3) applied only to con-
stitutional issues, and that this reading was consistent with the legisla-
ture's cautionary approach.2 14 If the court in Drew considered
MSMLL's legislative history, including the long-time unavailability of
balloon payments, the court should have taken a cautionary approach
and determined that the legislature's intent would be better served by
requiring that the postponement provision be in writing.2 15
The court in Drew did, in fact, recognize that legislative history
provided support for the postponement provision to be in writing, but
207. Drew, 379 Md. at 324, 842 A.2d at 5; see also Duckworth v. Bernstein, 55 Md. App.
710, 717, 466 A.2d 517, 520 (1983) (stating that the Act was "[o]bviously intended to pro-
tect.., consumers from unscrupulous lenders" and to afford other protections).
208. Drew, 379 Md. at 324, 842 A.2d at 4 ("balloon payment provisions are allowed only
if the contract gives the consumer the right to refinance") (quoting ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
Tit. 9-A, § 3-308 (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-3-308 (1995) ("the borrower has the right to
refinance the amount of a balloon payment at maturity without penalty")).
209. Drew, 379 Md. at 334-35, 842 A.2d at 11 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
210. Id., 842 A.2d at 10-11 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
211. Derry v. State, 358 Md. 325, 341, 748 A.2d 478, 486 (2000).
212. Id. at 340, 748 A.2d at 486.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 341, 748 A.2d at 486.
215. See supra notes 31-47 and accompanying text (detailing MSMLL's history).
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did not accord the legislative history proper weight.216 The court
noted that the Committee Report to House Bill 195,217 which
amended section 12-404(c)(2)(iii), stated that "balloon payment
transactions must give the consumer the right to request a postpone-
ment of the balloon payment once for a period not to exceed six
months. ' 2 18 Although the Drew court determined that this statement
could be interpreted as requiring written disclosure, it decided that
the statement was too ambiguous to support this assertion. 21 9 How-
ever, in light of the entire history of MSMLL, this report illustrates
that the postponement provision should be in writing.220
(2) Reading the Statute as a W0ole.-The Drew failed to in-
tetpret MSMLL as a whole, and instead read section 12-404(c) (2), its
subsections, and section 12-404(c) (3) in isolation from each other
without regard to actual legislative intent.221 The court in Drew should
have taken an approach similar to the court inJaycees, and should have
read the statute as a whole.222 As a condition of creating a balloon
payment, section 12-404(c) (2) (ii) requires the borrower and lender to
agree to the balloon payment in writing, and the next section, section
12-404(c) (2) (iii), requires the balloon payment to be postponed one
time at the borrower's request.2 23 These sections should be read to-
gether along with the other provisions of MSMLL, which provide for
regulation of the secondary mortgage loan business, place restrictions
on lenders, and provide remedies to borrowers, all aimed at protect-
ing consumers. 224 If read as a single statutory scheme, the Drew court
would have concluded that MSMLL's purpose was to protect consum-
216. Drew, 379 Md. at 330-31 n.9, 842 A.2d at 8-9 n.9.
217. Comm. Rep. on H.B. 195 at 2 (Md. 1985).
218. Drew, 379 Md. at 330-31 n.9, 842 A.2d at 8-9 n.9.
219. See id. at 330, 842 A.2d at 8 (stating that "the [1]egislature has not clearly mani-
fested any intention to read the disclosure provisions found in parts (i) and (ii) into part
(iii)').
220. See supra notes 31-47 and accompanying text (examining the history of MSMLL).
221. See Drew, 379 Md. at 332, 842 A.2d at 9 (analyzing each section of the statute
independently).
222. See State v. Crescent CitiesJaycees Found., Inc. 330 Md. 460, 470, 624 A.2d 955, 960
(1993). In Jaycees, the court reasoned that sections 255(b) (1) and 258B of Article 27 of the
Maryland Code should be read together to give full effect to each other. Id. at 470-71, 624
A.2d at 960-61. Section 255(b) (2) mentioned various gaming devices of the type used at
charity-run casino nights and section 255(0(5) prohibited casino nights in Baltimore
County. Id- Given this reading, the court concluded that section 255(b) (1) applied to
casino nights and that it implicitly included the restrictions on tipping into section 258B.
Id. at 472, 626 A.2d at 961.
223. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 12-401 (c) (2) (ii), (iii) (2000).
224. Id. §§ 12-401 to -415.
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ers against lenders and that this intent would be furthered by requir-
ing the postponement provision to be in writing.
As an example of how to read a statute as a whole, the court in
Drew should have relied upon the Attorney General's opinion, as the
court in Jaycees did.22 5 In Jaycees, the Attorney General noted that sec-
tions 255(b) and 258B of Article 27 of the Maryland Code were en-
acted in the same General Assembly session, and that therefore they
should be read together.226 The Attorney General's opinion in Drew
also read the provisions of section 12-404(c) together and determined
that the loan transaction must clearly give the borrower the right to
postpone the balloon payment at maturity. 227 The Attorney General
found that the language in section 12-404(c) (3) (i) is substantially par-
allel to section 12-404(c) (2) (iii), and that in order to comply with
these sections, the lender must notify the borrower of the right to
postpone.228 In interpreting these sections, the Attorney General also
considered the history of MSMLL, which supported his holistic read-
ing and concluded that the postponement provision should be in writ-
ing.229 Had the court in Drew taken this approach, as opposed to
ignoring legislative intent, it would have also reached the same result
as the Attorney General.2 30 However, the Drew court failed to read the
statute as a whole and did not even refute the Attorney General's in-
terpretation of legislative intent.
23 1
(3) Common-Sense Approach.-Finally, the majority in Drew
did not apply the common sense approach to statutory interpretation
that it advocated. 232 In contrast to Tucker, where the court rejected
the ordinary definition of pedestrian, which is a person traveling on
foot, because interpreting the statute in this manner would have re-
sulted in the denial of benefits to a parking attendant sitting on a
stool, and would be inconsistent with common sense,233 the Drew
court's interpretation of the statute produced an illogical result.
225. Jaycees, 330 Md. at 469, 624 A.2d at 960.
226. Id. at 470, 624 A.2d at 960.
227. 70 Md. Att'y Gen. Op. 87, 89 (1985).
228. Id. at 88-89.
229. Id.
230. See supra notes 181-200 and accompanying text (discussing how the Drew court ig-
nored legislative intent).
231. See Drew, 379 Md. at 331-32, 842 A.2d at 8-10 (failing to challenge legislative intent).
232. See id. at 328, 842 A.2d at 7 (noting that "our role is to apply a 'commonsensical'
approach to the information available to us so that we may best effectuate the General
Assembly's intent").
233. Tucker v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 74, 517 A.2d 730, 732 (1986).
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Holding that MSMLL does not require the postponement provi-
sion to be in writing is contrary to common sense because a postpone-
ment right has little meaning if borrowers do not know that it
exists. 2 3 4 The Drew court's interpretation results in the borrower not
knowing about the postponement right, and possibly leading the bor-
rower to believe that the right does not exist; this essentially deprives
borrowers of this right.235 This interpretation produces an illogical
result given the consumer protection purpose of MSMLL.2 36 Borrow-
ers may be forced to refinance their loans, pay additional fees, and
make uninformed decisions, all of which cut against the consumer
protection purposes of MSMLL. 237 These dangers are heightened by
the fact that the transactions in question involve consumers' homes,
the largest asset that most people own.238 Interpreting the statute
consistent with common sense would have led the court to conclude
that MSMLL requires the postponement provision to be in writing.239
c. The Court Should Have Liberally Construed MSMLL to Facili-
tate Its Remedial Nature.-Given the consumer protection purpose of
MSMLL, the Drew court should have considered its remedial nature
and liberally construed the postponement provision to effectuate the
legislature's consumer protection intent. Remedial statutes are those
designed to "correct existing law, to redress existing grievances and to
introduce regulations conducive to the public good. 2 4 ° MSMLL fits
this description because it was enacted to regulate the secondary
mortgage loan business, provide penalties for violations, and protect
consumers against lenders.24' Specifically, the postponement provi-
sion was added in an effort to make the MSMLL more conducive to
the public good after opponents argued that amendments to the stat-
ute would provide for potential abuse by lenders. 24 2
234. Drew, 379 Md. at 334-35, 842 A.2d at 11 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
235. Id. (Wilner, J., dissenting)
236. Id. at 333-35, 842 A.2d at 10-11 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
237. See id. at 323-24, 842 A.2d at 4 (finding that the underlying purpose of MSMLL was
to establish procedures that would provide consumers with knowledge in order to protect
them).
238. Id. at 323, 842 A.2d at 4.
239. Id. at 335, 842 A.2d at 11 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
240. Pak v. Hoang, 378 Md. 315, 325, 835 A.2d 1185, 1190 (2003) (quoting State v.
Barnes, 273 Md. 195, 208, 328 A.2d 737, 745 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, 326 Md. 663, 607
A.2d 8 (1992)).
241. 1967 Md. Laws 390.
242. Drew, 379 Md. at 326, 842 A.2d at 5-6.
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Past Maryland courts have also recognized the statute's remedial
nature. 243 The court in Duckworth found that MSMLL was intended to
protect a certain class of consumers from unscrupulous lenders.244 In
Duckworth, the borrowers alleged that the lender deliberately violated
several provisions of MSMLL.245 The court determined that MSMLL
was "intended to guard the foolish or unsophisticated borrower, who
may be under severe financial pressure, from his own improvi-
dence."246 The court also found that the statute's purpose was consis-
tent with the state's strong policy on usury and consumer
protection. 247 The Court of Special Appeals in Williams also declared
that MSMLL was remedial in nature.248 In Williams, the borrowers
alleged that the lender charged points in excess of those permitted by
MSMLL.249 In its analysis, the court, relying on Duckworth, found that
MSMLL was intended to protect consumers and, as a result, that it was
remedial in nature.25 °
Further supporting the statute's remedial nature is the Attorney
General's 1985 opinion, which recognized the remedial nature of
MSMLL. 25' At some level, the court in Drew understood the remedial
nature of the statute, as it noted that MSMLL was passed at a time
when consumer protection reform was sweeping the country.252 How-
ever, the Drew court ignored MSMLL's remedial nature in its analysis
of legislative intent, even though its own discussion and past prece-
dent indicated a contrary intent.
Once a statute is determined to be remedial in nature it "must be
liberally construed in order to effectuate the statute's broad remedial
purpose. '25 ' For example, the court in Breitenbach liberally construed
section 9-660(a) (1) of the Workers' Compensation Act to include
transportation costs even though there was no express mention of
these costs in the statute.2 5 4 Similarly, in Pak, the Court of Appeals
243. See generally Duckworth v. Bernstein, 55 Md. App. 710, 717, 466 A.2d 517, 520
(1983) (discussing the consumer protection purposes of MSMLL); Williams v. Standard
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 76 Md. App. 452, 455, 545 A.2d 708, 709 (1988) (noting the reme-
dial nature of MSMLL).
244. Duckworth, 55 Md. App. at 717, 466 A.2d at 520-21.
245. Id. at 712, 466 A.2d at 518.
246. Id at 724, 466 A.2d at 524.
247. Id.
248. Williams, 76 Md. App. at 455, 545 A.2d at 709.
249. Id. at 454, 545 A.2d at 709.
250. Id. at 455-56, 545 A.2d at 709.
251. 70 Md. Att'y Gen. Op. 87, 89-90 (1985).
252. Drew, 379 Md. at 325, 842 A.2d at 5.
253. Pak v. Hoang, 378 Md. 315, 326, 835 A.2d 1185, 1191 (2003).
254. Breitenbach v. N.B. Handy Co., 366 Md. 467, 484, 784 A.2d 569, 579 (2001); MD.
CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-660(a)(1) (1999, 2000 Cum. Supp.).
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liberally construed "reasonable attorney's fees" in section 8-203(e) (4)
of the Maryland Security Deposit Act 255 to include fees for postjudg-
ment motions to recover security deposits. 256 In applying a liberal
construction, the court recognized that landlords could defeat the
purpose of section 8-203(e)(4) because many tenants would poten-
tially decide that legal action is not feasible given the cost of an attor-
ney versus the relatively small dollar amounts involved and the
difficulties in obtaining the return of a security deposit.257
The court in Drew recognized the remedial nature of MSMLL,
but instead of liberally construing the statute to serve the legislature's
consumer protection intent, the court ignored the statute's remedial
nature by using various canons of construction to reach its conclusion
that the postponement provision need not be in writing.2 58 In Drew,
unlike the transportation costs in Breitenbach, there was express men-
tion of written notice in the statute, and thus Drew provides a stronger
case.for notice in light of the statute's remedial purpose.259 Further,
like the provision on attorney's fees in Pak, not requiring the post-
ponement provision to be in writing would effectively negate its reme-
dial purpose because borrowers would not know about this right.2 60
Additionally, past Maryland courts have specifically recognized the re-
medial nature of MSMLL, but the Drew court failed to take the reason-
ing of these courts into consideration. 261  The Drew court itself
acknowledged that balloon payments have long been problematic for
consumer borrowers; therefore, it should have liberally construed
MSMLL to protect these consumers by requiring the postponement
provision to be in writing. 2 62
5. Conclusion.-In Drew, the court held that MSMLL does not
require a lender who creates a balloon payment to state in writing that
the statutory postponement period of six months is available to bor-
255. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-203(e) (4) (2003).
256. Pak, 378 Md. at 321, 835 A.2d 1188.
257. Id. at 327-29, 835 A.2d at 1192-93.
258. Drew, 379 Md. at 333, 842 A.2d at 10 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
259. See id. at 329, 842 A.2d at 7 (stating that "the disclosure provisions listed in (i) and(ii) explicitly require lenders to expressly inform borrowers in writing that a balloon pay-
ment provision is included within the loan").
260. See id. at 334-35, 842 A.2d at 11 (Wilner, J., dissenting) (noting the statute's reme-
dial purpose).
261. See generally Williams v. Standard Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 76 Md. App. 452, 455, 545
A.2d 708, 709 (1988) (noting the remedial nature of MSMLL); Duckworth v. Bernstein, 55
Md. App. 710, 717, 466 A.2d 517, 520 (1983) (discussing the consumer protection pur-
poses of MSMLL).
262. See Drew, 379 Md. at 323, 842 A.2d 4 (describing balloon payments as "particularly
problematic for consumer borrowers").
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rowers.2 63 In doing so, the court used various canons of construction
to reach its conclusion and ignored the legislature's true intent.
2 64
The court failed to interpret the statute in context by examining legis-
lative history and reading the statute as a whole and from a common-
sense perspective. 265 Had the court taken this approach, it would
have discovered that the legislature's intent of protecting consumers
would be better served by requiring lenders to provide written disclo-
sure to borrowers about their postponement right.2 66 Given MSMLL's
consumer protection purpose, the court should have liberally con-
strued this remedial statute to effectuate its intent.267 Furthermore,
the court should have considered past Maryland court interpretations
of the statute, which have also found a consumer protection intent
and thus provide additional support for the postponement provision
to be in writing.
268
AMIR R. ZAIDI
263. Id. at 321, 842 A.2d at 3.
264. See supra notes 180-200 and accompanying text (discussing the court's use of the
canons of construction to ignore legislative intent).
265. See supra notes 201-239 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history and
reading statutes as a whole and from a common-sense approach to ascertain legislative
intent).
266. See supra notes 201-262 and accompanying text (finding that legislative intent sup-
ports written disclosure).
267. See supra notes 240-262 and accompanying text (construing the statute liberally to
effectuate intent).
268. See supra notes 243-250, 261 and accompanying text (finding that past decisions
support the statute's consumer protection purpose).
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VIII. TORTS
A. The Court of Appeals Paints a New Canvas: Imposing Stricter
Standards on Landlords to Abate Lead Paint Poisoning in Children
In Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc.,1 the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land considered whether a tenant was required to show that her land-
lord had notice of the peeling, flaking paint in her leased house in
order to establish a prima facie case of negligence under the Balti-
more City Housing Code for lead paint poisoning to her child.2 In a
5-2 decision, the court held that the tenant had no duty to show that
her landlord had notice of the peeling paint, thereby overruling
Richwind v. Brunson.3 In overruling precedent, the court properly de-
clined to follow the doctrine of stare decisis,4 in that (1) it recognized
that the Baltimore City Housing Code actually superseded the com-
mon law, despite its holding to the contrary in Richwind;5 (2) the in-
creased knowledge and awareness of the effects of lead paint
poisoning in children provided a reason to depart from precedent; 6
and (3) it abandoned a standard that would have been too harsh on
the tenant.7 The court's decision to overturn precedent and make it
easier for tenants to recover will positively impact the health and
safety of Maryland children and will help abate lead paint poisoning
in the future.8
1. The Case.-In August 1988, Shirley Parker rented a house at
1202 North Patterson Park Avenue, in Baltimore City.9 Fresh paint
was applied to the interior of the house before her tenancy began. 10
Soon after Shirley rented the house, her daughter, Sharon Parker,
1. 378 Md. 70, 835 A.2d 616 (2003).
2. Id. at 72, 835 A.2d at 617.
3. Id. In Richwind, the court held that a tenant must prove that a landlord had notice
of a lead paint violation in order for the court to find the landlord liable for negligence.
335 Md. 661, 673, 645 A.2d 1147, 1152 (1994).
4. Stare decisis is Latin for "to stand by things decided"; it is a "doctrine of precedent,
under which it is necessary for a court to follow earlier judicial decisions when the same
points arise, again in litigation." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1443 (8th ed. 2004).
5. See infra notes 173-182 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 187-196 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 197-202 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 203-208 and accompanying text.
9. Brooks, 378 Md. at 72, 835 A.2d at 617.
10. Id.
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moved in with her.1 On December 6, 1989, Sharon gave birth to the
minor appellee, Sean, who also lived at that address.
12
Sometime in February or March of 1991, an auction was held,
during which Lewin Realty (Lewin) purchased the house.13 Before
the purchase, Marvin Sober, on behalf of Lewin Realty, conducted a
walk-through inspection of the interior.1 4 Sharon accompanied Sober
as he inspected the house and later testified that at the time of the
inspection, there was peeling, chipping, and flaking paint present in
numerous areas of the interior of the house, including in Sean's bed-
room. 5 After Lewin purchased the house, the agency entered into a
new lease with Shirley and did not apply new paint to the interior of
the house.16 In February 1992, Sean was diagnosed with an elevated
blood-lead level,' 7 although Sharon did not learn about his condition
until four months later when a nurse from the Baltimore City Health
Department (BCHD) came to the house to speak with Sharon about
the situation." After BCHD inspected the house, they found fifty-six
areas of peeling, chipping, and flaking lead paint.1 9 Shortly thereaf-
ter, BCHD issued a lead paint violation notice for the property to
Lewin.2 ° Sober testified that Shirley never complained to him about
peeling paint in the house.2'
Sharon filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
against Lewin, alleging, inter alia, that Lewin was negligent in main-
taining and inspecting the premises.22 The claim was based on several
factors, including: (1) Lewin's violation of the Baltimore City Housing
Code;23 (2) Sean's exposure to an unreasonable risk of harm from the
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. Lewin Realty is owned by four stockholders, one of whom is Marvin Sober, who
was in charge of carrying out the company's daily business and managing the company. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 72-73, 835 A.2d at 617.
16. Id. at 73, 835 A.2d at 617.
17. Id. Two expert wimesses testified that Sean's exposure to lead paint caused perma-
nent brain damage, with the result that "Sean had trouble with organization, sustaining
attention, following directions, and controlling his behavior." Lewin Realty III, Inc. v.
Brooks, 138 Md. App. 244, 280-81, 771 A.2d 446, 467 (2001).
18. Brooks, 378 Md. at 73, 835 A.2d at 617.
19. Id., 835 A.2d at 617-18.
20. Id., 835 A.2d at 617.
21. Lewin Realty III, 138 Md. App. at 257, 771 A.2d at 453.
22. Brooks, 378 Md. at 73, 835 A.2d at 618.
23. BALTIMORE, MD., HOUSING CODE §§ 703(b) (3), 706(b) (1)-(2) (2000). Sharon al-
leged that Lewin violated section 703(3), which provides that to be considered in good
repair and safe condition, all walls and ceilings shall be "kept clean and free of any flaking,
loose, or peeling paint." Brooks, 378 Md. at 83, 835 A.2d at 623. In addition, Sharon al-
leged that Lewin violated section 706(b) (1), which states that "all interior loose or peeling
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lead-based paint while Lewin knew that Sean had no knowledge of its
danger and could not discover the danger, even in the exercise of
reasonable care; (3) Lewin's failure to exercise reasonable care in
properly maintaining the interior painted surfaces, despite actual and
constructive knowledge of the paint's flaking condition; and (4)
Lewin's failure to exercise reasonable care by inspecting the paint in
the interior of the house, when the flaking paint condition would
have been revealed upon a reasonable inspection.24
Before the case went to trial, Lewin filed a motion in limine to
exclude from evidence five lead paint violation notices issued in the
1980s by BCHD, in reference to Lewin's other properties, which were
not involved in the instant case. 25 Lewin argued that the notices were
irrelevant and were overly prejudicial to its case. 2 6 The court denied
the motion and the notices were admitted into evidence at trial.27
The jury found that Lewin was liable for negligence to Sean and
awarded $750,000 worth of damages to Sharon on Sean's behalf.21
Lewin appealed the case to the Court of Special Appeals. 29 The argu-
ments made to the Court of Special Appeals centered on whether the
circuit court had properly admitted the notices.3 0 The Court of Spe-
cial Appeals held that the admission of the notices was prejudicial er-
ror because the notices did not provide insight into the presence of
wall covering or paint shall be removed and the exposed surface shall be placed in a
smooth and sanitary condition," and section 706(b) (2), which states that "[n]o paint shall
be used for interior painting of any dwelling ... unless the paint is free from any lead
pigment." Id., 835 A.2d at 623-624.
The Housing Code no longer exists as such. In 2003, the City Council adopted and
codified the International Property Maintenance Code (IMPC) as part of the Building,
Fire and Related Codes of Baltimore City. See BALTIMORE, MD., BUILDING, FIRE, AND RE-
LATED CODES, pt. VII (2005). These codes replaced the former Housing Code and several
other city codes relating to property and building maintenance and safety. With regard to
lead paint, section 301.4 of the IMPC provides that "[1]ead-paint hazards must be abated in
accordance with the rules and regulations of the Maryland Department of the Environ-
ment and the Baltimore City Health Department." Id. § 301.4. The former Housing Code,
under which Brooks was decided, is, of course, still applicable to cases decided while it was
in force.
24. Brooks, 378 Md. at 73-74, 835 A.2d at 618.
25. Id. at 74, 835 A.2d at 618. Each document was entitled "Emergency Violation No-
tice and Order to Remove Lead Nuisance." Id.
26. Id. Lewin also argued that the documents should be deemed inadmissible as evi-
dence of other bad acts and that because Sober testified to having knowledge of the dan-
ger of lead paint, the issue of his knowledge and the notices were irrelevant. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. Before appealing the case, Lewin filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, which the circuit court denied. Id.
30. Id.
1270
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
peeling, chipping, or flaking paint in the rented property at issue.3 '
Accordingly, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the circuit court's
holding and remanded the case for a new trial.12 Sharon then ap-
pealed on Sean's behalf.33 The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to
elucidate the notice requirement in lead paint poisoning negligence
actions stemming from landlord violations of the Baltimore City Hous-
ing Code.34
After the initial briefing and oral argument, the Court of Appeals
amended its previously granted writ of certiorari and issued an order
directing the parties to file briefs that specifically considered three
main issues.3 5 The court asked the parties to consider: (1) whether a
landlord should have an affirmative duty to inspect his properties to
determine if there is flaking, chipping, or peeling paint, either before
or during a tenant's lease period; (2) whether plaintiffs in lead paint
negligence actions should have to prove that the landlord had notice
of a lead paint condition in the interior of the premises in order to
establish a prima facie case; and (3) whether a landlord should be
presumed to have notice of a lead paint condition when such a condi-
tion exists in the leased property.
2. Legal Background.-Since 1979, the Court of Appeals has uti-
lized the following standard for determining when it would be appro-
priate to depart from the principle of stare decisis and overrule
precedent: the common law must have "become unsound in the cir-
cumstances of modern life."3 7 Since then, the court has utilized this
standard, or a less stringent means of analysis, to overturn precedents
that the court found were no longer applicable. 3' The standard in
lead paint negligence cases since 1994 has required tenants to prove
that the landlord had notice of a violation in order to establish a
prima facie case of negligence.3 9 More recently, however, the aware-
ness of lead paint poisoning has substantially increased in Maryland-
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 72, 835 A.2d at 617.
35. Id. at 74-75, 835 A.2d at 618-19.
36. Id. at 75-76, 835 A.2d at 619.
37. See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 285 Md. 705, 714-15, 404 A.2d 1073, 1078 (1979). While this
standard was first articulated in White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 354, 223 A.2d 763, 767 (1966),
the Court of Appeals did not actually utilize the standard to overturn precedent until 1979
in Lewis.
38. See infra note 61 (noting two cases in which the Court of Appeals overturned prece-
dent due to changing conditions rendering precedent inapplicable).
39. Richwind v. Brunson, 335 Md. 661, 674, 645 A.2d 1147, 1153 (1994).
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and generally in the United States-catalyzing several states such as
Massachusetts, New York, and Connecticut to try to abate lead poison-
ing by holding landlords liable to tenants for negligence without the
tenant proving that the landlord had notice of a violation.4"
a. The Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Court's Standard for Over-
ruling Precedent.-The doctrine of stare decisis, meaning "to stand by
things decided," is a doctrine of precedent requiring a court to follow
earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise in litigation in
order to ensure consistency and predictability within the courts.4" In
most cases, the Court of Appeals follows the principle of stare decisis
to promote the consistent and predictable development of legal prin-
ciples.42 However, the Court of Appeals has adopted standards for
abandoning stare decisis in situations where common-law principles
can no longer serve as the basis for a decision.43
In 1979, in Lewis v. State, the Court of Appeals abandoned prece-
dent after it determined that the common law "ha[d] become un-
sound in the circumstances of modem life."44 In Lewis, the defendant
was convicted as an accessory before the fact to first degree murder.
45
The defendant appealed on the grounds that under the common law,
an accessory before the fact cannot be tried before the principal is
sentenced.46 The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the technical
common-law procedural rule, adopted in 1776, did require the sen-
tencing of the principal before an accessory before the fact could be
tried and that under that rule, the defendant was wrongly tried be-
40. See infra notes 118-136 and accompanying text (describing other states' efforts to
abate lead paint poisoning in children).
41. BLACK'S LAw DIcrIoNARY, supra note 4, at 1443.
42. Mayor of Baltimore v. Schwing, 351 Md. 178, 209, 717 A.2d 919, 934 (1998) (Raker,
J., concurring).
43. See Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 217, 438 A.2d 1301, 1308-09 (1981) (explaining
when the court should abandon stare decisis).
44. 285 Md. 705, 715, 404 A.2d 1073, 1078-79 (1979) (quoting White v. King, 244 Md.
348, 354, 223 A.2d 763, 767 (1966)). In White, the Court of Appeals examined whether the
principle lex loci delicti, meaning the law of the place where a tort or wrong took place,
should be abandoned in light of scholarly criticism. White, 244 Md. at 354-55, 223 A.2d at
767. The court stated that "the doctrine of stare decisis, important as it is, is not to be
construed as preventing us from changing a rule of law if we are convinced that the rule
has become unsound in the circumstances of modem life," and that stare decisis would
therefore not prohibit the court from determining that lex loci delicti should be overruled.
Id. at 354, 223 A.2d at 767. However, after analyzing the laws of other states, the court
determined that the present state of the law was such that any changes, if necessary, should
be made by the legislature and not the court. Id. at 354-55, 223 A.2d at 767.
45. Lewis, 285 Md. at 707, 404 A.2d at 1074.
46. Id.
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cause the principal had not yet been sentenced.4 7 However, the court
cited its reasoning from White v. King, decided thirteen years earlier,
and abandoned the common-law rule on the basis that it had become
unsound in the circumstances of modern life and needed to be
changed.48 The court reasoned that when the English courts origi-
nally adopted the common-law rule in the fifteenth century, the rule
acted as a means of easing the severity of the death penalty, but in
contrast, the rule only acts today to shield accessories from punish-
ment and reduce judicial efficiency.49 As such, the court abandoned
the common-law rule requiring that a principal be sentenced before
an accessory can be tried.5 °
Similarly in 1981, in Williams v. State, the Court of Appeals
adopted its reasoning from Lewis to change precedent, after finding
that the circumstances that gave rise to the common-law principles of
the precedent case no longer existed to a degree that rendered com-
mon-law principle applicable.51 In Williams, the defendant challenged
his convictions of murder and assault with intent to murder in a post-
conviction proceeding.52 The trial court held that the defendant's
right to be present at every stage of trial was violated because the jury
voir dire was conducted during a bench conference, while the defen-
dant remained at the trial table, even though he had not waived his
right to be present.53 On appeal, the Court of Appeals examined
whether the common-law principle that counsel's action or inaction
could never waive a criminal defendant's right to be present at all
stages of his trial was still applicable.54
In its analysis, the court recognized that there had been some
significant changes to the role of counsel since the time that this com-
mon-law principle was first established.55 According to the court, the
greatest change was the establishment of an absolute right to counsel
when there is a danger of incarceration, while in the past the right to
counsel was not absolute.56 In its analysis, the court cited Lewis, stat-
ing "that the common law is not static and is subject to modification in
47. Id. at 713, 404 A.2d at 1078.
48. Id. at 715, 404 A.2d at 1078-79 (citing White, 244 Md. at 354, 223 A.2d at 767).
49. Id., 404 A.2d at 1079.
50. Id. at 716, 404 A.2d at 1079.
51. 292 Md. 201, 218, 438 A.2d 1301, 1309 (1981).
52. Id. at 203, 438 A.2d at 1302.
53. Id. at 203-04, 438 A.2d at 1302.
54. Id. at 217-20, 438 A.2d at 1308-10.
55. Id. at 217, 438 A.2d at 1309.
56. Id. at 217-18, 438 A.2d at 1309.
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light of changing circumstances or increased knowledge. 57 It also
cited White and repeated the proposition that even though stare deci-
sis is an important legal principle, it does not prevent the court from
changing the law when it has become unfit for modern circum-
stances.58 As such, the court decided that because the primary func-
tion of mandated appointed counsel is to assert or waive the rights of
defendants, including the right to be present at trial, the common-law
rule that counsel's action or inaction could never waive a criminal de-
fendant's right to be present at all stages of his trial no longer ap-
plied.59 The court thus overturned precedent, finding that the right
to be present will be waived unless the defendant, himself, affirma-
tively asks to be present or fails to object to such occurrences and his
attorney consents or fails to address the issue.6"
In subsequent cases, the Court of Appeals applied the reasoning
used in Williams to similar cases to examine whether the common-law
principle in question was still applicable in light of the circumstances
and the court overturned precedent in situations where the circum-
stances had changed significantly enough to alter the effects of the
law. 6
1
In addition to applying the test used in Williams, the Court of
Appeals has applied less restrictive standards for overturning com-
mon-law rules. In 1998, in Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Schw-
ing, the court abandoned the rule that it used to decide a case two
years prior after determining that it had wrongly decided the previous
case.6 2 In the prior case, the court held that an employee who suffers
from an occupational disease and who receives a workers' compensa-
tion award for that condition may not pursue a new claim based on an
aggravation of the original condition due to additional exposure to
the same occupational hazards that produced the original condi-
57. Id. at 217, 438 A.2d at 1308 (citing Lewis v. State, 285 Md. 705, 715, 404 A.2d 1073,
1078-79 (1979)).
58. Id., 438 A.2d at 1309 (citing White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 354, 223 A.2d 763, 766-67
(1966)).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 220, 438 A.2d at 1310.
61. See Bozman v. Bozman, 376 Md. 461, 485, 496-97, 830 A.2d 450, 464-65, 471 (2003)
(abolishing the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity after finding it was a vestige of the
past and was unsound in the circumstances of modern life); Jones v. State, 302 Md. 153,
160-61, 486 A.2d 184, 188 (1985) (abrogating the common-law rule that an accessory can-
not be convicted of a crime greater than the principal because the court determined that
allowing the accessory to avoid the consequences of his actions was no longer sound in
modern life).
62. 351 Md. 178, 197, 717 A.2d 919, 928 (1998).
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tion.6 3 In Schwing, the court realized that its prior holding caused an
unfair result, and was contrary to the positions taken by many other
states,64 and thus found that an employee who suffers from an occupa-
tional disease may file a new claim for an aggravation in the condition
caused by new exposures to workplace hazards, thereby overruling its
prior holding.
6 5
The above cases demonstrate that the Court of Appeals has over-
turned precedent when a change in circumstances rendered prece-
dent unsound for the circumstances of modern life and when it has
determined that its logic had been faulty in an earlier case.
b. The Increased Awareness of the Frequency and Severity of the
Effects of Lead Paint Poisoning in Children.-
(1) Awareness and Action in Mayland.-Lead paint expo-
sure is incredibly dangerous and can cause permanent neurological
damage or even death.66 The consequences are more severe in chil-
dren under the age of six, where the lead slows the development of
the central nervous system and brain because their neurological sys-
tems are still developing.67
The General Assembly realized that because federal law prohibits
the sale of lead paint for the interior of homes,68 the dangers of child-
hood lead poisoning stem from old paint applied many years ago.
Thus, requiring homes to be properly maintained and free from flak-
ing or peeling paint prevents the lead-based paint from breaking into
chips and deteriorating into dust accessible to children, essentially
eliminating childhood lead poisoning.69 As a result, the Maryland leg-
islature enacted the Lead Poisoning Prevention Act in 1994 to reduce
the incidence of childhood lead poisoning.7 ° As part of the Act, the
63. Id. at 187, 717 A.2d at 923.
64. Id. at 197, 717 A.2d at 928.
65. Id. at 206, 717 A.2d at 932-33.
66. See Gore v. People's Say. Bank, 665 A.2d 1341, 1355 n.24 (Conn. 1995) (describing
the consequences of continued lead paint exposure).
67. MD. DEP'T OF THE ENV'T LEAD POISONING PREVENTION PROGRAM, at http://
www.mde.state.md.us/Programs/LandPrograms/LeadCoordination/index.asp (last vis-
ited Dec. 13, 2005) [hereinafter MD. DEP'T OF THE ENV'T].
68. Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 91-695, § 401, 84 Stat.
2078, 2079 (1971) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4831 (2000)).
69. See STATE OF MD., REPORT OF THE LEAD PAINT POISONING COMMISSION 3 (1994)
[hereinafter MD. LEAD PAINT REPORT] (stating that the single most important source of
childhood lead poisoning is dust resulting from deteriorated lead-based paint in older
houses).
70. Act of May 2, 1994, 1994 Md. Laws 114 (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN.,
ENVIR. §§ 6-801 to -852 (2000)).
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legislature required the establishment of a Lead Paint Poisoning Com-
mission that would meet at least quarterly to discuss the progress of
lead paint abatement efforts71 including certain lead poisoning pro-
tection programs and studies,72 satisfaction of the risk reduction stan-
dards by landlords of affected properties,73 lead contamination testing
and inspection programs, 4 and blood tests of tenants.75 In addition,
the legislature has proposed and enacted several measures in an at-
tempt to increase the public's awareness of the harmful effects of lead
and of methods of preventing lead paint poisoning in children. For
example, in 1997, the Maryland State Legislature enacted the Child-
hood Lead Screening Program, 76 designed to require universal blood-
lead prevention screening for children under the age of six in areas of
Maryland classified as high risk. 7 It also required that all children
under age six be screened for lead poisoning within thirty days of en-
tering a childcare facility.78
In 2002, the Maryland House of Delegates proposed the Mary
land Lead Poisoning Protection Act to further abate lead poisoning in
children. 79 This act would have required, inter alia, lead reduction
treatments to be included in certain risk reduction standards, reports
to include testing of lead-contaminated dust, and the establishment of
certain lead reduction procedures and guidelines by the Department
of the Environment.8 0
(2) Awareness and Action by the Federal Government.-In re-
sponse to the lead poisoning problem facing children in the United
States, Congress passed the Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Re-
duction Act of 1992, also known as Title X, which mandated the crea-
tion of an infrastructure to correct lead paint hazards existent in
homes, redefined lead paint hazards, and articulated how they can be
controlled.8 ' The Act ensured that lead paint problems are disclosed
71. MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 6-808.
72. Id. § 6-810.
73. Id. § 6-815.
74. Id. § 6-818.
75. Id. § 6-829.
76. 1997 Md. Laws 521, codified at MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 18-106 (2003).
77. Id. The law requires the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene to establish
and administer a lead poisoning screening program to guarantee appropriate screening of
children for lead poisoning. Id.
78. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-556.1 (2004).
79. H.B. 1154, 416th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2002).
80. Id.
81. Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 3672 (1992) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4851-4856 (2000)).
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before the sale or lease of a residential property, developed national
and local education programs, required inspectors and abatement
contractors to become licensed, and provided the impetus for other
governmental acts against lead paint poisoning.1
2
In addition, in recognition of the problem of childhood lead
paint poisoning, President Clinton issued Executive Order 1304583 in
April 1997, directing each federal agency to make it a high priority to
assess, identify, and address the risks of childhood lead paint poison-
ing."' To accompany the Order, President Clinton created the Task
Force on Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks to Children
5
to develop a set of recommendations and strategies to protect the en-
vironmental health and safety of children in the United States.86
Through research, the task force determined that lead poisoning is a
completely preventable disease, and that residential lead paint
hazards in homes where children live could be eliminated in ten
years.87 President Clinton made the ultimate goal for the Task Force
the elimination of childhood lead poisoning as a major public health
problem in the United States by 2010.88
c. The Maryland Standard for Establishing Negligence in Lead
Paint Cases.-In order to establish a negligence cause of action under
the common law, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant had a duty
to protect the plaintiff from injury, that the defendant breached that
duty, that the plaintiff suffered an actual loss or injury and that the
loss or injury was proximately caused by the defendant's breach of
duty.89 In addition, the common law provides that a landlord is not
liable to a tenant for negligence for a defective condition on the
premises unless the landlord knew or had reason to know of the con-
dition and had a reasonable opportunity to correct it.9"
Since 1994, when it decided Richwind, the Court of Appeals has
held that the lead paint provisions of the Baltimore City Housing
Code do not alter or supersede the common-law requirement that a
82. Id.
83. Exec. Order No. 13,045, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,885 (Apr. 23, 1997).
84. Id. § 1-101(a).
85. Id. § 3-301.
86. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON ENV'TL HEALTH RISKS & SAFETY RISKS TO CHILDREN,
ELIMINATING CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING: A FEDERAL STRATEGY TARGETING LEAD PAINT
HAZARDs (2000).
87. Id. at 1.
88. Id. at i.
89. Richwind v. Brunson, 335 Md. 661, 670, 645 A.2d 1147, 1151 (1994) (citations
omitted).
90. Id. at 673, 645 A.2d at 1153 (citations omitted).
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landlord receive notice of a defect before he is held liable to the ten-
ant for failing to correct it.9" Section 301 of the Housing Code re-
quired the Commissioner of Housing and Community Development
to give landlords notice of any discovered violations92 and section 303
mandated that the Commissioner order the required corrections by
notice and service.9" In addition, section 702 provided that every
building in Baltimore City containing a dwelling had to be in "good
repair, safe condition, and fit for human habitation,"94 while section
703 detailed the standards for good repair and safe condition and re-
quired that all walls, ceilings, woodwork, doors and windows were
clean and free of flaking, loose, or peeling paint. 5 Lastly, section 706
prohibited the use of lead paint in the interior of homes and required
that all interior loose or peeling paint be removed. 6
In Richwind v. Brunson, a tenant brought a negligence action on
behalf of her minor children against her landlord for injuries sus-
tained by her children as a result of their exposure to lead-based
paint.9 7 The Court of Appeals examined both the common-law negli-
gence standard in Maryland and the requirements imposed by the
Baltimore City Housing Code and determined that both the code and
the common law required that the landlord had notice and/or actual
knowledge of the dangerous condition on the property and a reasona-
ble chance to fix it before being held responsible." It therefore de-
termined that a private cause of action in a landlord-tenant context
could arise from a lead paint violation of any type of statutory duty or
implied warranty created by the Baltimore City Housing Code, but
that sections 301 and 303 required that a landlord have adequate no-
tice of the lead paint violation before being held liable. 9 The court
determined that under the Housing Code, a landlord has a duty to
91. See, e.g., id. at 675-76, 645 A.2d at 1154 (holding that a tenant had a duty to prove
that the landlord had notice of a defective condition to establish a prima facie case for
negligence).
92. BALTIMORE, MD., HOUSING CODE § 301 (2000).
93. Id. § 303.
94. Id. § 702.
95. Id. § 703.
96. Id. § 706.
97. 335 Md. 661, 668-69, 645 A.2d 1147, 1150 (1994).
98. Id. at 674-75, 645 A.2d at 1153. The court stated that the primary difference be-
tween the code and the common law was that the code seemed to require the Commis-
sioner to provide the landlord with notice, whereas the common law just requires that the
landlord receive notice from any source. Id. at 675, 645 A.2d at 1153.
99. Id. at 671, 645 A.2d at 1151-52. The court quoted language from section 301,
which required the Commissioner of Housing and Community Development to give notice
of a lead paint violation to a landlord once it had been determined that such a violation
existed. Id. at 673, 645 A.2d at 1152. It then quoted language from section 303, which
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protect his tenants from injuries caused by lead paint, that the land-
lord in the case breached his duty and that he proximately caused the
tenant's injury.' ° The court determined that even though the Hous-
ing Code required notice by the Commissioner, the landlord was still
liable for negligence under the common-law standard because he re-
ceived notice of the condition from the tenants and the management
company knew the age of the building and the dangers of lead
paint.' 1 Importantly, it held that the Baltimore City Housing Code
did not alter or supersede the common-law notice requirements, but
instead reinforced the requirement that the landlord have notice
before he can be held liable.
10 2
The Court of Appeals decided Scroggins v. Dahne'0 3 on the same
day as Richwind. The Court examined whether a landlord could be
held liable for lead poisoning when the landlord had no knowledge of
the flaking lead paint in a rented apartment. 10 4 The court drew upon
its reasoning in Richwind and stated that in order to impose liability on
a landlord, the landlord must have notice and an opportunity to re-
pair the defective condition before the plaintiff sustained injuries
from that condition.10 5 Accordingly, the court held that because the
landlords did not have notice of flaking lead-based paint and because
they were not given a reasonable opportunity to correct the condition,
they were not negligent as a matter of law.'0 6
The court established less stringent standards than those set forth
in Richwind six years later in Brown v. Defmer,' °7 when a mother, on
behalf of her minor children, sued her landlords for negligence and
sought damages for lead paint poisoning suffered by the children.1
0 8
The Court of Appeals held that in lead poisoning negligence actions
based on violations of the Baltimore City Housing Code, the tenants
had to show that the landlord had "reason to know" of a condition on
the property that may pose harm to the tenants.'0 9 Specifically, in
order to satisfy this standard, the tenants had to show (1) that there
was flaking paint in the premises and (2) that the landlord had notice
required the commissioner to order the necessary corrections by means of notice and ser-
vice. Id.
100. Id. at 670-71, 645 A.2d at 1151-52.
101. Id. at 679-80, 645 A.2d at 1155-56.
102. Id. at 674-75, 645 A.2d at 1153.
103. 335 Md. 688, 645 A.2d 1160 (1994).
104. Id. at 690, 645 A.2d at 1161.
105. Id. at 693, 645 A.2d at 1162.
106. Id., 645 A.2d at 1163.
107. 357 Md. 344, 744 A.2d 47 (2000).
108. Id. at 349-50, 744 A.2d at 50.
109. Id. at 362, 744 A.2d at 57.
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of the condition."' In meeting this standard, the tenant did not have
to show that the paint was lead based."' In Brown, the court held that
the landlord could be liable for negligence to the tenant because the
landlord had "reason to know" of the peeling, flaking paint based on
complaints to the landlord about the deteriorating condition of the
paint.'12
Lastly, in Jones v. Mid-Atlantic Funding Co.," 3 a tenant brought a
lead paint poisoning negligence action against the landlords on her
own behalf and on behalf of her minor children." 4 The Court of
Appeals examined whether the lower court properly granted summary
judgment in favor of the landlords." 5 It determined that the case
should have been submitted to the jury to determine (1) whether the
landlords had reason to know of the flaking paint condition; and (2)
whether landlords of ordinary intelligence with the same knowledge
would have realized the risk of lead poisoning, in accordance with the
test established in Brown."' The court therefore reversed and re-
manded the case with instructions that the jury hear the case."1 7
d. Other States' Attempts at Lead Paint Poisoning Prevention.-
In addition to the legislative and judicial actions of Maryland and the
legislative actions of the United States government, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, and New York have taken judicial action to combat lead
paint poisoning in children by imposing strict standards upon land-
lords in negligence cases of lead paint poisoning.
(1) Massachusetts.-In 1984, in Bencosme v. Kokoras," 8 the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded that landlords were
strictly liable for any compensatory damages resulting from violations
of the state's lead paint laws." 9 In Bencosme, the court examined sec-
tion 199 of the Massachusetts General Laws,'120 which created landlord
liability, and it determined that neither negligence nor knowledge of
110. Id.
111. Id. The court found that the language of the Baltimore City Housing Code re-
quired the tenant to show a presence of flaking, loose, or peeling paint to establish a
violation and it contained no express language requiring a further showing of the content
of the paint. Id.
112. Id. at 367, 744 A.2d at 60.
113. 362 Md. 661, 766 A.2d 617 (2001).
114. Id. at 670, 766 A.2d at 621-22.
115. Id. at 665, 766 A.2d at 619.
116. Id. at 685-87, 766 A.2d at 630-31.
117. Id. at 687-88, 766 A.2d at 631.
118. 507 N.E.2d 748 (Mass. 1987).
119. Id. at 750.
120. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 111, § 199 (West 1984).
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the risk is an element of liability.12 1 Instead, the court found that the
owner is liable for any damages caused by his failure to perform the
duties required of him by statute, including removing or covering lead
paint when a child under the age of six resides in the premises.
122
The court concluded that the statute did not require a showing of
notice to the landlord before the landlord could be held liable to the
tenant for injuries caused by the lead paint violation. 123
(2) Connecticut.-In 1989, in Hardy v. Griffin,124 the Supe-
rior Court of Connecticut held landlords strictly liable for injuries to
minor tenants caused by the ingestion of lead paint. 125 The court de-
termined that the tenant's son suffered from lead paint poisoning and
that this condition resulted from his exposure to the lead-based paint
present in the apartment rented from the landlords. 126 The court
found that because section 16-49 of the New Haven, Connecticut,
Code of General Ordinances imposes a duty on landlords to maintain
rental premises free of lead paint and make all necessary repairs to
put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition, the land-
lords in the case were liable for the injuries incurred by the tenant's
son. 1 27 The court relied on the traditional rule that violation of an
ordinance enacted for the protection of the public is negligence as a
matter of law. 128 The court concluded that the landlords were liable
for the tenant's condition because of their negligent failure to keep
the premises free of lead paint and because they should have known
of the presence of lead paint at the time they rented out the
premises. 129
(3) New York.-The Court of Appeals of New York's 1996
decision, Juarez v. Wavecrest Management Team Ltd.,' 3° charged land-
lords with notice of any lead paint condition that a reasonable inspec-
tion would have revealed.' 3 ' The court in Juarez charged landlords
with notice of all of the hazardous conditions in the rental premises in
121. Bencosme, 507 N.E.2d at 750.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. 569 A.2d 49 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1989).
125. Id. at 51.
126. Id. at 50.
127. Id. at 50-51.
128. Id. (citing Panaroni v. Johnson, 256 A.2d 246, 253 (Conn. 1969)).
129. Id. at 51.
130. 672 N.E.2d 135 (N.Y. 1996).
131. Id.
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question.13 2 In its analysis, the court examined the Administrative
Code of New York, specifically Local Law 1' and determined that it
required landlords to remove or cover paint containing specified
levels of lead if the landlord had been notified that a child six years
old or younger was living in the dwelling.1 3 ' The court also deter-
mined that Local Law 1 further established a presumption that peel-
ing paint in a dwelling unit occupied by a child six years of age or
under comprises a hazardous lead condition in any building erected
prior to 1960.15 The court specifically stated that the law did not
create an additional standard of care because it imposed a reasonable-
ness standard that allowed a landlord to argue that a lead paint hazard
existed despite his reasonable attempts to prevent it, meaning that he
would not be held liable for negligence if he could prove that he exer-
cised reasonable care in maintaining the premises.1 36
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., the
Court of Appeals examined the Baltimore City Housing Code and the
relevant common-law rules and held that a tenant does not have to
prove that her landlord had notice of a lead paint violation in order to
establish a prima facie case of negligence.137 Judge Eldridge, writing
for the majority,1 3 ' determined that Sharon Parker, the tenant, did
not need to show that Lewin, the landlord, had notice of the Housing
Code violations in order to establish a prima facie case of negligence,
overruling Richwind and its progeny.13 9 The court then held that be-
cause Sharon did not need to show that Lewin had notice of the viola-
tion, notices of past violations were irrelevant to the case and were
erroneously admitted into evidence at trial and therefore remanded
the case for a new trial. 140
The court examined the Baltimore City Housing Code, which im-
poses obligations and duties upon landlords who rent residential
property to tenants.1 41 The court determined that sections 702, 703,
and 706 of the Housing Code place an affirmative duty on landlords
132. Id. at 137.
133. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 27-2013(h) (1982).
134. Juarez, 672 N.E.2d at 143.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 141-42.
137. 378 Md. 70, 72, 835 A.2d 616, 617 (2003).
138. Judge Eldridge's opinion was joined by Chief Judge Bell and Judges Cathell, Har-
rell, and Battaglia. Id. at 70-71, 835 A.2d at 616-17.
139. Id. at 72, 835 A.2d at 617.
140. Id. at 72, 99, 835 A.2d at 617, 627.
141. Id. at 81, 835 A.2d at 622. The court noted that section 103(b) required that the
Housing Code be liberally construed. Id.
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to continuously keep the dwellings free of loose or peeling paint.
14 2
The court lastly noted that if the Commissioner of Housing and Com-
munity Development determined that a code violation existed, section
301 required him to give notice of the violation to the landlord, and
section 303 required him to order the necessary corrections by means
of notice and service.
143
The court next analyzed the general rule that under the common
law, and in absence of a statute, a landlord has no duty to inspect the
rented premises or keep the rented premises in good repair. 144 The
court noted that under Maryland common law, where there is an ap-
plicable statutory provision specifically designed to protect a class of
people to which the plaintiff belongs, violation of the statute or ordi-
nance by the defendant is evidence of negligence. 14 5 In examining
the Baltimore City Housing Code against the facts of the case, the
court determined that the injured child, Sean, was within the class of
people that the Baltimore City Housing Code was designed to protect;
the City Council, by enacting sections 702 and 703 of the Housing
Code, intended to protect children from lead paint poisoning by put-
ting landlords on notice of conditions that could increase the risk of
such injuries.146 Because the Housing Code applied, the court deter-
mined that this case was an exception to the common-law principle
that a landlord has no duty to inspect and maintain the premises.
47
Moreover, the court determined that two separate sections, sections
703 and 706 of the Housing Code, required removal of flaking, loose,
or peeling paint in order for the dwelling to be considered safe and
therefore reasoned that the common-law rule was inapplicable and
that landlords did have a duty to inspect the property.'
48
The court examined case law and concluded that in order to es-
tablish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must only show that
142. Id. at 83-84, 835 A.2d at 623-24. Section 702 requires that a dwelling be kept in safe
condition, good repair, and fit for human habitation. BALTIMoRE, MD., HOUSING CODE
§ 702 (2000). Section 703 mandates that all walls, ceilings, woodwork, doors, and windows
be kept free of loose, flaking, or peeling paint. Id. § 703. Section 706 required the re-
moval of loose and peeling paint from interior surfaces and that all newly applied paint be
lead free. Id. § 706. The court reasoned that landlords should not have trouble meeting
the requirements because section 909 of the Housing Code required dwelling occupants to
grant access to landlords at all reasonable times. Brooks, 378 Md. at 84, 835 A.2d at 624. In
the event that the landlord could not comply, section 1001 prohibited the lease of the
dwelling. BALTIMORE, MD., HOUSING CODE § 1001 (2000).
143. Brooks, 378 Md. at 87, 835 A.2d at 626.
144. Id. at 78, 835 A.2d at 620.
145. Id., 835 A.2d at 620-21.
146. Id. at 81, 835 A.2d at 622.
147. Id. at 78-81, 835 A.2d at 621-22.
148. Id. at 81-84, 835 A.2d at 623-24.
128320051
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
there existed a violation of a statute or ordinance designed to protect
a specific class of persons of which the plaintiff is a part and that the
violation proximately caused the injury.14 9 The court noted that none
of the relevant cases imposed the additional burden of proving that
the defendant was aware that he or she violated the applicable stat-
ute. 5 It further stated that if the violation of the statute proximately
caused the plaintiff's injury, evidence of the violation was enough to
warrant the court's submission of the question of the defendant's neg-
ligence to the jury, and the jury will then evaluate whether the defen-
dant's actions were reasonable under all of the circumstances. 15 1
Because a landlord's liability for injury to a child caused by lead paint
poisoning depends on the jury's evaluation of the landlord's actions
under all circumstances, the court explicitly stated that landlords were
not subject to a strict liability regime. 152
In addition, the court rejected the argument that imposing upon
a landlord a duty to inspect property during a tenancy would be too
burdensome because it would require the landlord to inspect the
property on a frequent basis.1 5 ' The court relied on the fact that peel-
ing and flaking of paint is a gradual, prolonged process that a land-
lord can detect with reasonable periodic inspections.' 5 4 Further,
because section 909 of the Housing Code requires that tenants allow
access of their rented property to their landlords, the court rejected
Lewin's argument that the tenant might object to the landlord's
inspections. 15
5
The court next recognized that its present holding conflicted
with its 1994 holding in Richwind v. Brunson, which, in addressing a
negligence claim based on a landlord's alleged lead paint violation,
held that the Housing Code did not modify the common-law notice
requirement because violations of sections 301 and 303 of the Hous-
ing Code explicitly contemplated notice to the landlord. 56 The court
noted that section 301 required that the Commissioner give notice to
the landlord when he discovered a Housing Code violation and that
section 303 required the Commissioner to order the necessary correc-
tions by notice and service. 157 The court explained that in Richwind,
149. Id. at 79, 835 A.2d at 621.
150. Id. at 80, 835 A.2d at 622.
151. Id. at 79, 835 A.2d at 621.
152. Id. at 84-85, 835 A.2d at 624.
153. Id. at 85, 835 A.2d at 625.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 86, 835 A.2d at 625.
156. Id. at 86-88, 835 A.2d at 625-27.
157. Id. at 87-88, 835 A.2d at 626-27.
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the court found that each of these code provisions mandated that the
landlord be served with notice and afforded a reasonable opportunity
to correct the defect.1 58 The court explained that its opinion in
Richwind was flawed because it wrongly extended these two provisions
to apply to tenants, despite the fact that the Housing Code, in refer-
ence to notice, refers to members of government and fails to make
any mention of tenants in its description of duties.
15 9
In dissent, Judge Raker, joined by Judge Wilner, opposed the ma-
jority's conclusion that the Housing Code abolishes the common-law
notice requirement as a precursor to negligence liability and dis-
agreed with the majority's decision to abandon the principles of stare
decisis and overrule Richwind. 6 ° Judge Raker argued that the major-
ity wrongly interpreted the Housing Code as abolishing the notice re-
quirement and therefore incorrectly abrogated Maryland's well-
established common-law principle that requires the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the landlord knew or had reason to know that the
premises had flaking or peeling paint before being held liable.' 6 '
Judge Raker opposed the majority's decision on the basis that it makes
it possible for tenants to establish a prima facie case for negligence if
they have flaking paint in their homes and a person in the class pro-
tected by the Housing Code has suffered a lead paint injury, regard-
less of whether the landlord acted reasonably.1 6 2 Judge Raker
contended that in doing so, the majority's holding abolished the com-
mon-law principle that traditionally forgave landlords who had valid
excuses for their transgressions in not fixing the problem, including
lack of notice, and did not hold the landlords liable for the injury.' 6 "
Judge Raker also disagreed with the majority's establishment of what
she characterized as a strict liability standard, which relegates land-
lords to the status of insurers for any lead-based paint injury sustained
by a child.' 64 Finally,Judge Raker argued that because the tenant is in
158. Id., 645 A.2d at 626.
159. Id at 87-88, 645 A.2d at 626. The court also mentioned that other jurisdictions
have charged landlords with notice of conditions that could be found through a reasona-
ble inspection. Id. at 89 n.7, 645 A.2d at 627 n.7.
160. Id. at 90 & n.1, 835 A.2d at 627-28 & n.1 (Raker, J., dissenting).
161. See id. at 92-94, 835 A.2d at 629-30 (Raker, J., dissenting) (discussing the long line
of cases, as well as the Restatement (Second) of Property § 17.6, which states that a tenant's
prima facie case for negligence includes proof that the landlord knew or had reason to
know of the flaking paint).
162. Id. at 90-91, 835 A.2d at 628 (Raker, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 91, 835 A.2d at 628 (Raker, J., dissenting).
164. Id. (Raker, J., dissenting).
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a better position to observe flaking or chipping paint, it should be the
tenant's responsibility to notify the landlord of this condition. 165
4. Analysis.-In Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., the Court of Ap-
peals imposed strict standards upon landlords in negligence cases in-
volving lead paint poisoning in children by eliminating the tenant's
burden of proving that the landlord had notice of peeling, flaking
paint on the premises.' 66 In doing so, the court overruled Richwind
and its progeny, which required the tenant to prove that the landlord
had notice of the violation in order to establish a prima facie case of
negligence.' 67 The court's decision to overturn precedent was proper
because (1) it recognized that the Baltimore City Housing Code su-
perseded the common law, despite its holding in Richwind to the con-
trary;' 68 (2) awareness and knowledge of the harm caused by lead
paint in children has increased, rendering the precedent standard in-
applicable;' 69 and (3) it abandoned a standard that would have been
too harsh on the tenant and the children of Maryland. 17 The court's
decision to overturn precedent and impose more stringent standards
upon landlords will impact positively the health and safety of children
and will help abate future cases of lead paint poisoning in
Maryland.' 7 '
a. The Court Properly Abolished the Notice Element in Common-
Law Negligence Actions for Injuries Resulting from Lead Paint Violations.-
The court in Brooks properly interpreted the Baltimore City Housing
Code as modifying or superseding the common law because there was
clear evidence that the City Council intended the Housing Code to
supersede the common law. 172 The court properly recognized that at
common law, and in the absence of a statute, a landlord has no duty
to keep rental premises in good repair or to inspect the rented prop-
erty at any time before or during the lease.'7 3 The court also recog-
nized that in construing a statute, the Court of Appeals has
traditionally assumed that the statute was not intended to modify, nul-
lify, or supersede the common law unless there is clear indication to
165. Id. at 97, 835 A.2d at 632 (Raker, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 89, 835 A.2d at 627.
167. Id. at 72, 835 A.2d at 617.
168. See infra notes 173-182 and accompanying text.
169. See infra notes 187-196 and accompanying text.
170. See infra notes 197-202 and accompanying text.
171. See infra notes 203-208 and accompanying text.
172. Brooks, 378 Md. at 81, 835 A.2d at 622.
173. Id. at 78, 835 A.2d at 620.
1286 [VOL. 64:1268
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
the contrary. 174 The Brooks court properly found that the City Coun-
cil intended the Housing Code to supersede the common law. Sec-
tion 103(b) of the Housing Code explicitly states that it is intended to
be remedial and should be liberally construed to accomplish its goals,
which is a clear indication that the City Council intended the Housing
Code to supersede the common law.' 75 In addition, Maryland law
states that where there is an applicable statutory scheme designed to
protect a class of people of which the plaintiff is a part, the defen-
dant's duty is prescribed by the statute, 176 which further indicates that
the Brooks court properly determined that Lewin had a duty to in-
spect the property and keep it free of flaking paint.
As in Schwing, where the Court of Appeals examined a prior case,
determined that its prior holding was incorrect and therefore aban-
doned precedent, 177 the Court of Appeals in Brooks properly over-
turned Richwind after finding that its reasoning in Richwind was
flawed.17 The Brooks court determined that Richwind mistakenly in-
terpreted the language of section 303 of the Housing Code to require
tenants to provide the landlord with notice after discovering a viola-
tion, while the plain language of the Housing Code fails to make any
mention of tenants in its description of duties and instead refers only
to members of the government. 79 Thus, the court properly aban-
doned its erroneous interpretation from Richwind. As such, the court
in Brooks permissibly abolished the common-law notice requirement.
Lastly, while Judge Raker, in dissent, argued that the majority im-
posed a strict liability regime upon landlords in lead paint negligence
actions by abolishing the notice requirement, 8 0 the new standard
cannot reasonably be characterized as a strict liability regime.1 81 Be-
cause the Brooks majority still requires the jury to determine whether
the landlord acted reasonably in his efforts to abate the flaking paint
condition, the majority did not establish a strict liability regime that
174. Id. at 86-87, 835 A.2d at 625-26; see Richwind v. Brunson, 335 Md. 661, 672, 645
A.2d 1147, 1152 (1994).
175. See Brooks, 378 Md. at 81, 835 A.2d at 622.
176. Brown v. Dermer, 357 Md. 344, 358-59, 744 A.2d 47, 55 (2000).
177. In Schwing a workers' compensation claimant filed a second claim for benefits
stemming from an occupational heart disease, which was rejected because it was not based
on a new disability, as was required by precedent. Mayor of Baltimore v. Schwing, 351 Md.
178, 197, 717 A.2d 919, 928 (1998). In its analysis, the Court of Appeals felt that it was
appropriate to revisit precedent and determined that it had reached the wrong result in its
prior holding. Id.
178. Brooks, 378 Md. at 88, 835 A.2d at 626.
179. Id. at 8--88, 835 A.2d at 626.
180. Id. at 91, 835 A.2d at 628 (Raker, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 84-85, 835 A.2d at 624-25.
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would hold the landlord liable without determining whether he acted
reasonably.'
82
b. It Was Proper for the Court of Appeals to Overturn Precedent
and Find That Notice Was No Longer Required Because Increased Knowledge
of Lead Paint Dangers Rendered Precedent Inapplicable and the Precedent
Standard Would Have Been Too Harsh on Plaintiffs.-Instead of uphold-
ing its standard that tenants must demonstrate that their landlord had
notice of a lead paint violation before establishing a prima facie case
of negligence, the court in Brooks properly held that a plaintiff can
establish a prima facie case of negligence absent any proof that the
landlord had notice of the existence of flaking and peeling paint.
18 3
In doing so, the court properly abandoned its holdings from the
Richwind line of cases,1 8 4 where it stated that the tenant had the bur-
den of proving that the landlord had such notice.18 5 As a result, the
Brooks court established a standard whereby tenants no longer bear
the burden of proving that their landlord had notice of a violation in
order to establish a prima facie case for negligence.
1 6
(1) The Court Appropriately Overruled Precedent Because of the
Increased Knowledge and Awareness of Lead Paint Dangers.-The Brooks
court properly abandoned precedent by following its holding in
Lewis, which determined that it is appropriate to abandon precedent
and adopt new standards when changed circumstances and increased
knowledge render precedent unsuitable to current circumstances. 8 7
In Lewis, the court determined that accessories could be tried before
the principal to a crime was sentenced because the circumstances had
changed since the fifteenth century, when the law was in place to
lessen the instances of the death penalty.' Likewise, in Williams, the
court examined the common-law principle that action or inaction by
counsel could never waive a criminal defendant's right to be present
at all stages of his trial and determined that because criminal defend-
ants facing incarceration now have an absolute right to counsel that
182. Id. at 85, 835 A.2d at 624-25.
183. Id. at 72, 835 A.2d at 617.
184. E.g.,Jones v. Mid-Atlantic Funding Co., 362 Md. 688, 766 A.2d 617 (2001); Brown v.
Dermer, 357 Md. 344, 744 A.2d 47 (2000); Scroggins v. Dahne, 335 Md. 668, 645 A.2d 1160
(1994); Richwind v. Brunson, 335 Md.'661, 674-75, 645 A.2d 1147, 1153-54 (1994).
185. Richwind, 335 Md. at 674-75, 645 A.2d at 1153-54.
186. See Brooks, 378 Md. at 81, 835 A.2d at 622.
187. Id.
188. Lewis v. State, 285 Md. 705, 716, 404 A.2d 1073, 1078 (1979).
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was not present at the time that the common-law rule was established,
the common-law principle was no longer applicable."8 9
Just like in these cases, circumstances have changed since the no-
tice requirement was read into lead paint negligence cases in 1994, in
that there is an increased knowledge and awareness of the harms of
lead paint poisoning. The Maryland Legislature's enactment of the
1994 Lead Paint Prevention Act to reduce the incidence of childhood
lead poisoning increased the knowledge and awareness of the harmful
effects of childhood lead paint poisoning.190 The legislature's main
goal in enacting this law was to increase the public's awareness of the
harmful effects of lead and the methods required for preventing lead
paint poisoning in children.19 1 The legislature further increased the
public's knowledge and awareness of lead paint by proposing and en-
acting several other bills designed to do exactly that. 92 Action by the
federal government has also increased public knowledge and aware-
ness of the ill effects of lead paint poisoning. 193
In addition to the increased knowledge and awareness of lead
paint poisoning provided by both the Maryland and federal legisla-
tures, the trends of other states to attempt to abate lead paint poison-
ing by abolishing the notice requirement further illustrate the general
increased knowledge of the dangers of lead paint. The Brooks court
properly supported its decision by noting that other jurisdictions have
also charged landlords with notice of the conditions that a reasonable
inspection would have revealed.19 4 In particular, it explained that in
Juarez, the Court of Appeals of New York charged landlords with no-
tice of any hazardous conditions existing in the rental premises of a
tenant.195 As further demonstration of the changed circumstances,
189. Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 217-18, 438 A.2d 1301, 1309 (1981); see also Bozman
v. Bozman, 376 Md. 461, 467-68, 830 A.2d 450, 454 (2003) (abrogating the doctrine of
interspousal tort immunity after finding that it went against the prevailing social norms
and was therefore useless); Jones v. State, 302 Md. 153, 160-61, 486 A.2d 184, 188 (1985)
(determining that because it had abrogated the common-law rule in Lewis that an acces-
sory before the fact cannot be tried before a principal, the common-law principle that an
accessory cannot be convicted of a crime greater than the principal had become obsolete).
190. See MD. CODE. ANN., ENVIR. §§ 6-801 to -852 (2000).
191. See MD. LEAD PANr REPORT, supra note 69.
192. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
193. For example, in 1992 Congress passed the Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard
Reduction Act, also known as Title X, which mandated that landlords disclose lead paint
problems before the sale or lease of a residential property and developed national and
local education programs to help make the public aware of the devastating effects of lead
paint. Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 3672 (1992) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4851-4856 (2000)).
194. Brooks, 378 Md. 70, 89 n.7, 835 A.2d 616, 627 n.7 (2003).
195. Id.
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courts in Connecticut and Massachusetts have established a strict lia-
bility regime in lead paint negligence cases against landlords.
196
Thus, it is clear that state and federal legislation, along with the
judicial decisions of other states, have increased the public knowledge
and awareness of the effects of lead paint poisoning over the past dec-
ade, rendering Richwind, which required tenants to prove that their
landlords had notice of the lead paint condition, no longer practical
because landlords now have sufficient reason to be aware of the dan-
gers of lead paint.
(2) The Court Properly Overruled Precedent by Abandoning a
Standard That Increased the Likelihood of Lead Paint Injuries.-Lastly, the
Court of Appeals properly abandoned precedent consistent with the
standard established in Schwing, where it overruled precedent be-
cause it determined that the prior standard would have been harmful
to the plaintiff and others similarly situated.1"7 The Schwing court
abandoned a rule that barred the plaintiff from making a second
workers' compensation claim for benefits not based on a new disabil-
ity because the consequences were too harsh in that they left the
plaintiff without a remedy for the injuries suffered as a result of addi-
tional exposure to occupational hazards.'
98
As in Schwing, the Brooks court determined that the harm to Sean
and future minor tenants would have been greater under the prior
standard than that which the court chose to adopt because the ten-
ant's prima facie case would be more difficult to prove.' 99 Under
Richwind, Sharon would have had to prove that Lewin Realty had no-
tice of the lead paint violations and would likely have had difficulty
doing so because Lewin's manager was the only person who had ex-
amined the house, there was no evidence that he actually saw the flak-
ing, peeling paint, and no evidence that Sharon ever complained to
Lewin about the paint condition.200 Had the Court of Appeals there-
fore followed precedent, it would have been difficult for Sharon to
establish her negligence case by proving that Lewin had notice of the
defective condition. The court's rejection of precedent allowed
Sharon to prove her prima facie case without demonstrating that
196. See Hardy v. Griffin, 569 A.2d 49, 51 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1989); Bencosme v. Kokaras,
507 N.E.2d 748, 749 (Mass. 1987).
197. Mayor of Baltimore v. Schwing, 351 Md. 178, 197, 717 A.2d 919, 928 (1998).
198. Id. at 178, 717 A.2d at 919. The court reasoned that the plaintiff would be barred
from asserting a claim based on new workplace hazards that did not arise until long after
the statute of limitations had run. Id. at 197, 717 A.2d at 928.
199. Brooks, 378 Md. at 89, 835 A.2d at 627.
200. See id. at 72-73, 835 A.2d at 617-18.
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Lewin had notice of the defective condition, making it easier for her
to sue for negligence on her minor son's behalf.2° ' Because the Court
of Appeals overruled precedent to avoid a harmful result to the plain-
tiff, it did not abuse its discretionary powers and properly eliminated
the notice requirement in negligence actions involving lead paint
poisoning in children. 2
In addition to abandoning a standard that would have been
harmful to the plaintiff in the instant case, the court's decision will
also impact positively the health and safety of the children of Mary-
land and will help abate the severe effects of lead paint poisoning in
the future. The court's new standard will make landlords more cau-
tious because they will now be held liable for lead paint violations
even if the tenant did not give them notice of the condition, thus
providing them with an incentive to keep their units free of lead
paint. By decreasing the tenant's burden in lead paint poisoning
cases, the Court of Appeals adopted a standard that will likely prevent
future generations of children from experiencing the devastating ef-
fects of lead paint poisoning.203
Children under the age of six are most vulnerable to lead paint
because their neurological systems are in the process of developing.
20 4
Continued exposure to lead in adults and children is incredibly dan-
gerous and can cause permanent neurological damage and even
death. 2 5 However, in young children, lead slows the development of
the central nervous system and brain, which causes, among other
things, a lowered IQ reading and learning disabilities, attention defi-
cit disorder, and several behavioral problems.20 6 In turn, these
201. Id. at 72, 835 A.2d at 617.
202. See Schwing, 351 Md. at 197, 717 A.2d at 928 (abandoning precedent to avoid conse-
quences that would too harshly affect the plaintiff).
203. Since 1991, childhood lead poisoning has been the number one preventable envi-
ronmental health risk facing children in the United States and in other industrialized
countries. See MD. LEAD PAINT REPORT, supra note 68; Press Release, Office of the Vice
President, Tipper Gore Unveils New Steps to Eliminate Lead Hazards (Oct. 22, 1999)
[hereinafter Press Release], available at 1999 WL 965798. According to the Centers for
Disease Control, almost half a million children in the United States have levels of lead in
their bodies that are high enough to cause "irreversible damage to their health." CENTERS
FOR DISEASE CONTROL, CDC's LEAD POISONING PREVENTION PROGRAM, http://www.cdc.gov/
nceh/lead/factsheets/leadfacts.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2005). As of 1994, the federal
government estimated that at least three million children in the United States, approxi-
mately seventeen percent of all children, were at risk of lead poisoning. Jane Schukoske,
The Evolving Paradigm of Laws on Lead-Based Paint: From Code Violation to Environmental Haz-
ard, 45 S.C. L. REv. 511, 516 (1994).
204. MD. DEP'T OF THE ENV'T, supra note 67.
205. Gore v. People's Sav. Bank, 665 A.2d 1341, 1355 n.24 (Conn. 1995).
206. Press Release, supra note 203.
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problems have resulted in lower educational achievement, higher
high school dropout rates, behavioral problems, and an estimated
tripling of the number of children requiring special education
services.20 7
As demonstrated by these statistics, the court's holding has the
ability to impact significantly the public health of the children of
Maryland. In addition, the court's new standard will require landlords
to be more cautious when inspecting properties because tenants will
be able to establish a prima facie case of negligence simply by showing
that someone was injured and that there was flaking paint on the
premises.20 8
5. Conclusion.-The Court of Appeals in Brooks v. Lewin Realty
III, Inc., held that tenants do not need to show that their landlord had
notice of peeling, flaking paint in order to establish a prima facie case
of negligence in lead paint cases, overruling the Richwind line of
cases. 209 In doing so, the court properly overturned precedent be-
cause (1) it recognized that the City Council intended the Baltimore
City Housing Code to supersede the common law, despite its holding
to the contrary in Richwind;211 (2) increased knowledge and awareness
of the effects of lead paint poisoning in children rendered precedent
no longer applicable;21' and (3) it abandoned a standard that would
have been too harsh on the tenant.212 The court's decision to depart
from stare decisis in this manner, and thus make it easier for tenants
to recover, will affect positively the health and safety of Maryland chil-
dren and will help abate lead paint poisoning in the future. 3
CORI S. ANNAPOLEN
207. Gore, 665 A.2d at 1355 n.24.
208. Brooks, 378 Md. at 72, 835 A.2d at 617.
209. See id. at 76, 835 A.2d at 619.
210. See supra notes 173-182 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 187-196 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 197-202 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 203-208 and accompanying text.
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Recent Decisions
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FOURTH CIRCUIT
I. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Tipping the Balance of Qualified Immunity Against the Interests of
Government Officials
In Love-Lane v. Martin,' the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit considered whether a public school district super-
intendent was entitled to qualified immunity from a free speech retali-
atory action claim when he transferred an assistant principal after she
voiced concern over disciplinary practices she perceived to be racially
discriminatory.2 The court held that the superintendent was not enti-
tled to qualified immunity because he allegedly violated his em-
ployee's clearly established right to free speech, and a reasonable
public school superintendent would have known that his action vio-
lated this right.3
In its holding, the Fourth Circuit did not pay proper regard to its
own and the United States Supreme Court's precedents for qualified
immunity defenses raised in response to free speech claims.4 The
court ruled that a public school superintendent should have been
able to perform precisely an intricate balancing test and determine
that he would be liable for transferring a public school administrator
who criticized disciplinary practices she perceived as racially discrimi-
natory.5 By subjecting the superintendent to liability, the court now
forces public officials to become proficient in the nebulous enterprise
1. 355 F.3d 766 (4th Cir. 2004). The Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 4,
2004. Love-Lane v. Martin, 543 U.S. 813 (2004).
2. Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 783.
3. Id. at 784-85.
4. Id. at 801-02 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting); see infra notes 178-218 and accompanying
text (discussing how the court ignored or misconstrued controlling authority regarding
qualified immunity).
5. Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 784-85 (holding that a reasonable school administrator
would know that demoting an assistant principal to a teaching position after she spoke out
about racial discrimination falls within "the ambit" of a clearly established free speech vio-
lation); see infra notes 219-232 and accompanying text (providing a discussion of how the
court inappropriately expected a superintendent to perform flawlessly an intricate balanc-
ing test to determine whether his actions violated constitutional law).
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of constitutional balancing before making basic management
decisions.6
1. The Case.-Decoma Love-Lane began working for the Win-
ston-Salem/Forsyth County Board of Education in North Carolina in
1974.7 In 1995, she became an assistant principal at Lewisville Ele-
mentary, partly because School Board Superintendent Donald Martin
believed the school needed an African-American presence.8 During
her first year at Lewisville, Love-Lane developed concerns about dis-
criminatory disciplinary practices.9 Instead of publicly questioning
the school's policies,1" however, she concentrated on fostering good
relationships with her colleagues.'1
In her second year, Love-Lane began expressing her concerns to
Principal Blanchfield but was always "rebuffed or ignored."' 2 Love-
Lane then voiced her concerns at faculty meetings and School Im-
6. See Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 799 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (noting that, because of
the difficult nature of applying the balancing test established in Pickering v. Board of Educa-
tion, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), denying qualified immunity to officials like Martin will paralyze
their administrative discretion); see infra notes 233-247 and accompanying text (noting that
public officials now face a more difficult task in applying complex doctrines when making
operational decisions that may have constitutional implications).
7. Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 769. Love-Lane worked as a high school teacher from 1974
to 1988, and as an assistant principal thereafter. Id. Until 1995, she received excellent or
superior evaluations for her work as an assistant principal. Id.
8. Id. Lewisville Elementary served mostly middle to upper class white children, as
well as some poor and working class African-American children. Id. Almost all of the
school's staff was white. Id. at 770. The school administration and its white principal,
Brenda Blanchfield, had a reputation for racial insensitivity. Id. at 769.
9. Id. at 770.
10. Love-Lane was principally concerned about the schools "time-out" room, a place
teachers sent misbehaving students. Id. African-American students, especially boys, were
sent to the time-out room in disproportionate numbers. Id. Moreover, teachers frequently
asked white girls to escort these students to the time-out room, which Love-Lane perceived
as a source of unnecessary embarrassment. Id. Love-Lane also felt that some teachers used
the time-out room excessively, in lieu of making an extra effort to deal with the misbehav-
ior in a more constructive manner. Id. Finally, once students reached the time-out room,
they often received inadequate instruction. Id.
Love-Lane also had more general concerns about teachers treating African-American
and poorer students more strictly than others. Id at 770-71. For example, Love-Lane seri-
ously disagreed with teachers who excluded several poor white and African-American stu-
dents from participating in a field trip based on minor disciplinary infractions alone. Id. at
770. Love-Lane further maintained that many Lewisville staff members were insensitive to
African-American culture. Id at 771. These particular concerns stemmed from parental
complaints, negative staff reactions to diversity training, and staff members like one partic-
ular fifth grade teacher who barred a student from her classroom because the teacher
claimed that her "jelly-curl or what y'all call it, stinks." Id. (internal citations omitted).
11. Id. at 771. Love-Lane received a superior evaluation from Principal Blanchfield
after her first year at Lewisville. Id.
12. Id.
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provement Team (SIT) meetings, as well as directly to Superintendent
Martin. 3  At the end of Love-Lane's second year, Principal
Blanchfield gave Love-Lane low communication skills ratings on her
evaluation, recommended an atypically short contract for Love-Lane,
and expressed a desire not to work with her. 4 Consequently, Love-
Lane requested a transfer.15
Instead of granting Love-Lane's transfer request, at the start of
their third year together Martin simply encouraged Blanchfield and
Love-Lane to cooperate and warned Love-Lane that he did not want
to hear from her that year. 16 Love-Lane, however, continued to voice
concerns about racial discrimination, and her relationship with
Blanchfield and other teachcrs deteriorated. t7 Because of Love-
Lane's failure to adhere to Martin's recommendations and her contin-
ued communication problems with Blanchfield and other staff mem-
bers, Martin declared Love-Lane's career as a school administrator
over and subsequently assigned her to a teaching position in a high
school for the 1998-99 school year.
18
In response, Love-Lane filed a grievance with the Winston Sa-
lem/Forsyth County Board of Education challenging the reassign-
ment.'9 A panel of three members voted two to one to uphold
Martin's decision to reassign Love-Lane.2" Love-Lane then appealed
to the full Board, which upheld the panel's decision.2
13. Id. at 771-72. Martin discounted Love-Lane's concerns because he did not agree
with her observations. Id. at 772.
14. Id.
15. Id. Love-Lane was also involved in an altercation with a teacher at the end of her
second year. Id. Based on an independent investigative report, Martin sent Love-Lane a
letter warning that another similar incident would lead him to recommend her dismissal.
Id. at 772-73.
16. Id. at 773.
17. Id. The fifth grade teachers requested another administrator to work with them,
and Blanchfield rated Love-Lane "below standard" and "unsatisfactory" in her communica-
tion skills and efforts in a draft evaluation she sent to Martin. Id. at 773-74. Additionally,
teachers and administrators, regardless of their race, found Love-Lane's demeanor "unpro-
fessional and contentious." Id. at 791 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). Love-Lane's difficulties
with Blanchfield also involved conflicts over bus loading policies, recess supervision, kin-
dergarten care, and custodial staff. Id. at 792 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 774. Martin also transferred Blanchfield from Lewisville to the school sys-
tem's central office. Id. He said he did not know, or consider, that Love-Lane was engag-
ing in constitutionally protected free speech activities. Id.
19. Id,
20. Id. at 775. Despite the presence of counsel at the Board meeting, Love-Lane did
not present any evidence regarding her right to free speech. Id. at 793 (Wilkinson, J.,
dissenting). Instead, she argued that she was harassed and sabotaged by Blanchfield. Id.
(Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 775.
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On August 28, 1998, Love-Lane filed a charge of racial discrimi-
nation and retaliation against Martin and the Board with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) .22 On June 30, 1999,
the EEOC granted her the right to sue.2 3
Love-Lane then sued Superintendent Martin and the Board in
the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Caro-
lina.24 Her suit alleged discrimination on the basis of race under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,25 and contended that, in violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 1981,26 42 U.S.C. § 1983,27 and Article I, §§ 14 and 19
of the North Carolina Constitution,2 she was denied her rights to free
speech, equal protection, and due process. 29 The district court
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that
Love-Lane failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of racial discrimi-
nation and could not show a violation of her rights to free speech and
due process of law.30
In dismissing Love-Lane's free-speech claim against the Board,
the district court determined that Love-Lane voiced her concerns
more in her capacity as Lewisville's Assistant Principal than as a pri-
vate citizen speaking out about a matter of public concern. 1 Further-
more, the court noted that any First Amendment interest Love-Lane
may have had was outweighed by the Board's interest in operating
public schools in an efficient manner.3 2 The district court then con-
cluded that the federal constitutional claims against Martin in his offi-
cial capacity were redundant and dismissed them as well.33 Finally,
the court granted Martin qualified immunity in his individual capac-
ity. 4 Specifically, the court determined that Martin could not have
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000). Title VII prohibits
employment discrimination based on race. Id.
26. Id. § 1981. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in the making and en-
forcement of contracts. Id.
27. Id. § 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 permits a citizen to sue state and local officials who,
under color of state law, violate that citizen's constitutional rights. Id.
28. N.C. CONST. art. I, §§ 14, 19. Section 14 provides for freedom of speech. N.C.
CONST. art. I, § 14. Section 19 provides for equal protection under the law, and prohibits
discrimination based on race. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19.
29. Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 775.
30. Id.
31. Love-Lane v. Martin, 201 F. Supp. 2d 566, 580 (M.D.N.C. 2002) [hereinafter Love-
Lane I], affd in part and vacated in part by 355 F.3d 766 (4th Cir. 2004).
32. Id. at 580-81.
33. Id. at 583.
34. Id. at 584-85.
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known his conduct violated Love-Lane's clearly established constitu-
tional rights of free speech, equal protection, or procedural due
process.35
Love-Lane appealed all but the due process decisions to the
Fourth Circuit.36 The court considered, inter alia, whether Martin
could have violated Love-Lane's First Amendment rights, and whether
Martin was entitled to the defense of qualified immunity.
7
2. Legal Background.-The United States Supreme Court has de-
termined that government officials enjoy immunity from liability for
civil damages as long as their actions do not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which another similarly situated
reasonable official would be aware.3" To evaluate the applicability of a
qualified immunity defense, the Fourth Circuit requires a court to (1)
identify the right allegedly violated; (2) consider whether at the time
of the alleged violation the right was clearly established; and (3) deter-
mine whether a reasonable person in the government official's posi-
tion would have known that his actions would violate that right.39 An
employee can establish a First Amendment claim of retaliatory demo-
tion if the employee speaks as a citizen rather than as an employee
upon a matter of personal interest.4" The employee must show that,
first, his interest in speaking on a matter of public concern outweighs
the employer's interest in providing effective services and, second,
that his speech is a substantial factor in the employer's decision to
reassign him.41 Amidst these balancing standards, however, there is a
dearth of clearly established law setting forth constitutionally pro-
tected activities.42
35. Id. at 583-85. The court found that it was not clear whether Love-Lane's speech was
as a private citizen addressing a matter of public concern, or whether the school system's
interest in operating Lewisville Elementary efficiently outweighed Love-Lane's interest in
free expression. Id. at 583-84.
36. Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 775.
37. Id. at 775, 782. Additionally, the court considered whether the Board violated Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 or 1983 by discriminating on the basis
of race. Id. It also addressed racial discrimination and free speech claims arising under
the North Carolina Constitution. Id.
38. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
39. Wilson v. Layne, 141 F.3d 111, 114 (4th Cir. 1998).
40. McVey v. Stacy, 157 F.3d 271, 277 (4th Cir. 1998).
41. Id. at 277-78.
42. DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 806 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that public employee
speech on matters of public concern will only rarely be clearly established as receiving
constitutional protection).
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a. The Development of Qualified Immunity Jurisprudence: From
the Supreme Court to the Fourth Circuit.-State government officials may
be held personally liable for actions that breach the constitutional
rights of others. 43 But the Supreme Court has also consistently held
that, as recognized at common law, public officials require some form
of immunity from suits for damages in order to perform the responsi-
bilities of their positions without "undue interference" or "threats of
liability."' "4 Thus, a limited class of government officials is totally im-
mune from suits for damages.4" Most others, however, enjoy qualified
immunity from suits while performing discretionary functions within
the scope of their office.4 6 To protect an individual's constitutional
rights and protect the government and its officials from costly and
distracting litigation, qualified immunity is used to protect public offi-
cials from certain constitutional tort actions.47 Furthermore, qualified
immunity is employed to ensure citizens are not deterred from enter-
ing public office and officials are not prevented from resolutely dis-
charging their duties.48
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court established its modern,
objective approach to qualified immunity defenses. 49 The Court held
two former senior aides to President Nixon eligible for qualified im-
munity after they allegedly conspired to violate the constitutional and
statutory rights of an Air Force employee.5" The Court declared that
officials "performing discretionary functions generally are shielded
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not vio-
late clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a rea-
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
44. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982).
45. Id. at 807. These officials' special functions or constitutional status require com-
plete protection from suit. Id. They include legislators in their legislative functions, judges
in their judicial functions, and certain executive officials. Id.
46. Id. at 818. The Supreme Court first recognized the defense of qualified immunity
in Pierson v. Ray, when it extended common-law good faith immunity, traditionally granted
to police officers, to constitutional tort claims. 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967). Later, in Wood v.
Strickland, the Court announced that it would deny an official qualified immunity where he
"knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of offi-
cial responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff] affected, or if he
took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights
or other injury." 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975). Thus, the Court's early qualified immunity
jurisprudence involved both objective and subjective inquiries. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815.
47. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 & n.30. These constitutional tort actions include suits
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a statue allowing a citizen to sue state and local officials
who, under color of state law, violate that citizen's constitutional rights. Id.
48. Id. at 814.
49. 457 U.S. 800, 815-19 (1982).
50. Id. at 802-03, 813.
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sonable person would have known."' The Court specifically rejected
its prior approach of also reviewing the subjective good faith of gov-
ernment officials, because questions of subjective intent can rarely be
decided at summary judgment.5 2 Thus, by relying solely upon the ob-
jective reasonableness of an official's conduct, according to clearly es-
tablished law, the Court concluded that courts may dismiss many
insubstantial claims that could disrupt the government and its
employees.53
Questions about the proper application of the Harlow Court's
test-how to determine when conduct does and does not violate
clearly established law-reached the Court in Anderson v. Creighton. 4
An issue of particular concern to the Anderson Court was whether the
phrase "clearly established" meant that, to defeat a qualified immunity
defense at summary judgment, a plaintiff merely needs to cite a long-
established constitutional right, or whether a plaintiff must address
whether, given the actual circumstances surrounding a defendant's
particular conduct, the defendant acted in an objectively legally un-
reasonable manner.55 Specifically, the Court addressed whether an
FBI officer who conducted an objectively reasonable, but ultimately
illegal, search could receive qualified immunity at summary judgment
from a Fourth Amendment claim for damages.56 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held it could not resolve the
question of qualified immunity at summary judgment, because un-
resolved factual issues existed as to whether the officer violated the
Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights, which it found clearly estab-
lished.57 In reversing and allowing qualified immunity, the Supreme
Court emphasized the need to inquire beyond the legality of the al-
leged violation in the abstract, and instead review whether the defen-
dant's actual conduct, under the specific circumstances of the case,
would appear clearly illegal to a reasonable officer.58 The Court re-
jected the lower court's approach of denying qualified immunity de-
51. Id. at 818. The Court recognized the need to protect society from "the expenses of
litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of
able citizens from acceptance of public office" and to avoid dampening "the ardor of all
but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching dis-
charge of their duties." Id. at 814 (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.
1949)).
52. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816.
53. Id. at 816, 818.
54. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
55. Id. at 640-41.
56. Md at 637-38.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 640-41.
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fenses at summary judgment in the face of vaguely asserted but long-
established constitutional rights.5 9 Instead, the Court held that for an
official to be held liable for violating a constitutional right, the right's
contours must be so clear that a reasonable official would understand
that his conduct would violate it.6" Qualified immunity should thus
protect a public officer whose conduct, though objectively reasonable,
ultimately turns out to violate the law.61
In Saucier v. Katz,6 2 the Court reaffirmed its holding in Anderson
and reversed a denial of qualified immunity to an officer who used
force to arrest a protestor at a forum where Vice President Al Gore
was speaking.63 The Court rejected the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit's approach of avoiding a qualified immu-
nity inquiry simply because it found a potential constitutional
violation based on a reasonableness inquiry.64 Instead, the Court re-
emphasized that conducting a threshold reasonableness inquiry does
not preclude the need for courts to conduct another more specific
and individualized fact inquiry to determine whether a reasonable of-
ficer, within the particular context, would have clearly known his con-
duct was illegal.6"
The Fourth Circuit's approach to finding that law is clearly estab-
lished, which would afford no immunity to most public officials who
transgress that law, has traditionally struck a balance between federal
circuits that look to a wide group of jurisdictions and factual scena-
rios,6 6 and those that require case law involving nearly identical fac-
tual scenarios from a strictly limited number of jurisdictions.67 For
59. Id. at 63940.
60. Id. at 640.
61. Id. at 636-37, 640-41.
62. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
63. Id. at 197, 200.
64. Id. at 200.
65. Id. at 202-03.
66. See Kelley v. Borg, 60 F.3d 664, 666-67 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding the right at issue did
not have to be clearly established as to every single fact in the instant case, but at a more
general level); Romero v. Kitsap County, 931 F.2d 624, 629 (9th Cir. 1991) (allowing courts
to look to case law from any other jurisdiction in the absence of binding precedent in
order to determine whether the right to shellfish was clearly established).
67. See Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950, 955 (11th Cir. 2003) (reaffirming the Elev-
enth Circuit's strict approach of only looking to cases from the Supreme Court, the Geor-
gia Supreme Court, and itself, when deciphering clearly established law); Mozzochi v.
Borden, 959 F.2d 1174, 1178-81 (2d Cir. 1992) (requiring a more particularized right to
have been violated in a more factually analogous case to satisfy the clearly established law
requirement). The Fourth Circuit's approach accords with the Supreme Court's decision
in Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002). The Supreme Court indicated that courts of appeal
could look to sources other than its own jurisprudence in finding clearly established law.
Id. at 74145. It would also require government officials to look to the reasoning, and not
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instance, in Pinder v. Johnson,6 8 the Fourth Circuit noted that for law to
be clearly established the facts from prior cases need not be "on all
fours" with the facts of the current case.69 Later, in Edwards v. City of
Goldsboro,7 ° the court noted that district courts usually should not
need to look beyond the U.S. Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals, and the highest court of the state in which the case
arose.7" Thus, at least ordinarily, an official may retain immunity even
though he would not in another federal circuit.72 But the court will,
nevertheless, recognize clearly established law in the absence of iden-
tical conduct from its traditional sources of authority.7 3 Indeed, the
court in Pinder canvassed decisions from other federal circuits in
reaching its decision that at the time of the events in question there
was no clearly established duty to protect individuals outside of the
custodial context.7 4 Furthermore, in Doe v. Broderick,75 the Fourth Cir-
cuit noted that, in order to find clearly established law, the very act in
question need not have previously been held unlawful, but must be
apparently illegal in light of preexisting law.76 The court therefore
upheld the denial of qualified immunity to an officer who conducted
a search without probable cause, even though no court had previously
found that a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his
methadone treatment records.7 7
While the Fourth Circuit may look to a wide number of jurisdic-
tions and factual scenarios in deeming law clearly established, it em-
phasized in Wilson v. Layne that qualified immunity should protect "all
but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."
78
The court further asserted that even though the existence of clearly
established law did not require a government official's precise actions
to have been ruled illegal, case law should render the illegality of the
challenged conduct manifest. 79 Thus, the court reversed the denial of
just the holdings, of qualified immunity case law for guidance on the constitutionality of
their actions. Id. at 743.
68. 54 F.3d 1169 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
69. Id. at 1173.
70. 178 F. 3d 231 (4th Cir. 1999).
71. Id. at 251 (citing Jean v. Collins, 155 F.3d 701, 709 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc)).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1176-78 (4th Cir. 1995).
75. 225 F.3d 440 (4th Cir. 2000).
76. Id. at 455 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
77. Id.
78. 141 F.3d 111, 114 (4th Cir. 1998), affd, 526 U.S. 603 (1999) (quoting Mally v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
79. Id.
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qualified immunity to officers who illegally permitted reporters to ac-
company them on the execution of an arrest warrant because, at the
time they acted, they could have reasonably presumed their actions
legal, given the absence of case law to the contrary.8" Indeed, the
Fourth Circuit has determined that in the interest of encouraging offi-
cials to exercise reasonable discretion without hesitation, reasonable
mistakes should not be actionable.8 Its qualified immunity doctrine
aims to allow government officials to exercise freely their fair judg-
ment without fearing the consequences of lawsuits based on unclear
law.82
b. Retaliatory Free Speech Claims.-A public employee may sue
his employer when the government retaliates against him for exercis-
ing his First Amendment right to speak about matters of public con-
cern.8" But in order to succeed, the employee must demonstrate that
his interest in speaking about a matter of public concern outweighs
the government's interest in serving the public efficiently. 84 Further-
more, employers need not wait for an employee's speech to become
disruptive before taking action.85
The Supreme Court first held in Pickering v. Board of Education
that unless a teacher knowingly or recklessly makes false statements,
he may not be dismissed from public employment because of his
speech.86 In Pickering, the Court reversed and remanded the Illinois
State Supreme Court's judgment that a school board justifiably fired a
teacher after he criticized the board's revenue-raising methods.87
However, the Court also noted that a balance must be struck between
the teacher's interest in speaking about issues of public concern and
the state's interest in efficiently serving the public.88 The Court later
made clear, in Connick v. Myers, that speech about racial discrimina-
80. Id. at 115-16.
81. Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942 F.2d 257, 260-61 (4th Cir. 1991) (affirming the grant of
summary judgment to a deputy sheriff who acted with objective reasonableness even
though his actions might have been illegal).
82. Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1173 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
83. Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co., 218 F.3d 337, 351 (4th Cir. 2000).
84. McVey v. Stacy, 157 F.3d 271, 277-78 (4th Cir. 1998).
85. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983).
86. 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968).
87. Id at 564-65.
88. Id. at 568. This test became known as the Pickering balancing test. Cromer v.
Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1325-27 (4th Cir. 1996). Increased deference to the employer's judg-
ment is necessary when close working relationships serve the public interest. Connick, 461
U.S. at 151-52. On the other hand, a government may have to demonstrate a more com-
pelling efficiency interest when the speech more substantially involves a matter of public
concern. Id at 152. More recently, the Court has announced that:
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tion that relates to political, social, or other community matters in-
volves a matter of public concern."9 The Court also reaffirmed that an
employee does not forfeit his right to protest discrimination simply
because he conveys his views in a private manner.
90
In Stroman v. Colleton County School District,1 the Fourth Circuit
determined that public schools cannot dismiss employees because
they engage in protected speech." Then, in McVey v. Stacy, the court
formally articulated its test for determining whether an employee has
a cause of action for retaliatory demotion under the First Amend-
ment.93 A court must decide:
(1) whether the public employee was speaking as a citizen
upon a matter of public concern or as an employee about a
matter of personal interest; (2) whether the employee's in-
terest in speaking upon the matter of public concern out-
weighed the government's interest in providing effective and
efficient services to the public; and (3) whether the em-
ployee's speech was a substantial factor in the employee's ter-
mination decision.94
Government agencies are charged by law with doing particular tasks. Agencies
hire employees to help do those tasks as effectively and efficiently as possible.
When someone who is paid a salary so that she will contribute to an agency's
efficient operation begins to do or say things that detract from the agency's effec-
tive operation, the government employer must have some power to restrain her.
Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674-75 (1994) (plurality opinion).
89. 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983). In Connick, the Court reversed the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's judgment and held that an Orleans Paish Assistant District
Attorney did not violate his employee's right to free speech when he fired her, in part, for
distributing a questionnaire to other Assistant District Attorneys regarding office employ-
ment policies. Id. at 140-41, 154.
90. Id. at 148 & n.8.
91. 981 F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1992).
92. Id. at 155-56. In Stroman, the court affirmed a summary judgment ruling in favor of
a school district that discharged a teacher for circulating a letter that criticized the school
district and encouraged teachers to engage in a "sick-out" during the week of final exami-
nations. Id. at 154. The court also noted that, in order to remain protected, an employee's
speech must be about a matter of public concern, and not outweighed by the state's inter-
est in serving the public. Id. at 156.
93. 157 F.3d 271, 277-78 (4th Cir. 1998). The court in McVey affirmed the United
States District Court for the Western District of Virginia's denial of the defendant airport
commissioner's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs retaliatory free speech action on the basis
of qualified immunity. Id. at 273-74. It also noted that public officials do not have a duty
to resolve difficult constitutional issues. Id. at 277. It further resolved that public officials
should be liable for crossing bright lines, but not for making wrong choices in gray areas.
Id.
94. Id. at 277-78. The second part of this analysis is known as the Picketing balancing
test. Connick, 461 U.S. at 158.
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Further, as noted in Stroman, school officials need not wait until an
employee's speech becomes manifestly problematic before taking ac-
tion to prevent employees from continuing to play a disruptive role. 95
This approach accords with the Supreme Court's decision in Rankin v.
McPherson.9 6 In determining whether a constable violated an em-
ployee's right to free speech by firing the employee for commenting
on a failed presidential assassination attempt, the Rankin Court noted
that the time, place, and manner of an employee's speech are relevant
to considering that speech's impact on office efficiency.9 7
c. Qualified Immunity and Free Speech Converge.-In determin-
ing whether or not a public official is entitled to qualified immunity
from a retaliatory free speech claim, a court must do more than sim-
ply find that an employee's right to speak, in the abstract, is clearly
established.9" The court must also determine, first, whether the em-
ployee spoke out about a matter of public concern, and second,
whether the government's efficiency interest outweighed the em-
ployee's interests in free speech. 99 Because this test is fact-intensive
and difficult to apply, a court will infrequently find that a public em-
ployee's speech on a matter of public concern is clearly established
law. 00 Thus, a public official will typically avoid personal liability for
acting in his official capacity. 10 1
The Supreme Court, in Crawford-El v. Britton, suggested that
under the doctrine of qualified immunity a defendant may be im-
mune from suit, even though the rule barring retaliation against pro-
95. 981 F.2d at 158 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 152, where the Court failed to see "the
necessity for an employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of the
office and the destruction of working relationships is manifest before taking action"). The
Fourth Circuit has applied the same rule in the law enforcement context. SeeJurgensen v.
Fairfax County, 745 F.2d 868, 882 n.21 (4th Cir. 1984). Other circuits have also agreed.
See Fales v. Garst, 235 F.3d 1122, 1124 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding that a school's interest in
avoiding disharmony among staff outweighed the teachers' interest in speaking); Cochran
v. City of Los Angeles, 222 F.3d 1195, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding preventative
action in the law enforcement employment context); Derrickson v. Bd. of Educ., 738 F.2d
351, 352-53 (8th Cir. 1984) (finding that the interest in preventing disruptive and frequent
internal criticisms outweighed a teacher's free speech tights).
96. 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
97. Id. at 388.
98. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 592-93 (1998).
99. Picketing v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
100. DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 806 (4th Cir. 1995).
101. See id. (noting that public employees should usually be entitled to qualified immu-
nity from free speech actions, and be able to act without fear of lawsuits from their
subordinates).
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tected speech has existed for thirty years.' 0 2 The Court noted that in
the free speech context, a court must determine whether or not the
defendant's conduct was manifestly illegal. 10 3 An employer should
win in the absence of proof that it would not have fired the employee
if the employee had never engaged in protected speech.'0 4
In accordance with the Supreme Court's statements on this issue,
the Fourth Circuit, in DiMeglio v. Haines° 5 encountered the difficulty
of finding clearly established law in retaliatory free speech cases.' 06 In
DiMeglio, the court reversed the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland's denial of summary judgment and granted quali-
fied immunity to a zoning commissioner who reassigned a zoning in-
spector after he gave legal advice.'0 7 The court held that the
inspector's claim-that his reassignment was in retaliation for his ex-
ercise of free speech-failed because, first, it was not clear that the
inspector spoke as a private citizen and, second, the state's interest in
efficiently operating its offices might have outweighed the inspector's
interest in expressing himself."0 8 The court specifically noted that
"only infrequently will it be 'clearly established' that a public em-
ployee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally pro-
tected, because the relevant inquiry requires a 'particularized
balancing' that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not well-defined."'09
On the other hand, in Cromer v. Brown,"' the Fourth Circuit re-
versed the United States District Court for the District of South Caro-
lina's grant of qualified immunity at summary judgment to a sheriff
who demoted a police officer from captain to lieutenant after the of-
ficer signed a letter the Black Officers' Association sent to sheriffs con-
102. 523 U.S. 574, 592-93 (1998); see Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574 (establishing the rule
barring retaliation against protected speech in 1968).
103. Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 593. There may be doubt, for instance, whether the plain-
tiff spoke about a matter of public concern. Id.
104. Id.
105. 45 F.3d 790 (4th Cir. 1995).
106. Id. at 806 (stating that infrequently will it be clearly established that an employee's
speech is constitutionally protected).
107. Id. at 793.
108. Id. at 805-06. The court noted that "a government employer, no less than a private
employer, is entitled to insist upon obedience to the legitimate, day-to-day decisions of the
office without fear of reprisal in the form of lawsuits from disgruntled subordinates who
believe that they know better than their supervisors how to manage office affairs." Id. at
806.
109. Id.
110. 88 F.3d 1315 (4th Cir. 1996).
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cerning racial discrimination within their offices. 1 The court
determined this was an infrequent occasion when the employee en-
joyed a clearly established right to speak.1 12 The court justified its
unique finding, in part, because Cromer had joined thirty other black
officers in complaining about racial discrimination in a private letter,
without affecting the sheriff's efficiency interests.'13
In summary, a court must not only determine whether a govern-
ment employer illegally retaliated against its employee's right to free
speech, but also make an additional fact-sensitive inquiry into whether
a competent and law-abiding government official should have realized
that he was violating clearly established law.' 14 As a result, qualified
immunity defenses, once asserted, will usually withstand First Amend-
ment attacks. 1 5
Indeed, cases involving free speech and qualified immunity from
various federal circuits demonstrate just how sparse clearly established
law is. For example, in Rakovich v. Wade," 6 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit discussed the difficulty of finding
clearly established law amidst balancing tests like those involved in
First Amendment cases, and granted qualified immunity to a police
chief and police officers who investigated a civil employee after the
employee criticized the police department." 7 Similarly, in Noyola v.
Texas Department of Human Resources," 8 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit granted qualified immunity to welfare ser-
vices supervisors who fired a technician after he complained about his
caseload."' The court emphasized that because of the case-by-case
balancing involved in free speech employee rights cases, courts should
rarely make a priori judgments that retaliating against an employee
violates clearly established constitutional rights. 2 °
111. Id. at 1318. Cromer is the only Fourth Circuit retaliatory free speech case of good
authority in which the court has denied qualified immunity at summary judgment to a
defendant who retaliated only after an employee spoke.
112. Id. at 1326. The court cited case law outside the Fourth Circuit that protected
speech by police officers concerning racial discrimination and animus in their own offices.
Id. at 1329.
113. Id. at 1320, 1328. The sheriff's efficiency interests were not affected partly because
Cromer communicated his concerns in a nonconfrontational manner. Id. at 1330 n.11.
114. See DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 806 (4th Cir. 1995) (discussing the difficulty of
applying the Pickering balancing test in the context of qualified immunity).
115. Id.
116. 850 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1988).
117. Id. at 1213-14.
118. 846 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1988).
119. Id. at 1026.
120. Id. at 1025.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit made
another instructive note about the rarity of clearly established law in
Grantham v. Trickey."'2 In Grantham, the court affirmed the grant of
qualified immunity to officials of the Missouri Sexual Offender Pro-
gram who fired a caseworker after he criticized the program's opera-
tion.122 In affirming the grant of immunity to the defendants, the
court cited its reasoning from an earlier case where it noted, inter alia,
that at least five circuits have emphasized the difficulty of finding
clearly established law when conducting the fact-intensive Pickering
balancing test.123 Not surprisingly, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit recognized the same difficulty a few years later in
Lytle v. Wondrash.'24 The court in Lytle reversed the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Nevada's decision to deny qualified im-
munity to school administrators who allegedly retaliated against a
school teacher who sued the school district. 25 The court reached its
decision because it was not demonstrably unreasonable for the offi-
cials to conclude that they did not violate the school teacher's right to
free speech. 12
6
In Denno v. School Board of Volusia County,127 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit also noted the difficulty of
finding clearly established law in First Amendment cases. 128 It thus
affirmed the grant of qualified immunity to school officials who disci-
plined a student for displaying a Confederate flag. 129 Finally, in Fabi-
ano v. Hopkins,"3° the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit granted qualified immunity from a free speech claim to the
City of Boston's Corporation Counsel after she fired her employee, a
pro se attorney, for failing to follow city policy in his challenge to the
renewal of a zoning variance."' The court specifically noted the diffi-
culty of finding clearly established law in the midst of the fact-inten-
sive Pickering balancing test.132 Thus, as case law demonstrates in this
context, the shield of qualified immunity will seldom break.'33
121. 21 F.3d 289 (8th Cir. 1994).
122. Id. at 296.
123. Id. at 293.
124. 182 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999).
125. Id. at 1089.
126. Id.
127. 218 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2000).
128. Id. at 1275.
129. Id at 1278.
130. 352 F.3d 447 (lst Cir. 2003).
131. Id. at 458.
132. Id. at 457.
133. DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 806 (4th Cir. 1995).
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3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Love-Lane v. Martin, the Fourth Cir-
cuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment to Martin
in his individual capacity and found that he was not entitled to a quali-
fied immunity defense against Love-Lane's claim that he retaliated
against her exercise of free speech. 134 The court initially addressed
Love-Lane's free speech claim. 135 Writing for the majority, 1 36 Judge
Michael determined that Love-Lane's speech pertained to a matter of
public concern because of its content and context."' 7 Specifically, the
court found that the content of Love-Lane's speech dealt with racially
discriminatory disciplinary practices, which is a concern to much of
the Lewisville school community.'3 8 The court also maintained that
although Love-Lane repeatedly spoke about such practices in the con-
text of public meetings, she did not forfeit her right to protest dis-
crimination simply because she spoke about the policies in private
settings as well. 1 39 Therefore, the court found that Love-Lane spoke
about a matter of public concern. 4 °
The court then held that Love-Lane's free speech interest out-
weighed the Board and Martin's interests in operating the school sys-
tem efficiently.1 4 The court noted that the community's strong
interest in Love-Lane's speech about discriminatory practices placed a
heavier burden on the Board and Martin to show that their efficiency
concerns outweighed Love-Lane's right to free speech. 142 The court,
therefore, discounted both of the defendant's arguments-that Love-
Lane's speech adversely affected school administration and caused
poor working relationships between Love-Lane and Blanchfield and
134. Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 789. The Fourth Circuit also affirmed the district court's
grant of summaryjudgment to the Board and Martin in his official capacity on Love-Lane's
free speech claim and to both defendants on Love-Lane's federal race discrimination
claims and claims under the North Carolina Constitution. Id. The court later denied Mar-
tin's motion for a hearing en banc. E-mail from Douglas S. Punger, School Attorney, Win-
ston Salem/Forsyth County Schools to Author (Nov. 9, 2004, 17:23:48 EST) (on file with
author).
135. Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 775-76.
136. Judge Gregory joined Judge Michael in the 2-1 decision. Id. at 768. Judge Michael
began by noting that summary judgment requires a court to view the facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, and draw all reasonable inferences in Love-Lane's favor.
Id. at 775.
137. Id. at 777. Judge Michael noted that Love-Lane often spoke about race discrimina-
tion, a public issue, at public forums. Id. at 776-77.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 777.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 779.
142. Id. at 778.
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Love-Lane and other staff.1 43 The court emphasized that, in fact,
many individuals in the Lewisville community found Love-Lane's
speech professional and helpful, not disruptive. 4 4 The court con-
cluded that Love-Lane's speech did not affect the delivery or quality of
the educational services at Lewisville.' 4 5 Further, the court stipulated
that even if Love-Lane's speech did have these effects, its bearing on
such a substantial issue of public concern still outweighed the school's
efficiency interests.1 46 In dismissing the complaints of the teachers
and administrators, the court noted that the same people also took
offense at the content of Love-Lane's speech opposing race discrimi-
nation in discipline. 147 The court maintained that because Love-Lane
asserted she had voiced her complaints in a respectful way, her state-
ments must be credited when considering summary judgment.148
The court concluded that there was a genuine issue of material
fact whether Love-Lane's speech was a substantial factor in Martin's
decision to transfer Love-Lane from her job as an Assistant Principal
at Lewisville to a high school teaching position.1 49 The court empha-
sized that as Love-Lane amplified her criticism of racially discrimina-
tory discipline practices at Lewisville, Blanchfield and Martin's
assessments of her became increasingly negative.1 50 The court further
stated that Love-Lane's history of good working relationships before
she came to work at Lewisville cast doubt on the notion that Martin
demoted her for attitude and communication problems.1 51 The court
determined that Love-Lane had offered enough evidence for a rea-
sonable jury to conclude that Love-Lane's speech was a substantial fac-
tor in her demotion, which would violate the First Amendment.
1 52
143. Id. at 778-79. The court announced seven factors to consider when balancing a
school's efficiency interests against an employee's interests:
whether the employee's speech (1) impairs the ability of supervisors to mete out
discipline, (2) impairs harmony among co-workers, (3) damages close working
relationships, (4) impedes the performance of the public employee's duties, (5)
interferes with the operation of the agency, (6) conflicts with the responsibilities
of the employee within the agency, and (7) is communicated to the public or to
the co-workers in private.
Id. at 778.
144. Id. at 779. The court also noted that Superintendent Martin admitted that Love-
Lane never jeopardized the students' well-being. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 778. The court cited the statement of one fifth-grade teacher for its conclu-
sion about this appearance. Id. at 778-79.
148. Id. at 779.
149. Id. at 782.
150. Id. at 780-81.
151. Id. at 781.
152. Id. at 781-82.
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Next, after determining that Love-Lane had a potential First
Amendment claim for retaliatory demotion, the court reversed the
district court's grant of qualified immunity to Martin in his individual
capacity.' 5 3 In doing so, the court maintained that Martin might have
violated Love-Lane's right to free speech. 54 The court then noted
that this right to speak out on racially discriminatory discipline prac-
tices at public schools was clearly established well before 1997 and
1998.55 Dismissing case law that suggested otherwise, 156 the court de-
termined that it was still possible for an employee's right to speak out
on matters of public concern to be clearly established.1 57 Finally, the
court concluded that a reasonable person in Martin's position should
have known that transferring Love-Lane in retaliation for speaking
out would violate her free speech rights. 151
In short, the court found that Martin was not entitled to qualified
immunity because case law established Love-Lane's right to speak and
the Pickering balancing test tipped convincingly in her direction.1 59
The court held that Martin was not entitled to summary judgment in
his favor on the basis of qualified immunity because any reasonable
superintendent in his position would have realized that that he would
violate the Constitution by taking adverse employment action against
Love-Lane because she spoke out about race discrimination.' 6 °
153. Id. at 783. The court upheld the district court's dismissal of Love-Lane's free
speech claim against Martin in his official capacity as redundant. Id. The court also held
that the Board could not be held liable for violating Love-Lane's free-speech rights. Id.
The court noted that Love-Lane failed to produce enough evidence to demonstrate that
the Board was aware of the denial of her free speech rights and either participated in, or
otherwise condoned, that denial. Id.
154. Id. at 784-85. The court emphasized that Love-Lane would have to prove that her
reassignment came in retaliation for her exercise of free speech. Id.
155. Id. at 784. The court noted that the right of a teacher to speak out on public issues
without facing adverse employment action was well established, and that statements about
racial discrimination at public schools were for many years recognized as involving matters
of public concern. Id. It also maintained that because Martin admitted Love-Lane was not
a threat to the safety of students, her right to speak out outweighed his interest in running
the school system in an efficient manner. Id.
156. The court effectively dismissed case law that suggested that courts will rarely find it
clearly established that public employee speech on matters of public concern should re-
ceive constitutional protection, because the Pickering balancing test is fact-intensive, subtle,
nebulous, and difficult to apply. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 784. The court also defended itself against the dissent's criticism that its
decision will hamper the ability of school administrators to make personnel decisions. Id.
at 785. It asserted that administrators could simply hear out but not retaliate against lower-
level administrators who raised concerns about racial discrimination. Id.
159. Id. at 784.
160. Id. at 783-84. The majority also addressed several of the dissent's other concerns in
its opinion. Id. at 785-86. The court first argued that protecting Love-Lane's speech about
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In dissent, Judge Wilkinson suggested that the majority's decision
ignored Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit precedent, and harmed
public education in the process.' 6' Judge Wilkinson began by con-
struing the facts to argue that the district court was correct in holding
that the relationship between Blanchfield and Love-Lane became so
dysfunctional that Martin had to reassign them both.'62 Judge Wilkin-
son determined that Love-Lane did not have a viable claim for retalia-
tory demotion under the First Amendment.'63 He maintained that
the speech that spurred Love-Lane's transfer came in her capacity as
an employee, not as a concerned public citizen.164 Judge Wilkinson
also contended that Martin had a stronger interest in maintaining effi-
ciency at Lewisville than Love-Lane had to speak.
165
Next, Judge Wilkinson vigorously attacked the majority's decision
to strip Martin of his qualified immunity.'66 First, he maintained that
precedent showed that since Love-Lane presented her concerns in a
confrontational manner, Martin's interest in operating Lewisville Ele-
mentary School efficiently outweighed Love-Lane's interest in First
Amendment expression.1 61 Second, because there was no clearly es-
tablished law, Martin could not have known that transferring Love-
Lane because she had made allegations about racial discrimination
would violate her First Amendment rights. 6'
discrimination fostered good disciplinary practices more than hampered them. Id. at 785.
It also maintained that allowing the free speech claim to proceed before a jury would
subject causal issues but not, as the dissent suggested, disciplinary policy to the results of
litigation. Id. at 785-86. Finally, the court emphasized that its decision would not drive
good educators to private schools, but encourage them to speak up for underprivileged
students instead. Id. at 786.
161. Id. at 790 (Wilkinson,J., dissenting).
162. Id at 791-93 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 798 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 794-95 (Wilkinson,J., dissenting). The dissent noted that Love-Lane and her
counsel argued to the Board that Love-Lane and Blanchfield's difficulties were personal,
while failing to raise any argument about retaliation for her public speech. Id. at 795 (Wil-
kinson, J., dissenting). Further, she and her fellow employees differed over a wide variety
of topics unrelated to public concerns. Id. (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
165. Id. (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). Judge Wilkinson first observed that Love-Lane dis-
rupted Lewisville's operation through her manner, and not just her speech. Id. at 795-96
(Wilkinson, J., dissenting). He then remarked that the majority failed to show any defer-
ence to Martin's judgment even though Martin was not, according to precedent, required
to ignore Love-Lane's allegedly inappropriate methods of communication. Id. at 796-97
(Wilkinson, J., dissenting). Finally, he asserted that Love-Lane failed to show that her
speech was a substantial factor in Martin's decision to reassign her, because Blanchfield,
and not Martin, was upset by Love-Lane's speech about racial discrimination. Id. at 797-98
(Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
166. Id. (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 798-99 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 799 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
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Judge Wilkinson ended his discussion of qualified immunity by
arguing that denying Martin qualified immunity would render school
administrators ineffective because of a heightened threat of litiga-
tion. 169 In particular, Judge Wilkinson argued that the majority's deci-
sion would subject the disciplinary efforts of school communities, like
Lewisville, to increased litigation.17° Thus, he continued, it will be-
come even harder for teachers to maintain order, and harder for stu-
dents to learn in less orderly environments. 7' Judge Wilkinson also
asserted that the majority imprudently removed school decisions from
the hands of administrators and placed them into the hands of courts,
thereby threatening public education itself.'72 He concluded that in-
correctly denying the protection of qualified immunity to school ad-
ministrators like Martin will hurt the communities and students that
educators serve. '
7 3
4. Analysis.-In Love-Lane v. Martin, the Fourth Circuit held that
a reasonable school superintendent should have recognized that
transferring an assistant principal who alleged that her school's disci-
plinary practices were discriminatory would clearly violate her right to
free speech.' 74 The court misapplied both its own and the Supreme
Court's standards for qualified immunity defenses asserted in re-
sponse to free speech claims.' 7 5 Moreover, despite a muddled factual
context, the court determined that even though the law applicable to
his actions was not clearly established, a public school superintendent
did not enjoy immunity from suit under the doctrine of qualified im-
munity because he failed to act in accordance with clearly established
law of which a reasonable person should have known. 176 Conse-
quently, government officials must now flawlessly perform precise bal-
169. Id. (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). Judge Wilkinson noted that Martin had in fact, as
the majority suggested would be proper, repeatedly heard out Love-Lane's concerns. Id.
(Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 800 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
171. Id. (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 800-01 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 801-02 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 782.
175. Id. at 790 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting); see infta notes 178-218 and accompanying text
(discussing how the court ignored or misconstrued good authority on qualified immunity).
176. Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 784-85 (holding that Martin was not entitled to summary
judgment because his conduct fell "within the ambit" of illegality, despite the infrequency
of such conduct violating the Pickering balancing test); see infra notes 207-232 and accompa-
nying text (providing a discussion of how the court inappropriately expected a superinten-
dent to perform flawlessly an intricate balancing test to determine whether his actions
violated constitutional law).
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ancing tests before making operational decisions with constitutional
implications. 77
a. The Fourth Circuit Ignored Both the Supreme Court's and Its
Own Jurisprudence in Holding That Superintendent Martin Disregarded
Clearly Established Law.-In finding that Martin violated clearly estab-
lished law, and thus denying him qualified immunity from Love-
Lane's free speech claim, the court disregarded Supreme Court prece-
dent and its own jurisprudence.' 78 Because of its oversight, the court
concluded that Love-Lane's was the infrequent case where, even after
a Pickering balancing test, the employer's actions violated clearly es-
tablished law.' 79 The court did not give due regard to the difficult
process involved in concluding that a public employee's speech de-
serves constitutional protection. I18 The court did not recognize that
pre-existing law had not clearly established Martin's decision to trans-
fer Love-Lane as unlawful. 181
(1) The Court Ignored Key Precedents in Misapplying the Pick-
ering Balancing Test.-In deciding whether Love-Lane's free speech
rights were violated, the court mistakenly concluded that Love-Lane's
claim met the threshold Pickering requirement 82 of a free speech re-
taliatory action claim in that she had spoken about public concerns
rather than on matters of personal interest. 183 It ignored the fact that
Love-Lane's speech covered a wide range of other private employ-
ment-related issues.' 8 ' The Supreme Court in Connick held that an
employee who distributed a questionnaire regarding intra-office em-
ployment policies did not speak out upon a matter of public con-
177. See Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 790 (Wilkinson,J., dissenting) (noting that because of the
majority's holding, the threat of federal lawsuits will restrict the latitude and discretion of
superintendents and principals); see infra notes 241-238 and accompanying text (discussing
how government officials will face unreasonable decisionmaking demands as a result of the
court's decision).
178. Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 790 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
179. See id. at 785. Courts rarely find clearly established law after employing the Pickering
balancing test because the relevant inquiry requires a fact-intensive balancing that is subtle,
nebulous, and difficult to apply. DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 806 (4th Cir. 1995).
180. See DiMeglio, 45 F.3d at 806 (discussing the difficulty of applying the Picketing bal-
ancing test in the context of qualified immunity).
181. Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 798 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
182. An employee must demonstrate that his interest in speaking about a matter of pub-
lic concern outweighs the government's interest in efficiently serving the public. Goldstein
v. Chesnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co., 218 F.3d 337, 351 (4th Cir. 2000).
183. See Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 777-78. Love-Lane's frequent speech about race discrimi-
nation buttresses this conclusion. Id. at 776.
184. Id. at 794-95 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
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cern.1 8 5  Employees who speak about a number of private
employment-related topics, as opposed to only one matter of public
concern, may therefore not qualify as having spoken out about public
concerns, and will not be able to sustain their free speech retaliatory
action claims.'8 6 Love-Lane's difficulties at Lewisville involved various
matters not of public concern such as bus-loading policies, recess su-
pervision, kindergarten care, a disagreement within the custodial staff,
and a heated confrontation with a teacher.18 7 Nonetheless, the
court's focus on Love-Lane's speech about discriminatory practices at
Lewisville allowed it to conclude that she spoke out about a matter of
public concern, and further conclude that a reasonable public official
should have clearly recognized her speech as protected.' 8
In concluding that Love-Lane's interest in free speech out-
weighed the school system's interest in efficiency and thus satisfied
the second requirement of Pickering, the court first misapplied words
of caution from the Supreme Court in Connick. The Court, in Connick,
warned that "a stronger showing may be necessary if the employee's
speech more substantially involved matters of public concern. '"' 9 In
its opinion in Love-Lane, however, the Fourth Circuit read Connick to
state that "the government employer must make a stronger showing of
the potential for inefficiency or disruption when the employee's
speech involves a 'more substantial[ I' matter of public concern." ' ° By
changing "may" to "must," and "substantially" to "substantial," the
court manipulated the Supreme Court's doctrine, forcing public offi-
cials always to demonstrate greater efficiency concerns when employ-
ees speak out on issues that relate, even tangentially, to issues of
public concern. Under Connick, a stronger showing was not necessary
where an employee distributed a questionnaire that focused on
predominantly personal office issues. 9 ' By contrast, however, a fire
company employee's speech about training for emergency personnel,
adherence to safety regulations, and unsafe crewmember conduct did
merit a greater degree of First Amendment protection.' 9 2 The Fourth
Circuit's distortion of Connick's warning will now require the govern-
ment to make a greater efficiency showing not just when an em-
ployee's speech touches mostly on issues of public concern, but also
185. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983).
186. Id.
187. Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 791-92 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 776-78.
189. Connick, 461 U.S. at 152 (emphasis added).
190. Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 778 (emphasis added).
191. Id. at 151-52.
192. Goldstein v. Chesnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co., 218 F.3d 337, 355 (4th Cir. 2000).
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when the employee happens to speak out on any matter of "substan-
tial" public concern, no matter how sparingly. By deeming race dis-
crimination a matter of "substantial" public concern, the Love-Lane
court managed to force Martin to demonstrate his efficiency interest
to a degree previous case law did not require.
The court also misapplied the second prong of the Pickering anal-
ysis by failing to consider fully the manner and tone of Love-Lane's
speech, factors a reasonable public official might have considered in
deciding whether Love-Lane was a disruptive influence at Lewis-
ville. t9  For instance, a reasonable superintendent should be able to
take action when teachers and administrators of all genders and races
find an administrator's demeanor unprofessional and contentious.' 94
While the court credited Love-Lane's own statements that she always
acted professionally,195 it ignored substantial evidence to the contrary
provided by four investigations of an incident between Love-Lane and
another employee, and the collective statements of both the entire
Lewisville administration and the school system's central office. 19 6 De-
spite its claims to the contrary,197 the court did not apply the law
stated in Connick that employers are not required to ignore employees
who disrupt their offices. 98
The court compounded its misapplication of the second Pickering
factor by disregarding its own rule from Stroman that school officials
need not wait until an employee's speech becomes manifestly prob-
lematic before taking action to prevent employees from disrupting the
workplace. 9 9 Instead, the court suggested that a reasonable superin-
tendent should continue to tolerate troublesome behavior without
193. Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 796-97 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). Surprisingly, the court
instead chose to focus on Martin's admission that Love-Lane never threatened the stu-
dents' safety. Id. at 779.
194. Id. at 791 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 779.
196. Id. at 797 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 779. The majority, without citing any cases itself, claimed it examined the
manner of Love-Lane's speech in a way that fell within the ambit of cases cited by the
dissent. Id.
198. Id. at 797-98 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
199. 981 F.2d at 58 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152); see also Fales v. Garst,
235 F.3d 1122, 1124 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding that a school's efficiency interest in avoiding
disharmony among staff outweighed the teachers' interest in speaking); Cochran v. City of
Los Angeles, 222 F.3d 1195, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding preventative action in the
law enforcement employment context); Derrickson v. Bd. of Educ., 738 F.2d 351, 352-53
(8th Cir. 1984) (finding that the interest in preventing disruptive and frequent internal
criticisms outweighed a teacher's free speech rights). The Fourth Circuit has noted the
same rule in the law enforcement context. Jurgensen v. Fairfax County, 745 F.2d 868, 882
n.21 (4th Cir. 1984).
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taking any action that could be deemed retaliatory. 2°° Thus, even
when an official like Martin, before taking action, spends two years
listening to an administrator's concerns and coping with the difficul-
ties arising from her employment within the school system, the court,
in spite of Stroman, may determine that he has somehow violated
clearly established law.201 Moreover, the Court found in Cromer that a
reasonable public official should not have to tolerate confrontational
speech, unprofessional behavior and ineffective working relationships
simply because an employee wants to speak her mind.20 2 But the
court in Love-Lane found the opposite, without citing any cases within
its analysis of Martin's qualified immunity defense, by concluding,
based on its initial analysis of the free speech claim, that Love-Lane's
speech interests weighed heavily in her favor. 203
The court further exacerbated the misapplication of its Pickering
efficiency analysis by ignoring Connick's clearly established rule that a
wider degree of deference to the employer's judgment is appropriate
when close working relationships are essential to fulfilling public re-
sponsibilities. 20 4 The court did not cite this rule, and thus neglected
to consider the possibility that the interest in having an assistant prin-
cipal and a principal cooperate is essential to educating elementary
school students.20 5 The court's oversight allowed it to conclude that
Love-Lane's speech caused Lewisville's educational community no
harm, rendering Martin's efficiency concerns inconsequential. 20 6
Again, properly adhering to, or at least acknowledging, the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Connick would have led the court to recognize
that a superintendent's interest in saving one of his district's schools
from distracting and costly employee disputes outweighed Love-
Lane's free-speech interest.
200. Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 785.
201. Id.
202. See Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1330 n.l (4th Cir. 1996) (noting the limited
nature of a holding denying qualified immunity to a Sheriff, because the speech for which
an employee was fired was communicated in a nonconfrontational manner).
203. Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 784.
204. Connick, 461 U.S. at 151-52; see also Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674-75 (1994)(plurality opinion) (noting that public agencies must have the power to restrain employees
who detract from the agency's effective operation).
205. See Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 795-96 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (noting that the major-
ity disregarded the disruptive nature of Love-Lane's behavior in concluding that educa-
tional services remained unaffected).
206. See id. at 779 (holding that Love-Lane's free speech interest outweighed Martin's
efficiency concerns).
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(2) The Court Ignored Precedent Requiring It to Perform an In-
dividualized, Fact-Specific Investigation into the Reasonableness of a Public
Official's Actions.-The court in Love-Lane ignored precedent by find-
ing that a reasonable superintendent would clearly understand that
transferring Love-Lane violated her free speech rights.2" 7 In so find-
ing, the court did not conduct an individualized fact-specific inquiry
to determine the legality of the defendant's conduct as required by
the Supreme Court in Saucier and Anderson.2 °8 Saucier requires that
the court, following its determination that Martin could have illegally
retaliated against Love-Lane's exercise of free speech, should have
considered whether superintendent Martin's conduct was reasonable
in light of clearly established law.209 Anderson requires that courts re-
view a defendant's particular conduct within the actual circumstances
surrounding it;210 the Fourth Circuit should have therefore analyzed
superintendent Martin's decision in the context of other undisputed
evidence that militated in favor of his decision to transfer Blanchfield
and Love-Lane. 211 Instead, the court ignored both Saucier and Ander-
son and concluded merely that, in light of its initial discussion of
whether Love-Lane's free speech rights would have been violated on
the facts alleged, Love-Lane's right to speak out about race discrimina-
tion was clearly established. 12 The court, therefore, did not analyze
Martin's conduct in the context in which he acted, as required by An-
derson and Saucier.213
Had it followed Saucier and Anderson, the court may have recog-
nized that a reasonable superintendent could not have understood
the contours of Love-Lane's right to free speech well enough to know
207. Id. at 798-99 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
208. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8-10, Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766 (4th Cir.
2004) (No. 03-1569); see Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202-03 (2001) (emphasizing that
conducting a threshold reasonableness inquiry does not preclude the need for courts to
conduct another more specific and individualized fact inquiry to determine whether a pub-
lic official, within the particular context, would have clearly known his conduct was illegal);
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 636-37, 640-41 (1987) (holding that qualified immu-
nity should protect a public official whose conduct, though objectively reasonable, ulti-
mately turns out to violate the law).
209. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8-10, Love-Lane (No. 03-1569).
210. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640-41.
211. Id. at 11-16. This evidence included the views of many teachers and administrators
who, contrary to the majority's conclusion that Love-Lane must be assumed to have acted
professionally, found Love-Lane's conduct offensive. Id.
212. Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 784.
213. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202-03; Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640-41.
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that his conduct would clearly violate that right.2 1 4 The Fourth Cir-
cuit has granted qualified immunity to a defendant who transferred
employees whose speech threatened a public office's interest in or-
derly management. 215 The court has also denied qualified immunity
to a defendant who fired his employee after the employee joined pri-
vate speech efforts in a manner that did not affect close working rela-
tionships or office efficiency. 216 But the court's rulings have failed to
establish any clearly established rule under which Martin, as a reasona-
ble superintendent, should have known that transferring Love-Lane
would violate her right to free speech. 217 Thus, in spite of the major-
ity's decision to deny Martin qualified immunity, the unlawfulness of
his conduct was far from manifest, and Martin's conduct violated no
clearly established constitutional standard that a reasonable superin-
tendent should have known.2 1 8
b. The Fourth Circuit Inappropriately Expected a School Adminis-
trator to Perform Perfectly Intricate Constitutional Balancing Tests to Deter-
mine Whether His Actions Violated Clearly Established Constitutional Law.-
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, public officials must per-
form multiple balancing tests to determine the constitutionality of any
action they might take that could compromise the constitutional
rights of another.2 1 ' The difficulty of this determination is demon-
strated by the varying conclusions of the four federal judges who
heard Love-Lane's suit. While Judge Michael and Gregory found that
Martin was not entitled to qualified immunity,220 Judge Wilkinson and
214. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 (holding that for an officer to be held liable for violat-
ing a constitutional right, the right's contours must be so clear that a reasonable official
would understand that his conduct would violate it).
215. DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 805-06 (4th Cir. 1995) (granting qualified immu-
nity to a zoning commissioner who reprimanded an inspector whose statements could have
reasonably been believed to have disrupted the function of the employer).
216. Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1325-29, 1330 n.l (4th Cir. 1996).
217. For instance, Love-Lane spoke out as an employee on matters of both public and
private concern. Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 776-78. Love-Lane also acted unprofessionally dur-
ing a hallway confrontation with a teacher. Id. at 792 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). More-
over, there is evidence that her speech had a negative effect on at least one of her close
working relationships, and brought further acrimony to the workplace. Id. at 798-99 (Wil-
kinson, J., dissenting).
218. Indeed, Superintendent Martin's conduct was so far from manifestly illegal that two
out of three school board panel members, and subsequently the full board, approved of it.
Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 775.
219. See DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 806 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting the difficulty in
determining whether conduct is clearly illegal after conducting two fact-intensive balanc-
ing tests).
220. Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 753.
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District Court Judge Osteen reached the opposite conclusion.2 '
Courts should not hold administrators liable when the law, as applied
to a certain set of facts, leads two federal judges to reach one result,
and two others to reach the opposite.222 If it was clearly established
that Martin acted illegally, at least a majority of federal judges should
agree.
Unfortunately, the court in Love-Lane effectively requires public
officials, before they make managerial decisions that could affect an-
other's constitutional rights, to hazard a guess as to whether or not
any court that might review their actions would find theirjudgment in
violation of clearly established law. 223 As demonstrated by the differ-
ing opinions of the four federal judges in Love-Lane, however, apply-
ing qualified immunity and divining clearly established law is a
difficult task.2 24 Courts expect doubt and error from those officials
who conduct constitutional balancing tests. 225 Therefore, although
appellate judges should review and criticize the Picketing analyses of
trial court judges, the analyses of other public officials should not be
subject to the same scrutiny. Indeed, case law holds that if a public
official reasonably but mistakenly assumes his efficiency interest in
dealing with an employee outweighs that employee's right to free
speech,226 the public official should enjoy immunity. 2 2 7 Especially in
difficult factual scenarios, appellate courts should not penalize the
same officials for failing to predict the legality of their actions. McVey
does require courts to ascertain whether employees speak as citizens
about matters of public concern or as employees about personal inter-
221. Id. at 790 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting); Love-Lane I, 201 F. Supp. 2d 566, 584-85 (D.
N.C. 2002).
222. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 618 (1999) (arguing that "[i]fjudges thus disa-
gree on a constitutional question, it is unfair to subject police to money damages for pick-
ing the losing side of the controversy").
223. See Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 785 (arguing that public officials like Martin should ei-
ther wait and hear out complaints by employees like Love-Lane, or risk losing their immu-
nity from suit).
224. Charles S. Wilson, "Location, Location, Location": Recent Developments in the Qualified
Immunity Defense, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 445, 447 (2000). A member of the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Wilson regards the task of adjudicating qualified immunity
questions as one of the most ethically and philosophically daunting tasks a federal judge
will face. Id. He points out that judges face a moral dilemma when resolving qualified
immunity issues: choosing between ensuring justice for a potential victim of humiliating
conduct and holding a public servant who appeared liable to act in good faith. Id.
225. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 592-93 (1998) (noting that, within the free
speech context, even when a constitutional right has been long established, a defendant's
particular conduct might not constitute a clear violation of the law).
226. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
227. See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text (discussing the discretion qualified
immunity affords government officials).
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ests, and whether the employees' interests in speaking about public
concerns outweigh the government's interest in providing effective
public services. 228 But when an official makes a reasonable error in
determining that his employee spoke out on a matter of public rather
than private concern, the employing official should, again, receive
protection from suit.
2 2 9
The court in Love-Lane placed too much of a burden on a super-
intendent's ability to divine clearly established law. The Fourth Cir-
cuit should instead have aligned itself with other circuits and
recognized that in the situation of free speech the contours of the
rights are typically not clearly enough established to warn reasonable
public officials that their conduct has crossed a legal threshold.
230
The court should have also noted the standards set by analogous fed-
eral case law holding that public officials should not be required to
delay taking action in resolving acrimonious disputes and other
human resource crises until their employees threaten to cause tangi-
ble harm.231 The majority in Love-Lane made no notice of these prece-
dents. By basing its decision on a method of balancing that is so
difficult to apply, the Fourth Circuit imposes a responsibility upon
public officials that they cannot be reasonably expected to discharge
effectively. 232
228. McVey v. Stacy, 157 F.3d 271, 277 (4th Cir. 1998). The court in McVey also noted
that public officials should only be held liable when they cross bright lines. Id. Balancing
tests are not so bright. Id.
229. Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942 F.2d 257, 260-61 (4th Cir. 1991).
230. See, e.g., Fabiano v. Hopkins, 352 F.3d 447, 457 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting the difficulty
of finding clearly established law in the midst of a Pickering balancing analysis); Denno v.
Sch. Bd. of Volusia County, 218 F.3d 1267, 1275 (11th Cir. 2000) (discussing the difficulty
of finding clearly established law in the free-speech arena); Lytle v. Wondrash, 182 F.3d
1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1999) (reversing a district court's denial of qualified immunity to
school officials because it was not demonstrably unreasonable for them to conclude that
they did not violate the First Amendment); Grantham v. Trickey, 21 F.3d 289, 293 (8th Cir.
1994) (noting the infrequency of finding clearly established law amidst the Pickering bal-
ancing test); Noyola v. Texas Dep't of Human Resources, 846 F.2d 1021, 1025 (5th Cir.
1988) (same); Rakovich v. Wade, 850 F.2d 1180, 1213-14 (7th Cir. 1988) (same); see supra
notes 98-133 and accompanying text (providing a discussion ofjust how sparse clearly es-
tablished law is among federal cases involving free speech and qualified immunity).
231. See, e.g., Fales v. Garst, 235 F.3d 1122, 1124 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding that a school's
efficiency interest in avoiding disharmony among staff outweighed the teachers' interest in
speaking); Cochran v. City of Los Angeles, 222 F.3d 1195, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 2000) (uphold-
ing preventative action in the law enforcement employment context); Derrickson v. Bd. of
Educ., 738 F.2d 351, 352-53 (8th Cir. 1984) (finding that the interest in preventing disrup-
tive and frequent internal criticisms outweighed a teacher's free speech rights).
232. On the other hand, while Martin may ultimately be held personally liable, Martin's
school board will indemnify him. E-mail from Douglas S. Punger, supra note 134. Indem-
nification will thus eliminate the pecuniary threat placed upon officials who work for simi-
larly generous government employers. Nevertheless, it will not eliminate the burden
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c. Subjecting Martin to Individual Liability Forces Government Of-
ficials to Worry About How to Balance Complex Doctrines when Making Oper-
ational Decisions That May Have Constitutional Implications.-The Fourth
Circuit's decision in Love-Lane poses a threat to government officials,
both current and future.233 Under the standard established by the
Fourth Circuit in Wilson,2 34 the facts of Love-Lane do not suggest that
Superintendent Martin is either plainly incompetent or knowingly vio-
lated the law. Absent malice or incompetence, a reasonable public
official like Martin should not have known that his actions would vio-
late clearly established law. Martin should therefore enjoy immunity.
The court's decision does not allow government officials to exercise
their fairjudgment. The court failed to consider that Superintendent
Martin spent two years working with Blanchfield and Love-Lane to re-
solve their difficulties,23 and that ultimately, he decided not to deal
solely with Love-Lane, but, in the interest of the school, to transfer
both her and Blanchfield.236 Further, the court did not give proper
weight to the fact that upon review, the Winston Salem/Forsyth
County Board of Education did not deem his actions incompetent,
but approved them.237 The Fourth Circuit's opposing decision in
Love-Lane takes decisionmaking power away from public officials and,
as a result, government and the citizens who pay for and receive its
services will suffer.
2 38
Forcing public officials to perform public-versus-private as well as
value-of-speech versus employer-efficiency balancing tests, without any
assurance that their judgment will be respected, fails to serve the goals
that qualified immunity aims to achieve. Qualified immunity is de-
signed to protect public officials' actions except when they recklessly
or knowingly infringe upon the constitutional rights of others.239 The
court's decision in Love-Lane upsets that balance. The Love-Lane
court's approach discourages officials from exercising their discretion
government officials will bear in responding to lawsuits, or the costs that taxpayers, in turn,
might have to assume.
233. See Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 799 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (asking what public offi-
cials are supposed to do in the wake of the majority's opinion).
234. 141 F.3d 111, 114 (4th Cir. 1998); see supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text
(discussing Wilson).
235. Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 799 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 798 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
237. See id. at 774. Superintendent Martin also could not have knowingly violated Love-
Lane's free speech rights because he was never, in fact, aware of them. Id.
238. This result is exacerbated when public officials are indemnified. Taxpayers will
inevitably have to pay for the litigation and costs arising from more lawsuits, in either
increased taxes or the loss of services.
239. Wilson, 141 F.3d at 114.
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with conviction and from taking timely, productive action in constitu-
tionally related contexts.2 4' This decision may even discourage capa-
ble superintendents like Martin from pursuing public service
altogether.2 41 Courts should heed the Supreme Court's call in Harlow
and dismiss insubstantial claims that disrupt the government and its
employees before such claims reach trial.2 42 Unfortunately, in Love-
Lane, the Fourth Circuit ignored Harlow's objectives of protecting soci-
ety from litigation costs and from distracted and impotent govern-
ment officials; it instead requires administrators to guess how courts
will resolve difficult constitutional balancing tests.
243
Finally, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Love-Lane has even
greater potential for harming public school administration due to the
recent enactment of the local accountability standards required in the
No Child Left Behind Act of 2001.244 One of the Act's purposes is to
"hold schools, local educational agencies, and States accountable for
improving the academic achievement of all students. '245 The court's
decision has made it even harder for schools to meet this standard by
making it more difficult for school administrators to resolve personnel
difficulties that might affect the administration of education. 246 In-
240. Alan K. Chen, The Ultimate Standard: Qualifled Immunity in the Age of Constitutional
Balancing Tests, 81 IOwA L. REV. 261, 311 (1995). Professor Chen argues that this reasoning
flouts substantive equality in actual outcomes. Id. He also argues that articulating immu-
nity rules rather than standards would leave constitutional standards more intact. Id. at
269.
But because of the nature of their jobs, public officials, as opposed to private employ-
ees, are particularly vulnerable to constitutional tort actions. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2000) (holding liable only those who undertake state action). Thus, when a federal cir-
cuit makes it easier for citizens within its district to sue public officials, potential officehold-
ers may notice. They may recognize that despite the best intentions, much of their time at
work could become occupied by defending lawsuits, and they could lose a significant por-
tion of their public sector salaries if they are not successful. They might also recognize that
if they are to avoid suits, they must tread so lightly, and act so meekly, that even their best-
planned and best-intentioned initiatives might never come to fruition.
241. Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 801 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
242. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814, 818 (1982). Judge Wilkinson implied that
Love-Lane's free speech claim was in fact insubstantial by pointing out that Love-Lane did
not raise free speech issues before the Board. Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 793 (Wilkinson, J.,
dissenting).
243. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814. Statutes like § 1983 serve the normative goal of ensuring
that public officials stop to consider the constitutional implications of their actions before
they act in haste. But it does not makes sense to punish officials if their conduct, though
objectively reasonable, ultimately proves unconstitutional. Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635, 636-37, 640-41 (1987).
244. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.)
245. 20 U.S.C. § 6301(4) (Supp. I 2001).
246. Brief of Amici Curiae North Carolina School Boards Association et al. at 6-7, Love-
Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766 (4th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-1569).
1322
2005] FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS 1323
stead, the court should recognize that public school administrators
need a strong shield of qualified immunity to allow them to make
tough choices and deliver the educational services children and par-
ents expect and deserve.
24 7
5. Conclusion.-In Love-Lane, the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals denied a school superintendent qualified immunity when he al-
legedly violated an assistant principal's right to free speech by
transferring her as a result of her complaints about race discrimina-
tion.248 In refusing to grant qualified immunity to Superintendent
Martin after he made a difficult yet reasonable administrative deci-
sion, the Fourth Circuit ignored the Supreme Court and its own quali-
fied immunity jurisprudence.249  The court incorrectly decided to
hold Superintendent Martin responsible for failing to perform pre-
cisely complicated constitutional balancing tests to determine whether
his actions violated clearly established constitutional law.2 50 As a re-
sult, the court forced him, and will in the future force other public
officials, to become experts in the difficult methods of constitutional
balancing before making management decisions.251
ANDREW S. JOHNSTON
247. No Child Left Behind also aims to increase local flexibility and control in making
education decisions. THE WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: No CHILD LEFr BEHIND ACT (Jan.
2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2OO2/01/2O2 108.html.
Reducing the discretion of top-level administrators to make staffing decisions appears to
flout this purpose.
248. Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 783.
249. Id. at 790 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting); see supra notes 178-218 and accompanying text
(discussing how the court ignored or misconstrued good authority about qualified
immunity).
250. Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 784-85 (holding that Martin was not entitled to summary
judgment because his conduct should have seemed illegal, even though such conduct
rarely violates the Pickering balancing test); see supra notes 219-232 and accompanying text
(providing a discussion of how the court inappropriately expected a superintendent to
perform flawless balancing tests in determining clearly established constitutional law).
251. Love-Lane, 355 F.3d at 790 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (noting that because of the
majority's holding, principals and superintendents will become haunted by an ever-present
specter of federal lawsuits); see supra notes 233-247 and accompanying text (noting that
public officials now face a more difficult task in applying complex doctrines when making
operational decisions with potential constitutional implications).
II. COPYRIGHT LAW
A. The Role of the ISP in Copyright Infringement: Applying the 1976
Copyright Act to the Internet by Fusing a Flawed Interpretation of
Precedent into a Flawed Interpretation of the Act
In CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc.,' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether an Internet service
provider (ISP) 2 was liable for direct copyright infringement when it
engaged in a brief screening process before allowing users to post in-
fringing material on its website.' The court held that an ISP, acting as
a passive conduit of information despite this brief screening process,
is not directly liable for the infringing material posted by its users.4
Specifically, the court concluded that when an ISP temporarily stores
material in its random access memory (RAM) 5 while transmitting ma-
terial over the Internet, it does not create "copies" as defined by the
Copyright Act.6 In doing so, the court departed from the precedent it
claimed to follow and misinterpreted the statutory definition of "cop-
ies."7 Rather than acknowledge the inapplicability of the Copyright
Act to the Internet,' the Fourth Circuit fused ajudicially created liabil-
ity scheme intended solely for ISPs into the legislative liability scheme
1. 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004) [hereinafter CoStar I1].
2. There is no standard definition of ISP. Congressional attempts to construct a defi-
nition have created ambiguity in the statutory provisions that refer to an ISP. Compare The
Communications Decency Act (CDA), 47 U.S.C. § 230(f) (2) (2000) (defining an ISP as an
"interactive computer service"), with The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 17
U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B) (2000) (defining an ISP as a "service provider"). The CDA defines
an "interactive computer service" as "any information service, system, or access software
provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server,
including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such sys-
tems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions." 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(f) (2). The DMCA defines a "service provider" as "a provider of online services or
network access, or the operator of facilities therefor." 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B).
3. CoStar II, 373 F.3d at 546.
4. Id. at 556.
5. RAM is a computer component that temporarily records data. Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 617, 622 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
6. CoStar ll, 373 F.3d at 550-51; see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "copies" as "material
objects . . . in which a work is fixed . . . and from which the work can be perceived").
7. See CoStarIl, 373 F.3d at 549-51, 555 (claiming to agree with the analysis in Religious
Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communications Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1368
(N.D. Cal. 1995), which accepted the opposite proposition that copies are created when
material is transmitted through an ISP's RAM); see also infra notes 142-162 and accompany-
ing text (identifying the court's misinterpretation of the statutory definition of "copies").
8. See CoStar II, 373 F.3d at 556 (holding that LoopNet cannot be liable under the
Copyright Act, as it is not a "copier").
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governing all of copyright law.' Applying the Copyright Act to a sce-
nario not contemplated by the legislature that enacted it, the Fourth
Circuit failed to defer to the constitutional purpose of copyright law.
As a result, its decision threatens the constitutionally protected inter-
ests of artists and the public, sets a dangerous precedent for subse-
quent courts determining liability for copyright infringement in
contexts other than ISPs, and impedes the development of a field of
law that is meant to adapt to advances in technology.' 0
1. The Case.-Plaintiff, CoStar Group, Inc. (CoStar), is a pro-
vider of commercial real estate information services and maintains a
comprehensive real estate database that contains copyrighted photo-
graphs of commercial properties. 1 Defendant, LoopNet, Inc. (Loop-
Net), is an ISP that offers its users the ability to post listings of
commercial real estate. t2 LoopNet operates a website that contains
over one hundred thousand commercial real estate listings, including
thirty-three thousand photographs, all of which are uploaded onto its
website by subscribers, mostly real estate brokers." Subscribers post-
ing purely textual listings have their information automatically
uploaded onto LoopNet's server for display. 4 Subscribers who wish
to include a photograph in their listing must agree that they have "all
necessary rights and authorizations" from the copyright owner of the
photographs and then a LoopNet employee must review the photo-
graph to ensure it in fact depicts commercial real estate and to check
for any obvious indication of copyright infringement before it is
uploaded onto the server for display."
Following CoStar's identification of over three hundred of its
copyrighted photographs on LoopNet's website, CoStar filed suit in
the United States District Court for the District of Maryland for copy-
9. See infra notes 164-168 (analyzing the court's attempt to interpret Netcom's liability
scheme, which was created outside the scope of the Copyright Act and intended to remedy
the inadequacies of the Act as applied to ISPs, as a statutory interpretation of the Act's
definition of "copies").
10. See infra notes 169-175 (establishing thejudiciary's role in considering the constitu-
tional purpose of copyright law when technological change renders the Copyright Act ob-
solete and discussing the implications of the failure to do so). Article I, section 8 of the
United States Constitution serves as the source for this inherent tension and provides the
foundation for copyright law by granting Congress the power " t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
11. CoStar II, 373 F.3d at 546.
12. Id. at 547.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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right infringement and several state law causes of action.1 6 After the
parties stipulated to the dismissal of all claims except for direct copy-
right infringement, the district court entered a final judgment on that
issue in favor of LoopNet.1
The district court relied on Religious Technology Center v. Netcom
On-Line Communication Services, Inc.,1 8 a Ninth Circuit case that con-
cluded that an ISP cannot be held liable for direct copyright infringe-
ment initiated by its users without some element of volition or
causation, which is absent when an ISP merely creates a copy in an
involuntary process initiated by a third party. 9 The district court
found that because third parties used LoopNet's system to create cop-
ies, LoopNet lacked the element of either volition or causation that
Netcom required to establish direct copyright infringement.2 ° CoStar
asserted that LoopNet directly copied and distributed its photographs
in violation of their exclusive rights under § 106 of the Copyright
Act,2" and that LoopNet's process of physically screening each photo-
graph before uploading it to the website was evidence of volitional
conduct that caused the copies to be created and distributed.22 How-
ever, the court agreed with LoopNet and concluded that LoopNet
merely allowed users to upload and download photographs and did
not "reproduce" those photographs on LoopNet's website.23 Despite
its screening process, the district court qualified LoopNet as a passive
conduit of information, and thus under Netcom, allowed it to escape
liability for direct copyright infringement.24
CoStar appealed the district court's award of summary judgment
on the issue of direct copyright infringement to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.25 The court considered
whether an ISP that screens each of the photographs posted by users
16. CoStar Group v. LoopNet, 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 692, 717 (D. Md. 2001) [hereinaf-
ter CoStar 1]. The state law causes of action included claims of unfair competition, unjust
enrichment, and intentional interference with business relations. Id.
17. CoStar II, 373 F.3d at 547.
18. 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
19. CoStar 1, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 695-96 (citing Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1370).
20. Id. at 696. The district court noted that the Fourth Circuit previously expressed its
preference for the Netcom approach in ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619
(4th Cir. 2001). Id.
21. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). This section provides authors the exclusive right to
reproduce, create derivative works, distribute, display, and publicly perform their copy-
righted works. Id
22. CoStar I, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 695.
23. Id. at 695-96.
24. CoStar II, 373 F.3d at 547-48.
25. Id. at 547.
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on its system is directly liable for photographs posted in violation of
existing copyright law. 26
2. Legal Background.-The United States Constitution gives Con-
gress the power to grant exclusive rights to authors of original works
in order to encourage such creations and ultimately advance the pub-
lic welfare. 27 Accordingly, Congress enacted the Copyright Act of
1976,28 awarding authors of artistic and literary creations the exclusive
right to reproduce their copyrighted material. 29 As such, to establish
a prima facie case of direct copyright infringement, a plaintiff need
only present evidence of unauthorized copying of a copyrighted
work.3" The 1976 statutory definition of "copies""' includes the prod-
uct of an ISP's display of a user's material on the Internet. 32 Conse-
quently, under a strict interpretation of "copies," the mere existence
of a website that contains unauthorized copyrighted material is suffi-
cient to hold an ISP liable for direct copyright infringement, regard-
less of the ISP's negligible role in the infringement. 33  Courts
recognized that imposing liability on ISPs that merely transmit mate-
rial to the Internet without an ability to monitor the content of that
material undermines the constitutional purpose of copyright law by
restricting the public dissemination of original works. 34 To prevent
the constitutional implications involved in strictly applying the Copy-
right Act to ISPs, courts have adopted a judicially created liability
26. Id. at 546.
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also infra notes 36-49 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the constitutional purpose behind copyright law).
28. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-1332 (2000).
29. Id. § 106. Authors are also granted the exclusive right to create derivative works,
and to distribute, display, and publicly perform their copyrighted works. Id.
30. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). As owner-
ship and copying are the only two elements required under the Copyright Act, direct copy-
right infringement is a strict liability offense, imposing liability on the infringing party
regardless of that party's lack of intent or knowledge of the infringement. 17 U.S.C.
§ 501 (a); see also infra notes 40-55 and accompanying text (examining the Copyright Act's
statutory framework).
31. 17 U.S.C. § 101. "Copies" are defined as "material objects . .. in which a work is
fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device." Id.
32. See infra notes 57-75 and accompanying text (examining the cases establishing that
an ISP creates "copies" under the statutory definition).
33. Courts initially relied upon a strict liability theory when applying the Copyright Act
to ISPs accused of copyright infringement initiated by their users. See infra notes 76-80 and
accompanying text (discussing the application of the statutory framework to determine
that an ISP is strictly liable for direct copyright infringement).
34. See infra notes 76-80 and accompanying text (describing the constitutional implica-
tions of designating ISPs as copiers).
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theory for ISPs based on causation, whereby an ISP is not liable for
direct copyright infringement without evidence of volition or
causation.35
a. The Constitutional and Statutory Foundation of Copyright
Law.-The Constitution establishes the field of copyright law by giving
Congress the power to protect an individual's intellectual works with
the ultimate goal of disseminating those works to the public. Effectu-
ating this purpose, Congress enacted a statutory framework that moti-
vates artistic creation by placing a limited monopoly in the hands of a
copyright owner.
The Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries. '"6 Congress then created the field of copyright law,
granting authors of artistic and literary creations certain exclusive
rights to their original works. 7 Granting a property right for intellec-
tual works rewards an author for his or her creative work and as a
result, "promote [s] the Progress of Science and useful Arts."3 Thus,
at the core of copyright law is the struggle to balance an author's ex-
clusive rights to his copyrighted works against the public's interest in
accessing those works.39
In effectuating the constitutional purpose of protecting both pri-
vate creativity and public welfare, Congress enacted the Copyright Act
of 1976. 4o Congress anticipated that the grant of a limited monopoly
in an author's original works would achieve the private motivation
necessary to reach the ultimate goal of disseminating intellectual
works to the public.4" As such, the Copyright Act gives authors the
exclusive right to reproduce, create derivative works, distribute, dis-
play, and publicly perform their copyrighted material.4 2
35. See infra notes 81-99 and accompanying text (discussing the judicially created liabil-
ity scheme intended to replace the strict liability scheme for ISPs).
36. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
37. 17 U.S.C. § 106. Namely, the rights to reproduce, create derivative works, dis-
tribute, display, and publicly perform their copyrighted material. Id.
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (ex-
plaining that encouraging individual creativity is the best way to advance public welfare).
39. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (describing
the competing claims upon the public interest: private motivation must ultimately serve
the public welfare by allowing for broad access to original works of art).
40. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-1332.
41. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (estab-
lishing that the primary purpose of the Copyright Act is not to provide a private benefit but
rather to promote the creation and dissemination of original works).
42. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
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In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,43 the Supreme
Court interpreted the limited monopoly that copyright law confers on
authors by way of exclusive rights as a means to the ultimate end of
benefiting the public." In Sony, Universal City Studios, which owned
exclusive rights to television programs broadcasted on public airwaves,
alleged contributory copyright infringement against Sony because it
manufactured and sold video tape recorders used by the public to
make unauthorized copies of television programs.45 In finding Sony
not liable for contributory copyright infringement because its record-
ers were capable of substantial noninfringing uses,4 6 the Court em-
phasized its reluctance to expand copyright protections without
explicit legislative guidance.47 The Court reasoned that this situation,
involving a product capable of substantial noninfringing uses, could
not have been contemplated by Congress when it enacted the Copy-
right Act in 1976, and thus deferred to the underlying constitutional
purpose of copyright law-stimulating artistic creativity in order to
benefit the public.48 As such, the Court relieved Sony of liability by
creating the doctrine of "substantial noninfringing uses" in order to
balance the interest of authors in controlling their art with the com-
peting interest of the public in the free flow of ideas.49
Violation of any of the exclusive rights granted to authors under
the Copyright Act is considered copyright infringement.5 ° In consid-
ering whether a publishing company infringed on the copyright of a
telephone company by using its listings without their consent, the Su-
preme Court in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,
Inc.5" identified only two elements as necessary to establish a prima
facie case of direct copyright infringement: (1) ownership of a copy-
righted work; and (2) unauthorized copying of that work by the de-
43. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
44. Id. at 429.
45. Id. at 419-20.
46. Id. at 456. The issue of substantial, noninfringing uses was not argued in CoStar II.
47. Id. at 431. If the Court had enforced Universal City Studios' exclusive rights to
certain television programs against Sony, the manufacturer of a product not primarily used
to infringe on copyrights, it would have expanded copyright protection beyond what Con-
gress authorized in the language of the Copyright Act. Id.
48. See id. at 430-32 (noting that copyright law develops in response to changes in tech-
nology); see also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (finding
that courts must defer to the basic purpose of copyright law when technological change
has created ambiguity in the literal terms of the Copyright Act).
49. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
50. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2000).
51. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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fendant.5 2 Direct copyright infringement is thus a strict liability
offense, whereby a plaintiff need only prove that an individual created
an unauthorized copy of his or her work, regardless of the copier's
lack of intent or knowledge of the infringement. 53
Under the Copyright Act, "copies" are defined as "material ob-
jects .. .in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later
developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a ma-
chine or device."54 The Act further provides that a work is "fixed" if it
is "sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transi-
tory duration."55
b. Applying the Statutory Framework of the Copyright Act to the
Internet.-Under the Copyright Act, because the transmission of copy-
righted material, even in an action initiated by third parties, creates a
"copy" of the material, all ISPs would be strictly liable for direct copy-
right infringement in their role of instantaneously and unknowingly
transmitting the copyrighted material to the Internet. Such a scenario
undermines the constitutional purpose of copyright law by unduly val-
uing its private benefit over the ultimate goal of public dissemination
of intellectual works.5 6
(1) The Designation of an ISP as a Copier.-In order to cre-
ate a copy of a work, as defined by the Copyright Act, that copy must
be fixed in such a way that it can be perceived for more than a period
of transitory duration. 57 As applied to material transmitted through
computers, most courts have deferred to the example set by the Ninth
Circuit in MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.5" MAI, a computer
52. Id. at 361. The Fourth Circuit noted its agreement with Feist in Trandes Cp. v.
Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 665, 660 (4th Cir. 1993).
53. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (a). While the Copyright Act does not explicitly distinguish be-
tween direct, contributory, or vicarious copyright infringement, the Supreme Court has
implied this distinction through general principles of law. Sony, 464 U.S. at 435. The
Court explained that vicarious and contributory liability are imposed in nearly all areas of
the law and that copyright law should not be an exception, despite the absence of such
provisions in the copyright statute. Id.
54. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
55. Id.
56. See infra notes 76-80 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional implica-
tions of designating ISPs as copiers).
57. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
58. 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993); see infra note 64 (citing cases that followed MA!).
However, some courts avoid the issue of proving copying altogether by applying the tradi-
tional inference test where a plaintiff can create an inference of "copying" by proving that
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and software manufacturer, brought a copyright infringement claim
against former employees after they used MAI's copyrighted software
at their new employment with Peak Computer.59 Peak Computer ar-
gued that it did not violate MAI's copyright by merely loading software
from a disk into a computer's RAM6" because RAM is not a tangible
medium where a copy of the software can be fixed.6 The Ninth Cir-
cuit, however, found that under the Copyright Act, a copy is created
when a computer program is transferred from a permanent storage
device to a computer's RAM because the representation created in
RAM may then be perceived on the computer for a period of more
than transitory duration.62 Thus, in concluding that Peak Computer
did engage in copyright infringement, the MAI court found the ability
to be perceived in any tangible medium fixes a copy, not the medium
in which the copying takes place.
6 3
Courts have consistently applied MA! to copyright infringement
cases involving material transferred through the Internet, holding
that a copy is created when a third party transfers material to an ISP's
server which then transmits that material over the Internet.64 For in-
stance, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, in Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Ass'n of Fire Equipment Distributors
& Northwest Nexus, Inc., found copying when material was uploaded
from a personal computer's storage device to an ISP's storage media,
or RAM.65 In particular, the court noted that when a user transmits
the defendant had access to the copyrighted work and that the two works are "substantially
similar." See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503, 509 (N.D.
Ohio 1997). Courts have even found copying where there is no proof of access if the
allegedly infringing material is "strikingly similar" to the copyrighted material. See Playboy
Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543, 551 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
59. MAJ, 991 F.2d at 513.
60. See supra note 5 (defining RAM, or random access memory, as a computer compo-
nent that temporarily records data).
61. MAI, 991 F.2d at 518.
62. Id. at 518-19 (citing Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 260 (5th Cir.
1988), which found that a copy is created when loading a program from a storage medium
to a computer's memory).
63. Id. at 519; see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining copies as fixed material objects
that can be "communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device" (emphasis
added)).
64. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1167-68 (C.D.
Cal. 2002) (online age verification service); Marobie-FL, Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Fire Equip.
Distribs. & N.W. Nexus, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1167, 1177-78 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (online clip art
software); Sega Enter., Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679, 686 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (electronic
bulletin board service).
65. 983 F. Supp. at 1177. Third parties, or "users," transfer information over their
Internet connection from a personal computer, typically a hard drive, to a storage device
on the ISP. Sega, 857 F. Supp. at 683. This process, known as "uploading," records the
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material over the Internet to post on a website, a copy is created on
the computer of the website operator and the ISP's computer. 66
Thus, the court found that the user's initial act of posting material on
the Internet results in the automatic copying of this material from the
website operator's computer to the ISP's computer, allowing that ma-
terial to be viewed by other users, and consequently fixes the copies.67
In Marobie-FL, the owner of copyrighted clip art pictures brought
a suit against an ISP for copyright infringement after finding its
images available for download on the defendants' website.6 s The de-
fendants argued that the instantaneous transmission of information in
electronic form through a computer's RAM cannot be considered
copying, as the information is never "fixed" in an ISP's RAM.69 Re-
jecting this argument, the court explained that the speed with which
material is duplicated during an Internet transmission has no rele-
vance to the material's ability to be perceived for more than a "transi-
tory duration."7" Although the transmission process breaks
information down into "bytes" which are typically not contained in an
ISP's RAM in totality,71 the court determined that the material is still
"fixed" under the statutory definition because those bytes eventually
reach an Internet site which can assemble and display the file in its
entirety on a computer for more than a period of transitory dura-
tion.72 As such, the court concluded that by merely transmitting infor-
mation through a computer's RAM, the defendants did create copies
of the material, emphasizing that such material need not be "fixed" in
the medium of transmission but rather the medium of
communication.73
Additional courts have followed Marobie-FL and concluded that
when assessing the statutory definition of "copies," the ability to be
perceived must be of more than transitory duration and the duration
user's information onto the ISP's storage media and allows it to be accessed by other users.
Id.
66. Marobie-FL, 983 F. Supp. at 1177. As a result, copyright infringement actions are
often brought against both the website operator and the ISP. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1171.
69. Id. at 1176-77.
70. Id. at 1177-78.
71. Rather, the information is transmitted so instantaneously that only a portion exists
in RAM at any one time. Id. at 1177.
72. Id. at 1177-78.
73. Id. at 1178.
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of the copying process is irrelevant.74 Under this interpretation, all
ISPs create "copies" when material is instantaneously transferred
through its RAM to be displayed on the Internet. 5
(2) Constitutional Implications of Designating ISPs as Copi-
ers.-As copying is a necessary component of the process by which an
ISP displays images on the Internet, the mere existence of unautho-
rized copyrighted material on a website is sufficient to establish a
prima facie case of direct copyright infringement against an ISP.7 6
For example, the first decision applying copyright principles to in-
fringement occurring on the Internet used the statutory strict liability
scheme to find an operator of an electronic bulletin board service
(BBS) 77 liable for material posted by its users, regardless of whether
the operator had knowledge of the infringement or an intent to in-
fringe.78 As such, an ISP is strictly liable under the Copyright Act for
the unauthorized copying of copyrighted material without ever directly
participating in the copying process that causes the infringement.79
However, courts have recognized that imposing liability on all ISPs
whose users post infringing material would effectively cripple the In-
ternet, hinder the public's ability to access copyrighted works, and ul-
timately impede the constitutional purpose of advancing public
welfare .8
c. Restoring the Constitutional Purpose: A Judicially Created ISP
Liability Scheme to Replace the Statutory Liability Scheme.-Various courts
rejected the idea of holding all ISPs strictly liable for direct copyright
infringement for their passive role in creating "copies" and instead
have adopted a causation liability theory, whereby an ISP is not held
liable for creating copies unless it has engaged in an element of voli-
tion or causation. This causation liability theory was introduced in
1995 by the Northern District of California in Religious Technology
74. SeePerfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1167 (C.D. Cal.
2002) (online age verification service); Cent. Point Software, Inc. v. Nugent, 903 F. Supp.
1057, 1060 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (electronic bulletin board service).
75. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F.
Supp. 1361, 1368 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (explaining that an ISP's action in creating a copy is a
necessary step in the process of transmitting material to and from the Internet).
76. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (setting forth the elements of a prima
facie claim of copyright infringement).
77. A BBS is a type of website that offers users the ability to upload and download
material. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1369 n.11.
78. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
79. Id.
80. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1369 (finding that this conflict would result in unreason-
able liability affecting every ISP in the "worldwide link of computers").
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Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc."1 Faced with a de-
fendant ISP that provided Internet access to a BBS whose users posted
infringing material, the court departed from the statutorily required
strict liability scheme requiring only ownership of a copyright and
copying by the defendant and instead imposed a requirement of voli-
tion or causation in order to find an ISP liable for direct copyright
infringement.8 2 The court concluded that the elements of volition
and causation do not exist where an ISP's system incidentally and au-
tomatically creates copies in a process initiated by a third party.83 In
doing so, the court made the crucial distinction between creating a
copy and causing a copy to be created. 4 The court concluded that
where an ISP's system can be used solely to create a copy by a third
party, it would be unfair from a policy perspective to hold an ISP di-
rectly liable when it has not caused a copy to be created.8 5
Although the court acknowledged that Netcom did maintain a
system that allowed users to automatically post material and thus cre-
ated a copy of the plaintiffs work, Netcom's system could operate with-
out human intervention. 6 In emphasizing this fact, the court
concluded that Netcom did not cause the copy to be created. 7 The
court was unwilling to hold Netcom directly liable for its passive con-
duct. 8 As a result, the court created a standard of causation liability
whereby the two statutory elements of unauthorized copying of copy-
righted material may be satisfied and yet a defendant ISP can avoid
liability if it has not engaged in voluntary infringement.8 9
Following Netcom, most courts have recognized that where the ele-
ments of volition or causation are lacking, an ISP should not be held
liable for the infringing material posted by its users. The Fourth Cir-
cuit has, in dicta, expressed its preference for Netcom's causation liabil-
81. Id. at 1370-71. Netcom has become the seminal case dealing with copyright infringe-
ment on the Internet and has fundamentally altered the way courts address whether an ISP
should be held liable for direct copyright infringement initiated by its users.
82. Id. The Netcom court explicitly identified the issue it set out to resolve: "whether
possessors of computers are liable for incidental copies automatically made on their com-
puters using their software as part of a process initiated by a third party." Id. at 1368
(emphasis added).
83. Id. at 1368-69.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1369.
86. Id. at 1368-69 & n.12.
87. Id. In the court's analysis, the touchstone for causation was human intervention.
Id.
88. Id. at 1372.
89. Id. at 1370. The court emphasized that a passive ISP does not create, control, or
monitor the content of the material it transfers to the Internet. Id. at 1372.
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ity theory over a strict liability theory,9" while other courts have
expressly adopted the Netcom approach. For example, in Sega Enter-
prise, Ltd. v. MAPHIA,9" the Northern District of California allowed a
BBS operator to escape liability for direct copyright infringement by
relying on Netcom's distinction between creating a copy and causing a
copy to be created.92 While the BBS operator had solicited subscrib-
ers to upload Sega video games onto the Internet and charged other
subscribers a fee to download those games onto their computer, the
court found this insufficient to prove that the operator caused the
copying, despite acknowledging that the BBS operator created the
copies in posting material on its system.93
Just as courts have used Netcom to allow passive ISPs to escape
liability, several courts have imposed liability on ISPs for direct copy-
right infringement where the ISPs have exercised some element of
volition or causation. For example, the Northern District of Ohio, in
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc.,94 used two crucial
facts to determine that a BBS operator was liable for the copyright
infringing adult pictures posted by its users.95 First, the defendants
solicited users to upload photographs.96 Second, the defendants con-
ducted a screening process during which an employee viewed each
photograph and moved them into a file that could be accessible to
subscribers.97 As such, the human interaction involved in the screen-
ing process, in particular, allowed the court in Hardenburgh to find the
defendants liable for direct copyright infringement.98
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc.,
the Fourth Circuit concluded that an ISP automatically transmitting
material on its system and storing that material in its RAM does not
create "copies" as defined by the Copyright Act.99 Instead, the court
90. SeeALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc. 239 F.3d 619, 622 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting
that the Netcom reasoning is more persuasive than strict liability but deciding the case based
on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act).
91. 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
92. Id. at 932.
93. Id.
94. 982 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
95. Id. at 512-13.
96. Id.
97. Id. The court found that these two facts transformed the defendants from a passive
conduit of information into an active participant in copyright infringement. Id. at 513.
98. Id. at 511-12.
99. 373 F.3d at 550-51. The court stated that:
When an electronic infrastructure is designed and managed as a conduit of infor-
mation and data that connects users over the Internet, the owner and manager of
the conduit hardly "copies" the information and data in the sense that it fixes a
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reasoned that Netcom's elements of volition and causation are derived
from the statute and required to prove the creation of copies in all
copyright infringement cases, not to determine the liability of an ISP
by distinguishing between creating copies and causing copies to be
created.10 0 The court then applied this reasoning to conclude that
LoopNet's screening process was not substantial enough to be consid-
ered volitional conduct and, as such, was insufficient to amount to
copying.
0 1
Writing for the majority,'0 °Judge Niemeyer first discussed the na-
ture of the Netcom decision before applying it to the instant case. 0 3
CoStar argued that the holding in Netcom-an ISP cannot be held lia-
ble for direct copyright infringement without some evidence of voli-
tion or causation-was a pragmatic and temporary limitation to the
statutorily required strict liability scheme.' 0 4 Further, CoStar con-
tended that the causation liability scheme developed in Netcom was a
judicially created doctrine intended as a policy-based judgment to pre-
vent crippling the Internet. 10 5 The Fourth Circuit, however, did not
interpret Netcom as introducing a new liability theory and refused to
accept that the policy implications involved in holding all ISPs liable
for the infringing conduct initiated by its users had any effect on
Netcom's holding.'0 6 While the court acknowledged that Netcom dis-
cussed the consequences of applying a strict liability scheme that re-
quired only proof of unauthorized copying of copyrighted material, it
stated that such considerations were not the impetus for Netcom's in-
troduction of the elements of volition and causation.
10 7
Instead, the Fourth Circuit decided that Netcom grounded its deci-
sion in a rational interpretation of § 106 of the Copyright Act.108 The
copy in its system of more than transitory duration.., and the ISP therefore would
not be a "copier" to make it directly liable under the Copyright Act.
Id.
100. Id. at 549-50.
101. Id. at 556.
102. Id. at 546. Judge Michael joined Judge Niemeyer. Id.
103. Id. at 548-53. CoStar raised the issue of whether Netcom was applicable due to the
post-Netcom enactment of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). Id. at 548. Co-
Star argued that the DMCA preempted Netcom because it codified much of the Netcom
decision. Id. at 552. The court relied on the express language of the DMCA, rules of
statutory construction, and the legislative history to conclude that the DMCA did not sup-
plant case law and that the DMCA's safe harbor provisions served as a floor and not a
ceiling for defenses to copyright infringement on the Internet. Id. at 552-55.
104. Id. at 548.
105. Id. at 549.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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court noted that the Act explicitly requires proof of two elements to
establish copyright infringement.10 9 The court then found that the
Act implicitly required that there be a "sufficiently close and causal"
nexus between the infringing conduct and the illegal copying, and
interpreted Netcom's requirement of volition or causation as a manifes-
tation of this nexus."10 Thus, the court reasoned that Netcom's ele-
ments of volition and causation are statutorily required to prove the
creation of copies in all cases involving copyright infringement."1 '
The Fourth Circuit then interpreted the statutory definitions of
"copies" and "fixed" to conclude that a passive ISP that automatically
transmits material to the Internet does not create copies of that mate-
rial and so cannot be held liable for direct copyright infringement. 1 2
According to the court, a passive conduit that transmits material over
the Internet does not make fixed copies because the transmission pro-
cess does not last for more than a period of "transitory duration."' 1 3
The court cited the Copyright Act's definitions of the term "copies" as
"material objects.., in which a work is fixed," and the term "fixed" as
"sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory
duration.""' 4 The court then described an ISP as a conduit that con-
nects users over the Internet, making temporary electronic copies and
downloading information as a fleeting, automatic response to a user's
request.1 ' 5 The court concluded that an ISP does not create "copies"
because the copying process is too transitory.' 6 Such an automatic
transmission, the court concluded, could not possibly fix a copy in its
system for a period of more than transitory duration."'
Recognizing that this conclusion conflicts with the holding of
MA/-a copy is created when material is transferred to a computer's
RAM-the Fourth Circuit next attempted to distinguish the transmis-
sion process that occurs on an ISP's computer from the same process
that occurs for all other computers, such as the personal computer of
the defendant in MA.' 18 The court made this distinction by charac-
terizing the use of the term "transitory duration" in the definition of
109. Id. (1) Unauthorized copying of (2) copyrighted material. Id.
110. Id. at 550.
111. Id.
112. Id at 550-51.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 550 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000)).
115. Id. at 550-51.
116. Id. at 551.
117. Id.
118. Id.; see MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518-19 (9th Cir. 1993).
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"fixed" as both quantitative and qualitative.' 19 The court described
the quantitative aspect as the duration of the copying process and the
qualitative aspect as the status of the copying process, or the ability of
the copied material to serve the computer owner.1 2' Thus, while the
quantitative duration of the copying process may be identical between
an ISP's computer and all other computers, the qualitative status of
the transition differs. t21 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that an ISP au-
tomatically retransmits material through its RAM to the Internet and
so the qualitative status of this process remains transitory. 122 On the
other hand, the court asserted that non-ISP computers and their users
would now have access to the material in their RAM, which makes the
copying process exceed a transitory duration and constitute a "copy"
as defined by the statute.1 23
The Fourth Circuit then applied its interpretation of Netcom to
the case at hand, determining whether LoopNet's screening process
involved in uploading the copyrighted work to the Internet had the
requisite levels of volition or causation to conclude that it created
"copies" under the Copyright Act.1 24 The court summarily dismissed
LoopNet's screening process, in which an employee briefly screened
each photograph to ensure that it depicted real estate and did not
have any explicit evidence of copyright protection before uploading it
to the Internet, as insufficient to amount to copying.1 25 The court
found LoopNet's conduct too cursory to be significant.1 26 As the
screening process only takes a few seconds, the court concluded that it
was too transitory to create "copies," as defined by the Copyright
Act.1 27 As a result, the Fourth Circuit held that LoopNet did not vio-
late the Copyright Act and was not liable for direct copyright
infringement. 12
8
119. CoStar l, 373 F.3d at 551.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. The court explained that:
when the copyrighted software is downloaded onto the [non-ISP] computer, be-
cause it may be used to serve the computer or the computer owner, it no longer
remains transitory. This, however, is unlike an ISP, which provides a system that
automatically receives a subscriber's infringing material and transmits it to the
Internet at the instigation of the subscriber.
l 1.
124. Id. at 555-56.
125. Id. at 556.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. Note that the court analyzed the Netcom argument in terms of whether Loop-
Net's volitional conduct would make it liable as a "copier" under the Copyright Act, rein-
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In dissent, Judge Gregory disagreed with the majority's character-
ization of LoopNet as a passive conduit of information. 9 Instead,
Judge Gregory argued that LoopNet's nonpassive, volitional conduct
in screening each photograph before uploading it to the Internet dis-
qualified it from protection under Netcom.a3 1 Judge Gregory reasoned
that the majority inappropriately extended the nonvolitional defense
beyond Netcom and its progeny and consequently gave ISPs greater
protection than their analogues in print and other traditional
media.1
3 1
Judge Gregory began by distinguishing the actions in Netcom from
LoopNet's actions, asserting that the nonvolitional defense should not
be extended beyond ISPs that are truly passive, automatic transferors
of information. 13 2 He explained that the court in Netcom meant for its
decision only to apply to such ISPs and explicitly memorialized this
intent.133 Citing Netcom directly, Judge Gregory argued that the court
in Netcom extended immunity only to ISPs that automatically transfer
information and whose sole responsibility is to maintain a system
whereby users upload material without any supervision by the ISP.'34
In the instant case, however, Judge Gregory asserted that LoopNet's
screening process is a volitional action that causes the photographs to
be displayed on the Internet.135 Consequently, Judge Gregory argued
that the majority mistakenly relieved LoopNet of liability and thereby
extended the Netcom defense to afford ISPs greater protection than
would be afforded to its traditional print equivalent.1 6
4. Analysis.-In CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., the Fourth
Circuit held that an ISP does not create "copies" when it transmits
forcing its interpretation of Netcom's elements of volition and causation as a strict statutory
interpretation rather than a policy-driven result.
129. Id. at 557 (Gregory, J., dissenting).
130. Id. (Gregory, J., dissenting).
131. Id. (Gregory, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 558 (Gregory, J., dissenting).
133. Id. (Gregory, J., dissenting).
134. Id. (Gregory, J., dissenting) (citing Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1369-70). Judge Gregory
noted that the defendants in Netcom were a bulletin board operator (BBO) and the ISP that
provided access to the Internet for the BBO; neither party possessed the ability to screen
messages posted by its users. Id. at 557-58 (Gregory, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 558-59 (GregoryJ, dissenting). Judge Gregory noted a flaw in the majority's
argument that the user's initial direct infringement negated liability for LoopNet's cursory
screening process by applying the same factual situation to a publisher of a free print
version of LoopNet's website. Id at 559-61 (Gregory, J., dissenting). Judge Gregory ar-
gued that a magazine publisher, controlling the content of its publication in the same
manner as LoopNet, would indisputably be directly liable for distributing infringing mate-
rial. Id. at 560 (Gregory, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 560-61 (Gregory, J., dissenting).
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material over the Internet,1 37 thus fundamentally misinterpreting the
Copyright Act and departing from the precedent that it claimed to
follow. The court first misinterpreted the statutory definition of "cop-
ies" by applying the phrase "transitory duration" to the copying pro-
cess instead of the ability of the copied material to be perceived.1 38
Next, the court refused to interpret Netcom's causation liability scheme
as a policy-driven departure from the statutorily required strict liability
scheme that would have held all ISPs liable for copyright infringe-
ment.1 39 Rather than acknowledge the inapplicability of copyright in-
fringement principles to the Internet, the court fused a policy-driven
judicially created liability scheme intended solely for application to
ISPs into the legislative liability scheme governing all of copyright
law. 4 Without deferring to the underlying constitutional purpose of
copyright law when applying the Copyright Act to a scenario not con-
templated by the legislature that enacted it, the decision threatens the
interests that copyright law seeks to protect and sets a dangerous pre-
cedent if followed by other courts applying its statutory interpretation
outside the scope of ISP liability.
14 1
a. The Fourth Circuit's Statutory Misinterpretation: Applying
"Transitory Duration" to the Copying Process Instead of the Ability to Be Per-
ceived.-The Fourth Circuit misinterpreted the term "transitory dura-
tion" as used in the Copyright Act's definition of "fixed" as referring
to the copying process instead of the ability of the copies to be per-
ceived, which allowed it to conclude that an ISP does not create "cop-
ies" when material is instantaneously transferred through its RAM.
1 4 2
137. Id. at 555.
138. See id. at 550-51; see also infra notes 142-161 and accompanying text (examining the
court's statutory misinterpretation).
139. See CoStar l, 373 F.3d at 551 ("[W]e conclude that Netcom made a particularly ra-
tional interpretation of § 106 when it concluded that a person had to engage in volitional
conduct-specifically, the act constituting infringement-to become a direct infringer.").
But see 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER3 & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12B.01(A) (1)
(2005) ("At bottom .... [Netcom] reflects a policy judgment as to where the line of liability
should be drawn.").
140. See infta notes 164-168 and accompanying text.
141. See infra notes 169-175 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of the
Fourth Circuit's decision).
142. See CoStar II, 373 F.3d at 550-51. The court stated that:
When an electronic infrastructure is designed and managed as a conduit of infor-
mation and data that connects users over the Internet, the owner and manager of
the conduit hardly 'copies' the information and data in the sense that it fixes a
copy in its system of more than transitory duration.
Id. But see supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text (discussing MA, which established
that a copy need not be fixed in the medium from which the copying occurs, but rather
the medium from which the copy can be perceived).
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Under the Copyright Act, there are two elements necessary to prove
direct copyright infringement: (1) a plaintiff's ownership of a copy-
right and (2) unauthorized copying by the defendant. 143 The statute
defines "copies" as material objects in which a work is "fixed."1 4 A
work is "fixed," when it is "sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it
to be perceived... for a period of more than transitory duration."
1 45
The Fourth Circuit, however, applied the "transitory duration" modi-
fier to describe the copying process-in this case, the transmission
function of an ISP-instead of the ability of the copied material to be
perceived, as the statute intended from its plain language. 46 The
CoStar court departed from Marobie-FL, which properly interpreted
the definition of "fixed."14 7 Marobie-FL explained that the determina-
tion of whether a copy is "fixed" turns on the capability of that copy to
be perceived for more than a transitory duration, not the duration of
the process by which the copy is created.1 48 Nonetheless, the Fourth
Circuit mistakenly concluded that the copying process by which mate-
rial is transmitted through an ISP's RAM is too temporary and auto-
matic to be fixed for more than a period of transitory duration. 14
9
Contradicting the Ninth Circuit's holding in MAI-a copy is cre-
ated when material is transmitted to a computer's RAMl 5°-the
Fourth Circuit attempted to distinguish itself by qualifying "transitory
143. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (inter-
preting the Copyright Act to require these two elements for a prima facie case of direct
copyright infringement).
144. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
145. Id.
146. See CoStar I, 373 F.3d at 550-51. But see MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991
F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993) (applying the statutory language to conclude that material
downloaded to a computer's RAM can afterwards be perceived for a fixed amount of time
and thus, creates a copy under the Copyright Act). According to the plain meaning of the
statute's definition of "fixed," the material must be perceivable for a period of more than
transitory duration. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
147. Marobie-FL, Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distribs. & N.W. Nexus, Inc., 983 F.
Supp. 1167, 1178 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
148. See id. ("The fact that a copy is transmitted after it is created, or even as it is created,
does not change the fact that once an Internet user receives a copy, it is capable of being
perceived and thus 'fixed.'").
149. CoStar 11, 373 F.3d at 551. As the court concluded:
Even if the information and data are "downloaded" onto the owner's RAM or
other component as part of the transmission function, that downloading is a tem-
porary, automatic response to the user's request .... While temporary electronic
copies may be made in this transmission process, they would appear not to be
"fixed" in the sense that they are "of more than transitory duration," and the ISP
therefore would not be a "copier" to make it directly liable under the Copyright
Act.
Id.
150. MAI, 991 F.2d at 519.
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duration" as both qualitative and quantitative, even further confusing
the statutory language.1"1  Attempting to resolve the conflict
presented by recognizing the creation of "copies" where a computer
owner downloads copyrighted material into that personal computer's
RAM but not when an ISP completes the same process, the court in-
troduced the entirely new and unprecedented concept that transitory
duration refers to both the duration and status of the copying pro-
cess. 2 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that while the quantitative dura-
tion of the copying process is identical for both a non-ISP and ISP
computer, 53 the fact that a non-ISP computer now has access to the
transferred material whereas an ISP computer re-transfers that mate-
rial to the Internet is the qualitative aspect of "transitory duration" that
"fixes" a copy in the former but not the latter.1 54 However, as the
statute illustrates, the distinction is irrelevant because "transitory dura-
tion" does not refer to the copying process; it refers to the temporal
length of the copied material's capability of being perceived. 55
The distinction between the quantitative and qualitative aspects
of "transitory duration" undermines the Fourth Circuit's own reason-
ing. The court initially stated that the quantitative duration of the
transfer to an ISP's RAM is too instantaneous to constitute a fixed
"copy."156 Following this logic, no computer could create copies be-
cause they all engage in identical instantaneous transmission
processes. 157 However, the court then contradicted this logic by find-
ing that non-ISP computers do create copies despite the fact that the
duration of the transmission process is identical to that of ISP com-
puters. 158 The court attempted to resolve the inconsistency by intro-
151. CoStar II, 373 F.3d at 551; see also supra notes 118-123 (explaining the court's
distinction).
152. Id. No other court has found that transitory duration refers to the copying process.
See, e.g., Marobie-FL, 983 F. Supp. at 1177-78 (applying "transitory duration" solely to the
ability to perceive a copy and negating the argument that it applies to the copying
process).
153. A non-ISP computer for purposes of this analysis is any computer that does not
automatically retransmit the material out of its RAM.
154. CoStar II, 373 F.3d at 551; see supra notes 118-123 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the court's reasoning).
155. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (establishing that a work is "fixed" when it can "be per-
ceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory dura-
tion"); see also supra notes 64-75 (noting the application of the statutory definition of
"fixed" to ISPs transmitting material to the Internet).
156. CoStar II, 373 F.3d at 551.
157. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F.
Supp. 1361, 1368 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (acknowledging that the transmission process that oc-
curs for personal computers is identical to that of ISP computers).
158. CoStar II, 373 F.3d at 551.
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ducing a qualitative aspect of transitory duration. The court reasoned
that once material is downloaded to the RAM of a non-ISP computer,
the qualitative status of transition lasts for more than a period of tran-
sitory duration because that material may now serve the computer or
computer owner.' 59 Thus, the court asserted that "transitory dura-
tion" refers to both the duration of the transmission (the quantitative
element) and the status of the transmission (the qualitative ele-
ment). 6 ° However, this reasoning renders the quantitative element
of "transitory duration" meaningless, as the duration of the copying
process is identical for an ISP and a non-ISP computer. As a result,
"transitory duration" must consist wholly of the qualitative element, as
this is the only distinction between an ISP and a non-ISP computer.
161
Therefore, the court's previous analysis concluding that an ISP does
not create copies specifically because the quantitative duration of the
copying process is too transitory is undermined by its subsequent anal-
ysis introducing the qualitative element, which renders the quantita-
tive element meaningless.
1 62
b. The Fourth Circuit's Misinterpretation of Precedent: Fusing
Netcom into the Copyright Act.-In the first federal court of appeals de-
cision explicitly analyzing and applying the precedent set by Netcom-
an ISP should not be held liable for creating copies of copyrighted
material without evidence of volition or causation-to an ISP for di-
rect copyright infringement initiated by its users, the Fourth Circuit
fused ajudicially created liability scheme meant to be applied solely to
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. That is, if the court characterizes "transitory duration" as both qualitative and quan-
titative and both computers engage in the same quantitative element, then the qualitative
element is the only distinguishing characteristic of "transitory duration."
162. Note that if the court correctly interpreted "transitory duration" as referring to the
ability to be perceived and kept the same framework for its subsequent analysis, the substi-
tuted argument would still fail, however this time not due to a flaw in the logic but instead
due to the application of the Copyright Act. This substituted argument, a corollary of its
qualitative distinction between ISPs and non-ISPs, would be that an ISP does not create
copies because the ISP operator has no ability to perceive the material during the instanta-
neous transfer through its RAM whereas a non-ISP computer does create copies because
the computer owner can perceive the material in its RAM for more than a period of transi-
tory duration and thus is fixed. However, the analysis remains inconsistent with the Copy-
right Act because the statutory definition of "fixed" makes no reference in regard to who
must be able to perceive the copy. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). As such, it makes no difference
whether an ISP operator has the ability to view the copy as long as the third party to whom
that operator transmits the copy to over the Internet has the ability to perceive the copy for
more than a transitory duration. See Marobie-FL v. Nat'l Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distribs. &
N.W. Nexus, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1167, 1178 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (explaining that a copy is still
created even if the ability to perceive it occurs sometime after its creation).
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ISPs into the legislative liability scheme governing all of copyright law.
The court refused to acknowledge that Netcom introduced its causa-
tion liability scheme as a response to the inadequacies of the Copy-
right Act as applied to ISPs for direct copyright infringement. t63 As a
result, the Fourth Circuit was forced to misapply the express language
of the Copyright Act in order to conclude that Netcom created its liabil-
ity scheme based on CoStar's flawed interpretation of the statute.'6 4
The Fourth Circuit viewed Netcom's introduction of the elements
of volition and causation as a statutory interpretation rather than a
judicially created supplemental rule. 165 The court was unwilling to
acknowledge that Netcom based its decision outside of the scope of the
applicable law.166 As such, the court failed to recognize that the
Netcom decision was a purely policy-driven response to the inapplica-
bility of copyright principles to the Internet and the crippling results
that would occur if ISPs were held strictly liable for any infringing
material appearing on the Internet without any inquiry into their rela-
tive degrees of control over the posting of such infringing material.1 67
Ultimately unwilling to interpret a judicial decision as policy-driven
and not based on a rational interpretation of the law, the Fourth Cir-
cuit attempted to interpret Netcom's ISP liability theory based on voli-
tion and causation to be required by a statute that the Netcom court
explicitly rejected as an impractical theory of copyright
infringement. 68
c. The Implications: Ignoring the Constitutional Purpose and Un-
dermining the Judiciary's Role.-In CoStar, the Fourth Circuit lost sight of
the constitutional purpose behind copyright law and the responsibility
of the courts to defer to that purpose when confronted with a scenario
163. CoStarI, 373 F.3d at 549; seeFeistPubl'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S.
340, 361 (1991) (interpreting the statutory language strictly to impose liability on any indi-
vidual who makes unauthorized copies of copyrighted material).
164. CoStar II, 373 F.3d at 550-51 ("The Netcom court described [§§ 501 and 106 of the
Act] as requiring some aspect of volition or causation.").
165. See id. at 551 ("[W]e conclude that Netcom made a particularly rational interpreta-
tion of § 106 when it concluded that a person had to engage in volitional conduct.., to
become a direct infringer.").
166. But see Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1372 (finding that the statutory liability theory is
unreasonable as applied to ISPs).
167. 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 139, § 12B.01 (A)(1) (recognizing Netcom as a pol-
icy-driven decision).
168. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1372 (concluding that "[t]he court does not find worka-
ble a [statutorily required] theory of infringement that would hold the entire Internet
liable").
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not contemplated by the framers of the Copyright Act. 69 The CoStar
court failed to consider that at the foundation of copyright law are two
interests in competition with one another: private rights that incen-
tivize creativity and the public benefit afforded by the dissemination
of creative works.17° CoStar also ignored the precedent set by the Su-
preme Court in situations where technological change upsets the bal-
ance of this tenuous relationship. The Supreme Court requires courts
to defer to the constitutional purpose behind protecting those inter-
ests: private motivation used to stimulate creativity must serve the ulti-
mate goal of advancing the public welfare. 171 The court in Netcom
acknowledged this mandate by deferring to public policy considera-
tions, holding that the statutorily required strict liability theory would
lead to unreasonable liability and ultimately cripple the Internet as a
tool for the free flow of information.1 72 The Fourth Circuit, on the
other hand, ignored any mention of the underlying constitutional
purpose of copyright law and instead undermined the holding of the
most influential case determining ISP liability by fusing its judicially
created liability scheme into a statutory liability theory that it expressly
rejected.
The Fourth Circuit fused the elements of volition and causation
that Netcom introduced as necessary to find an ISP liable for direct
copyright infringement into the statute governing all of copyright law,
making it more difficult to prove copyright infringement. 173 Under
the Copyright Act, the only element necessary to prove direct copy-
right infringement is unauthorized copying of a copyrighted work.
174
Under the Fourth Circuit's interpretation, in order to even qualify as
a copier, the individual must engage in some act that demonstrates
volition or causation.1 7 1 While this theory works well for determining
the liability of ISPs, who often have no ability to monitor the content
169. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429-32 (1984)
(examining the constitutional purpose and explaining the judiciary's role in upholding
that purpose).
170. Id. at 429.
171. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("When tech-
nological change has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be con-
strued in light of this basic purpose."); see also supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text
(discussing the Supreme Court's reluctance to apply the Copyright Act in situations not
contemplated by the legislature and instead requiring the judiciary to appeal to the consti-
tutional purpose).
172. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1369, 1372.
173. See CoStar I1, 373 F.3d at 550-51 (determining that the elements of volition and
causation are required by the Copyright Act).
174. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
175. CoStar II, 373 F.3d at 551.
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of the material they transfer to the Internet, applying it to all realms
of copyright infringement would relieve many traditional "copiers" of
liability for blatant copyright infringement. For instance, under the
Fourth Circuit's interpretation, a newspaper that automatically repro-
duces images submitted by others onto its publication does not create
"copies," and therefore could not be held liable for any of those
images that infringe on another's copyright. Similarly, a radio station
that broadcasts copyrighted material without permission would not
have "copied" that material if the transmission was merely an auto-
matic response to a listener's request.
5. Conclusion.-In holding that an ISP does not create copies
when it transmits material over the Internet, 176 the Fourth Circuit in
CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc. misinterpreted the Copyright Act's
definition of "copies"'177 and improperly fused a judicially created lia-
bility scheme into the statute. In doing so, the court incorporated
Netcom's elements of volition and causation, intended solely to deter-
mine the liability of ISPs for direct copyright infringement, into the
statute governing all of copyright law.178 Ultimately, the court strug-
gled to apply the Copyright Act to a scenario that the legislature could
not have contemplated when they enacted it, and did so while ignor-
ing the constitutionally protected interests at the foundation of copy-
right law.1 7' As a result, the Fourth Circuit's decision represents a
patent disregard for the constitutional purpose of copyright law, sets a
dangerous precedent for subsequent courts using its statutory inter-
pretation in contexts other than ISP liability, and threatens to impede
the development of a field of law that is meant to change as fast as
advances in technology.
BRANDON R. LEVITT
176. Id. at 556.
177. See supra notes 142-162 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 163-168 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 169-175 and accompanying text.
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III. LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
A. Holding an Employer Liable for a Hostile Work Environment Existing
Prior to an Employee's Hire
In Ocheltree v. Scollon Productions, Inc.,' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether an employee satis-
fied the "because of sex" requirement for a hostile work environment
claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 when the work
environment about which the employee complained had existed
before the employee began working for the employer.' In a 10-2 deci-
sion, the court held that a sexually charged environment that exists
prior to an employee's hire can be considered directed at the em-
ployee because of the employee's sex.4 As such, the court concluded
that Ocheltree satisfied the "because of sex" requirement for a hostile
work environment claim under Title VII.5 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court examined the incidents of alleged harassment as well
as the context in which they occurred.6 The court's approach fol-
lowed the Supreme Court's directive in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.
7
to consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a
work environment is hostile.8 The court's decision is also consistent
with the spirit of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
(EEOC) regulations in that it provides an incentive for employers to
1. 335 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Ocheltree I1].
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2a (2000). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful "to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's ... sex." Id. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 will hereinaf-
ter be referred to as "Title VII."
The "hostile work environment" claim is one of two actionable claims in a sexual har-
assment suit under Title VII. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). To
establish a sexual harassment claim based on a "hostile work environment," the plaintiff
must prove:
(1) the subject conduct was unwelcome; (2) it was based on the sex of the plain-
tiff; (3) it was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the plaintiffs conditions of
employment and to create an abusive work environment; and (4) it was imputa-
ble on some factual basis to the employer.
Spicer v. Va. Dep't of Corrs., 66 F.3d 705, 710 (4th Cir. 1995).
3. Ocheltree II, 335 F.3d at 331-32.
4. Id. at 336.
5. Id. at 332.
6. Id. at 333.
7. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
8. Ocheltree I, 335 F.3d at 333; see Harris, 510 U.S. at 23; see also infra notes 211-220 and
accompanying text.
1347
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 64:1347
improve hostile work environments.9 However, the court's decision is
troubling insofar as it charged Scollon Productions with the knowl-
edge of its employees' treatment of Ocheltree, and thus concluded
the company was liable for compensatory damages for the Title VII
claim, but did not charge Scollon Productions with the knowledge
that the conduct was prohibited by statute, and thus concluded that
the company was not liable for punitive damages under the Civil
Rights Act of 1991."0 Further, in setting aside the punitive damages
award, the court failed to consider the elements it set forth in Harris v.
L & L Wings, Inc." to determine whether the employer possessed the
requisite level of malice or reckless indifference toward sexual harass-
ment in the workplace.' 2
1. The Case.-
a. Background.-In 1971, Bill Scollon established Scollon
Productions, which creates costumes for cartoon characters and mas-
cot costumes for universities.13 Scollon Productions is located in
White Rock, South Carolina and employs approximately fifty work-
ers-from sculptors to sewers to design artists.14 Scollon and his wife
own the corporation.15 Ellerly Locklear is the Senior Vice-President
of the company and has worked there since 1975.16 Scollon and
Locklear are the corporation's only managers. 17
9. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (f) (2004) (offering employers an inexhaustive list of affirm-
ative steps to take to prevent sexual harassment); see also infra notes 221-231 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the way in which the Ocheltree II court's decision will encourage
remedial action consistent with the EEOC regulations).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000). The statute states that "a complaining party may recover
punitive damages under this section . . . if the complaining party demonstrates that the
respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or
with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual." Id
§ 1981(b)(1). In Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, the Court stated that the terms malice
and reckless indifference "pertain to the employer's knowledge that it may be acting in
violation of federal law, not its awareness that it is engaging in discrimination." 527 U.S.
526, 535 (1999).
11. 132 F.3d 978, 983 (4th Cir. 1997).
12. See infra notes 232-247 and accompanying text.
13. Ocheltree I, 335 F.3d at 328; Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 308 F.3d 351, 353 (4th
Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Ocheltree 1]. Scollon Productions manufactured the costumes for
the mascots at Clemson University and the University of South Carolina. Brief for Appel-
lant at 5, Ocheltree 1, 308 F.3d 351 (4th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-1648).
14. Ocheltree 1, 308 F.3d at 353; Brief for Appellant at 6, Ocheltree I (No. 01-1648).
15. Brief for Appellant at 6, Ocheltree I (No. 01-1648).
16. Ocheltree II, 335 F.3d at 328; see Brief for Appellant at 6, Ocheltree I (No. 01-1648)
(noting that as of 2001, Locklear had been with the corporation for twenty-seven years).
17. Ocheltree II, 335 F.3d at 328.
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Lisa Ocheltree began work at Scollon Productions in the produc-
tion shop in February 1994.18 Scollon Productions terminated Ochel-
tree because of her poor work performance in August 1995." Before
she was terminated, Ocheltree worked alongside approximately ten
men and was the only female in the production shop.2 ° Ocheltree
described the atmosphere when she began work at Scollon Produc-
tions as "fun" and "friendly."21 During her first year of work, however,
Ocheltree became the target of increased sexual banter and other
forms of sexual conduct.22 Brian Hodge, a co-worker, confirmed the
increase in sexual conduct during Ocheltree's employment. 23 Hodge
began work in the production shop several months after Ocheltree,
and he testified that although the atmosphere seemed "okay" initially,
the atmosphere became increasingly coarse over time.24
b. Incidents of Harassment.-On April 25, 1996, Ocheltree
filed a claim against Scollon Productions alleging sexual harassment
under Title VII in the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina.25 Ocheltree cited three specific incidents in addition
to the general atmosphere of the production shop as evidence of sex-
ual harassment.26 First, one morning when Ocheltree arrived at work,
two male co-workers were demonstrating sexual techniques with a
mannequin. 2 ' One of the co-workers was pinching the mannequin's
nipples while the other simulated oral sex on the mannequin.28
Ocheltree told the two employees: 'You guys are disgusting. This
needs to stop. '29 The men laughed in response.3 0 Second, a male co-
worker approached Ocheltree in the production shop and sang in an
opera-like fashion: "Come to me, oh baby, come to me, your breath
smells like come to me. '31 The male co-workers in the production
shop laughed at this incident.32 Third, while Ocheltree was seated at
her workstation, a man brought a book to Ocheltree containing pic-
18. Id.
19. Brief for Appellant at 6-7, Ocheltree I (No. 01-1648).
20. Ocheltree II, 335 F.3d at 328.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 354.
24. Ocheltree I, 308 F.3d at 367 (Michael, J., dissenting).
25. Ocheltree II, 335 F.3d at 330.
26. Id. at 328.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
13492005]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEw[L
tures of men with pierced genitalia. 33 The co-worker opened the
book to a centerfold photograph showing a man's genitalia.34 Hoops
pierced the man's scrotum and chains were attached to the top of his
penis. 5 The co-worker asked Ocheltree, "Lisa, what do you think
about this?" 6 The co-worker and men in the surrounding area re-
sponded to the incident with laughter.3 7
In addition to these specific incidents, Ocheltree complained of
other offensive behavior that created a sexually charged environ-
ment.31 Ocheltree's co-workers regularly engaged in open and ex-
plicit conversations about their sex lives, made comments about the
sexual habits of other employees, and told sexually explicit jokes.39
Ocheltree also claimed that some of the men would perform sexual
acts with the mannequins whenever she was present.4 ° The use of sex-
ually tinged profanity was prevalent, as Ocheltree's co-workers used
such words as "motherf r," "faggot," "d khead," "p-ssy," and "ass"
when talking to each other.4" Some employees also engaged in hand
gestures toward their genital area, and told other employees to "suck
it."4 2 Ocheltree cited this atmosphere as evidence of harassment."
c. Scollon Productions 'Failure to Have a Policy on Sexual Harass-
ment.-In June 1994, one of Ocheltree's co-workers, Steve Zourass,
told Scollon that an employee told a sexually explicit joke to Ochel-
tree and that Ocheltree was offended by it.44 Locklear asked Ochel-
tree about the incident and Ocheltree confirmed that it had
occurred.45 Scollon immediately terminated the offending employee
and apologized to Ocheltree for the incident.46 Ocheltree told Scol-
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 328-29.
39. Id. at 329. For a detailed account of the graphic nature of these comments, see id.
40. Id. at 328. Hodge testified that some of the production shop workers would fondle
the mannequin when they passed by and that anytime Ocheltree walked by, the workers
would do something sexual to the mannequin just because they knew it bothered Ochel-
tree. Id.
41. Ocheltree I, 308 F.3d at 358. Hirsch noted that the men would openly engage in
sexually explicit conversation in front of her because they enjoyed seeing her reaction.
Ocheltree II, 335 F.3d at 329.
42. Ocheltree II, 335 F.3d at 329.
43. Id at 328-29.
44. Ocheltree 1, 308 F.3d at 362 n.l1.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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Ion that she did not want the employee to be terminated.47 Scollon
responded, "I am sorry; that is the way it is; we won't stand for it."'48
Following this incident, Ocheltree attempted to speak with both Scol-
Ion and Locklear about the work environment on several additional
occasions without success.4 9 By the admission of Scollon he turned
her away because he believed that whatever she wanted to talk about
was not important.
50
Ocheltree was never able to properly put management at Scollon
Productions on notice of the harassing behavior, despite her repeated
attempts to discuss the atmosphere with both Scollon and Locklear.5 1
Scollon Productions's employee handbook outlined a procedure to
address verbal abuse; it stated that verbal abuse was prohibited and
was grounds for discharge.52 In another section captioned "Open
Door Policy," the handbook stated that if an employee had a com-
plaint or a problem, the employee should attempt to resolve the mat-
ter with her immediate supervisor first and thereafter Scollon and
Locklear were available to address any grievances.53 In Ocheltree's
case, her immediate supervisor was Harold Hirsch, who made active
attempts to prevent Ocheltree from reaching management.
54
47. Brief for Appellant at 8, Ocheltree I (No. 01-1648).
48. Id.
49. Ocheltree II, 335 F.3d at 329. On one occasion, Scollon told Ocheltree that he did
not have time to speak with her and instructed her to talk with Locklear. Id. There is no
indication whether Ocheltree made Scollon aware that she wanted to speak to him about
the work environment. Id. On another occasion, Ocheltree went to speak to Locklear, but
he was on the phone, so she left a note stating "Ellery [Locklear], Need to talk to you, very
important, Lisa." Id. at 330. When Locklear concluded his telephone conversation, he saw
the note but did not talk to Ocheltree. Id. Ocheltree made numerous other attempts to
speak to management about the environment but her attempts were actively prevented by
Hirsch, the shop supervisor. Id. at 330. Ocheltree stated that on several occasions she took
refuge in the bathroom and Hirsh would follow her to prevent her from talking to
Locklear. Id. He would often wait outside the bathroom and then tell her to go back to
work and continue to follow her. Id.
50. Id. at 329-30.
51. Id. at 330. The only time that Ocheltree complained about any behavior was at a
safety meeting where she addressed everyone saying "the sexual conduct, pictures, the ges-
tures, the imitating of sex to mannequins and all that" should stop. Id. at 330 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Ocheltree testified she believed the supervisor would be taking
minutes of the meeting and that those minutes would be passed along to Scollon and
Locklear. Id.
52. Id. at 329.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 330; see also supra note 49 (discussing Hirsh's attempts to prevent Ocheltree
from talking to Locklear).
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d. Termination of Ocheltree's Employment.-Management at
Scollon Productions did not consider Ocheltree a model employee.55
During her eighteen-month tenure at Scollon Productions, Ocheltree
received at least five written warnings and additional oral warnings for
her excessive absences and telephone usage in violation of company
policy.56 In August 1995, Scollon Productions terminated Ocheltree
for excessive phone use, excessive absences, and her husband's physi-
cal threats to Locklear.57
e. Litigation.-In response to Ocheltree's claim of sexual
harassment, the South Carolina District Court granted summary judg-
ment for Scollon Productions on all claims.5 ' The magistrate judge
found that there was no basis for imposing liability on Scollon Produc-
tions because neither Scollon nor Locklear were aware, or should
have known, of the alleged harassment.59 Ocheltree filed a pro se ap-
peal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
60
After the parties had briefed and argued the first appeal, the Supreme
Court decided Burlington Industries v. Ellerth6 ' and Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton,62 holding that an employer is vicariously liable for a hos-
tile work environment created by a supervisor, subject to an affirma-
tive defense that allows the employer to avoid strict liability for one
employee's sexual harassment of another.63 On August 11, 1998, the
Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's decision in Ocheltree based
on Burlington Industries and Faragher and remanded the case for fur-
ther proceedings consistent with the opinions.64
55. Ocheltree 1, 308 F.3d 351, 354 (4th Cir. 2002).
56. Brief for Appellant at 7, Ocheltree II (No. 01-1648). Ocheltree testified that once
while she was using the phone, Locklear stated, "You always have an excuse, I don't care if
someone is dying in your family, you are not to be on the phone and you must be here at
work." Ocheltree 1, 308 F.3d at 357 n.3 (internal quotation marks omitted). Ocheltree also
testified that Locklear told her that "if I didn't like it there that I ought to go home and be
a housewife, that maybe I am not cut out to be here, to be at thisjob." Id. (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
57. Ocheltree I, 308 F.3d at 354; see also Brief for Appellant at 7-8, Ocheltree I (No. 01-
1648) (noting that on one occasion, Ocheltree's husband went to Locklear's office and
told Locklear that he would "kick his ass" if Locklear upset his wife again) (citation
omitted).
58. Ocheltree II, 335 F.3d at 330.
59. Ocheltree 1, 308 F.3d at 354.
60. Id. at 355.
61. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
62. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
63. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 766; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 810.
64. Ocheltree II, 335 F.3d at 330; see also Ocheltree I, 308 F.3d at 355 (noting the reason
the case was remanded).
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On remand, Scollon Productions filed three separate motions for
summary judgment.65 The district court denied each motion.66 The
case went to trial, and the jury returned a special verdict in favor of
Ocheltree for $7,280 in compensatory damages and $400,000 in puni-
tive damages.67 Scollon Productions filed a motion for judgment as a
matter of law requesting that the district court set aside the jury ver-
dict.68 Scollon Productions requested that, if the court did not set
aside the jury verdict, it should reduce the damage award based on
the statutory cap on punitive damages and compensation under 42
U.S.C. §1981a(b) (3).69 Although the district court denied the motion
to set aside the jury verdict, the court reduced the punitive and com-
pensatory damages award to $42,720 pursuant to § 1981a(b) (3) (a).70
Scollon Productions timely appealed.7 1
The Fourth Circuit granted certiorari to consider whether Ochel-
tree presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that
she was sexually harassed in a hostile work environment at Scollon
Productions. 72 A divided panel of judges for the Fourth Circuit held
that Scollon Productions was entitled to judgment as a matter of law
because the sexually charged environment that existed was not di-
rected at Ocheltree because of her sex. 73 Judge Williams, writing for
the majority, reasoned that because the sexual conversations, the
sexual jokes, the commentary on the sexual habits of co-workers, and
the use of sexually tinged profanity existed before Ocheltree's em-
ployment at Scollon Productions these innuendos were not directed
at Ocheltree because of her sex.75 Additionally, the court found that
there were only a handful of actual incidents directed at Ocheltree
and therefore the "severe or pervasive" requirement for a sexual har-
assment claim was not satisfied. 76 The Fourth Circuit then vacated the
65. Ocheltree I, 308 F.3d at 355.
66. Id.
67. Ocheltree II, 335 F.3d at 330.
68. Id.
69. Ocheltree 1, 308 F.3d at 355. Section 1981 limits the amount of punitive damages to
$50,000 for employers who have more than 14 but fewer than 101 employees for at least 20
calendar weeks of the current or preceding year. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (3) (a) (2000).
70. Ocheltree II, 335 F.3d at 330.
71. Ocheltree 1, 308 F.3d at 355.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 359.
74. Judge Niemeyer joined Judge Williams in the majority. Id. at 353.
75. Id. at 358-59.
76. Id. at 359-60.
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panel decision and on February 25, 2003 reheard the decision en
banc. 7
2. Legal Background.-Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
prohibits employment discrimination based on gender.78 Initially,
however, women who attempted to recover damages for sexual harass-
ment in the workplace were unsuccessful because Title VII did not
provide employer liability for sexual harassment as a matter of law.79
In 1980, the EEOC established guidelines that created a cause of ac-
tion for sexual harassment in the workplace."0 The guidelines also
make employers responsible for sexual harassment in the workplace."'
The first time the Supreme Court examined the issue of sexual harass-
ment based on the 1980 EEOC regulations was in Meitor Savings Bank
v. Vinson in 1986.2 In Meritor, the Court articulated two types of ac-
tionable sexual harassment claims: quid pro quo claims8 3 and hostile
77. Ocheltree II, 335 F.3d at 327.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000); see supra note 2 (quoting the relevant language of
the statute).
79. See, e.g., Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) (find-
ing that Title VII did not cover sexual advances by another employee, even a supervising
employee, if those acts had no relation to the nature of the work); see also infra note 91
(noting examples of trial courts' denials of recovery to sexual harassment claimants).
80. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 45 F.R. 74677 (Nov. 10, 1980) (codi-
fied as amended at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2004)). Congress established the EEOC through
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 78 Stat. 253, 258 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-4 through 2000e-5 (2000)). The EEOC is the administrative agency charged with
enforcing Title VII's provisions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2000). The regulations established
by the EEOC are entitled to great deference on the ground that they embody the express
will of Congress. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971). The Supreme
Court has stated that the guidelines, "while not controlling upon the courts by reason of
their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts
and litigants may properly resort for guidance." Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 65 (1986) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11. The regulation provides that:
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of section 703 of title VII. Unwel-
come sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment ....
An employer may also be responsible for the acts of non-employees, with respect
to sexual harassment of employees in the workplace, where the employer (or its
agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct
and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.
Id. § 1604.11(a), (e).
82. 477 U.S. at 57-58.
83. The Meritor Court defined quid pro quo claims as sexual harassment where employ-
ment benefits or detriments are conditioned on submission to sexual acts or favors. Id. at
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work environment claims.84 In 1993, the Supreme Court narrowed
the distinction between quid pro quo claims and hostile work environ-
ment claims in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.85 Harris established the
criteria for determining if a work environment was hostile.86 Since
Harris, the Court has continued to narrow the distinction between
quid pro quo claims and hostile work environment claims. Using the
Supreme Court's direction in Harris, the Fourth Circuit established
the necessary requirements for a prima facie case for a hostile work
environment in Spicer v. Virginia Department of Corrections.87 Lastly, in
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, the
Supreme Court created a standard by which employers can be held
vicariously liable in sexual harassment claims, as well as the affirmative
defenses available to the employer in such cases.88
a. Title V.-Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 pro-
vides that employers are prohibited "to fail or refuse to hire or to dis-
charge . . .or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's.., sex."89 The statutory lan-
guage does not contain any information as to whether sexual
harassment is considered a prohibited form of sexual discrimina-
tion." Following the passage of Title VII, most trial courts denied
claimants recovery against employers for sexual harassment claims.91
b. EEOC Regulations.-In 1980, the EEOC promulgated reg-
ulations for sexual harassment claims that established criteria for de-
84. Id. The Court deemed all non quidpro quo sexual harassment claims as hostile work
environment claims. Id.
85. 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
86. Id. "When the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule,
and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's
employment and create an abusive working environment, Title VII is violated." Id. (inter-
nal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. 66 F.3d 705, 710 (4th Cir. 1995); see infra notes 119-124 (setting forth the prima
facie case).
88. Faragher, 524 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998); Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. 742, 764-65
(1998).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
90. Id.
91. See Garber v. Saxon Bus. Prods., Inc., 552 F.2d 1032, 1032 (4th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam) (reversing the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs claim under Title VII based on
plaintiffs failure to state a cause of action when she was dismissed for rebuffing the sexual
advances of her male supervisor); see also Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d
1044, 1045 (3d Cir. 1977) (reversing the district court's holding dismissing plaintiffs case
for failure to state a Title VII claim when plaintiff contended that her employment was
conditioned on submitting to sexual advances by her male supervisor).
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termining whether behavior constitutes sexual harassment.9 2 These
regulations were the first guidance issued for courts in evaluating sex-
ual harassment claims under Tide VII." The regulations describe
workplace conduct actionable under Title VII as:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute
sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is
made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an
individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of
such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employ-
ment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such con-
duct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering
with an individual's work performance or creating an intimi-
dating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
9 4
The EEOC's 1980 regulations added greater specificity and substance
to the concept of sexual harassment.9 5 Prior to these regulations,
most trial courts denied sexual harassment claims.96 The regulations
created a cause of action against employers under Title VII.9 v They
are the foundation for the American legal system's jurisprudence on
sexual harassment claims.9 8
c. The Supreme Court's Jurisprudence.-In Meitor Savings Bank,
FSB v. Vinson, the Supreme Court addressed the EEOC's sexual harass-
ment guidelines for the first time.9 9 Upholding the regulations, the
Court created two types of actionable sexual harassment claims, quid
pro quo and hostile work environment.' When first defined in Men-
92. 45 F.R. 74677 (Nov. 10, 1980) (codified as amended at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2004)).
93. See generally Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
94. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a).
95. See id. (specifying that harassment can take the form of unwanted sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, and a catch all category of conduct of a sexual nature that is a
term of the individual's employment or interferes with the individual's employment).
96. See supra note 91 (citing sexual harassment claims where the trial courts found no
cause of action under Title VII).
97. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (b)-(e) (explaining circumstances under which an employer
may be liable for sexual harassment).
98. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 755 (1998) (discussing the crea-
tion of supervisor liability created by the guidelines); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524
U.S. 775, 806 (1998) (discussing the adoption of the guidelines, which charged employers
with taking steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510
U.S. 17, 22-23 (1993) (discussing the possible questions left unanswered by the guidelines).
99. 477 U.S. 57, 65-67 (1986).
100. Id. at 65-66.
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itor, the terms had a narrow construction and limited meaning.10'
The Court defined quid pro quo claims as sexual harassment where the
employer's actions are linked to the grant or denial of an economic
quid pro quo.10 2 To establish a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim,
the Court reasoned that the harassment must result in a tangible det-
riment to the subordinate employee.10 Quid pro quo claims created
vicarious liability for the supervisor's actions.10 4
The second circumstance the Court recognized as creating a sex-
ual harassment claim is when a co-worker's actions create a hostile
work environment for the employee. 10 5 In a hostile work environ-
ment, the co-worker's conduct unreasonably interferes with the indi-
vidual's work performance or creates "an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment." 106 Employer liability in quid pro quo
claims is distinct from employer liability in a hostile work environment
claim.10 7 To sustain a cause of action against an employer in a hostile
work environment claim, the Court noted that the employee must
demonstrate that the conduct was severe or pervasive enough so as "to
alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abu-
sive working environment."' 0 In Meritor, the Supreme Court declined
to rule on the issue of imputed employer liability in hostile work envi-
ronment claims and encouraged the courts to look at agency princi-
ples in determining employer liability.10 9
d. Hostile Work Environment Claims.-The EEOC regulations
provided that in a hostile work environment, Title VII barred conduct
that would seriously affect a reasonable person's psychological well-
being.110 The regulations, however, did not provide specific informa-
tion on what would constitute a serious effect on a reasonable per-
son's psychological well-being. The lack of specificity permitted a split
to develop in the circuits as to what constituted an effect on a person's
101. Id.; see also Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 752-53 (discussing the evolution of the
application of quid pro quo claims and hostile work environment claims and stating that in
Meritor "the terms served a specific and limited purpose").
102. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
103. Id. at 76 (Marshall, J., concurring).
104. See id. (Marshall, J., concurring) ("[E]very Court of Appeals has held that sexual
harassment by supervisory personnel is automatically imputed to the employer when the
harassment results in tangible job detriment to the subordinate employee.").
105. Id. at 65-67.
106. Id. at 65.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 67.
109. Id. at 72.
110. Cf Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
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psychological well-being, ranging from merely offensive behavior to
tangible psychological injury."'
In 1993, the Supreme Court held in Harris that it was unnecessary
for an employee to demonstrate that she suffered psychological harm
to find that the employer violated Title VII. 2 The Court found that
the applicable standard for a Title VII violation was only that the envi-
ronment be reasonably perceived as hostile.'13 Moreover, the stan-
dard for a Title VII claim is not contingent upon whether the
employee's work has been impaired, but upon whether working con-
ditions have been discriminatorily altered." 4 Harris also established
criteria for determining if a work environment was hostile."1 5 The
Court held that a hostile work environment could be determined only
by examining the totality of the circumstances.' 16 These circum-
stances may include "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its
severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere
offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee's work performance."' 17 Based on these criteria, the Court
determined that employers will be held liable if the plaintiff demon-
strates a "severe or pervasive" standard of a hostile work
environment. 1 8
e. Relationship Between Fourth Circuit Cases and Supreme Court
Cases.-Using the Supreme Court's decision in Harris as a foundation,
the Fourth Circuit established the necessary requirements to create a
prima facie case for a hostile work environment claim in Spicer v. Vir-
ginia Department of Corrections."9 The Fourth Circuit held that an em-
ployee must meet four criteria to establish the prima facie case for a
hostile work environment claim.' 2 ° First, the employee must prove
that the conduct was unwelcome."' Second, the employee must
111. Compare Vance v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1510 (11th Cir. 1989)
(requiring serious effect on psychological well-being), and Rabidue v. Osceola Refining
Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) (same), and Downes v. FAA, 775 F.2d 288, 292 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (same), with Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting the
requirement that a plaintiffs psychological well-being be seriously affected and instead
requiring the harasser's conduct to be sufficiently severe).
112. 510 U.S. at 22.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 25 (Scalia, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 23.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 21.
119. 66 F.3d 705, 710 (4th Cir. 1995).
120. Id.
121. Id.
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demonstrate that the conduct was engaged in because of the sex of
the employee. 122 Third, the employee must show that the conduct
was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the employee's conditions
of employment and to create an abusive work environment.
1 23
Fourth, the employee must establish that the conduct was imputable
on some factual basis to the employer.
24
The Supreme Court added further clarity to the "because of sex"
requirement in Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Services, Inc.1 25  The Su-
preme Court specifically ruled that sex discrimination consisting of
same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII. 12 6 In ad-
dressing the issue of same-sex sexual harassment, the Court provided
greater clarity on what a plaintiff must demonstrate to satisfy the "be-
cause of sex" requirement. In holding same-sex claims actionable, the
Court stated that harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual
desire; rather, the harasser need only be motivated by the general hos-
tility to the presence of women in the workplace. 127 The Court held
that Title VII does not prohibit verbal or physical harassment in the
workplace, but only "discrimination because of sex."1 2 8 The Court
concluded that a claimant must demonstrate the conduct at issue does
not merely imply sexual connotations, but that the conduct actually
constituted discrimination because of sex.
129
Because the Supreme Court had not yet addressed the issue of
employer liability for its employees' actions in hostile work environ-
ment claims in 1996, the Fourth Circuit established its own jurispru-
dence on the issue. In Andrade v. Mayfair Management, Inc.,13 ° the
Fourth Circuit held that the employee's claims against the company
were not valid because the supervisor, who had made sexually explicit
remarks, was not of a sufficient management level to hold the em-
ployer liable for the supervisor's actions.1 3' The court created the
standard that the employer is held liable only if the employer was
aware of the sexual harassment, or should have been aware of it and
failed to take prompt remedial action.132
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
126. Id. at 79-80.
127. Id. at 80.
128. Id. at 81.
129. Id.
130. 88 F.3d 258 (4th Cir. 1996).
131. Id. at 262.
132. Id.
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Following Andrade, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of em-
ployer liability in 1998 in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.33 and Burling-
ton Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth."' In these cases, the Court narrowed the
distinction between quid pro quo claims and hostile work environment
claims with regard to employer liability.' The Court found that the
rule subjecting employers to vicarious liability in quid pro quo claims
created an incentive for plaintiffs to attempt to fit their claims into the
definition of quid pro quo in order to create employer liability and,
thus, allowed plaintiffs to recover damages against their employer. 136
The holdings in Faragher and Burlington Industries created a standard
by which employers could be held vicariously liable for their employ-
ees' actions whether the plaintiff made a quid pro quo claim or a hostile
work environment claim.1
3 7
In both cases, the Court held that an employer is vicariously liable
for an employee's claim for a hostile work environment when a super-
visor with immediate, or successively higher authority over the em-
ployee, created the environment.' The Court further determined
that the burden then shifts to the employer, who may avoid liability by
establishing one of the following affirmative defenses: "(a) that the
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly
any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or correc-
tive opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm other-
wise."'3 9 The Supreme Court thus narrowed the distinction between
quid pro quo claims and hostile work environment claims by creating
employer liability regardless of the type of claim asserted by the
employee.
f Punitive Damages.-Punitive damages are awarded to pun-
ish malicious conduct or to make an example to deter potential future
wrongdoers from engaging in similar harm.14 ° When Title VII was
originally enacted, the statute did not provide for compensatory or
punitive damages. 141 Subsequently, Congress enacted the Civil Rights
133. 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998).
134. 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
135. See id. at 753-54; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
136. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 753 (finding that "[t]he rule encouraged Title VII
plaintiffs to state their claims as quid pro quo claims, which in turn put expansive pressure
on the definition").
137. Id. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 790, 809.
138. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 809.
139. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 809.
140. BLACK's LAw DICrIONARY 418-19 (8th ed. 2004).
141. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 533-34 (1999).
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Act of 1991, which made compensatory and punitive damages availa-
ble in Title VII cases, but provided a cap for liability based on the
number of employees. 42 Despite the enactment of this provision, pu-
nitive damages have been difficult to obtain. 43 In Kolstad v. American
Dental Ass'n, the Supreme Court addressed punitive damages awards
under Title VII for the first time.1 44 Upholding the statute, the Court
defined the circumstances in which punitive damages may be awarded
under Title VII.' 4 5 The Court held that, when an employer demon-
strates malice or reckless indifference towards an employee's federally
protected rights, that employer may be held liable for punitive dam-
ages.1 46 Additionally, the Court stated that where the employer had
made good faith efforts to comply with Title VII, the employer may
not be vicariously liable for the discrimination of its managerial
agents. 147 The Court reasoned that because the primary objective of
Title VII was to avoid harm, providing punitive damage protection to
employers who make a good-faith effort to prevent discrimination ac-
complished Title VII's objectives.' 48
In Harris v. L & L Wings, Inc., the Fourth Circuit provided further
clarity on the requirements for punitive damages-specifically in a Ti-
tle VII claim based on sexual harassment.149 In L & L Wings, the
court upheld the district court's decision awarding $150,000 in puni-
tive damages to each plaintiff because they met the heightened show-
ing of the culpable state of mind of the employer in a claim for
142. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (3) (2000); see supra note 69 (discussing the statutory cap for
an employer the size of Scollon Productions).
143. Koistad, 527 U.S. at 533 (recognizing a split among circuits as to the circumstances
warranting punitive damages).
144. Id. The Supreme Court first considered the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in Landgrafv.
USI Film Productions, 511 U.S. 244 (1994). In Landgraf the Court upheld the lower court's
decision denying punitive damages. Id. at 286. However, the Court did not consider the
substance of the punitive damages claim; rather, the Court held that because the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 became law while Landgraf s appeal was pending, the Court found no
clear evidence of congressional intent that would demonstrate the statute was intended to
be applied retroactively. Id.
145. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 534-35.
146. Id. at 534. The Court went on to say that intentional discrimination does not create
an automatic cause of action for punitive damages. Id. at 536-37. The Court stated that
there may be instances where "the employer may simply be unaware of the relevant federal
prohibition. There will be cases, moreover, in which the employer discriminates with the
distinct belief that its discrimination is lawful." Id. at 537. However, the Court did not state
that ignorance was enough. The Court stated that punitive damages may be granted where
the employer knows that, or shows reckless disregard for the matter of whether, its conduct
was prohibited by statute. Id.
147. Id. at 544.
148. Id. at 545-46.
149. 132 F.3d 978, 982-83 (4th Cir. 1997).
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punitive damages. 5 ° The court relied on three types of evidence to
determine that the employer had the requisite level of malice or reck-
less indifference to support a finding of punitive damages: "1) evi-
dence of the employer's attitude towards sexual harassment; 2) direct
statements by the employer about plaintiffs' rights or complaints; and
3) egregiousness of the conduct at issue."'' 51
In evaluating the first element, evidence of the employer's atti-
tude towards sexual harassment, the court placed great weight on the
existence of a sexual harassment policy and the employer's implemen-
tation of such a policy.152 The court discussed the importance its sis-
ter circuits had placed on a written sexual harassment policy. The
court noted that in some circuits, the existence of a written policy had
operated as an absolute bar to the recovery of punitive damages.153
The court cited Splunge v. Shoney's Inc.,'5 4 which held that the defen-
dant's failure to post a sexual harassment policy that communicated
to employees how to contact management regarding sexual harass-
ment complaints barred the company's affirmative defense that it was
not on notice of the sexual harassment.1 55 The L & L Wings court
stated that although the absence of a sexual harassment policy alone
could not establish liability for punitive damages, the absence of such
a policy coupled with the employer's failure to address the harassment
when employees complained, was sufficient to meet the first element
for punitive damages.1 5 6
The court then examined the second element, direct statements
by the employer about plaintiffs' rights or complaints in evaluating
the propriety of punitive damages. 57 The court found a direct state-
ment by the corporation's president, that a sexual harassment policy is
"a ridiculous thing," constituted a disavowal of responsibility under
Title VII.158 Finally, the court examined the evidence presented to
150. Id. at 983-85.
151. Id. at 983. The court went onto say that the defendant's "failure to implement any
sexual harassment or grievance policy and its utter failure to respond to repeated com-
plaints of pervasive sexual harassment do little to bolster its challenge to the punitive
award." Id. The court further explained that absence of a sexual harassment policy alone
will not establish liability, but "the institution of a written sexual harassment policy goes a
long way towards dispelling any claim about the employer's 'reckless' or 'malicious' state of
mind." Id. at 984.
152. Id. at 983-84.
153. Id, at 983.
154. 97 F.3d 488 (11th Cir. 1996).
155. Id, at 491.
156. L & L Wings, 132 F.3d at 983-84.
157. Id. at 984.
158. Id.
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the jury and found the actual nature of the harassment was sufficiently
egregious to support an award of punitive damages. 59 In L & L
Wings, the employees were harassed daily with vulgarities, crude re-
marks, and, often, physical groping. 60 The court found that the har-
assment was crude, persistent, and demeaning.16" ' The court held that
based on the lack of a sexual harassment policy, the statements by the
company president, and the egregious nature of the conduct, the har-
assment was sufficient to sustain ajury finding of punitive damages. 
62
3. The Court's Reasoning.-In Ocheltree II, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a reasonable jury could
find that a sexually charged environment that existed before Ochel-
tree's employment was a hostile work environment under Title VII. 6
In a 10-2 decision,' 64 the court, sitting en banc, affirmed the decision
of the district court, finding that Ocheltree had met the requirements
for a hostile work environment claim. 165 The en banc court con-
cluded that a reasonable jury could find the harassing behavior was
directed at Ocheltree because of her sex and the behavior was suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive to satisfy that requirement for a hostile
work environment claim under Title VII.166 However, the court re-
versed the district court's award of punitive damages, finding that no
reasonable jury could award punitive damages based on the level of
knowledge required of the employer under the Civil Rights Act of
1991.167
The court, following its decision in Spicer, stated that to establish a
sexual harassment claim based on a hostile work environment, the
plaintiff must prove that (1) the conduct was unwelcome; (2) it was
based on the sex of the plaintiff; (3) it was sufficiently severe or perva-
sive to alter the plaintiff's conditions of employment and to create an
abusive work environment; and (4) it was imputable on some factual
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 984-85.
163. Ocheltree II, 335 F.3d at 327, 331-33.
164. Chief Judge Wilkins, and Judges Wilkinson, Luttig, Motz, Traxler, King, Gregory,
and SheddjoinedJudge Michael in the majority. Id. at 327. Judge Niemeyer wrote a sepa-
rate opinion concurring in judgment. Id. Judge Widener joined Judge Williams in his
opinion dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment in part. Id.
165. Id. at 327.
166. Id. at 331-33.
167. Id. at 335-36; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (1) (2000) (stating that a plaintiff is enti-
tled to damages if the employer engages in the discrimination "with malice or with reckless
indifference to [the plaintiffs] federally protected rights").
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basis to the employer.' 6 ' Scollon Productions did not contest the first
requirement, but it argued that the evidence was insufficient to satisfy
the second, third, and fourth elements. 6 ' The majority concluded
that Ocheltree satisfied each of the remaining elements and found
Scollon Productions liable for the Title VII claim. 170 However, the
court reversed the punitive damage award.' 7' The court stated that
although Scollon Productions had knowledge of the sexual harass-
ment sufficient to satisfy the fourth prong of a hostile work environ-
ment claim, it did not have the knowledge required to warrant
punitive damages. 172
Examining the second element for a hostile work environment
claim, that the harassment took place "because of sex," the court
found the behavior was directed at Ocheltree because of her sex de-
spite the existence of a sexually charged environment at Scollon Pro-
ductions prior to Ocheltree's employment. 73 Relying on Oncale, the
court stated that the "because of sex" prong is satisfied when a female
is harassed with sexually derogatory terms that make it clear that the
harasser's motive is based on the presence of women in the work-
place.' 74 The court emphasized that even though the environment
had existed before Ocheltree's employment, and much of the sexual-
ized commentary and sex-laden conduct could be witnessed by any-
one present, the behavior was still directed at Ocheltree because of
her sex. 175 The court reasoned that the men behaved as they did to
make Ocheltree uncomfortable and provoke a reaction from her as a
woman. 176 The court stated that, although Scollon Productions may
have exposed the male employees to the same environment, there was
no evidence the conduct was aimed at them in order to solicit an em-
barrassed or humiliated reaction, as was the case with Ocheltree. 177
Consequently, the court concluded that a reasonable jury could find
that Ocheltree satisfied the second element for a hostile work environ-
ment claim.1
78
168. Ocheltree II, 335 F.3d at 331 (citing Spicer v. Va. Dep't of Corrs., 66 F.3d 705, 710
(4th Cir. 1995)).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 335.
171. Id. at 336.
172. Id. at 335-36.
173. Id. at 331-33.
174. Id. at 331-32 (citing Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80
(1998)).
175. Id. at 332.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 332-33.
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Examining the third element, the majority found that the inci-
dents Ocheltree complained of were severe or pervasive enough to
constitute harassment for the purpose of a hostile work environment
claim.179 The majority reasoned that taken together, the mannequin
incidents, the vulgar song, the pictures, as well as the general environ-
ment of sexual banter satisfied the severe or pervasive requirement.1
8 0
The court stressed that the sexual banter did notjust exist as impartial
sexual comments; rather, the sexual discussions constantly painted
women in a "sexually subservient and demeaning light."' 1 Thus the
court found Ocheltree met the third prong for a hostile work environ-
ment claim. 8
2
For the fourth element of a hostile work environment claim, that
the harassment was in some way imputable to the employer, the court
found that a reasonable person could find that Scollon Productions,
although it may have lacked actual knowledge, did have constructive
knowledge of the harassment as defined in Spicer.183 The majority de-
termined that knowledge of harassment could be imputed to an em-
ployer if a reasonable person would have known about the harassment
and "an employer may be charged with constructive knowledge of co-
worker harassment when it fails to provide reasonable procedures for
victims to register complaints." '84 The court used the Spicer standard
to determine Scollon Productions's level of constructive knowledge.
In determining the culpability of Scollon Productions, the court
found it debatable whether Scollon Productions even had a sexual
harassment policy, as the term sexual harassment did not appear in
their employee manual.'8 5 The court implied that management may
179. Id. at 333.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 333-35; see Spicer v. Va. Dep't of Corrs., 66 F.3d 705, 710 (4th Cir. 1995)
(discussing the burden on the employer to demonstrate that it provided reasonable proce-
dures for employees to make management aware of sexually harassing behavior in the
workplace).
184. Ocheltree II, 335 F.3d at 334.
185. Id. The majority pointed out that nothing in the handbook, nor any company
documentation, ever contained the term "sexual harassment policy." Id. Scollon Produc-
tions relied on a section in the employee handbook labeled "Talking" that stated verbal
abuse was not acceptable and was grounds for termination. Id. It also relied on a section
entitled "Open Door Policy," which stated that an employee with a complaint or problem
should first try to resolve it with their immediate supervisor, and that Locklear or Scollon
were available throughout the day to resolve complaints not settled by supervisors. Id. The
court found such a complaint procedure was ill equipped to ensure upper management is
made aware of such behavior as the victim would have to make a second complaint to the
company's top officials. Id. at 334-35.
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have in fact taken steps to avoid actual knowledge of the sexual harass-
ment that went on at Scollon Productions, stating that "[a] n employer
cannot avoid Title VII liability for coworker harassment by adopting a
'see no evil, hear no evil strategy.'"186 The court took note of the
attempts Ocheltree made to talk with Locklear and Scollon and the
evidence that these attempts were constantly frustrated.1 7 Applying
these facts to the standard articulated in Spicer, the court found it was
reasonable for a jury to find Scollon Productions should have known
about the harassment and, therefore, charged it with constructive
knowledge. 188
The court, however, did not find Scollon Productions possessed
the requisite level of knowledge to support liability for punitive dam-
ages.'89 The court determined that an employer is liable for punitive
damages if the employer knew, either directly or by imputation, that
they were acting in violation of federal law.190 Applying this standard,
the court found no evidence Scollon Productions knew, or should
have known, that it was acting in violation of Ocheltree's federally pro-
tected rights and therefore set aside the punitive damage award. 9'
Whereas the majority held that Ocheltree introduced sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case for a hostile work environ-
ment claim under Title VII, Judge Williams's dissent substantially dif-
fered in its characterization of the facts.' 92 The dissent argued that
the majority's conclusion rested on too wide a conception of the "be-
cause of sex requirement."' 93 The dissent argued that a reasonable
jury could neither identify Ocheltree's claims as satisfying the "be-
cause of sex" element nor as being sufficiently severe or pervasive
enough to amount to a hostile work environment.1 94
The dissent reasoned that Ocheltree could not demonstrate that
the harassment was because of her sex and therefore concluded that
she did not satisfy the second element of her hostile work environ-
186. Id. at 334.
187. Id. at 335. The court noted that despite the "open door policy," Ocheltree at-
tempted to talk to Locklear and Scollon on numerous occasions with the intent of report-
ing the harassment. Id. She was repeatedly told by Scollon that he had no time to talk to
her and that she should discuss her problem with Locklear, who was equally unavailable.
Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 336.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 337-44 (Williams, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 337 (Williams, J., dissenting).
194. Id. (Williams,J., dissenting).
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ment claim.' 9 5 The dissent relied on Oncale, stating that Title VII
claims were not intended to cover "all verbal or physical harassment in
the workplace; it is directed only at discrimination because of sex." 196
The dissent stated that only three of the incidents were directed at
Ocheltree, 19 7 characterizing her claims as conduct that "occurred in
group settings as part of the male workers' daily bantering with one
another."1 9 8 Judge Williams characterized the type of offensive behav-
ior that occurred, including the profanity, the dirty jokes, and the dis-
cussions of sexual exploits of the employees, as part of the work
environment, and, as such, concluded that it was not gender-
related.19 9 The dissent reasoned that because the behavior was
equally offensive to men and women alike, the behavior was not di-
rected at Ocheltree because of her sex.20 0 Moreover, Judge Williams
concluded that because the behavior did not begin or change with
Ocheltree's employment, the behavior was not directed specifically at
her.2 Consequently, the dissent found that Ocheltree did not satisfy
the second element of the prima facie case for a hostile work environ-
ment claim.20 2
In its analysis of the third element, the dissent found that the
incidents Ocheltree complained of were not severe or pervasive
enough to constitute harassment.20 3 The dissent reasoned that only
three of the incidents were directed at Ocheltree because of her sex;
therefore, the dissent only applied the severe or pervasive test to those
three incidents. 20 4 The dissent relied on its prior finding in Oncale
that isolated incidents of harassment generally do not meet the neces-
sary level of severity to constitute an actionable Title VII claim.20 5 Ad-
ditionally, because the dissent examined only three incidents of
harassment, the dissent found that the types of incidents Ocheltree
195. Id. (Williams, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 338 (Williams, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
197. Id. at 339 (Williams, J., dissenting). The dissent characterized only the "come to
me" song, the simulated oral sex on the mannequin, and the body piercing as incidents of
sexual harassment directed at Ocheltree. Id. (Williams, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 340 (Williams, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 339-40 (Williams, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 339 (Williams, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that of the other eleven
employees at Scollon Productions, all of whom were male, three of the men testified that
they were offended by the atmosphere at Scollon Productions and also complained about
it. Id. (Williams, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 341 (Williams, J., dissenting).
202. Id. (Williams, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 343 (Williams, J., dissenting).
204. Id. (Williams, J., dissenting); see supra note 197 (listing the three incidents the dis-
sent characterized as those directed at Ocheltree because of her sex).
205. Ocheltree II, 335 F.3d at 343 (Williams, J., dissenting).
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complained of were isolated and scattered over the course of a year
and a half and therefore did not support a claim under Title VII.
206
4. Analysis.-In Ocheltree II, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit found that Ocheltree established a prima facie
case for a hostile work environment claim under Title VII because the
alleged conduct was directed at her because of her sex and was suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive, even though the conduct was present in
the workplace prior to Ocheltree's employment.20 7 In reaching its de-
cision, the majority followed the Supreme Court's direction in Harris,
which requires an examination of the totality of the circumstances to
determine the merit of a hostile work environment claim.20 8 Addi-
tionally, the court reinforced the EEOC regulations that echo the Har-
ris approach, as the court's decision encourages employers to correct
sexually harassing environments. 209 However, the court's decision was
inconsistent insofar as it found that Scollon Productions had the req-
uisite knowledge to be held accountable for its employees' harassing
behavior toward Ocheltree, but not the requisite knowledge to be
held liable for punitive damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1991.210
a. Following the Supreme Court's Directive in Harris.-By exam-
ining the major incidents of harassment against the backdrop of a sex-
ually charged environment in Ocheltree II, the Fourth Circuit followed
the Supreme Court's directive in Harris to consider a hostile work en-
vironment claim based on the totality of the circumstances. 21' In
Ocheltree II, the majority analyzed the mannequin incident, the vulgar
song, the pictures, as well as the numerous vulgar discussions of sex
and graphic descriptions of crude sex acts to find the incidents of
harassment were sufficiently severe or pervasive enough to constitute
206. Id. (WilliamsJ., dissenting).
207. Id. at 327.
208. Id. at 333; see infra notes 211-220 and accompanying text.
209. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (2004) ("In determining whether alleged conduct con-
stitutes sexual harassment, the Commission will look at the record as a whole and at the
totality of the circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context in
which the alleged incidents occurred."); see also infra notes 221-249 and accompanying text.
210. See infra notes 232-248 and accompanying text (discussing the court's failure to
consider the factors set forth in Harris v. L & L Wings, Inc., 132 F.3d 978, 983 (4th Cir.
1997), in reversing the punitive damage award).
211. Ocheltreell, 335 F.3d at 333; Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). The
Court listed several factors for courts to use to determine whether a workplace is hostile:
"the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threaten-
ing or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes
with an employee's work performance." See id.
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a hostile work environment.2 12 The court specifically stated that "we
consider all of the circumstances" in determining if the harassment
was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of Ochel-
tree's employment and create a hostile work environment.2 13 In con-
trast, the dissent analyzed only three incidents of possible harassment,
discounting all other incidents and the environment in which the inci-
dents took place. 214 The dissent reasoned that because only three in-
stances could possibly meet the first "because of sex" element of a
hostile work environment claim, the severity of only these instances
should be analyzed. 5 Under the dissent's approach, an offender
who subjected victims to harassment on a daily basis with constant in-
appropriate behavior would likely not be found in violation of Title
VII because he would be part of the environment and the behavior
would not be directed at the employee because of the employee's
sex. 2 16 Logically, an offender whose incidents of harassment were
fewer and more isolated would be more likely to be found in violation
of Title VII because, under the dissent's approach, he would no
longer be part of the general environment and therefore his behavior
would be directed at the employee because of sex.2 17
The majority properly recognized that by using the very factors
the Harris Court articulated-frequency, severity, physical threats, and
whether the harassment affects the employee's work performance-
courts can evaluate all of the evidence and still have the ability to filter
out trivial claims 8.2 1  The majority's recognition illustrates the inappli-
cability of the dissent's fear of ordinary workplace teasing and gender-
related jokes becoming actionable under Title VII. As the Supreme
Court has articulated, such conduct does not rise to the level of sexual
harassment.219 Moreover, the court in Ocheltree II correctly followed
precedent by applying the totality of the circumstances standard an-
nounced by the Supreme Court in Harris, when it found that a reason-
able jury could find that, taken together, the incidents of harassment
212. See Ocheltree II, 335 F.3d at 333.
213. Id. (emphasis added).
214. Id. at 33940 (Williams, J., dissenting).
215. Id. (Williams, J., dissenting).
216. See id. (Williams, J., dissenting) (stating that the behavior the majority relies on
does not meet the because of sex requirement because all the employees, not just the
females, were subject to the same vulgarities as part of the regular environment).
217. See id. (Williams, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 333.
219. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 778 (1998) (stating that the ordi-
nary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-
related jokes, and occasional teasing are not actionable Title VII claims).
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as well as the sexually charged atmosphere of the production shop
constitute a harassing environment.22 °
b. Furthering the Purpose of the EEOC Regulations.-In addition
to following the Supreme Court's precedent in Harris, the Fourth Cir-
cuit's holding in Ocheltree II also reaffirms the purpose of Title VII,
thereby creating an incentive for employers to take the remedial ac-
tion that Title VII encourages. The EEOC was created to enforce the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination based on
sex.22 1 Through its regulations, the EEOC encourages employers to
take voluntary steps that are necessary and appropriate to eliminate
hostile work environments.222 In Ocheltree II, the majority's holding
directs employers to take remedial action to correct sexual harass-
ment in the workplace.22
The dissent suggests that so long as the environment existed
before the aggrieved employee began working for the employer, the
sexual harassment could not have been directed at the employee be-
cause of her gender.224 Under the dissent's view, an employer would
be insulated from suits so long as the hostile work environment ex-
isted prior to the employee's tenure.225 As a result, under the dis-
sent's view an employer would be deterred from taking remedial
action to correct a hostile work environment because taking such ac-
tions would expose an employer to liability if an employee later files a
hostile work environment claim.
The majority reasoned to the contrary, finding that regardless of
when the hostile atmosphere began relative to an employee's tenure,
a reasonable jury could find that the behavior was directed at Ochel-
tree because of her sex, thus encouraging employers to take remedial
action against instances of sexual harassment. 226 Although the atmos-
220. Ocheltree II, 335 F.2d at 333.
221. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
222. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806 ("As long ago as 1980, the EEOC, charged with the
enforcement of Tide VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4, adopted regulations advising employers to
take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring, such as... informing
employees of their right to raise and how to raise the issue of harassment." (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
223. Ocheltree II, 335 F.3d at 332.
224. Id. at 341 (Williams, J., dissenting). The dissent cites the testimony of Ocheltree's
co-worker, Zouras, who stated that the same conversations went on before Ocheltree came
to work at Scollon Productions as after she arrived. Id. (Williams, J., dissenting). The
dissent concluded that the behavior could not have been motivated by her sex. Id. (Wil-
liams, J., dissenting).
225. See id. (Williams, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 332.
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phere existed prior to her employment,227 the court pointed to the
specific conduct of the offending employees, finding that "[in] uch of
the conduct, a jury could find, was particularly offensive to women
and was intended to provoke Ocheltree's reaction as a woman."228
The majority's reasoning follows the Supreme Court's directive in On-
cale, holding that harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual
desire, but could be motivated by general hostility towards women in
the workplace.229 Even though much of the atmosphere existed prior
to her employment, engaging in such behavior to solicit a reaction
from Ocheltree as a woman satisfies the "because of sex" prong. The
court reasoned that, although the general atmosphere may have ex-
isted prior to Ocheltree's employment, the harassment was of such a
nature that it was particularly offensive to women, and therefore to
Ocheltree, as the only woman in the shop.2"' Under the court's rea-
soning, had Scollon Productions corrected harassing behavior prior to
Ocheltree's employment, it could have avoided liability.21 Thus, the
court's decision furthered the airfls of the EEOC regulations and Title
VII by creating an incentive for employers to avoid liability by utilizing
remedial measures to correct and eliminate sexual harassment in the
workplace.
c. The Inconsistency in Vacating the Punitive Damages Award.-
In setting aside the jury award for punitive damages in Ocheltree II, the
court was inconsistent in its finding that Scollon Productions had the
requisite level of knowledge to find liability for compensatory dam-
ages, but not for punitive damages. Although the Supreme Court has
held that intentional discrimination alone does not create an auto-
227. There is conflicting evidence as to the nature of the atmosphere prior to Ochel-
tree's employment. Ocheltree described the atmosphere as "fun" and "friendly" when her
employment first began, but stated that in the course of the first year the sexual conduct of
the men began to occur with increasing frequency. Id. at 328. However, the dissent points
to testimony of Ocheltree's co-worker who stated the atmosphere was the same before her
employment and maintained the same level of sexual charge after Ocheltree began her
employment. See supra note 224 (noting testimony of Ocheltree's co-worker, Zouras). Re-
gardless of the level of elevation, if any, in sexual remarks and conduct in the workplace
after Ocheltree's employment, neither side claims that the workplace was harassment free
prior to her employment.
228. Id. at 332.
229. Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79-80 (1998).
230. Ocheltree II, 335 F.2d at 332. The majority pointed to such incidents as the degrad-
ing song the men sang-" [c] ome to me, oh baby come to me, your breath smells like come
to me," concluding that its words were particularly aimed at a woman. Id.
231. Id. at 335.
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matic cause of action for punitive damages, 232 the Ocheltree II court
failed to recognize that just as Scollon Productions had the requisite
knowledge for liability for sexual harassment, Scollon Productions
also had the requisite knowledge to support a finding for punitive
damages. Had the court applied the test articulated in L & L Wings to
the facts underlying its finding of sexual harassment, the court likely
would have found Scollon Productions liable for punitive damages.233
In Ocheltree II, the court imputed liability to the employer for sex-
ual harassment because Scollon Productions failed to provide an ade-
quate procedure to report sexual harassment.234 The court found
that Scollon Productions should have known about the harassment
but did not because of its own failure to provide adequate avenues for
employees to register complaints. 2 35 The court, however, did not ad-
dress this lack of a sexual harassment policy in its punitive damages
analysis. 236 The court merely stated that "we find no evidence that
would allow a jury to find that Scollon Productions knew, either di-
rectly or by imputation, that it might have been acting in violation of
Ocheltree's federally protected rights. '237 In failing to apply the test
articulated in L & L Wings, the court failed to adequately examine the
issue of punitive damages in Ocheltree II.
The Ocheltree II court recognized that in Kolstad, the Supreme
Court required that an employer act with malice or reckless indiffer-
ence toward the employee's federally protected rights to warrant an
award of punitive damages under Title VII. 2 8 However, the Ocheltree
I court failed to acknowledge that the Fourth Circuit specified the
criteria for determining what constituted malice or reckless indiffer-
ence in a Title VII action for punitive damages in L & L Wings.239 In
L & L Wings, the court stated that to determine an employer's malice
or reckless indifference, three sources of evidence should be consid-
ered: (1) evidence of the employer's attitude toward sexual harass-
ment; (2) direct statements by the employer about the employee's
rights or complaints; and (3) egregiousness of the conduct at issue.240
232. See supra note 146 (discussing the Supreme Court's holding on punitive damages in
Kolstad).
233. See supra notes 150-163 and accompanying text (discussing the L & L Wings court's
analysis of the elements used to determine punitive damages).
234. Ocheltree II, 335 F.2d at 335.
235. Id.
236. See id. at 335-36.
237. Id. at 336 (internal quotation marks omitted).
238. Id. at 335-36; Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 535 (1999).
239. Ocheltree II, 335 F.3d at 335-36; Harris v. L & L Wings, Inc., 132 F.3d 978, 983 (4th
Cir. 1997).
240. L & L Wings, 132 F.3d at 983.
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The Ocheltree II court ignored L & L Wings, and did not examine,
or even refer to, these elements in determining whether punitive dam-
ages were warranted. 241 The court's punitive damages decision in
Ocheltree I was inconsistent with the L & L Wings court's analysis of
the first element for determining malice or reckless indifference. In
evaluating the evidence of.the employer's attitude toward sexual har-
assment, the L & L Wings court found that the absence of a written
policy, coupled with the company's failure to respond to repeated
complaints, was sufficient evidence to show that the employer's atti-
tude toward sexual harassment satisfied the requisite malice or reck-
less indifference for a punitive damages claim.24 2 Although the
majority in Ocheltree // found it debatable as to whether Scollon Pro-
ductions had a sexual harassment policy, and if it did, it was utterly
deficient in its implementation,243 the court neglected to consider the
fact that the policy Scollon Productions implemented is not consistent
with the types of policies implemented in good faith that courts have
sought to reward on the basis of preventive measures in its punitive
damages analysis.244 In addition, the court's punitive damage analysis
made no mention of Ocheltree's repeated complaints to her shop su-
pervisor and numerous attempts to talk to the company president and
vice-president that were all ignored.245 Furthermore, the Ocheltree II
court failed to recognize that the lack of a sexual harassment policy
and Ocheltree's ignored complaints illustrate Scollon Production's
reckless indifference toward sexual harassment in the workplace.
In addition, the court in Ocheltree !!failed to consider the possibil-
ity that a reasonable jury could have found Bill Scollon's statements
regarding why he turned Ocheltree away despite her repeated at-
tempts to talk with him about the harassing atmosphere-"he be-
lieved whatever she wanted to talk about was not important"24 6-to
constitute direct statements illustrating the direct disavowed responsi-
bility for Title VII, in satisfying the second L & L Wings element of
recklessness.2 47 Finally, under L & L Wings, the Ocheltree II court
should have examined the egregiousness of the conduct at issue. The
Ocheltree H court failed to recognize that in L & L Wings punitive dam-
241. See Ocheltree II, 335 F.3d at 335-36.
242. L & L Wings, 132 F.3d at 983-84.
243. Ocheltree II, 335 F.3d at 334-35.
244. Id. at 335-36.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 330.
247. Id,; see L & L Wings, 132 F.3d at 984 (finding the employer's statement "it's a ridicu-
lous thing" in response to why the employer did not have a sexual harassment policy was
sufficient to demonstrate the employer's disavowal of responsibility toward his employees).
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ages were warranted based on similar harassment as that suffered by
Ocheltree: vulgar comments, graphic pictures, and boasts of sexual
prowess.248 It is likely that, had the court examined the facts in Ochel-
tree II using the three-part test articulated in L & L Wings, the court
would have found enough evidence to support a reasonable jury's
finding of punitive damages based on the similar circumstances pre-
sent in Ocheltree II. The court's vacatur of the punitive damages award
is inconsistent with its finding of liability for compensatory damages.
5. Conclusion.-In Ocheltree v. Scollon Productions, Inc., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit correctly found an em-
ployee may satisfy the "because of sex" requirement for a hostile work
environment claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
even though the work environment about which the employee com-
plained had existed prior to her employment.249 The court properly
examined the incidents of alleged harassment as well as the context in
which they occurred, in line with the Supreme Court's directive in
Harris to consider the totality of the circumstances in determining
whether a work environment is hostile.250 The court's decision pro-
vides an incentive for employers to improve hostile work environ-
ments, and as such is consistent with the spirit of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's regulations.2 ' However, the
court's examination of the punitive damages issue is incomplete. The
court did not charge Scollon Productions with the knowledge that the
conduct was prohibited by statute, and thus concluded that the com-
pany was not liable for punitive damages under the Civil Rights Act of
1991.252 In doing so, the court failed to examine the factors articu-
248. Ocheltree If, 335 F.3d at 335-36; seeL &L Wings, 132 F.3d at 980-81. In L &L Wings,
employee's treatment was slightly different in that they were also subject to physical grop-
ing by their employer as well; however, despite this added form of harassment, a reasona-
ble jury could have found this similar atmosphere, even without the physical conduct, rose
to the level sufficient to award punitive damages. See id.
249. Ocheltree II, 335 F.3d at 332.
250. Id. at 333; Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993); see supra notes 211-220
and accompanying text.
251. See supra note 222 (discussing the EEOC's encouragement to employers through
adopted regulations to take steps to prevent sexual harassment); see also supra notes 221-
237 and accompanying text (discussing how the Ocheltree II court's decision furthers the
purpose of the EEOC Regulations).
252. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
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lated by the court in L & L Wings for determining punitive damage
liability in sexual harassment cases.253
BRIDGET WYANT
253. See Ocheltree II, 335 F.2d at 335-36; Harris v. L & L Wings, Inc., 132 F.3d 978, 983
(4th Cir. 1997); see also supra notes 239-248 (criticizing the Ocheltree II court for failing to
consider the L & L Wings elements of recklessness in its punitive damages discussion).
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